



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Land at Crabtree Lane, Openshaw

Apartments & Houses

For: MCI Developments

Version C: 14th February 2025

URN: 2021/0471/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

Land at Crabtree Lane. Openshaw

2021/0471/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Points for Further Consideration

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The development is broadly acceptable, in terms of designing out crime; however, the points raised in section 3.3 should be addressed including the following:

- Secure enclosure of apartment amenity space.
- Treatment of parking spaces to the side and rear of dwellings.
- Access into passageways serving rear gardens.

If the recommendations contained within section 3.3 are implemented, we would be generally supportive of the planning application.



Patrick Babb

Consultant

e: patrick.babb@designforsecurity.org

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
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1 Visual Audit


The site, shown red on plan, lies in the Openshaw district of east Manchester, about 1km northwest of the district centre at Lime Square. The area contains a mix of residential, commercial and community premises. There are also some vacant / undeveloped plots in the vicinity.

Public routes around the site lack natural surveillance from overlooking premises. The Ashton Canal passes close to the northern boundary, separated from the site by an access track leading to a neighbouring industrial operation. Crabtree Lane runs along the western side of the site, and forms part of a pedestrian route linking Openshaw with retail premises on Ashton New Road via a bridge over the canal past a public house. A primary school adjoins the south east boundary.

The site is currently vacant, and contains the derelict structures from its former use, with unmanaged vegetation and infrastructure, allowing informal access. There is evidence of fly-tipping, and criminal damage in and around the site. Any criminal / antisocial activity occurring on the site is unlikely to be witnessed or reported to the police.



Locks and pedestrian bridge over canal to north west of site



Crabtree Lane looking south with site on left



Crabtree Lane along the western side of the site.



The site adjoins housing on Eastern By-pass



There is evidence of fly tipping in and around the site



Unmanaged vegetation and accumulations of rubbish on the site



Vehicular access to the site through adjacent business estate

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
26	6	92	175	19	14	6	13	11	5

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is average for the Manchester district with less serious wounding, criminal damage and vehicle crime being the highest recorded offences taking place in the area. Offences have taken place to the north around Ashton New Road and to the south, around Sandywell Street.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, particularly around Sandywell Street and the surrounding roads. Assaults and public order offences have the highest recorded offences taking place in the local area, with domestic disputes and incidents between known associates most commonly reported.
- 2.1.3 Criminal damage against vehicles and dwellings has most commonly been reported, with offences occurring around Edge Lane and Ashton New Road. Glazing in windows and doors of dwellings and vehicles have mostly been targeted, using implements to smash the glazing. Paint work and body work of vehicles have also been targeted, as well as internal features of the property (internal doors and walls).
- 2.1.4 Vehicle crime has taken place around the residential estates, with theft from a vehicle being the highest recorded vehicle offence. Offenders have smashed glazing in cars in order to gain access and remove items, as well as using tools in order to remove vehicle registration plates.
- 2.1.5 The neighbourhood around the site contains large plots of undeveloped or vacant land, where any criminal / antisocial activity is less likely to be witnessed or reported, and the above data should be viewed in this context.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure windows and doors (mostly to the rear of the property) using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access.

Possible Solution - Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to BS PAS 24 or equivalent security standard (see section 4) - these doors are very difficult to force open. Front doors & garage doors should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the street, rather than set within recesses or on more secluded elevations. Offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed. Back / side doors should be located within a secure rear garden space.

- 2.2.2 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.

Possible Solution - All ground floor windows should include key-operated locks and opening restrictors. Unauthorised access to the rear of the dwellings should be deterred by the erection of robust boundaries, and the avoidance of open pedestrian routes to the rear of the properties. Side and rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high and robust fencing with lockable gates so that rear windows are only accessible to residents. Secluded passageways to the sides and rear of properties should be avoided wherever possible, as such routes can facilitate offender access to rear gardens, as well as attract anti-social behaviours such as graffiti, fly-tipping or damage to fencing.

- 2.2.3 Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

Possible Solution - All ground floor / accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. As above, side and rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high and robust fencing with lockable gates so that rear windows are only accessible to residents.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Crime Rate Comparison




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2020.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **52% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **16% lower** than Greater Manchester and **20% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **28% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **100% higher** than Greater Manchester and **114% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **21% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **76% higher** than Greater Manchester and **161% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **32% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **23% higher** than Greater Manchester and **114% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.5.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Wednesday and Friday during the late evening and early hours of the morning. Offenders often target properties during this time as it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access.
- Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Posing as a legitimate tradesperson and gaining unlawful entry to the property.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Thursday, Friday and Saturday during the afternoon and into the late evening (2pm -8pm and 9pm -10:30pm.) During the afternoon people are working and leave cars unattended for long periods of time, therefore creating opportunities for offenders. During the late evening it is dark, the streets are quiet, and offenders perceive this as a reduced risk of being caught/ identified.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development comprises clearance of all existing features of the site and construction of a mix of semi-detached houses and apartments.
- 3.1.2 Vehicular access will be off Crabtree Lane in two places, with an additional pedestrian entrance from the canal towpath (over the access track).

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposal will bring legitimate activity to a currently vacant site that is a generator of disorder. Redevelopment with housing and population of the site should help to create a sense of ownership and responsibility and improve informal policing of the area.
- 3.2.2 The proposed development will significantly help to improve natural surveillance along parts of Crabtree Lane and the canal towpath in places where currently there is little overlooking of these routes.
- 3.2.3 The development does not appear to include any gable-end walls directly abutting streets or other public space.
- 3.2.4 The majority of car parking provision for the new houses is located within the curtilage of the property.
- 3.2.5 Space is available within the enclosed rear gardens of each house to accommodate waste bins, avoiding the need for free-standing bin stores in front of the houses where they could provide potential hiding places and targets for criminal damage.
- 3.2.6 Apartment car parking spaces will be overlooked by the apartments and houses within the development.
- 3.2.7 The apartments will overlook the canal towpath, potentially allowing residents to detect any misuse of the towpath and deter offenders, or those antisocially minded, from operating.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 In a number of locations there are passageways which provide access to rear gardens of dwellings. These passageways should be restricted to residents with a full height gate. Gates should be a minimum of 1.8m high, of robust construction, and, lockable from both sides. The gate into the passageway should be positioned as close to the entrance as possible.
- 3.3.2 Any ground floor apartment windows not within the secure rear boundary should be afforded defensible space either with a low boundary or with shrubbery - to prevent would be offenders, or those antisocially minded, from easily accessing ground floor windows.
- 3.3.3 Apartment car parking areas should be illuminated to a high standard to deter offenders and to facilitate surveillance.
- 3.3.4 Where car parking spaces are located to the rear of a dwelling it is highly recommended that a more visually permeable boundary treatment is used, such as railings or the incorporation of trellis in the fence, so that residents can view parked vehicles. These spaces must be illuminated, and any rear garden gates should be capable of being locked from both sides.
- 3.3.5 Any parking spaces positioned at the side, or rear, of dwellings should be illuminated with dusk-til-dawn lighting.
- 3.3.6 The proposed access roads should be illuminated to adoptable standard, to reduce the potential for crime and fear of crime. The apartment car parking areas and any pedestrian routes in the site should be illuminated in accordance with BS 5489.
- 3.3.7 The proposed cycle stores should be a robust, weatherproof enclosure, with access restricted to residents.
- 3.3.8 The proposed dwellings and apartments should be built to Secured by Design standards.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- Front and rear doors to houses, including must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- French / double doors and folding or sliding patio doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- Front doors to houses should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.
- Front doors should have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.
- Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.
- Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- Garage doors to integral / attached garages (if there is a connecting internal door with the dwelling) must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR1. Alternatively, the internal connecting door must be to the same burglary resistant specification as the front door (normally BS PAS 24). If there is to be no internal connecting door or the garage is detached, the garage door should be of robust construction, with a multi-point locking mechanism.

- External communal access doors to apartment blocks must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system - these features should be permitted under the scope of the security certification. Secondary doors off the internal lobby should be the same standard.
- Individual apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.

4.2 Windows

- Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- To achieve a Secured by Design Award any glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, (including internal doors in to garages and, PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.
- If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.5 Access Controls (Apartments)

- Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
 - Communal entrance doors to apartment blocks
 - Cycle stores
 - Gates / doors into any communal amenity space

4.6 Boundaries

- Rear garden boundaries should generally be 1800mm high and of close boarded timber construction. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.
- Rear garden boundaries that are adjacent to public space should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base, with timber fence above to a total height of 2100mm. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.
- Sub-divisional rear garden boundaries may be as low as 1500mm.
- The fronts of properties should be demarcated by low boundaries such as planting and / or railings to an approximate height of 1000mm.
- Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels / sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

- Gates in to the rear curtilage of dwellings should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:
 - A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
 - A key operable deadlock
- If residents are likely to use these gates when leaving their property, then the gates must be lockable from both sides.

4.7 Landscaping

- In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.8 Lighting

- External lighting must be provided to the front and rear of dwellings, operated by photoelectric cell / daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended for these locations and should not be employed unless advised.
- Lighting in parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 lux with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- Lighting to pedestrian routes through the site should be in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting to public areas (footpaths and roads) should be evenly distributed and not create areas of shadowing or pooling. Any low level lighting should be positioned to avoid creating glare.
- Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow / orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.9 Other

- Meter cupboards should be located to the fronts of houses only, not in the private areas. Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- There have been incidents involving metal theft from the area. Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and metal pipework and wiring should not be visible.
- Any garden sheds must be securely fixed to a concrete foundation and the shed door fitted with a certificated 'Sold Secure' Silver Standard padlock, hasp and staple (coach bolted through the shed structure). The shed door should be at least 44mm thick so that the door can be locked into the doorframe using either a mortise deadlock or mortise sash lock certificated to BS 3621: 2007.
- Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.

- Mail boxes for the apartments should be from a supplier approved by Secured by Design (see www.securedbydesign.com).

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
 - Regular inspection, service and repair to communal security features (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV, alarms, fencing & gates)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees to ensure that sight lines are maintained and coverage of lighting and any CCTV is not impaired.
- 5.1.3 Ensure that the site management is for which the site was designed remains in place, such as 24 hour concierge / security patrols.
- Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

Appendix

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
21/09/2021	Euan Kellie Property Solutions	CIS instruction received
27/09/2021	Euan Kellie Property Solutions	Commission confirmed / fee agreed
07/10/2021	N/A	Site visit
19/10/2021	MCI Developments	Payment received
03/11/2021	Euan Kellie Property Solutions	CIS version A issued
01/07/2022	Ellie Philcox	CIS version B issued
16/12/2024	Katie Daniels	Meeting
14/02/2025	Katie Daniels	CIS version C issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
S03	Proposed Site Layout	Jan 20	D13
MCI.TS.115	Topographical Land Survey	18/06/21	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Revised drawings	01/07/2022