



ii.

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Change of use from 6 apartments to synagogue (Class F1) with single-storey, rear, extension and two-storey, side, extension

AT 29/29 Middleton Road, Crumpsall, Manchester

FOR: Gold Sketch Studios

Greater Manchester Police

VERSION C: 23.12.24

design**for**security

2022/0227/CIS/01



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Originally produced in 2023, this Statement has been updated following revisions to the scheme. There have been no significant land use changes in the vicinity of the site in the recent past and crime patterns in the neighbourhood have not changed significantly since the analysis was undertaken. Design for Security consider the report valid and remain happy to support the proposals.

DEVELOPMENT SUPPORTED

The design team have produced a scheme that is appropriate from a crime prevention perspective, and we are happy to support it. There are several features of the development that will minimise the risk of criminals targeting the building, including:

- the inclusion of appropriately styled and tall perimeter walls and fencing;
- restricting access into the site to three locations;
- windows to the offices allow supervision of the street, entry gates and the car park; and,
- provision of car, cycle parking and refuse storage on site.

There are a few issues highlighted in the report which should be addressed in order to enhance security at the site, they are:

- install locks to boundary gates;
- increase the height of the western boundary wall so that it is consistent with the southern boundary;
- install a visitor entry system at the main entrance door;
- install security-rated, external doors and window frames, with glazed elements fitted with laminate glass;
- all elevations of the buildings and the perimeter gates should be illuminated with low intensity dusk-to-dawn lighting; and,
- CCTV and intruder alarm systems should be installed.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will recommend that, should Manchester Planning be minded to approve the application, a condition be included to require the new building to be built in accordance with the recommendations set out in this report and to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

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1 The Site and Surroundings

The application site and its surroundings are shown on the plan and photographs below. The site, 27/29 Middleton Road, edged in red, is located at the junction of Middleton Road and Moxley Road in Crumpsall and within the Crumpsall Lane Conservation Area. Middleton Road, A576, is a heavily trafficked route that connects Crumpsall and the neighbouring suburbs of Cheetham Hill and Broughton with the M60 motorway and the town of Middleton, both west of the site. Parking on Middleton Road in the vicinity of the application site is restricted during peak hours. Moxley Road is a local, residential road that connects Middleton Road with Melton Road, a residential cul-de-sac, to the west. The neighbourhood contains a mixture of residential properties including houses, apartments, care homes and houses in multiple occupation, as well as a range of small hotels, commercial premises, sports grounds, and King David School. Cheetham Village district centre with a range of shops and a large supermarket are situated about 500metres to the south-east. Number 31 Middleton Road is an extended detached, residential property with accommodation over three floors, which has been converted into five apartments. Access to the modest car park at the rear of number 31 is gained from Moxley Road, via a driveway between the application site and number 2 Moxley Road, a two-storey house. The properties south of the site appear to be dwellinghouses, whilst those on the opposite the site, on the eastern side of Middleton Road, include a hotel and an Edwardian villa converted into apartments.


The Middleton Road façade of numbers 27 and 29 Middleton Road



Number 27 and 29 are bay-fronted residential houses that have been converted into apartments




The Moxley Road elevation of number 27 and the rear elevations of both properties



A Google Streetview image looking east along Moxley Road towards Middleton Road with the site on the left



Nº 2 Moxley Road, a semi-detached house west of the site & driveway to the car park at the rear of 31 Middleton Road



The Westlynne Hotel and an apartment building are situated opposite the site on the eastern side of Middleton Road



The application site comprises numbers 27 and 29 Middleton Road, a pair of extended, semi-detached, two-storey (plus basement), late Victorian/Edwardian houses that have been converted into six apartments. The red-brick and render, bay-fronted building has entrance doors on the front elevation facing Middleton Road, as well as entrance doors to two ground floor apartments at the rear of the building, one on the side elevation facing Moxley Road and another on the northern elevation accessed via a narrow, front-to-rear pathway. The front garden of number 27 is partially enclosed by a low wall and a privet hedge; the front of number 29 is open to Middleton Road and includes an area of hardstanding that may be used for parking. The space at the rear of the two properties has been surfaced with crushed stone and tarmac and is used for residents' parking. The car park is open to Moxley Road, although a 1.3metre high, brick wall defines the western edge and a low wall with chain-link fence and hedging separates the car park, and the front-to-rear pathway, from the boundary with number 31 Middleton Road.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st March 2022 to 28th February 2023.

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood

All crime

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Crimes involving the use or threat of violence	Theft (including shoplifting)	Robbery	Drug related offences	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
29	6	48	396	83	9	22	26	13	3

2.1.1 There were 661 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed. This volume of crime is well above the average for a neighbourhood within Manchester, but the neighbourhood does include Cheetham Village district centre where one might expect a higher volume of crime due to the density of retail outlets, take-aways and other commercial premises, large car parks and a concentration of people.

2.1.2 The most common crimes recorded were:

- the use, or threat, of violence - 60%
- theft - 13%
- vehicle crime, i.e., theft of, theft from and criminal damage to a vehicle - 7%
- criminal damage – 7%
- burglary - 5%



2.1.3 Typically, crimes involving the use or threat of violence are usually the most common in any given residential neighbourhood and this is the case here. The major crime generators and attractors are the concentration of commercial and education buildings, the large number food and drink premises, car parks, all located in and around the district centre where there are large numbers of people are present throughout the day.

2.1.4 The top five streets/places for recorded crime were:

1. Bury Old Road - 112 crimes
2. Middleton Road – 61 crimes
3. Holland Road – 58 crimes
4. Crumpsall Lane – 56 crimes.

2.1.5 There were six crimes recorded at Moxley Road - a vehicle-related crime and five offences involving the use or threat of violence.

Vehicle Crime





2.1.6 Risk is consistently high throughout the week, particularly so on Monday, Tuesday and Saturday and around mid-night.


Hate Crime

- 2.1.7 There were four offences where antisemitic language was used and two further incidents of violence without causing injury where Jewish residents or Jewish institutions were targeted.

2.2 Crime at synagogues across Manchester, Bury and Salford



- 2.2.1 The risk of a crime occurring around a synagogue is greater on a Thursday and Friday during the late afternoon and early evening.



- 2.2.2 Public order offences have accounted for 50% of all crime occurring at synagogues. Offences mostly involved passengers in vehicles shouting racial abuse, as well as using threatening language towards people attending synagogue; racially abusive emails have also been received. Burglary offences have accounted for 17% of offences, with offenders posing a legitimate visitor before targeting property.

2.3 Modus operandi used in committing crime at places of worship

2.3.1 Breaking windows, in particular at the rear of the premises, in order to gain entry

To minimise the risk of offenders breaking windows to gain access:

- Avoid siting windows where they could be an easy target for casual criminal damage. Windows in particularly vulnerable locations, such as close to public footways or streets should be protected with external gauze or grilles;
- All glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Where possible, the size of any glazed

elements within and directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points; and,

- Enclose the site with security fencing.

2.3.2 Theft of lead from the roofs

To minimise the risk of offenders stealing lead:

- Use lead substitute and promote the fact by use of signage;
- Ensure access to the roof is made difficult by enclosing the site with security fencing; and,
- Include rounded eaves or parapet walls to increase the elevation required to access the roof.

2.3.3 Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- external doors should be certified to the PAS 24 or LPS 1175 security standard - such doors are difficult to force open;
- the most vulnerable doors should be further protected by fitting security certified roller shutters;
- all external doors should be illuminated with dusk-to-dawn light. Light suggests a presence of people and may deter offenders from targeting a premise. Lighting will also support CCTV systems and highlight the actions of an offender increasing the chance of a crime being witnessed; and,
- CCTV should be installed to record activity within and around exterior of the building, particularly around the entrance doors.

2.3.4 Theft of unsecured property

To minimise the risk of offenders stealing property from the premises:

- access control systems should be employed within the building to prevent unauthorised personnel from entering;
- overt signage can also assist in deterring casual entry; and,
- include space for staff to store personal/valuable items securely e.g., small lockers or lockable drawers.

2.4 Environmental features that can influence crime patterns

2.4.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.4.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- the buildings on the site are occupied by residents who have a personal stake in being vigilant to acts of crime and disorder;
- the site is very visible from Moxley Road and Middleton Road, where there is the prospect of passers-by witnessing the actions of offenders, which can act as a deterrent to criminal or anti-social activities;

- the presence of nearby residents, and staff and guests of the nearby hotels generate activity and passive surveillance of the site; and,
- off-road parking is available to the residents of the apartments.

2.4.3 There are also several features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- the site is located in a neighbourhood where there is a high number of crimes recorded;
- there are several crime attractors and crime generators in the wider neighbourhood, including leisure uses, retail, and food and beverage businesses. Criminals already familiar with or active in this area may exploit any new opportunities as the site is redeveloped;
- the concentration of schools in the vicinity of the site leads to traffic congestion at peak times;
- the absence of secure boundaries to the front and side of the site, leaves the site vulnerable to trespass, cars vulnerable to theft or damage and the apartments vulnerable to breaking and entering;
- the pathway along the northside of the building allows trespassers access to the most secluded elevation;
- the high hedge at the corner of Middleton Road and Moxley Road hinders passive surveillance;
- the secure qualities of the doors and windows on the building are poor. On visiting the site, the communal entry door to number 27 was not secured;
- the site is visible from Bury New Road. Offenders are likely to observe the site as it develops and be aware of, and potentially exploit, any criminal opportunities; and,
- there are indicators of neglect and deterioration on and in the immediate vicinity of the site, e.g., over-fortification of premises, which is often an indicator that crime is, or has been, a significant issue. Developments where there are obvious signs of physical deterioration and neglect often attracts offenders, who may have a perception that because of the poor quality of the environment their actions will go unchallenged.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 The proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development involves the retention of numbers 27 and 29 Middleton Road, construction of a single-storey, rear extension, a two-storey, side extension, and conversion of the resulting building to a synagogue.
- 3.1.2 The resulting building will have accommodation set out over two floors.
- 3.1.3 The existing entrance doors on the Middleton Road elevation will be removed and replaced with windows. A slightly recessed entrance will be formed on the rear elevation, at the south-western corner, and another entrance formed at the north-eastern corner of the building, facilitating more direct access to the upper floor. A means of escape door will be located centrally on the northern elevation.
- 3.1.4 The ground floor of the synagogue will include a modest entrance hall, men's w.c's, cloakroom and a coffee bar. The remaining part of the ground floor, about three quarters of the floor area, will accommodate the Aron and Bimah with the male seating surrounding the Bimah.
- 3.1.5 The upper floor, which includes an open area directly above the Bimah will accommodate the Ezras, women's seating. A series of five small offices, a small area for cloaks and ladies w.c's make up the remaining uses on the upper floor.
- 3.1.6 Externally, at the rear of the building, there will be a small, permeable-paving surfaced, car park with space for three vehicles. The car park will be accessed from Moxley Road where a sliding gate will secure the entrance; a pedestrian gate will be installed next to the vehicle gate. A refuse store and cycle shelter will be located next to the parking bays. There will be a pathway around the building.
- 3.1.7 Partially supplemented with a hedge, the Middleton Road and Moxley Road boundaries will be defined with 1800mm high, brick wall with piers and railing infill. A second pedestrian gate will be installed on the Middleton Road boundary. The northern and western boundaries appear to remain unchanged.

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposal

- 3.2.1 The development is modest in size and seems to be appropriately located at the heart of the community it will serve.
- 3.2.2 The building will be set within an appropriately tall and robust boundary, clearly defining the separation between public space and private space.
- 3.2.3 Each of the three entrances within the boundary will be secured with a gate.
- 3.2.4 The entrance doors seem well-located, on less conspicuous, side and rear elevations of the building where it is unlikely that there will be any conflict with the congregation entering and exiting the synagogue and passing traffic.
- 3.2.5 Windows in the office rooms will facilitate supervision of the adjacent streets, entry gates and the car park.
- 3.2.6 A small amount of car and cycle parking will be provided on the site. Given that Orthodox Jews do not view the use of the automobile in order to fulfil the mitzvah of attending synagogue as acceptable, the low level of parking provision does not seem inappropriate.

3.3 Recommendations to enhance the security of the development

Controlling entry to the site

- 3.3.1 The new boundary wall, railings and gates should be at least 1800mm high.
- 3.3.2 The wall that defines the western boundary should be supplemented with additional courses of brick or railings to increase its height to 1800mm
- 3.3.3 The vehicle and pedestrian gates should be locked when the building is closed.
- 3.3.4 Consider adding a pointed or fleur-de-lis finial to the infill railings to deter trespassers climbing into the site.
- 3.3.5 All of the gates on the site should be designed so that they are not easy to climb over, i.e., avoid vertical elements at the central part of a gate and add suitable finials to the ironwork.

Recessed entrance door

- 3.3.6 Recessed doors can be focal points for anti-social and criminal behaviour. Consider securing the recess with a security-rated, roller shutter or relocating the door to remove the recess.

Door, window & glazing specification

- 3.3.7 All new external doors and window frames should be certified to a Secured by Design recognised security standard.
- 3.3.8 Consider replacing retained window frames with those that meet a recognised security standard.
- 3.3.9 Laminated glass should be used throughout the extended building.
- 3.3.10 For use when the synagogue is closed to the public, but staff are present, an audio-visual unit should be fitted at the main entrance door to allow staff within the building to vet visitors prior to allowing entry. It may be useful to allow staff within the offices to be capable of operating the locking mechanism of the door remotely.

Protection of windows

- 3.3.11 Consider installing security-rated, roller shutters or grilles to windows, particularly those on the more secluded elevations, including the upper floor windows that can be accessed from the flat roof extension. Timber shutters may be a more sympathetic method of securing the Middleton Road facing windows

CCTV

- 3.3.12 A CCTV system should be installed. It should include cameras capable of identifying all vehicle and pedestrian movements in and around the site. Cameras should also be capable of monitoring all building entrances, parked vehicles and the cycle shelter.
- 3.3.13 The system should be monitored by an appropriate security company and, ideally, include a public address system, allowing monitoring staff to issue an audible warning to alert intruders that they have been detected and a response generated.

Lighting

- 3.3.14 For pedestrian and vehicle safety, and to support the CCTV system, dusk-to-dawn lighting should be provided at each external door, the car park, cycle shelter, and pathways around the building.

Parking area

- 3.3.15 Parking bays should be clearly marked.

Cycle parking

- 3.3.16 Cycle stands should enable users to secure the wheels and the frame to the stand and, ideally, be set within a secure, weatherproof enclosure, and monitored by CCTV.

Refuse store

- 3.3.17 The material used in the construction of the refuse store should be fire resistant and the store or bins within it should be secure.

Graffiti

- 3.3.18 Expanses of wall may be targeted by offenders, consequently, a graffiti-resistant wall coating should be applied to the street facing elevations and boundary wall.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ A secure mailbox should be mounted on an external wall next to the Moxley Road entrance door or pedestrian gate.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors should be avoided.
- ☐ The internal doors to the offices should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with three hinges and a 5-lever mortise deadlock (to BS 3621 or 8621), so that the rooms can be secured when unoccupied.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Where feasible, windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2022 or LPS 1175.
- ☐ Opening windows must be able to be locked with a key and have opening restrictors fitted.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ All glazing must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ As an alternative to laminate glazing, particularly to the more secluded windows, consider the installation of a protective gauze, such as anti-vandal screens or polycarbonate reinforced glazing.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ An intruder alarm and a panic alarm should be installed.
- ☐ The intruder alarm should be linked to contacts on all external doors with PIR detectors in all rooms with windows including upper floor rooms accessible from the flat roof extension.
- ☐ Panic alarms should be located in strategic places around the building, such as in the offices and entrance hall.
- ☐ The alarm system should be monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security patrol team).

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ Boundaries should be around 1800mm high.
- ☐ Gates should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary wall and incorporate either a pad lockable bolt or key-operable deadlock

4.6 Landscaping

- ☐ Loose surface materials, such as gravel, should be avoided.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk-to-dawn, LED, white lighting should be provided to all external doors and to the car park. Lights should be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.

4.8 CCTV

- ☐ A CCTV system should be installed. Suitable locations for cameras are all entrance doors, the entrance hall and the car and cycle parking.
- ☐ Images should be recorded, and a playback/review system included in the system. CCTV equipment should be located in the secure room in the building or images relayed to an appropriate security contractor.

4.9 Other

- ☐ Externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing.
- ☐ All high value equipment should be suitably marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft.

5 Construction

- ☐ The developer should instal appropriate measures to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access into and out of the site.
- ☐ The contractor on this scheme should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme.'
- ☐ Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority approved.

6 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of a development and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
03.05.22		Request for crime impact statement
08.05.23		Site visited
18.07.23		Report issued
11.11.24	Sam Golding, Gold Sketch Studios	Request for updated crime impact statement
28.11.24		Additional plans received
29.11.24	Sam Golding, Gold Sketch Studios	Report re-issued
23.12.24	Sam Golding, Gold Sketch Studios	Report re-issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
502	Site – Existing and Proposed	28/10/24	
002	Existing Plans	09/08/24	
003	Existing and Proposed Elevations	09/09/24	3
004	Proposed Plans	14/08/22	5
005	Existing and Proposed Street Scene	13/11/24	

In the event of any changes to the scheme, it may be necessary for Design for Security to review the recommendations made in this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions	Date
A		18.08.23
B	Scheme revised from new building to retention, conversion and extension of existing properties	29.11.24
C	Minor changes to text	23.12.24