



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Former Particular Baptist Church, 35 Rochdale Road
133 No. Apartments & Ground Floor Commercial Unit

FOR: CITY POINT RESIDENCES LTD

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

VERSION A: 20th January 2025

REFERENCE: 2024/0441/CIS/01

Former Particular Baptist Church, 35 Rochdale Road

2024/0441/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed residential development is acceptable in general; however there are a number of points that should be considered to increase the security of the building and reduce the vulnerability of criminal and antisocial behaviour:

- The proposed retention of the main facade of the church and some of the existing church building will potentially create areas between the proposed building and retained existing church building, which could generate antisocial or criminal behaviour.
- There is a recessed door on the main elevation that could generate antisocial/criminal behaviour.

More details can be found in section 3.3 where there are a number of recommendations made which would enhance the security of the development and it is highly recommended that these are considered. It is also recommended that the development is built to Secured by Design standards.



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

1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located on the periphery of the Manchester city centre area.

The site is bound by Dyche Street to the North-East, Sharp Street to the South-East, Rochdale Road to the South-West, and a construction site to the North-West.

The site is currently developed as a 19th century church (Particular Baptist Church) which has been vacant for a number of years. The proposed development will retain some of the church building including the façade.

The adjacent site, which was formerly a surface car park, is currently being developed as an 11-storey hotel with ground floor restaurant/bar.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st December 2023 to 30th November 2024.

Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
27	57	152	563	241	59	17	237	29	21

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the past 12 months has been high for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding, vehicle crime and theft having been the most reported offences taking place. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres where there is often a higher concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a higher number of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding offences have occurred all throughout the local area, particularly at a higher concentration of incidents to the southwest of the proposed site towards the city centre. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most reported less serious woundings taking place, with incidents most commonly occurring in the evening/late at night and alcohol consumption often being a factor.
- 2.1.3 Theft offences have also taken place throughout the local area with a higher concentration towards the city centre. Offenders have predominantly targeted insecure items such as mobile phones, wallets and purses left on benches and tabletops in public spaces, restaurants and bars. There have also been cases of parcels being stolen from communal areas of apartment buildings.
- 2.1.4 Theft from motor vehicle has been the most reported vehicle crime taking place. Offenders have targeted vehicles parked on the streets and within parking facilities throughout the local area, particularly at locations close to Oldham Road and Great Ancoats Street. Offenders have used implements in order to smash glazing in the windows before removing items from within, as well as removing vehicle parts and registration plates using tools.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to apartments

Possible Solution - All apartment entrance doorsets should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. BS PAS 24). External doors should be located where they can be overlooked by other properties or be seen from the public highway. External doors should be illuminated with a dedicated lighting source.

- 2.2.2 Entering apartment buildings by means of insecure doors/ tailgating residents and gaining access to communal areas.

Possible Solution - There should be two access controlled secure doorsets restricting access to the circulation core of the building to reduce the possibility of would-be offenders from tailgating residents and visitors into the building.

- 2.2.3 Posing as a legitimate customer and gaining access to staff only areas by means of tailgating staff and exploitation of insecure doors.

Possible Solution – Any staff-only areas should operate on an access control system with access restricted to authorised personnel.

- 2.2.4 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors to gain access into communal areas and apartments

Possible Solution – All ground floor communal doors should be fitted with door closers and lock automatically, to prevent these doors from being left open and insecure. Any publicly accessible apartment entrance doors should be fitted with a split-spindle, or fixed external handle, to prevent them from being opened from the outside when unlocked. Any accessible windows should be restricted in

opening to prevent them from being fully opened if left insecure.

2.2.5 Theft of parcels from communal areas

Possible solution – There should be a secure parcel store with access restricted to residents. The parcel store should be covered by CCTV which can be reviewed in the event a parcel goes missing.

2.2.6 Forcing open secure shutters using bodily pressure and implements in order to access the doors/windows behind

Possible Solution - Any shutters should conform to a recognised security standard such as LPS 1175 SR 2.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Crime Rate Comparison


The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **79% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **73% lower** than Greater Manchester and **72% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **58% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **43% lower** than Greater Manchester and **9% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **38% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **19% lower** than Greater Manchester and **1% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **18% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **95% higher** than Greater Manchester and **137% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.




2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on Thursday in the evening (21:00-22:00) and on Friday around midday (12:00-13:00). Offenders tend to target dwellings in the evening when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area. Offenders also target dwellings during the day in the working week when they are usually empty whilst the owners are at work, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as "unknown", it is likely that the offenders has exploited insecure windows or doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.
- Using bodily pressure or implements in order to force open secure windows and doors.

2.6 Non-Domestic Burglary Risk Analysis - Offices

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.





2.6.1 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester peaks on Tuesday and Sunday. During the day, the risk of burglary rises at night / into the early hours of the morning. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.

2.6.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Secure doors have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools. Many burglaries committed in Manchester office buildings do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing equipment with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks.
- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.
- Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.
- Shutters have been prised open to target doors and windows behind them.

2.7 Offices - Theft Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.7.1 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest during the working week, when the opportunities to offend are greater, and is significantly lower at the weekend, when many offices premises are closed or operate on reduced opening hours / staffing levels. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.

2.8 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.8.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Wednesday just before midnight (23:00-00:00). Offenders often target vehicles at this time when they tend to be left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposals include the partial demolition of rear of existing building and erection of residential tower of 23 storeys comprising 133 dwellings with ground floor commercial unit (Use Class E) with associated works.


3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development is positioned on Rochdale Road which is one of the main arterial routes into Manchester city centre. The site will be subject to high levels of passive surveillance from those passing by or on foot.
- 3.2.2 Opposite the site on Sharp Street is a large apartment development, and there are a number of similar developments in the local area. The activity generated by large volumes of dwellings can often deter offenders from operating in the area
- 3.2.3 The adjacent site is being development as a hotel which will be busy during the day, generating a variety of different activity in the area.
- 3.2.4 The proposed ground floor commercial unit will provide an active frontage to Rochdale Road and Sharp Street, facilitating high levels of surveillance and deterring offenders.
- 3.2.5 Apartments will be located at first floor, and above which will leave them less susceptible from noise disturbance at night and the early hours of the morning from people leaving the city centre area.
- 3.2.6 There is a security office on the ground floor, which will allow residents to report any issues directly to security staff. A security presence on site will deter offenders from targeting the building if they believe they could be seen or identified.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.



- 3.3.1 The proposed retention of the main facade of the church and some of the existing church building will potentially create areas between the proposed building and retained existing church building (highlighted in green). These areas, if not secured, could generate criminal and antisocial behaviour - particularly if they are sheltered by the building above. Misuse of similar spaces in the city centre areas and nearby include loitering, drug/alcohol consumption, public urination, and vagrancy, to the detriment of residents. To reduce the potential for misuse the spaces between the existing building, the adjacent building under development and the proposed building should be secured to prevent unauthorised access.
- 3.3.2 There is a recessed doorway highlighted in purple above. Similar recessed doors in the city centre area attract misuse (similar to the above) and should be avoided where possible. In this case the steps to the entrance could also generate loitering, increasing the risk of antisocial/criminal activity to the detriment of residents. Ideally, the recess should be omitted or should be gated to restrict access to unauthorised persons, if it is an escape route a panic bar could be installed on the inside to allow it to be used as an escape route.
- 3.3.3 If either of these spaces cannot be secured then they should be illuminated to a high standard, covered by monitored CCTV, and include tactile paving to deter loitering.
- 3.3.4 The entrance to the cycle store to the rear of the building should be illuminated to a high standard to facilitate safe use. The doors into the cycle store (external and internal) should operate on the access control system and the external doors should have a door closer so they cannot be left open. Cycle stands/racks should allow both wheels and the frame to be secured.
- 3.3.5 External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- 3.3.6 Access into the buildings should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.

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- 3.3.7 To prevent tailgating into the building there should be a secure lobby, with a residents/visitors passing through a second access control security rated door before they can enter the stair/lift core of the building.
 - 3.3.8 Postal workers should not be allowed unfettered access throughout the development. Postal workers should be granted access only to the post rooms only or mail/parcels should be delivered directly to the concierge.
 - 3.3.9 Access into the parcel store should be restricted to residents with an auditable access control system. There should be monitored CCTV within the parcel room to deter potential thieves and so that footage can be reviewed if parcels are missing.
 - 3.3.10 Building elevations should be illuminated at street level to reduce the potential for congregating and to facilitate safe travel around the building perimeter.

4 Physical Security (Residential)

In addition to the layout issues highlighted in section 3, the following checklist (sections 4-7) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access into the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. Apartment entrance doors must have a door viewer.
- ☐ Construction of internal walls surrounding internal apartment entrance doors (600mm either side of the door set) should incorporate a resilient layer to reduce the risk of anyone breaking through the wall to access the locking mechanism. The resilient layer should be timber (minimum thickness of 9mm) or expanded metal.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

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- ☐ There should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind or within any new cladding/insulated panels to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - Communal entrances
 - Communal areas
 - Bicycle stores
 - Circulation cores
 - Staff only areas
 - Parcel rooms

4.6 Bicycle Stores

- ☐ Doors into the cycle parking area(s) must be certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, with access restricted to registered residents (i.e. genuine bicycle owners).
- ☐ Cycle stands should either be U-profile or Sheffield style stands. If rack storage is used it should be possible for both wheels and the frame to be secured.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the development in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting should be taken from a variety of sources and levels (i.e. columns, up lighting) to provide a greater level of coverage and avoid shadows/pooling.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Elevations of the buildings should be illuminated.

4.8 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

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- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
 - ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
 - ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
 - ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
 - ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images, then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
 - ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
 - ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals.
 - ☐ Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

5 Physical Security (Commercial Unit)

5.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2. Staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day and night. The main sliding entrance doors should be capable of being controlled by reception staff if required (e.g. at night) to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobby.
- ☐ Sliding/revolving doors should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ All doors/frames to staff areas/stores/offices should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

5.2 Windows, Building Fabric & Shutters

- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

5.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

5.4 Alarms

- ☐ The commercial unit should have intruder alarms installed or the infrastructure for tenants to easily install an alarm.

5.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - External doors
 - Staff areas
- ☐ If access control is to be fitted out by the tenant then the infrastructure for tenants to easily install an access control system should be provided.

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 6.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.
- 6.1.3 A comprehensive security regime for the individual commercial units must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable, and up to date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures, and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
 - Opening and closing the building, including staff arrival and departure.
 - Management of deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods).
 - Details of staff security training.
 - Location and management of any smoking areas.
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access control systems, alarm systems, CCTV cameras, and lighting.
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti and litter; and
 - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 6.1.4 All high value equipment within publicly accessible areas (e.g. computers, televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

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- 6.1.5 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.
 - 6.1.6 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
0658-HOD-BC-03-DR-A(--)-204	Proposed GA Plan		
0658-HOD-BC-03-DR-A(--)-292	Enabling Plan Level 03 Floor Plan		
0658-HOD-BC-20-DR-A(--)-220	Proposed GA Plan Level 20 Floor Plan		
0658-HOD-BC-21-DR-A(--)-221	Proposed GA Plan Level 21 Floor Plan		
0658-HOD-BC-M0-DR-A(--)-201	Proposed GA Plan Level M0 Floor Plan		
0658-HOD-BC-M0-DR-A(--)-291	Enabling Plan Level M0 Floor Plan		
0658-HOD-BC-RF-DR-A(--)-223	Proposed GA Plan Level Roof Plan		
0658-HOD-BC-XX-DR-A(--)-280	Proposed GA Plan Typical Room Types		
0658-HOD-BC-XX-DR-A(--)-281	Proposed GA Plan B2P Accessibility (M2)		
0643-HOD-BC-ZZ-DR-A(--)-300	Proposed GA Elevation Southeast		
0643-HOD-BC-ZZ-DR-A(--)-301	Proposed GA Elevation Southwest		
0643-HOD-BC-ZZ-DR-A(--)-302	Proposed GA Elevation Northeast		
0643-HOD-BC-ZZ-DR-A(--)-303	Proposed GA Elevation Northwest		
0643-HOD-BC-ZZ-DR-A(--)-380	Proposed Facade Fragments		
0643-HOD-BC-ZZ-DR-A(--)-390	Enabling Elevations Southwest & Southeast		
0643-HOD-BC-ZZ-DR-A(--)-391	Enabling Elevations Northwest & Northeast		
0643-HOD-BC-ZZ-DR-A(--)-401	Proposed GA Section section AA		
0643-HOD-BC-ZZ-DR-A(--)-402	Proposed GA Section Section BB		
0658-HOD-BC-00-DR-A(--)-001	Proposed GA Plan Site Location Plan		
0658-HOD-BC-00-DR-A(--)-200	Proposed GA Plan Level 00 Floor Plan		
0658-HOD-BC-00-DR-A(--)-290	Enabling Plan Level 00 Floor Plan		
0658-HOD-BC-01-DR-A(--)-202	Proposed GA Plan level 01 Floor Plan		
0658-HOD-BC-02-DR-A(--)-203	Proposed GA Plan Level 02 Floor Plan		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		