



## CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

The Birtles, Civic Centre, Wythenshawe

Change of use of first and second floor to from Use  
Class E to F1 (Community Facility) together with  
associated elevational alterations

For: **LAMBERT SMITH HAMPTON**

Greater Manchester Police

Version C: **27/02/25**

design**for**security

Ref: **2009/0580/CIS/01**

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# The Birtles, Civic Centre, Wythenshawe

2009/0580/CIS/01

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Development Supported - security additions advised

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed scheme has been found acceptable and if submitted to the local planning department in its current form we will support the application.

The redevelopment of the site for community use is welcomed. The proposed redevelopment is well located and presents no significant issues from a crime prevention perspective. To improve the overall security of the building and wider site, a number of recommendations are included, as follows:

- Security rated external doors, window frames and laminate glazing should be used.
- CCTV and intruder alarm systems are installed.

**Please note:** Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition to meet Secured by Design certification is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

**David Maher** *Dip Arch*

Consultant

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# 1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is located in the retail centre of the existing civic centre of Wythenshawe, Manchester. The site is accessed off Hale Top, a pedestrianised street.

The site is located within an existing retail unit facing onto the pedestrianised streets.


Surrounding the site are retail units and fixed market stalls. The shopping arcade has a number of units in use and a large number closed/unused.

The site is served by a local bus route. The nearest tram stop is Wythenshawe Town Centre.


Currently two of the units are closed and boarded up, whilst a third unit is in operation as a coffee shop.

The retail units facing the public realm are covered with a solid canopy, however the lighting is poor quality and/or not working in places.

The main streets appear clear of litter and are maintained. The shopping centre is very dated, in poor quality in places and in need of attention. However there are proposals being developed for major re-development of the town centre.




1 – View towards the site.



2 – View towards the site from the public realm.



3 – View north along public realm.



7 – View west along public realm.



6 – Existing street furniture within the public realm.



5 – View east across the public realm.



4 – Existing street furniture within the public realm.

## 2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1<sup>st</sup> January 2024 to 31<sup>st</sup> December 2024.

### 2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

| Domestic Burglary | Non-Domestic Burglary | Criminal Damage | Less Serious Wounding | Theft | Robbery | Serious Wounding | Theft from Motor Vehicle | Theft of Motor Vehicle | Bicycle Theft |
|-------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|-------|---------|------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|---------------|
| 14                | 10                    | 80              | 385                   | 42    | 16      | 8                | 11                       | 14                     | 11            |

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the past 12 months has been above average for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding, criminal damage and theft having been the most recorded crime types occurring in the local area. The offences have taken place all throughout the local area, particularly within the town centre and the residential neighbourhoods to the north.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding offences have predominantly occurred at the locations mentioned above, where assaults, public order and harassment offences have been most reported. These incidents have involved disputes between known associates, cases of domestic violence and altercations between unknown associates within public spaces or retail outlets.
- 2.1.3 Criminal damage offences have mainly taken place within the parking facilities at the town centre, with a smaller number occurring in the wider area. Offenders have targeted vehicles by using objects or implements to dent or scratch the bodywork as well as smash the glazing in windows. Damage has also been dealt to retail properties whereby groups of youths have used bodily pressure and objects to smash the glazing in windows and damage external doors. There have also been cases of bus shelters being targeted, as well as vandalism of walls using graffiti.
- 2.1.4 The majority of theft offences have also taken place within the town centre, whereby offenders have mostly targeted insecure items such as mobile phones, wallets and bags temporarily placed on tabletops or benches in public spaces, retail outlets and restaurants.

### 2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 **Use of implements such as crowbars to open doors, particularly fire doors, and gain entry to the premises.**

*Possible Solution – Although the location of doors and windows should be considered (ideally placed where they can be readily observed, so that potential criminals would be more easily detected), it is inevitable that some will be located where they will benefit from lower levels of natural surveillance. All external doors and accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1 & 4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors and windows are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV (see Sections 4.6, 4.8 & 4.9) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.*

- 2.2.2 **Offenders posing as legitimate customers before gaining access to unauthorised 'staff-only' areas to commit theft.**

*Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that callers to the building/site are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.*

- 2.2.3 **Theft of materials, tools or plant equipment from warehouses/service yards.**

*Possible Solution – The integrity of the boundary treatments should be evaluated and regularly checked for defects. Inappropriately parked vehicles/trailers and other externally stored items can obscure the spread of lighting and CCTV coverage, creating potential areas of intense shadowing and blind spots. It*

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*is recommended that this is considered in the external arrangement, and 'no store/park' areas specifically identified to avoid inadvertently blocking surveillance. Storage/parking areas close to boundaries should also be avoided as they may mask any damage to perimeter fencing.*

#### **2.2.4 Smashing glazing in windows and doors to gain entry.**

*Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Windows that are particularly vulnerable should be secured with security-certified shutters out-of-hours (see Section 4.2).*

#### **2.2.5 Organised burglars targeting expensive I.T. equipment.**

Possible Solution - Secure storerooms, where such items can be kept, should be incorporated into the design of the building. These rooms should have solid blockwork walls or be reinforced with expanded metal mesh and certified door sets (to BS PAS 24). Valuable items should not be easy to remove, and should be uniquely identified using an appropriate property marking system. Equipment should not be positioned in communal areas where there may be regular community access. Effective access controls within the building should assist in restricting entry of visitors and potential intruders.



## **2.3 Risk Factors**

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:


- Burglary
- Criminal damage to property
- Unauthorised access to buildings and private spaces
- Antisocial behaviour
- Loitering groups
- Internal theft
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

## 2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (GM Community Centres): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against community centres, recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Greater Manchester community centres remains relatively consistent, with the exception of Tuesday – when it is slightly lower. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks in the early hours of the morning and during the early evening. At night, when it is dark and streets are quiet, offenders often perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected. During the early evening, community centres are likely to be at their busiest, meaning offenders posing as legitimate patrons can attempt to gain unauthorised access to restricted areas without being noticed.





- 2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** The following entry points and M.O.s have been the occurred most frequently:

- The majority of incidents have occurred through 'unknown' entry points, which is likely to have been where offenders posing as legitimate service users have gained entry to internal restricted areas by forcing doors, by tailgating or by targeting insecure doors unnoticed.
- Doors (particularly fire doors) have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements/tools or have been targeted when left insecure to gain access.
- Windows have also been prised open and targeted when insecure.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Shutters have been forced upwards/penetrated to gain access to the doors and windows behind them.

## 2.5 Theft (GM Community Centres): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against community centres, recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** Incidents of theft at Greater Manchester community centres peak on Monday and are lowest on Tuesday. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the afternoon/early evening. This aligns with the standard opening and closing times for many community centres, when more people attend them and, therefore, the opportunities for theft are greater. The most routinely targeted items are items of personal property belong to patrons and staff members, particularly laptops, mobile phones and handbags.

## 2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Saturday in the afternoon (15:00-16:00). This is likely due to the higher number of visitors to the civic centre at this time, meaning that there are more opportunities and potential targets for offenders.

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## 3 Layout Appraisal

### 3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 Change of use of first and second floor to from Use Class E to F1 (Community Facility) together with associated elevational alterations.
- 3.1.2 This project is part of a wider town centre regeneration project (see Wythenshawe Town Centre – Development Framework 2022). As such, not all security measures will form part of this phase and will be covered by the wider masterplan works.

### 3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

*The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.*

- 3.2.1 The site sits within an established shopping retail centre.
- 3.2.2 The proposed development will provide additional activity and natural surveillance/overlooking to the area when the facility is in operational.
- 3.2.3 The perimeter of the site will be defined by the existing building and security arrangements of the wider shopping precinct.
- 3.2.4 The footprint of the building is simple, with no recesses that could provide cover for covert criminal activity and external façades that should provide little opportunity to scale the structures.
- 3.2.5 The car parking areas are to be located directly to the south side of the building.
- 3.2.6 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design/construction of the scheme. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design/specification of the development can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

### 3.3 Recommendations

*The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.*

#### 3.3.1 Further Recommendations

- The CCTV system and site lighting should be adapted to reflect the changing layout of the site. CCTV cameras should be capable of identifying all pedestrian movements into and out of the site. An audible warning system should be employed to alert to intruders that they have been detected and a response has been generated. Signage should be located at the site entrance to inform visitors that their movements will be recorded.
  - Signage should be used to direct people through the development - to the appropriate parking spaces, service areas and office entrances.
  - Staff lockers should be provided, and in a location where there is a high level of activity and surveillance, so that staff can safely store personal items during the working day.
  - Internally, the building should be capable of zoning so that entry to parts of the premises can be effectively controlled. Movements in and out of the buildings should be confined to specific areas and access controls used to ensure only authorised staff can enter controlled areas.
- 3.3.2 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

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## 4 Physical Security

*The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.*

### 4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors (single and double leaf) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ Any sectional loading bay doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ Internal doors/frames to any offices, meeting rooms, back-of-house plant/service/stores etc. within the building should be robust/solid-core (minimum 44mm thick) and capable of being secured when unoccupied. Staff should be able to store their belongings in a secure area while at work.

### 4.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ All windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed.
- ☐ Any opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any shutters should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Shutters should either be provided internally or, if they are to be externally mounted, shutter boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building (where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage).

### 4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

### 4.4 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room. It is understood that this would be responsibility of the end owners/occupiers of the unit to install.

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## 4.5 Access Controls

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following doors/gates should operate on access control:
  - Any internal doors providing access to obvious high-risk areas (e.g. server rooms, storage areas, staff changing facilities/lockers etc.). It is understood that this would be responsibility of the end owners/occupiers of the unit to install.
- ☐ The electric locking system to be used throughout the site/units should be fully auditable (i.e. allowing the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that misuse is prevented. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work and keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

## 4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ Care should also be taken to ensure there are no trees or any other hard/soft landscaping features (such as lighting columns, street furniture etc.) immediately adjacent and on the publicly accessible side of any secure boundaries that could be used as a climbing aid to scale the fencing. Any such features should be pruned or removed where possible. The site boundary treatment should also be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary.
- ☐ It is highly recommended that condition of the fencing along the perimeter of the site is regularly inspected for signs of damage/attack and is repaired immediately if any incidents are experienced. Where exposed, the perimeter fencing to the service yards should be protected on the inner side from potential damage from large vehicles, using crash barriers or rails, to deflect any encroachment and maintain a secure boundary.

## 4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all access road, parking areas and service yards within the site, in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

## 4.8 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of

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an *Acceptable Standard* that will allow for *Identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

*Acceptable Standard* - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

*Identification* – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *Overview* and *Recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: *the entrance to the site, all external facades of the buildings and all service/parking areas*. It is understood that this would be responsibility of the future management company overseeing the site to install. CCTV coverage is also advised to *the main entrance lobby*. It is understood that this would be responsibility of the end owners/occupiers of the units to install.

## 4.9 Other

- ☐ There should be no features of the buildings (such as projecting window cills/cladding features, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to roof areas.
- ☐ The position of ancillary structures, parked trailers and any external storage areas should be carefully considered in relation to the following:
  - Their potential to block sight lines and create hiding places.
  - Their potential to obscure CCTV and lighting.
  - Their potential to create climbing aids that would assist unauthorised exit/entry over boundary fencing.
  - Their potential to obscure damage to fence lines.
  - Any proposed lighting columns, street furniture, tree/shrub planting etc. within or external to the site perimeter should also be reviewed in relation to the above issues.
- ☐ Any proposed cycle stores should include 'Sheffield' style racks, or similar, that allow staff to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/>.
- ☐ Any external bin/recycling stores should be a secure, lockable and fire resistant enclosure. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- ☐ Any lockers within staff changing facilities must be robust/secure and all users should be encouraged to use them and not leave belongs unattended in changing areas.

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## 5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the units must be prepared by the future management company overseeing the site and remain in place for its day-to-day running. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up to date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures, and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing the units, including staff arrival and departure.
  - Management of deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods).
  - Details of staff security training.
  - Location and management of any smoking areas.
  - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access control systems, alarm systems, CCTV cameras, lighting etc.
  - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
  - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 5.1.2 All high value equipment within communal areas (e.g. computers, televisions, tools etc.) should be properly marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 5.1.3 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.
- Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the units, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.

## 6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

## 7 Useful References

### 7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

## A Contact register

| Date       | Contact With          | Summary of Contact            |
|------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| 17/12/2024 | Lambert Smith Hampton | CIS instruction received      |
| 18/12/2024 | Lambert Smith Hampton | Fee / authorisation confirmed |
| 18/12/2024 | GMP                   | Invoice issued                |
| 23/01/2025 | DfS                   | Site visit                    |
| 31/01/2025 | DfS                   | CIS completed                 |
| 13/02/2025 | DfS                   | CIS issued                    |
| 19/02/2025 | Lambert Smith Hampton | CIS comments                  |
| 20/02/2025 | DfS                   | CIS updated & issued          |

## B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

| Drawing No. | Drawing Title     | Date | Rev |
|-------------|-------------------|------|-----|
| 601_0102    | Ex Gnd Floor Plan |      |     |
| 601_0103    | Ex 1st Floor Plan |      |     |
| 601_0104    | Ex 2nd Floor Plan |      |     |
| 601_Sk106   | Alt 2a Gnd Floor  |      |     |
| 601_Sk107   | Alt 2a 1st Floor  |      |     |
| 601_Sk108   | Alt 2a 2nd Floor  |      |     |
| 601_Sk109   | Alt 2a Roof Plan  |      |     |
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PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

## C CIS Version History

| Version | Revisions Made                      | Date     |
|---------|-------------------------------------|----------|
| A       |                                     |          |
| B       | Minor text amendments to the report | 20/02/25 |

## D Glossary

### Burglary Resistance Standards

#### BS 7950, 1997

**Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.**

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

#### BS PAS 23-1, 1999

**General performance requirements for door assemblies.**

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

#### BS PAS 24-1, 2012

**General security performance requirements for door assemblies.**

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

#### ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

**Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification**

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

#### LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

**Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components**

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

#### STS01 Issue 4: 2012

**Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24**

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

#### STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

#### EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

**Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.**

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

### Commonly Used Acronyms

#### CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

#### CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design  
(Learn more at [www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted](http://www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted))

#### CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

#### INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

#### PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

#### LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

#### UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

### Useful Websites

#### Design for Security

[www.designforsecurity.org](http://www.designforsecurity.org)

#### Secured by Design

[www.securedbydesign.com](http://www.securedbydesign.com)

#### RIBA Product Selector

[www.ribaproductselector.com](http://www.ribaproductselector.com)

#### LPCB – Red Book Live

[www.redbooklive.com](http://www.redbooklive.com)

#### Crime Reduction (Home Office)

[www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk](http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk)

#### DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

[www.designagainstcrime.org](http://www.designagainstcrime.org)

#### Building for Life

[www.buildingforlife.org](http://www.buildingforlife.org)

#### CLG (Communities and Local Government)

[www.communities.gov.uk](http://www.communities.gov.uk)