



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Erection of a LIDL Foodstore (Class E) with Associated
Car Parking & Landscaping

440 Hollinwood Avenue, Moston, Manchester

VERSION A: 6th February 2025

2024/0288/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The existing premises on the site are in decline and are likely to attract criminal activity if the premises remain vacant - there is already evidence of low level crime and anti-social activity at the site.

We welcome the investment in this part of Manchester and support the construction of a foodstore on the site. The development of a foodstore will inevitably attract criminals and potentially lead to an increase in crime - shoplifting, theft, burglary and criminal damage, for example, but with appropriate design interventions the risk and effects of crime can be minimised.

Several recommendations to improve security within the scheme are included in section 3.3 of the report. The principal recommendations are summarised as follows:

- install appropriate fencing and gates to define the edge of the development, secure the service yard and secure the spaces on the western side of the building
- ensure the external walls of the store are appropriately robust
- install security-rated doors, windows, shutters and glazing
- fit an intruder alarm and comprehensive CCTV system
- consider employing a security guard to deter offenders entering the store
- install access controls to the doors connecting the shop floor to warehouse and back-of house
- include motorcycle parking provision within the car park
- include signs to direct Eastgate residents and visitors and gym customers along an appropriate route around the edge of the site.

Greater Manchester Police support the application and, should the Manchester Planning be minded to approve the application, recommend the inclusion conditions requiring the development to a) be built in accordance with the security recommendations and physical security specification set out in sections 3.3 and 4 of this report, and/or b) to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

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Consultant

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1 The Site and Surroundings

The proposed development can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red, and in the photographs. The site is located in Moston, an area in the North of Manchester.


The site is bound by the rears of properties on South Crescent to the North, to the East the rear boundaries of houses on St Margaret's Road, to the South by Hollinwood Avenue, and to the West by adjacent properties on Hollinwood Road and Greengate.

The site is currently developed with a large, office and industrial building, which is currently vacant. The site boundary is well defined with green paladin weld metal mesh fencing.

Looking west along the A6104, Hollinwood Avenue with trees and shrubs on the site screening it from view



Vacant office and industrial buildings that occupy around 60% of the site



Tall, welded-wire mesh fencing and gates secure the Hollinwood Avenue boundary of the site



The car park and servicing area at the front of the site and residential property in the background



Commercial premises opposite the site on the south side of Hollinwood Avenue



The rear gardens of semi-detached houses on St Margaret's Road share a boundary on the eastern side of the site



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood around the site

The data below reflects crime committed within 500m of the site recorded between 1st September 2023 to 31st August 2024..

. All crime

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
21	<5	23	149	19	<5	6	6	5	<5

2.1.1 There were 270 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed. This volume of crime is significantly below the average for a typical neighbourhood within Manchester, however, the area analysed does include large areas of undeveloped land such as the adjacent rugby club and Blackley Golf Club north of the M60, as well as a section of the Motorway, which significantly affects the number, type and distribution of crimes

2.1.2 The most common crimes recorded (5% or more of the total) were:

- the use, or threat, of violence - 53%
- burglary - 11%
- vehicle crime, i.e., damage to, theft of & theft from a vehicle - 10%
- criminal damage - 9%
- theft - 9%

2.1.3 The most common place for a crime to be committed was in the street (29%), a house or flat (23%), retail premises (23%) and in a car park (12%)

2.1.4 The streets where 10 or more crimes were recorded were:

- Moston Lane - 38 crimes
- Victoria Avenue East - 32 crimes
- Hollinwood Avenue -15
- Kilmaine Avenue - 12
- Leyburn Road - 12
- Capricorn Road - 11
- Lightbowne Road - 11

2.1.5 Crime hotspots in the neighbourhood include the Pure gym, licensed premises and the adjacent Eastgate Apartments.



Crime at retail premises

2.1.6 As well as Fallowfield Retail Park, there are retail/commercial premises at Slade Lane and Kingsway. However, all crime (53 offences) at retail premises reported in the area analysed was concentrated at Fallowfield Retail Park. The most commonly occurring crimes were theft/shoplifting (30 offences), followed by crimes involving the use or threat of violence (15 offences) The remaining 8 crimes included criminal damage, robbery, burglary, theft from a vehicle and drug possession.

2.1.7 There are very few retail premises in the area analysed; only one crime, a robbery, was recorded at such premises.

Vehicle crime

2.1.8 The risk of vehicle crime is moderate. In terms of the day and time, the greatest risk appears to be on a Thursday and Friday, and during the early hours of the morning.



2.1.9 The risk of vehicle crime is very low. In terms of the day and time, marginally more offences are committed on a Tuesday and Friday than other days and, while incidents are spread across the day, there are too few to suggest a pattern of crime .



2.2 Crime at retail premises across the Manchester Division

The data below relates to burglary offences carried out at retail premises in Manchester.


There were 6,173 offences carried out at retail premises across the City of Manchester. These included:

- 3,637 incidents of theft and shoplifting
- 1,747 incidents where violence was used or threatened
- 397 burglaries
- 210 incidents of criminal damage
- 182 robberies

Burglary





2.2.1 The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week and is most commonly committed in the late evening and at night after premises have closed for business and members of staff have left.



2.2.2 In around half of the incidents of burglary at retail premises, offenders forced open the front or rear doors. Forcing shutters open was also a common method of gaining entry. Offenders also gained entry

by smashing glazing in doors and windows or forced their way through the walls or roof of a building. On a number of occasions, the offender entered by legitimate means, suggesting entry was not forced.

Theft (excluding shoplifting)



- 2.2.3 The risk of theft is consistently high throughout the week and is most common during the afternoon. Offenders have mostly targeted customer's personal belongings (mobile phones, bags, and purses) as well as items belonging to staff and to the business.

2.3 Modus operandi used in burglary and theft at retail premises in Manchester and measures to reduce risk

2.3.1 Ram-raiding walls, gates and shutters and penetrating walls and the roof

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing walls, roofs shutters and gates:

- security-certified fencing/gates (to LPS 1175) and should be used to secure service areas - sliding gates tend to be more secure than hinged gates;
- steel frame buildings, faced with a proprietary cladding system, should include a 2000mm high brick or blockwork base or a suitably robust inner layer of attack resistant material, e.g., expanded metal panels;
- roofs should be high enough that they are not easily accessible, comprise of a security-rated roofing system or include a sandwich of materials which makes them difficult to penetrate;
- secluded public passageways to the sides and rear of building should be avoided wherever possible; and,
- all external doors should be illuminated by dusk-to-dawn lights.

2.3.2 Shutters have been forced upwards by offenders

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing shutters:

- security-certified roller shutters (to LPS 1175) should be used wherever possible;
- where size limits the availability of certified shutters, intruder alarms, CCTV and lighting should be deployed to increase the security of these larger openings; and,
- anti-ram bollards or barriers should be deployed to help secure the most vulnerable shutters.

2.3.3 Doors have been forced open with tools and locks have been smashed to gain entry

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 sr2 standard; and,
- external doors should be placed where they can be readily observed by staff or monitored by CCTV and fitted with alarm contacts.

2.3.4 Entering a building via unsecured doors and windows.

To minimise the risk of offenders committing rime by entering via unsecured windows or doors

- other than customer entrance doors, external doors should be self-closing and lock upon closure; and,

- windows should have opening restrictors and key operated locks fitted:

2.3.5 **Glazing in windows and doors has been smashed**

To minimise the risk of breaking and entering via windows:

- windows should be avoided on secluded elevations;
- window and glazed doors should be fitted with laminate glass, which, because of its structural properties, is extremely difficult to break and penetrate sufficiently to reach in and open locks or climb through; and,
- security shutters or grilles, certified to the LPS 1175 sr2 standard, should be fitted to vulnerable windows.

2.3.6 **Shoplifting and theft of employee property**

To minimise the risk of offenders stealing personal property from retail premises:

- deploy a security guard at the entrance to the store
- install a one-way system to control movement through and in and out of the store;
- create a secure 'back of house' to the store, with fob or keypad-controlled doors;
- overt signage should be used to warn against entry to staff-only areas, referring visitors to appropriately located, visible reception areas; and,
- include space for employees to store personal/valuable items securely e.g., lockers or lockable drawers.

3 **Development Appraisal**

3.1 **The proposed development**

3.1.1 The proposed development is the erection of a new build LIDL foodstore (1,961sq m).

3.2 **Positive aspects of the proposal**

- 3.2.1 The proposals result in the redevelopment of a site and buildings which, if not put to appropriate use, may otherwise attract further crimes and anti-social behaviour.
- 3.2.2 The food store will have a relatively simple, broadly rectangular, footprint.
- 3.2.3 The design and height of the proposed store is such that the risk of offenders accessing the roof and exploiting any weaknesses in the construction to gain entry is minimal.
- 3.2.4 The customer entrance and exit doors will be very visible to customers arriving on foot or by car.
- 3.2.5 The proposed, glazed entrance and glazed southern elevation of the store facilitates supervision of the car and cycle parking by staff and customers. All parts of the car park are visible to passing traffic and pedestrians within the site.
- 3.2.6 Bicycle parking is provided on the site which can be viewed from the main service area.
- 3.2.7 The service bay is appropriately sited.

3.3 **Recommendations to improve the security of the development**

- 3.3.1 The area to the rear of the retail store should be restricted to staff to prevent misuse with full height gates and associated boundaries.
- 3.3.2 The main entrances and service doors should be illuminated with dusk-til-dawn lighting to deter offenders from targeting these openings.
- 3.3.3 Shutters and sectional overhead doors have been regularly targeted by offenders to gain access to industrial properties in the Salford area. To prevent shutters or sectional overhead doors being forced open they should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. LPS 1175 SR 2).

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- 3.3.4 The proposed car parking areas and pedestrian routes should be illuminated to a high standard in accordance with BS 5689 with an average illuminance of 10lx. Motorcycle parking places should be identified, with ground anchors or hoops located within a highly visible part of the car park.
 - 3.3.5 Given the layout of the car park, and likely mix of pedestrians - often pushing shopping trolleys, and vehicles, measures should be installed that will calm traffic speeds and direct pedestrians to safe routes across the car park. Poor behaviour by both motorists and pedestrians within a busy car park can sometimes lead to conflict. Designing the car park so that traffic speeds are moderated– using rumble strips or raised thresholds - and safe, convenient routes are included to cater for pedestrians – using distinctly different surfacing to denote pedestrian routes - will reduce the risk of disputes arising.
 - 3.3.6 The security of bicycles would be enhanced if the cycle hoops were relocated towards the customer entrance door.
 - 3.3.7 The lower 2000mm of the external walls should include a brick or blockwork to minimise the risk of intruders entering by force.
 - 3.3.8 The cash office door should be security-rated, include a door viewer (spyhole), be self-closing and lock securely upon closure. A safe which meets the LPS 1163 standard should be installed in the cash office. Chute deposit safes should be considered for use at each till point.
 - 3.3.9 An access control system should be installed within the foodstore, which controls entry to the warehouse and from the shop floor and staff welfare area. A fob activated system is preferred.
 - 3.3.10 A CCTV system should be installed at the foodstore, with cameras capable of monitoring activity within the store, the store entrance and exit doors, the warehouse and back of house, the service area, all elevations of the building, the car park and cycle parking. Monitoring equipment should be located within the management office whilst recording equipment should be located within a very secure place within the store, or images should be recorded off-site by a suitable management company. A more modest system that monitors entrances and till points should be installed in each of the small units.
 - 3.3.11 Consider employing a security guard within the foodstore, one that is, visible on the shop floor during shopping hours.
 - 3.3.12 Signs should be erected to inform the public of the name of the development; direct customers to the appropriate store entrance; deter customers from entering restricted areas, inform customers of the use of CCTV on the site; and, clearly state the regulations for use of the car park (and sanctions for misuse).
 - 3.3.13 High quality, well-maintained landscaping within the site will help improve the appearance of the development, define the edges of the site, prevent parking in inappropriate places and protect boundary fencing from irregular vehicle movements. Tree and shrub planting should respect the need to maintain lines of sight across the development by staff and customers as well as by CCTV cameras and lighting.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Building fabric

- ☐ There should be a brick or blockwork wall (or material of similar strength e.g., welded-steel mesh) behind any low-level cladding to the building (to a minimum height of 2000mm from external ground level), to ensure that the building itself is adequately secure.
- ☐ The foodstore cash room, in which the safe will be located, should have solid walls and a secure, rather than a false, ceiling.

4.2 Doors

- ☐ Sliding entrance and exit doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (RC2+) or a similar security standard.
- ☐ Hinged entrance, service doors, and all escape doors should be compliant with, and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. All of these doors should be self-closing and be capable of locking automatically upon closure.

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- ☐ The to the foodstore cash office should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202 or LPS 1175 SR2, self-closing and be capable of locking automatically upon closure.
 - ☐ The doors to the welfare area of the foodstore should be FD30-rated, fitted with fob-activated, electronic locks, be self-closing and capable of locking automatically upon closure.

4.3 Security shutters

- ☐ Roller shutters securing loading dock, and shutters installed to enhance security to entrance, shopfronts and means of escape doors or windows should meet LPS 1175 SR2 standard.

4.4 Window frames

- ☐ Any opening windows should be certificated to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175, include locks operated with a key, and have restrictors that limit opening to 100mm.

4.5 Glazing

- ☐ All external glazing should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g., 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened.
- ☐ External glazing should be kept largely free of any advertising materials.

4.6 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored intruder alarm system should be installed to the foodstore and small units. Each should be linked to contacts on all external doors, windows and shutters, and PIR detectors should monitor all internal floor areas, with a signal terminating at a recognised Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room. The alarm should have two secure signalling paths (one being GSM radio back-up).
- ☐ A panic alarm should be installed in the foodstore. Panic buttons should be fitted under the till points and in the management office so that staff can alert other staff members that assistance is required.

4.7 CCTV

- ☐ A CCTV system should be installed. Externally, the system should be capable of monitoring all facades of the building, the service bay, the car, motorcycle and bicycle parking, the vehicle and pedestrian entrances. Internally, the system should be capable of monitoring the entrance and exit doors, all other external doors, till points, circulation aisles, and the warehouse.

4.8 Boundaries

- ☐ The perimeter of the car park should be defined with a 1000mm high railing.
- ☐ The service bay should be enclosed with a 2400mm high, welded wire mesh fence and matching vehicle gates.
- ☐ Exposed hinges and large, sliding bolt apertures/locking points on the gates securing the service bay, and those of the gates securing the service pathway on the eastern side of the building, should be avoided. Alternatively locking points should be fitted with shrouding/protective plates to avoid the creation of footholds.

4.9 Car park

- ☐ Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated to avoid confusion or conflict, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.
- ☐ Traffic calming measures should be incorporated to limit the speed of vehicles within the site.

4.10 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to the car park should be in accordance with BS 5489, with an average lux level 20 and a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ Dusk-to-dawn, low-intensity lighting, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors, shutters and gates, and to all elevations of the building.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over fencing or gates.

4.11 Landscaping

- ☐ Traffic calming should be introduced to reduce vehicle speeds at appropriate places along the service road.
- ☐ In order to promote natural and electronic surveillance of the site, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground.

4.12 Other

- ☐ Shopping trolleys should be secured at night/when the store is closed to prevent theft/abuse.

5 Construction

- ☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in and out. The contractor on this scheme should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme' and Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority, SIA, approved (see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

6 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
05/12/2024	Caroline Tamwoth	Request for Crime Impact Statement

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
7123-SMR-66-ZZ-DR-A-8003-S2-	PROPOSED SITE PLAN OPTION 2		C1

In the event of any changes to the scheme, it may be necessary for Design for Security to review the recommendations made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions	Date
A		