



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Land bound by Postal Street, Newton Street, Dean Street and Faraday Street, Manchester

126 No. Apartments & 711sq m Ground Floor
Commercial Floorspace

FOR: THIS CITY

Greater Manchester Police
designforsecurity

VERSION A: 7th February 2025

REFERENCE: 2022/0223/CIS/01

Land bound by Postal Street, Newton Street, Dean Street and Faraday Street, Manchester

2022/0223/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Design changes not required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed scheme has been found generally acceptable with some recommendations made to enhance the security of the building. If the proposals are submitted to the local planning department in its current form we will support the application.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Appendix 2 of this report.



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
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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the city centre of Manchester, within the Northern Quarter area.

The site has is rectangular and the site boundaries are formed by Postal Street to the North, Dean Street to the East, Faraday Street to the South, and Newton Street to the West.

The site has previously been developed with industrial units, which have subsequently been demolished, and a surface car parking area to the rear. The site is presently hoarded with a metal vehicular gate to the rear. The site hoarding has been heavily graffitied, which is not usual for the local area, but there were no other obvious signs of antisocial or criminal behaviour.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st January 2024 to 31st December 2024.

Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
31	112	245	1,695	550	212	45	246	24	73

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime over the past 12 months has been high, which is to be expected given that the site is located in the city centre. Less serious wounding, criminal damage and theft have been the highest recorded offences taking place. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres where there is a higher concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a higher number of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding offences have occurred throughout the local area, with a higher concentration to the south and west of the site towards the city centre. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most reported less serious wounding, with incidents often occurring over the weekend period in the evening and late at night and alcohol consumption being a factor.
- 2.1.3 Theft offences have also occurred all throughout the local area. Offenders have used distraction and pickpocketing techniques in order to remove items stored on the person within crowded spaces such as bars or restaurants. Offenders have also targeted insecure items on tables and benches in public spaces, retail outlets and restaurants, as well as parcels left on doorsteps and in communal areas of apartment buildings.
- 2.1.4 Theft from motor vehicle has been the most reported vehicle crime taking place. Offenders have targeted vehicles parked on the streets and within parking facilities throughout the local area. Offenders have in most cases used implements in order to smash glazing in the windows before removing items from within, as well used tools to remove vehicle parts and registration plates.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to apartments
Possible Solution - All apartment entrance doorsets should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. BS PAS 24). External doors should be located where they can be overlooked by other properties or be seen from the public highway. External doors should be illuminated with a dedicated lighting source.
- 2.2.2 Entering apartment buildings by means of insecure doors/ tailgating residents and gaining access to communal areas.
Possible Solution - There should be two access controlled secure doorsets restricting access to the circulation core of the building to reduce the possibility of would-be offenders from tailgating residents and visitors into the building.
- 2.2.3 Posing as a legitimate customer and gaining access to staff only areas by means of tailgating staff and exploitation of insecure doors.
Possible Solution – Any staff-only areas should operate on an access control system with access restricted to authorised personnel.
- 2.2.4 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors to gain access into communal areas and apartments
Possible Solution – All ground floor communal doors should be fitted with door closers and lock automatically, to prevent these doors from being left open and insecure. Any publicly accessible apartment entrance doors should be fitted with a split-spindle, or fixed external handle, to prevent them from being opened from the outside when unlocked. Any accessible windows should be restricted in opening to prevent them from being fully opened if left insecure.
- 2.2.5 Theft of parcels from communal areas

Possible solution – There should be a secure parcel store with access restricted to residents. The parcel store should be covered by CCTV which can be reviewed in the event a parcel goes missing.

2.2.6 Forcing open secure shutters using bodily pressure and implements in order to access the doors/windows behind

Possible Solution - Any shutters should conform to a recognised security standard such as LPS 1175 SR 2.

2.3 Risk Factors - Residential

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems





2.4 Risk Factors - Retail

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer / staff property
- Criminal damage to property

2.5 Crime Rate Comparison


The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.5.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **82% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **76% lower** than Greater Manchester and **76% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **18% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **12% higher** than Greater Manchester and **114% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **29% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **7% lower** than Greater Manchester and **13% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **15% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **90% higher** than Greater Manchester and **130% higher** than England & Wales.

2.6 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.






2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary is highest on Sunday just after midnight (00:00-01:00). Offenders often target dwellings late at night when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

- 2.6.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:
- In cases where the entry point is recorded as "unknown", it is likely that the offender has exploited insecure windows and doors.
 - Smashed glazing in windows and doors.
 - Using bodily pressure or implements in order to force open secure windows and doors.

2.7 Non-Burglary Risk Analysis – Retail Premises

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.7.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed, and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.7.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:

- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating / exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.
- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

2.8 Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.8.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses, and bags.

2.9 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.9.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on Monday in the evening (18:00-19:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is an 8 storey building comprising 126 apartments, 711 sqm of ground floor commercial floorspace (up to 3 units), cycle parking and other associated works. The Application Site is in the Northern Quarter bounded by Postal Street to the east, Newton Street to the north, Faraday Street to the west and Dean Street to the south.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The site is located in a prominent location at the junction of Newton Street and Postal Street. Newton Street is one of the main routes into the city from the North and is subject to high levels of vehicular and pedestrian traffic, which will provide the development with high levels of passive surveillance.
- 3.2.2 The mix of uses will generate activity at different times of the day, which will deter offenders from targeting the building.
- 3.2.3 The proposed building will have active frontages to Newton Street and Dean Street, with some overlooking of Faraday Street. This will allow those in the building to view the external spaces which can deter offenders from operating in the area, it will also make use of the public footway around the building feel safer for pedestrians.
- 3.2.4 There will be a secure cycle store for residents of the building, allowing them to store their bicycles securely within the building.
- 3.2.5 The first floor roof level on Dean Street is more than 4000mm from the ground level and is unlikely to be easily climbed, even with a climbing aid such as a Eurobin which an offender might be able to find in the local area. There are also no features in the design of the building, or brickwork, which could facilitate climbing.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

Residential

- 3.3.1 The main communal entrance is recessed which could potentially generate antisocial behaviour. The depth and shape of the recess does make it unlikely that it would generate more significant issues such as vagrancy or drug/alcohol consumption, but it is highly recommended that it is illuminated to deter potential offenders or those antisocially minded.
- 3.3.2 External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- 3.3.3 Access into the buildings should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- 3.3.4 To prevent tailgating into the building there should be a secure lobby, with a residents/visitors passing through a second access control security rated door before they can enter the stair/lift core of the building.
- 3.3.5 Postal workers should not be allowed unfettered access throughout the development. Postal workers should be granted access only to the post rooms only or mail/parcels should be delivered directly to the concierge.
- 3.3.6 There should be a parcel store or locker for parcels to be stored securely if they are delivered when a resident isn't home, rather than being left insecure in communal areas of the building.

- 3.3.7 The door into the cycle store should be illuminated to a high standard for it to be used safely when it is dark.

Commercial unit

- 3.3.8 The commercial unit should have intruder alarms installed or the infrastructure for tenants to easily install an alarm.
- 3.3.9 The infrastructure should be provided for tenants to install a CCTV system and access control.

4 Physical Security (Residential)

In addition to the layout issues highlighted in section 3, the following checklist (sections 4-7) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access into the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. Apartment entrance doors must have a door viewer.
- ☐ Construction of internal walls surrounding internal apartment entrance doors (600mm either side of the door set) should incorporate a resilient layer to reduce the risk of anyone breaking through the wall to access the locking mechanism. The resilient layer should be timber (minimum thickness of 9mm) or expanded metal.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind or within any new cladding/insulated panels to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - Communal entrances
 - Communal areas
 - Bicycle stores
 - Circulation cores
 - Staff only areas
 - Parcel rooms

4.6 Bicycle Stores

- ☐ Doors into the cycle parking area(s) must be certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, with access restricted to registered residents (i.e. genuine bicycle owners).
- ☐ Cycle stands should either be U-profile or Sheffield style stands. If rack storage is used it should be possible for both wheels and the frame to be secured.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the development in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting should be taken from a variety of sources and levels (i.e. columns, up lighting) to provide a greater level of coverage and avoid shadows/pooling.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Elevations of the buildings should be illuminated.

4.8 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images, then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals.
- ☐ Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

5 Physical Security (Commercial Unit)

5.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2. Staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day and night. The main sliding entrance doors should be capable of being controlled by reception staff if required (e.g. at night) to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobby.
- ☐ Sliding/revolving doors should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

5.2 Windows, Building Fabric & Shutters

- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

5.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

5.4 Alarms

- ☐ The commercial unit should have intruder alarms installed or the infrastructure for tenants to easily install an alarm.

5.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - External doors
 - Staff areas
- ☐ If access control is to be fitted out by the tenant then the infrastructure for tenants to easily install an access control system should be provided.

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 6.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
	Deloitte	CIS application received
23/01/2025	Hawkins Brown	Meeting

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
POST-HBA-ZZ-00-DR-A-20-0001	Proposed Site Plan		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		