



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Grey Mare Lane, Openshaw

82 No. Apartments

FOR: Great Places Housing Group

VERSION C: 20th February 2025

REFERENCE: 2024/0342/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported with minor recommendations

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Car park, cycle store & pedestrian routes should be illuminated to a high standard, to reduce the potential for crime and fear of crime.
- Robust access controls to communal entrances/gate for residents/visitors, including a secure system for the delivery of post/parcels.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated into the proposed scope of work where appropriate, we would be happy to support the development. GMP will seek the inclusion of a planning condition requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

Matthew Granelli

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit


The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the Beswick area of Manchester.

The site is located on the junction of Grey Mare Lane and Ashton New Road with the above roads forming the East and North boundaries respectively. The West is shared with Newcombe Close. The South boundary currently fall within the fenced off site.

The site is currently vacant, with natural vegetation and some signs of littering however the site is secure.

Access and egress into the site is located on Grey Mare Lane. The boundary around the entire development is formed of a mixture of palisade fencing and concrete panels.

The surrounding buildings are a mixture of commercial, a stadium and residential developments, with the majority of the residential building being boarded up. Nonetheless, it benefits from good levels of natural surveillance, especially on match days.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st October 2023 to 30th September 2024.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
6	11	39	272	41	10	6	19	6	16

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the past 12 months is above average for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding, theft and criminal damage having been most commonly reported. These offences have mostly occurred in the residential neighbourhoods to the south of Ashton New Road, as well as at a hotspot of offences in the Etihad Campus to the north, and at the retail outlets off Gibbon Street to the northeast.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding offences have occurred throughout the locations mentioned above, where assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most reported. The majority of less serious wounding offences, have involved disputes between known associates and neighbours, as well as some cases of domestic violence and altercations between rival fans attending football matches at the Etihad Stadium.
- 2.1.3 Theft offences have primarily occurred within the Etihad Stadium and in the retail outlets to the south of Gibbon Street. Offenders have used pickpocketing techniques to remove items such as mobile phones, wallets and purses from people in crowded locations. Offenders have also targeted insecure items on tables and benches in public spaces, restaurants, and retail outlets, as well as targeting parcels left on doorsteps and in communal areas of apartment buildings.
- 2.1.4 Most offences of criminal damage occurred in the residential neighbourhoods to the south of Ashton New Road, whereby offenders have targeted vehicles by using objects or implements to damage the glazing and bodywork of cars. Offenders have also caused damage to properties by using bodily pressure and objects to smash windows and damage gates, fences and external doors.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.

- 2.2.2 Using bodily pressure or implements in order to force open secure windows and doors or have been targeted when left insecure by residents.

Possible Solution – All external doors and windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1 & 4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and locking, thus reducing the opportunity of them being left insecure.

All individual apartments should also be secured with a robust entrance door set (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

- 2.2.3 Posing as a legitimate resident and gaining access to communal areas of apartment buildings by tailgating residents and via insecure doors.

Possible Solution – A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to review visitors approaching the building before allowing them access (see Section 4.1). The main communal entrance

should be in a highly visible position and well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed.

2.3 Risk Factors


The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds, or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems


2.4 Crime Rates Comparison

The below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.


Comparison of Domestic Burglary Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester




Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester






Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **60% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **49% lower** than Greater Manchester and **48% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **69% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **130% higher** than Greater Manchester and **340% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **33% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **75% higher** than Greater Manchester and **113% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **11% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **47% higher** than Greater Manchester and **79% higher** than England & Wales.

Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.4.5 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on Friday and is more common in the evening and early morning. Offenders often target dwellings at these times when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area.

2.4.6 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- In cases where the entry point is recorded as "unknown", it is likely that the offender has exploited insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.
- Using bodily pressure or implements in order to force open secure windows and doors.

2.5 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Tuesday in the afternoon (13:00-14:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time during the working week when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time whilst they are at work.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development consists of the construction of a 6-storey apartment building containing 82 no. self-contained apartments.
- 3.1.2 The development will have 7 no. car parking spaces and cycles storage for 66 bicycles. There will be additional cycle storage for the ground floor apartments that face on to Ashton New Road and Grey Mare Lane.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.


- 3.2.1 The proposal will bring additional legitimate activity to a currently vacant site. Redevelopment with housing and repopulation of the site should help to generate a sense of ownership and responsibility and improve informal policing of the area.
- 3.2.2 The proposed development will bring activity, overlooking and surveillance to the area during the day and night.
- 3.2.3 There will be 82 apartments, which is considered to be sufficient to provide a reasonable prospect of a presence of residents throughout the day and at the weekend, providing activity and passive supervision within the development, which can help to deter offenders from targeting the properties.
- 3.2.4 The internal areas of the building appears to be generally free of obstacles, thus an intruder would find difficulty in hiding within the communal parts of the buildings. All communal doors within the corridors should include glazed elements to improve sight lines. Installation of mirrors should be considered to improve sight lines around blind corners in certain locations. The proposed development will bring additional activity and surveillance to the area, at varying times of the day and night.
- 3.2.5 Access controls can easily be deployed at the communal entrance door to the property, in order to restrict access to residents and authorised visitors only.
- 3.2.6 The principal entrance to the building will be located in a prominent position and will be capable of being clearly seen from the public realm.
- 3.2.7 Secure cycle and bin storage will be located within the parking area serving the properties.
- 3.2.8 The pedestrian gate to the gabion wall arch has been specified with a key fob for access control.
- 3.2.9 Car park is protect by a vehicle barrier.
- 3.2.10 Area of land between the proposed building and the public footpath provides good defensive space to the property. Preventing them from being exposed and vulnerable to unauthorised access, damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour (i.e. people banging on windows as they walk by - particularly late in the evening/at night when the surrounding bars/public houses), as well as a lack of privacy for residents.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The apartment car parking area and bike store should be illuminated to a high standard (i.e. in accordance with BS 3659) and car parking spaces should be well defined to avoid any conflict. Any visitor spaces should be clearly marked.
- 3.3.2 Any sheltered areas of the ground floor, patio areas and balconies should be illuminated to a high standard.

- 3.3.3 The obscured area highlighted below can offer concealment to view for those criminally, or antisocially, minded leading to issues such as alcohol/drug consumption, loitering, public urination, and loitering. It is highly recommended that this area is illuminated to a high standard and covered with CCTV.



- 3.3.4 External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock operating with an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- 3.3.5 Access into the building should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- 3.3.6 There should be a secondary access-controlled door into the circulation cores of the building to reduce the potential for tailgating. It is recommended that on a development of this size that access control is required to access each individual floor to further restrict access.
- 3.3.7 A secure mail delivery system should be supplied, to allow delivery without access to the whole building. Given the emerging trend of parcel thefts (particularly at apartment blocks), consideration should also be a secure system for depositing parcels (see Section 4.1 for more information).
- 3.3.8 The doors to the refuse stores should be security-certified and be self-closing and self-locking. Panic hardware is acceptable on the inner side of these doors, if required.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access into the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. Apartment entrance doors must have a door viewer.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The post-boxes themselves should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). The Royal Mail should be allowed access to the lobby to allow for deliveries to the building. Consideration should also be given to a secure system for depositing parcels within a secure area, such as the smart parcel boxes used by the major internet shopping companies. All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access control system.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm. Windows can be fully openable from the inside to allow ventilation of the dwellings in accordance with Approved Document O but the window restrictor must reengage when the window is closed.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either: BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems or BS 6799 for wireless systems.
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, (including internal doors into garages) and, PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:

- Communal entrances
- Parcel room
- Refuse store
- Staff only areas
- Circulation cores
- Vehicle barrier
- Pedestrian gate in gabion wall arch

4.6 Bicycle Parking Areas

- ☐ Cycle stands should either be U-profile or Sheffield style stands. If rack storage is used it should be possible for both wheels and the frame to be secured.

4.7 Boundaries

- ☐ The proposed boundaries comply with the Secured by Design standards – Drawing no. 423-01C Landscape GA-A1.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

4.9 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the development in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting should be taken from a variety of sources and levels (i.e. columns, up lighting) to provide a greater level of coverage and avoid shadows/pooling.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.10 CCTV

- ☐ A modest CCTV system should be installed. Cameras should be placed where they are able to monitor:
 - all external doors.
 - mail room.
 - the cycle store.

4.11 Car Parking Areas

- ☐ The car park should be secured with a 1800mm high automated gate.

-
- ☐ Apartment car parking areas should be illuminated to a high standard.
 - ☐ Car parking spaces should be clearly marked, and signage should indicate that these are for residents use only.

4.12 Other

- ☐ Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal.
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls).
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees.
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
18/09/24	Bowker Sadler	CIS Application
18/09/24	DFS	CIS Fee Proposal
10/10/24	Bowker Sadler	CIS Confirmation
21/10/24	DFS	Site Visit
20/11/24	DFS	CIS Ver 1 Issued
25/11/24	Bowker Sadler	Email with comments regarding CIS
18/02/25	Bowker Sadler	Email with updated drawings

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
1005	Proposed Site Plan		
1010	Apartment Floor Plan		
1011	Ground Floor Plan		
1012	First Floor Plan		
1013	Second Floor Plan		
1014	Third Floor Plan		
1015	Fourth Floor Plan		
1016	Fifth Floor Plan		
1020	Roof Plan		
1030	Elevations Sheet 1		
1031	Elevations Sheet 2		
423-01C	Landscape GA-A1		
	Location Plan		
	Ashton New Road View		
ISS/22-049/20	Document Issue Register		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Comment regarding the main entrance removed	26/11/2024
C	CIS revised to reflect the updated drawings	20/02/2025