



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

LAND AT FORMER BURNAGE CRICKET CLUB,
MAULDETH ROAD, BURNAGE, MANCHESTER
RESIDENTIAL (64 no. HOUSES & APARTMENTS)

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: Asteer Planning

VERSION A: 31/01/2025

REFERENCE: 2015/0923/CIS/02

Former Burnage Cricket Club, Mauldeth Road, Burnage, Manchester

URN: 2015/0923/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor design changes/security additions required


This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is only considered acceptable if the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Both apartment blocks should front towards the communal parking area between them, with their communal entrances taken off it, in order to maximise surveillance opportunities and allow the hidden sides and rear elevations of both buildings to be enclosed as resident-only private space. Additional boundary treatments to separate site from adjacent former social club/community centre building to the west, securely enclose cycle store and define parking area/building frontages.
- Secure system to control resident/visitor access to apartment blocks, including post/parcel deliveries.
- Boundary treatments to houses, including secure enclose of private gardens, gating of side/rear access alleyways, enclosure/segregation of front gardens/driveways and any exposed gable ends and enclosure/overlooking over potentially vulnerable rear driveway serving the corner plot at Block 1.
- Private drives serving Block 5 & 15 defined by low-level boundaries and planting along Mauldeth Road frontage, to deter pedestrian movement around/between parked vehicles.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site is located at the junction of Kingsway (A34) and Mauldeth Road in the Burnage area of south-east Manchester.

The site is a former cricket ground (now formed by unkempt scrub vegetation with areas of hard standing) and an adjacent sports and social club and outbuildings, which had its license revoked in 2022. There is also a two-storey building along the Kingsway frontage of the site, which appears to be in residential use.

The site is enclosed with low walls and timber fencing along Kingsway and chain link fencing and dense vegetation/high trees along Mauldeth Road. There are two sets of secured vehicular gates along Mauldeth Road and a set of vehicular gates off Kingsway, which are left open to allow access to the existing buildings. This also leaves the wider site accessible and the side/rear boundaries of the dwellings fronting onto Mauldeth Road, Brookthorpe Avenue, Kingsway and Burnside Drive, to the immediate north and east, accessible and potentially exposed to damage and unseen access.


Open land/routes adjacent to (and particularly to the rear of) sites, buildings and dwellings can often lead to nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues. Adjacent properties can also often be vulnerable to unauthorised access, as they can provide easy access/escape routes that benefit from little/no natural surveillance or direct overlooking.

Vacant and disused sites can often foster nuisance, anti-social behaviour and criminal activity, particularly when an offenders presence is unlikely to attract attention and a place feels like it is not under supervision. If signs of disorder (such as graffiti, smashed glazing, flytipping etc.) are not repaired/removed immediately, they can often attract further abuse and trigger a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality - giving the impression that such sites are not owned or cared for by anybody and that crime and disorder is tolerated.

Kingsway is a wide route, busy with vehicular traffic and pedestrian footfall – resulting in good levels of activity and passive surveillance. To the immediate south-east of the site are commercial properties fronting onto the junction of Kingsway and Mauldeth Road, including a carpet warehouse, hot food takeaways, an estate agent and a locksmith.

On the opposite side of Mauldeth Road from the site are semi-detached residential properties (providing direct overlooking over the site) and a parade of commercial premises including a restaurant, a salon, an accountants, a convenience store/off-license and hot food takeaways. While such premises can provide legitimate activity and surveillance opportunities to an area, they can also often be a focal point for nuisance/anti-social behaviour issues, particularly late at night.

The remaining surrounding areas to the north, east and south of the site are primarily formed by residential estates of semi-detached houses with enclosed front gardens/off-road parking driveways and private rear garden spaces.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st January 2024 to 31st December 2024.



2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
46	<5	40	186	20	10	<5	21	11	11

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area over the past 12 months has been approximately average for the Manchester division, with the most prevalent types of recorded crime being less serious wounding, domestic burglary and criminal damage. Offences occur throughout the local area, with particular concentrations around/off the junctions of Mauldeth Road/Talbot Street to the west, Mauldeth Road/Burnage Lane to the east and Kingsway/Brookdene Road/Northbank Gardens to the south.
- 2.1.2 Assaults, public order and harassment offences have been the most reported less serious wounding crimes taking place, with the majority of incidents involving disputes between known associates/neighbours and students from nearby schools, as well as cases of domestic violence. In cases of criminal damage, offenders have targeted vehicles parked throughout the local area - using implements to smash windows and dent bodywork. Offenders have also targeted commercial properties and dwellings – particularly damaging external doors and gates/fences, as well as smashing windows. Domestic burglary offences have also occurred throughout the residential areas surrounding the site, particularly at the hotspot around the junction of Mauldeth Road with Burnage Lane.
- 2.1.3 As this CIS report relates to a proposed residential scheme, the more detailed analysis below will look at local residential burglary and vehicle crime.


2.2 Crime Rate Comparison (Local Area)

The rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January to December 2022.




- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **54% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **98% higher** than Greater Manchester and **103% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **42% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **21% lower** than Greater Manchester and **50% higher** than England & Wales.

Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (km), Manchester and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (km), Manchester and Greater Manchester




- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **31% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **9% lower** than Greater Manchester and **10% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **28% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **19% higher** than Greater Manchester and **44% higher** than England & Wales.


2.3 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Local Domestic Burglary – Day Range



Local Domestic Burglary – Time Range





Local Domestic Burglary – Point of Entry



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks on Monday.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk fluctuates – peaking in the late afternoon/early evening and late at night/during the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target residential properties at night when it is dark, streets are typically quieter than during the day and they perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected. During the late afternoon/early evening, offenders can also often observe when residents are away from home, meaning they can attempt to gain access without fear of being disturbed.
- 2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:
- The majority of entry points are unknown. This is likely to be where offenders have exploited insecure communal entrances or have tailgated into blocks of flats behind genuine visitors/residents to gain access unnoticed. Offenders are likely to have also exploited insecure doors and windows to individual properties.
 - Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or the glazing within them has been smashed.
 - Offenders have gained access to rear gardens and targeted sheds.

2.4 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the day, the risk of vehicle crime peaks on Monday and Saturday.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks during the early hours of the morning - when it is dark and streets are generally quieter, resulting in offenders perceiving a lower risk of being witnessed or identified.
- 2.4.3 Offenders have smashed glazing to cause damage, gain access to vehicles to steal items or to steal vehicles themselves. Keys have also been stolen or cloned to steal vehicles. Offenders have also removed car parts and registration plates, as well as damaged tyres and vehicle paintwork.
- 2.4.4 Vehicles parked on streets or within open communal parking areas, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within secure/enclosed parking facilities or within the curtilages of individual properties.

2.5 General Risk Factors

- 2.5.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:
- Domestic burglary
 - Bogus callers and distraction burglary
 - Criminal damage to property and vehicles
 - Anti-social behaviour
 - Theft of/from parked vehicles
 - Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
 - Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)

- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Crime Summary

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent MOs (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting residential properties and parked vehicles are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- The majority of entry points are unknown. This is likely to be where offenders have exploited insecure communal entrances or have tailgated into blocks of flats behind genuine visitors/residents to gain access unnoticed. Offenders are likely to have also exploited insecure doors and windows to individual properties.

Possible Solution - All external doors and windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1/4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

A robust audio-visual access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to any apartment block before allowing them access. The main communal entrance to the block should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed. All individual internal apartment entrance doors should be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (see above), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

The locks to the front doors of individual houses should be fitted with split-spindles, essentially meaning they are key only entry and are secure from the exterior of the dwelling when shut. This will ensure that they cannot be left open and accessible (see Section 4.1). All ground floor/accessible windows should also be fitted with key-operated locks and opening restrictors (see Section 4.2).

Clearly defined defensible space between dwelling frontages and the 'street' (see Section 4.5) can a degree of separation between public and semi-private space and act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are more likely to feel under observation/scrutiny from the street or overlooking properties. Such boundary definitions can also reduce the risk of criminal damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour.

- Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or the glazing within them has been smashed.

Possible Solution - See above. All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

- Offenders have gained access to rear gardens and targeted sheds.

Possible Solution – All private spaces to the sides/rears of the dwellings should be robustly enclosed, particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access (see Section 4.5). Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the front and rear of dwellings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime.

Any sheds should be of robust construction (i.e. minimum 38x50mm planed timber frame; floor and roof constructed from minimum 11mm boards; and minimum 11x125mm tongue & grooved board walls and door), with coach-bolted hinges, two hasp and staples to meet 'Sold Secure' Silver and two padlocks to meet 'Solid Secure' Silver or LPS 1654 SR1.

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- Vehicles have been targeted when parked on the street or within publicly accessible communal parking areas

Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that resident's vehicles are secured and overlooked. It is preferable that all houses either have the provision to garage vehicles or have in-curtilage car parking arrangements, well-overlooked from habitable room windows. Ideally, any surface communal parking areas serving apartment buildings or groups of houses should be located directly in front of the dwellings they serve, clearly separated from the streets or any areas of adjacent open space/pedestrian routes. Any side, rear, undercroft or basement communal parking areas must be secured to prevent unauthorised access to where hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect 2 no. blocks of 1 bed apartments (13 in total) and 53 no. 3 & 4 bed townhouses, with associated parking and landscaping.
- 3.1.2 Vehicular access will be off Mauldeth Road, with a pedestrian link onto Kingsway. The houses will front onto Mauldeth Road, a new cul-de-sac access road and private drive taken off it. They will have enclosed rear garden spaces and off-road parking driveways directly in front/to the side of them, with the exception of the 2 no. properties at Block 4 (fronting onto Mauldeth Road), which will be served by detached garages to their rear. The 2 no. apartment blocks – Block 3 (comprising of 9 no. apartments) and Block 8 (comprising of 4 no. apartments) – will occupy the western portion of the site on either side of a communal parking area for 7 no. vehicles. There will also be a cycle store to the side of Block 3 and a bin store to the side of Block 8.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.


- 3.2.1 The proposed development will provide additional activity, surveillance and overlooking to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The proposed houses will front towards the proposed access road/private drives and each other, allowing for clear views of/between existing and proposed dwellings.
- 3.2.3 The houses and apartments will have habitable room windows to their street frontages, maximising surveillance opportunities over the street, parked vehicles and between dwellings.
- 3.2.4 The majority of the houses will be served by in-curtilage, off-road parking spaces – allowing residents to directly overlook their own vehicles.
- 3.2.5 The footprint of the buildings has been kept simple, with no doors hidden in deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack).
- 3.2.6 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the dwellings and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the buildings are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

Apartments

- 3.3.1 Both apartment blocks should front towards the communal parking area between them, with their communal entrances taken off it, allowing the hidden sides and rear elevations of both buildings to be enclosed as private spaces, for the access and use of residents only (see illustration opposite and Section 4.5 for more information). This will maximise surveillance opportunities over the parked vehicles, the communal entrances and visitors coming to/from them. There should be a symbolic barrier at the entrance to the communal parking area serving Blocks 3 & 8, formed



by brick pillars and a change of road surface texture/colour etc, to encourage a feeling of territoriality among the residents - psychologically giving the impression that the area beyond is private and discouraging anyone without a purpose from entering. The communal cycle and bin stores serving the buildings should also be securely enclosed to prevent theft or mis-use (see Sections 4.5 & 4.8).

- 3.3.2 The site should be defined as entirely separate from the adjacent former social club/community centre building to the west by a 2100mm high boundary. The private amenity spaces to the sides and rears of the blocks should be enclosed and defined as private space by 2100mm high walls, railings or close-boarded timber fencing, to prevent unauthorised access to the hidden windows and doors that could be vulnerable to unauthorised access/attack unseen if left open and accessible (again, see illustration above and Section 4.5 for more information). The front elevations, which include residential windows adjacent to parking areas and pedestrian routes, should be protected by some low-level hedging/defensive planting beds to provide some protection to the ground floor windows and funnel pedestrian movement away from them.
- 3.3.3 The communal entrances to each block should be formed by single-leaf, self-closing doorsets secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the security-certification, which are easier to secure and operate remotely via an access control system (see Section 4.1). There should also be a secure system for the delivery of post that does not require access to all floors of the buildings. Given the emerging trend of parcel thefts (particularly at apartment blocks) consideration should be given to a secure system for depositing parcels, such as the smart parcel boxes used by the major internet shopping companies, incorporated within a secure postal lobby (also see Section 4.1 for more information).

Houses

- 3.3.4 The boundary treatments to the houses are vitally important to secure them, any parked vehicles and prevent unauthorised access to private spaces. The sides and rears of the houses should be defined as private space and adequately secured to prevent unauthorised access, particularly robustly where adjacent to publicly accessible space (see Section 4.5 for more information). All communal side/rear access alleyways serving the blocks of dwellings must be gated at their outermost point, in order to ensure that anyone who may attempt to gain unauthorised access can be clearly seen from the street. The front gardens/off-road driveways of the houses should be defined as entirely separate from the street and in ownership/control of the residents themselves. Clearly defined defensible space between dwelling frontages/residential windows and the public realm provides a degree of separation between public and semi-private space and acts as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are more likely to feel under observation/scrutiny if they enter or cross the space. Such boundary definitions can also reduce the risk of criminal damage to both doors/windows and parked vehicles. The boundary treatments themselves should be carefully considered to ensure they adequately define the spaces without impeding surveillance or providing features that could be comfortably sat on/leaned against, to the nuisance and intimidation of residents (again, see Section 4.5 for more information). Exposed gable ends should ideally be protected in the same way by low-level railings, or if not at least dense defensive planting beds/hedging, to funnel pedestrian movement away from any residential windows and deter loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour.
- 3.3.5 It is preferable for the houses at Block 4 (along Mauldeth Road) to be served by off-road parking driveways directly in front of them, as at Block 16. If this is not possible, the proposed detached garages to the rear of the properties must be constructed to a secure standard (see Section 4.1), as they will be somewhat remote from the dwellings where they cannot be directly overlooked from the dwellings themselves.
- 3.3.6 The private drives serving Blocks 5 & 15 (along Mauldeth Road) should be defined by low-level walls/railings (designed to deter comfortably sitting on or leaning against them) and dense defensive planting along the street frontage, to deter pedestrian movement around/between parking vehicles. Pedestrians should access the dwellings via the proposed access road, rather than directly off Mauldeth Road.
- 3.3.7 The off-road parking space for the corner plot at Block 1 will be located to the rear of the property/garden, where the parked vehicle cannot be easily overlooked by the residents themselves, leaving it potentially vulnerable. The parking space should either be incorporated into the rear curtilage of the dwelling, behind high vehicular gates (lockable from both sides), where it can be secured and overlooked by the residents themselves, or the adjacent rear boundary between the driveway and rear garden should be partially visually permeable (formed by 2100mm high walls/railings - see Section 4.5 for more information) to allow some surveillance through.

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- 3.3.8 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

In addition to the layout issues highlighted in Section 3, the following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

Apartment Blocks

- ☐ All external doorsets should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ The main communal entrance doorsets serving Blocks 3 & 8 must be security-certified to one of the above standards, including a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. They should be single-leaf, self-closing and controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet callers to the buildings before allowing them access.
- ☐ There should be a secure system for the delivery of post without needing to provide access to all floors of the blocks. Ideally, postal delivery arrangements should allow for external deposits and internal withdrawals by residents. If not, there should be a 'secure lobby' arrangement with a secondary communal door to the same security specification as the outer door, to allow for deliveries to postboxes within a secure postal lobby without providing access to other areas/floors of the blocks. The postboxes themselves should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). Consideration should also be given to a secure system for depositing parcels within the secure postal lobbies, such as the smart parcel boxes used by the major internet shopping companies. All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access control system.
- ☐ Any communal doorsets to rear garden areas should be security-certified, single-leaf, self-closing/locking doorsets secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, operated by resident key-card only on access and egress.
- ☐ All individual internal apartment entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights and are provided with door viewers instead. Chain limiters are recommended, but not generally essential.
- ☐ The external doorset to the proposed bin store should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2, operated by resident key or fob. Security-certified louvered doorsets are available if required (see www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search for SBD-compliant products).

Houses

- ☐ The front and rear doors to the houses must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. Any external french/double doors, sliding doors or bi-folding doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Front entrance doors should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key. Full instructions should be provided to residents to ensure that they understand that the key must be used to fully lock/secure the door.
- ☐ Front doors should also have either fixed sidelights or door viewers. Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential. Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Ideally, the garage doors to the detached garages serving the Block 4 houses should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR1. If not, they must be of robust construction with a multi-point locking mechanism. Pedestrian doorsets should be certified to BS PAS 24.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ All ground floor and potentially accessible first floor windows (e.g. above any single-storey elements) should be certificated to BS PAS 24. Any ground floor/accessible curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed.
- ☐ All ground floor and potentially accessible first floor opening lights must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground floor and potentially accessible first floor glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be no features of the buildings (such as projecting brickwork/cladding features, projecting window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby lighting columns, trees, handrails, street furniture etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper level windows or over boundaries to private space.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ Each house should have an intruder alarm to comply with BS EN 50131 (wired and wire free systems). Alarms should be linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors should cover any accessible rooms with windows.

4.5 Boundaries

Apartment Blocks

- ☐ The sides (including gables up to/as close as possible to the front building line) and rears of the buildings should be defined and enclosed as a private, resident-only spaces with 2100mm high walls, close-boarded timber fencing or railings and lockable gates. Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and there should be no immediately adjacent climbing aids, such as low walls, projecting elements of the building, lighting columns, junction boxes etc, which may form a climbing aid. Any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and close-boarded timber fencing/railings should have railing or fencing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.
- ☐ Any pedestrian gates to private space should also be 2100mm high, self-closing and self-locking, operated by staff/resident key or fob on access and egress. They should also be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, planters/street furniture, lighting columns etc. Mid-point horizontal elements, exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points to any gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates to avoid the creation of footholds (see illustration opposite).
- ☐ The site should be defined as entirely separate from the adjacent former social club/community centre building to the west by a 2100mm high walls, close-boarded timber fencing or railings. The plant enclosure and cycle store should also be similarly enclosed, along with 2100mm high lockable gates – see Section 4.8 for more information relating to the cycle store.
- ☐ The street frontage of the communal parking area serving the apartment blocks should be formed by low-level railings (e.g. 1200mm high), with a symbolic barrier at the entrance (e.g. brick pillars, change of road surface texture/colour etc.) to encourage a feeling of territoriality among the residents, psychologically giving the impression that the area is private and discouraging anyone without a legitimate purpose from entering. The front elevations of the apartment block themselves should be protected by some defensible space, defined by low-level dense planting or hedging, to separate them from the parking spaces and funnel pedestrian movement away from residential windows.



Houses

- ☐ The sides (including gables up to/as close as possible to the front building line where possible) and rears of the houses should generally be enclosed with 2100mm high walls or robust close-boarded timber fencing (with the top 300mm consisting of robust integral trellis if required). Boundaries to private space that are adjacent to publicly accessible open space should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base. Any side or rear pedestrian gates to the private spaces of houses should also be 2100mm high and should be fitted with either a pad-lockable bolt (to the mid-point of the internal face) or a key operable deadlock. Sub-divisional rear boundaries could be 1800mm high.
- ☐ The off-road parking space located to the rear of the corner plot at Block 1 should ideally be incorporated into the rear garden behind 2100mm high steel-framed vehicular gates (either double-gates or bi-folding gates) that are lockable from both sides (see opposite for example). If not, the rear boundary of the dwelling should be formed by 1200mm high walls and 900mm railings above, in order to allow the residents to overlook their own vehicles. Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls/railings should have railing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.
- ☐ Any communal side/rear access alleyways should be gated at their outermost point to prevent unauthorised access to where the dwellings could be attacked unseen. The gates themselves should be 2100mm high, self-closing and 'slam to lock' (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, key operated from both sides), which cannot be left unlocked when shut.
- ☐ The front gardens/driveways of the houses should be defined/segregated by low-level walls or railings to an approximate height of 1200mm. The design of any low boundaries should be carefully considered to discourage comfortably sitting on or leaning against them – which could potentially cause nuisance and intimidation to residents. Any exposed gable ends should ideally be protected in the same way by low-level railings, or if not at least dense defensive planting beds/hedging.
- ☐ The private drives serving Blocks 5 & 15 (along Mauldeth Road) should be defined by low-level walls/railings (e.g. 1200-1400mm high) and dense defensive planting along the Mauldeth Road frontage designed to deter comfortably sitting on or leaning against them. There should also be symbolic barriers at the entrances off the proposed access road (see above).
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher (see opposite for example).



4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to all access roads/private drives and footpaths should be to adoptable standards (to comply with BS 5489). Lighting to all communal parking areas should display an average lux level of 10, with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the front and rear doors of all apartment blocks and houses, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around dwelling entrances/frontages, around parking areas and along pedestrian routes, low planting should not exceed 1200mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people, dwellings and vehicles (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.8 Other

- ☐ It is highly recommended that the external cycle store or cycle lockers serving the apartment blocks are sourced from an SBD supplier - please see [Accredited Product Search \(securedbydesign.com\)](https://securedbydesign.com). If not, the cycle store should be of steel-framed construction, with welded-wire mesh panels/roof and lockable steel-framed gate (with no exposed hinges or large sliding bolt apertures that could form a climbing aid). The cycle store itself should include 'Sheffield' style racks, or similar, that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.
- ☐ If timber sheds are to be provided within rear garden spaces of the houses, they should have a concrete foundation, minimum 38x50mm planed timber frame; floor and roof constructed from minimum 11mm boards; and minimum 11x125mm tongue & grooved board walls and doors. The doors should have coach-bolted hinges and hasp and stables/padlocks to meet at least Sold Secure Silver standard and there should be a secure ground anchor system or a cycle stand to lock cycles to within the structure.
- ☐ Ideally, meter cupboards should be remotely read or located to the fronts of houses/apartments only and not in the private areas, in order to deter bogus callers.
- ☐ A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (such as boundaries, access controls, lighting, signage etc.)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings. Low-level defensive planting beds can be used to great effect to funnel pedestrians away from vulnerable areas (such as gable walls, boundaries to private space or parking bays).

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
23 rd October 2024	Asteer Planning	Receipt of CIS instruction form
23 rd October 2024	Asteer Planning	Quote issued
19 th November 2024	Asteer Planning	Email sent re: confirmation to proceed or remove from records
13 th December 2024	Asteer Planning	Email correspondence re: information needed
15 th January 2025	Asteer Planning	Email confirming instruction/fee
16 th January 2025	Asteer Planning	Email sent re: plans required
22 nd January 2025	Asteer Planning	Planning pack received
23 rd January 2025	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
A815_P_001	LOCATION PLAN	Aug '24	-
A815_P_003	TOPOGRAPHICAL SURVERY	Aug '24	-
A815_P_100C	PROPOSED SITE PLAN	06/12/24	C
A815_P_101A	PROPOSED EXTERNAL WORKS PLAN	25/11/24	A
A815_P_140A	BLOCK TYPE A PLANS	08/10/24	A
A815_P_141A	BLOCK TYPE B PLANS	Aug '24	-
A815_P_142A	BLOCK TYPE C PLANS	11/10/24	A
A815_P_143A	BLOCK TYPE D PLANS	11/10/24	A
A815_P_144	BLOCK TYPE E PLANS	Aug '24	-
A815_P_145A	BLOCK TYPE F PLANS	10/12/24	A
A815_P_146A	BLOCK TYPE G PLANS	10/12/24	A
A815_P_147	BLOCK TYPE H PLANS	Aug '24	-
A815_P_310A	BLOCK TYPE A_B SECTION	08/10/24	A
A815_P_312A	BLOCK TYPE C_F SECTION	11/10/24	A
A815_P_313A	BLOCK TYPE D_E SECTION	11/10/24	A
A815_P_314	BLOCK TYPE G SECTION	Oct '24	-
A815_P_315	BLOCK TYPE H SECTION	Oct '24	-
A815_P_410A	BLOCK TYPE A ELEVATIONS	08/10/24	A
A815_P_411A	BLOCK TYPE B ELEVATIONS	11/10/24	A
A815_P_412A	BLOCK TYPE C ELEVATIONS	11/10/24	A
A815_P_413A	BLOCK TYPE D ELEVATIONS	11/10/24	A
A815_	DESIGN & ACCESS STATEMENT	Oct '24	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk