



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

2-4 Whitworth Street

Mixed use scheme

For: **Glenbrook WWS Limited, Maizelands Limited and Arringford Limited.**

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Version B: 15/11/24

Ref: 2024/0232/CIS/01

2-4 Whitworth Street

2024/0232/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

Advice is included in the report, which we consider will enhance security of the development and this set out in sections 3.3 and 4. The principal recommendations relate to securing the site, and the commercial and apartment buildings appropriately, and encouraging high quality in the private and public realm. The recommendations are summarised as follows:

- the public realm should be of a high quality, including such measures as distinctive surfacing, furniture, lighting, and signage.
- secure the site's southern boundary.
- install appropriate controls at the communal entrance doors and entry gates to restrict access to residents and *bona fide* visitors.
- Robust control of access in/and around the buildings.
- Ground floor external material protection against graffiti.
- Management and maintenance policy

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will support the application subject to the design team suitably addressing the recommendations contained in the report (Sections 3.3, 4 & 5), and will seek the inclusion of a planning condition requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site lies to the south of M/cr Central Convention Centre, and is bound by Whitworth St West to the north, Bugle St to the west, Cameron St to the east and a Network Railway line / archways to the south.

The existing site currently contains two existing buildings, both of which are not in use. The two buildings are separated by Rowendale St which will be removed and form part of the new proposals. Rowendale St, Bugle St and Cameron St are all narrow roads connecting from Whitworth St West to Little Peter St.

Whitworth St West (Deansgate Locks), a popular nighttime economy destination in the area.


The site is located south of M/cr Central Convention Centre, an area where the night-time economy is popular and centred on Peter Street.

The site has excellent transport links, with Deansgate Metrolink and train station within 100m. There are bus stops in close proximity.


Across the typical working day footfall past the site is generally high.

The area has high levels of pedestrian activity given its location to Deansgate station and Metrolink stop and surrounding residential, and business uses. There are 4 pedestrian entry points to the tram stop: 3 from Whitworth St West & 1 from Great Bridgewater St.


The rear of the existing buildings and archways are hidden and poorly lit spaces. Overtime this situation has given rise to ASB; Graffiti, street toilets & drug taking.




1 – View towards site & along Whitworth Street West.



2 – View towards the site from Albert St bridge. Deansgate Locks



3 – View towards Cameron St, temporarily stopped-up.



4 – View east along Little Peter St.



5 – Rowendale St.



6 – Bugle St.



7 – Pedestrian ramp access Deansgate train station.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2023 to 30th June 2024.

Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
15	50	170	996	404	67	24	391	27	28

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the local area over the past 12 months has been high for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime having been the most reported offences taking place. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres where there is often a higher concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a higher number of crime and disorder issues. These offences have taken place all throughout the local area, particularly at a hotspot of offence around Deansgate tram stop and at the junction of Quay Street with Deansgate to the north of the site.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place all throughout the local area, particularly at the hotspots mentioned above where assaults, harassment and public order offences have been most reported. The majority of incidents have been carried out by unknown offenders with alcohol consumption often being a factor, and they have mostly occurred in the late evening and early morning over the weekend period which is when licensed premises tend to be open for longer and have a larger attendance.
- 2.1.3 The majority of theft offences have taken place in public spaces throughout the local area and at the hotspots mentioned above. Offenders have used pickpocketing and distraction methods in order to remove items from the person such as wallets and mobile phones, as well as targeting insecure items, bags or coats left on tabletops and benches.
- 2.1.4 Theft from motor vehicle has been the most reported vehicle crime taking place. Offenders have in most used objects to smash the glazing in windows or used implements to bypass the locks of cars before removing items from within.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 **Offenders posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas to steal property.**

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 4.4).

- 2.2.2 **Shutters have been prised open to target doors/windows behind them.**

Possible Solution - To minimise the risk of offenders forcing shutters:

- security-certified roller shutters (to LPS 1175) should be used wherever possible.
- where the size limits the availability of certified shutters, CCTV and lighting should be deployed to increase the security of these larger openings.

- 2.2.3 **Forcing open secure windows and doors (mostly front doors and fire exit doors) using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain entry to the premises.**

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.

- 2.2.4 **Broken glazing in windows and doors.**

Possible Solution – All new ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or

window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters, grilles or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection—

2.2.5 General: Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.

Possible Solution - Front doors should include a split spindle mechanism which locks on closure and can only be opened from outside with a key.

2.2.6 General: Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain entry to the property.

■ *Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.4), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 5.4). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.*

2.2.7 General: Forcing open shutters using implements and tools in order to gain access to the doors and windows located beneath.

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc) have been scrutinised by professionals. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines.

2.2.8 General: Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.

Possible Solution – All ground floor / accessible glazing should include a laminated pane which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Ensure that rubbish and loose material is removed from the areas around the site. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

2.2.9 Commercial/Retail: Posing as a legitimate customer and entering restricted areas by means of insecure doors and tailgating employees.

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 5.1).

2.2.10 Office: Organised burglars targeting expensive I.T. equipment.

Possible Solution - Secure storerooms, where such items can be kept, should be incorporated into the design of the building or fit-out. These rooms should have solid blockwork walls or be reinforced with expanded metal mesh and certified door sets (to BS PAS 24). Valuable items should not be easy to remove and should be uniquely identified using an appropriate property marking system. Portable equipment should not be positioned in communal areas where there may be regular visitor access. Effective access controls within the building should assist in restricting entry of visitors and potential intruders.

2.2.11 Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period.

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting the construction site:

- a secure boundary should be erected around the site.
- access should be restricted to contractors and authorised visitors.
- security staff should patrol during non-working hours.
- lighting and CCTV should be installed to illuminate and record activity.
- plant and machinery should be arranged so as to prevent forced access onto the site; and,

plant and machinery should be fitted with a tracking device.

2.3 Risk Factors - Residential

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Risk Factors - Retail

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer / staff property
- Criminal damage to property





2.5 Risk Factors – Leisure Centres/Gym

- Burglary
- Theft of user/staff belongings
- Other theft from premises
- Theft of/from parked cars
- Uncontrolled access
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Arson
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Cycle security
- Cash robbery/attacks on vending machines

-
- Anti-social behaviour
 - Loitering groups
 - Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.6.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **90% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **88% lower** than Greater Manchester and **87% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.6.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **39% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **17% lower** than Greater Manchester and **59% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.6.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **43% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **25% lower** than Greater Manchester and **9% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.6.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **63% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **169% higher** than Greater Manchester and **227% higher** than England & Wales.

2.7 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.






2.7.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary is highest on Thursday in the morning (09:00-11:00). Offenders often target dwellings at this time during the working week when they tend to be left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time whilst they are at work, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.7.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as 'unknown', it is likely that the offenders have exploited insecure windows or doors.
- Smashed glazing in the windows and doors.
- Using bodily pressure or implements in order to force open secure windows and doors.

2.8 Non-Burglary Risk Analysis – Retail Premises

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.8.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed, and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.8.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:

- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating / exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.
- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

2.9 Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis


The data below relates to thefts within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.9.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses, and bags.

2.10 Non-Domestic Burglary Leisure Facilities: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area.





2.10.1 **Day/ Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Greater Manchester leisure facilities peaks on Thursday/Friday and is slightly lower on Saturday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the late afternoon/early evening and during the early hours of the morning. During the late afternoon/early evening, leisure facilities are often at their busiest, meaning offenders can take advantage of busy staff and anonymity among higher numbers of legitimate customers. Offenders often target commercial properties at night, when they are often closed (or operate with a reduced number of on-site staff), it is dark and the streets/areas in which they are typically located are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

2.10.2 **Point of Entry:** The following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently by offenders targeting Greater Manchester leisure facilities:

- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using bodily pressure and implements.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Where the point of entry is 'legitimate' or 'unknown', this is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas without being noticed.

2.11 Theft Leisure Facilities: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area.



Day/ Time Range: During the week, the risk of theft at Greater Manchester leisure facilities peaks on Tuesday, but remains consistently high throughout the week. During the day, the risk of theft rises in the afternoon and peaks in the evening. This is when leisure facilities are typically at their busiest and the opportunities to offend are greater. Personal property belonging to staff and customers, such as mobile phones and cash, are the most routinely targeted items – taking place most often in changing/locker rooms and staff-only areas.

2.12 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



2.12.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Friday in the evening (18:00-19:00). Offenders often target vehicles at this time when they tend to be left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders,

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is for the construction of a build to rent residential tower at 2-4 Whitworth Street in Manchester. The tower will provide 363 apartments over up to 44 floors. The ground floor will include residential amenity, main front of house entrance & reception area, private resident's gym, plus associated back of house facilities (bin storage, cleaners store etc). The ground floor will also include a small retail unit. The upper mezzanine floor will provide additional amenity and co-working space.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposals will result in the redevelopment of an underutilised site, which contributes little to the vitality and viability of the neighbourhood, indeed it adds to the general feeling of insecurity in the area and the poor quality of the local environment. The redevelopment of the site is welcomed.
- 3.2.2 The scheme design is of a very high quality, both visually and from a crime prevention perspective.
- 3.2.3 The development will help to continue to repopulate this part of the city and create activity through the day and at weekends.
- 3.2.4 A management presence (concierge) is particularly welcome as visible staff in the development will not only discourage offender attempts to gain entry to the scheme but also gives residents a readily accessible contact to whom they may report management issues. Such provision can help to instil confidence in residents that the development is secure and that maintenance issues will be dealt with promptly.
- 3.2.5 There are a significant number and of apartments within the development, which increases the likelihood of residents being from a broader age range, including young singles, older residents and potentially families with children.
- 3.2.6 The proposed building plot provide further ground floor activity in the form of the main residential reception space and a small commercial retail space. New public realm leading to improvements around the site, in-turn these uses offer good levels of activity and natural surveillance of the adjacent streets. Cycle storage is located towards the rear of the building, accessed from Little Peter St provides further activity to this location.
- 3.2.7 Resident amenity spaces provide opportunities for residents to meet and foster community relations within the development. Schemes which have good social communities are less likely to tolerate inappropriate behaviour and are more willing to challenge unfamiliar faces in the development.
- 3.2.8 Where ground floor amenity spaces have been located, consideration appears to have been taken through the use of external facing materials, glazing, providing good levels of activity.
- 3.2.9 The entrance lobbies incorporate a concierge which provides a good view of people entering each building. Entry to the stairs and lifts from the lobby should require access-controlled-operation. All visitors to the residents of the apartments will be required to enter via the concierge. Mailboxes for residents should be located within the lobby area so that regular delivery personnel do not need to be given access to the residential parts of the building.
- 3.2.10 The residential cycle store will be enclosed within the secure area. Ensure that each entrance/exit point is provided with access control to prevent illegitimate access. Racks within the enclosures should allow cyclists to lock the frame and both wheels.
- 3.2.11 The landscaped areas and public realm will be well-overlooked by the proposed building and should benefit from legitimate activity and passive surveillance at all times of the day and night, promoting a greater sense of safety in the public realm.
- 3.2.12 The main entrance will be accessed via an electronic access control fob system for residents and staff. The arrangement of the lobby space is greeted and controlled via a concierge.
- 3.2.13 Security measures carefully incorporated into the building design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime. The proposed

development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Street furniture and landscape features should be used to prevent unwanted parking or access onto pedestrian only surfaces. It should be very clear in which spaces, or on which streets, vehicle parking is authorised.
- 3.3.2 Access beyond the reception lobby should be controlled so that intruders cannot easily reach restricted parts of the building. Access to the stair core and lifts from the entrance lobby should require passage through access-controlled turnstiles or doors. The main entrance doors should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if required, to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in / around the entrance lobbies.
- 3.3.3 Glazing to proposed elevations along or in close proximity to crowded pedestrian spaces/routes should incorporate laminated glass (see section 4.3 for further detail).
- 3.3.4 The gates (at night) and doors (all times) should be secured, and the locks activated with a programmable fob.
- 3.3.5 An intercom system should be installed at each gate (night-time use) and entrance doors. There should be an audio-visual link to each apartment (and concierge), to enable residents or staff to vet visitors prior to releasing the gate or door locking mechanism and allowing *bona fide* visitors entry into the development or lobby. Residents should meet visitors in the lobby areas before being escorted to the relevant apartment.
- 3.3.6 Zoning. The building should be capable of zoning which would restrict access within the site and thus if an intruder does manage to enter, their movements are restricted. All rooms containing facilities for residents should have access controls managed by the building operators. The scale of the proposed development requires subdivision so that residents only have access to the zone where they live and do not have unrestricted entry to all residential floors.
- 3.3.7 Residential post/parcel/grocery room. Arrangements for the delivery of post should not allow postal or grocery delivery staff to have access to internal areas of the residential blocks beyond the GF reception space. Mail boxes for residents should be located either within a secure lobby area or use a 'through-the-wall' post box arrangement. Further design details of these ancillary spaces are to be developed.
- 3.3.8 Given the prolific high levels of graffiti within and around the site, it is important that external cladding materials at ground floor are sealed, protected and supports the removal of graffiti, a resistant coating applied to enable easy removal of any unauthorised markings. The external space should not contain climbing aids that could allow an intruder to gain access to the upper floor balconies. The detailing of the façade and any proposed external landscape features will need to be considered to avoid introducing an access vulnerability point into the building.
- 3.3.9 Ground floor access for cycles. Given the high number of theft of cycles in the local area, access to the cycle store must be robustly secured, controlled and maintained, in order to prevent unauthorised access. Access should be operated by a specific resident key fob. All access doors should be security-certified and access controlled, preventing unauthorised access into further areas of the building.
- 3.3.10 The residential stair and lift cores in the block will require access control allowing only building staff and residents' access beyond the reception space to upper floors, in order to create a secure lobby area.
- 3.3.11 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme as a whole. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

In addition to the layout issues highlighted in section 3, the following checklist (sections 4-7) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- ☐ Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The post boxes themselves should be of robust construction, with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access-controlled main entrance.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621/8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Any external French/double doors or sliding doors to easily accessible balconies or terraces should also be certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2 and should include laminated glazing (see below).
- ☐ The doors to the cycle store should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2, or be steel gates within steel frames. These doors/gates should both be self-closing and lock securely upon closure and be accessible by a programmable fob.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:

- BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
- BS 6799 for wireless systems

☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.5 Boundaries

☐ Secure boundaries should be formed to the car parking undercroft. Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings should have railing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.

☐ Inward opening automatic gates to provide access to the courtyard area must be certified to one of the following standards:

- LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR2
- STS 202: Issue 3, BR2
- Sold Secure Gold

☐ PAS 68: 2013

4.6 Landscaping

☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by

4.7 Lighting

☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.

☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).

☐ Lighting in the car park should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.

☐ Lighting to undercroft parking areas should display an average lux level of 75-100, with a uniformity level of no less than 50%.

☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.8 CCTV

☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [Main entrances](#), [foyer](#), [stairs](#), [lift lobbies](#), [landings](#), [cycle stores](#), [bin store entrances](#).

4.9 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- ☐ Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

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- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
21/06/24	Glenbrook WWS Ltd	CIS application submitted
10/07/24	Glenbrook WWS Ltd	Client confirmation
15/08/24	Glenbrook WWS Ltd	Scheme presentation
11/07/24	DfS	Site visit
30/09/24	Glenbrook WWS Ltd	Updated GA's issued
03/10/24	DfS	CIS completed & issued
15/11/24	Deloitte	Updated client details

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing	Date	Rev
7196-SRA-XX-00-DR-A-SK024		21/06/24	
2-4 WWS_GMP Pentation_240815		15/08/24	
7196-SRA-ZZ-00-DR-A-20100		30/09/24	
7196-SRA-ZZ-XX-DR-A-02200		30/09/24	
7196-SRA-ZZ-XX-DR-A-02201		30/09/24	
7196-SRA-ZZ-XX-DR-A-02203		30/09/24	
389-LYR-XX-ZZ-DWG-L-1001 [Landscape General Arrangement] Rev		30/09/24	
389-LYR-XX-ZZ-DWG-L-5002 [Elevation _ Service Entrance] Rev P01		30/09/24	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door-sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk