



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

EQUITABLE BUILDING, 7-9 ST. ANN STREET, MANCHESTER
REDEVELOPMENT OF UPPER FLOORS TO PROVIDE
RESIDENTIAL APARTMENTS

Greater Manchester Police
designforsecurity

FOR: PH Property Holdings
VERSION B: 16/12/2024
REFERENCE: 2017/0784/CIS/02

Equitable Building, 7-9 St Ann Street, Manchester

URN: 2017/0784/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Design changes/security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is only considered acceptable if the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- The proposed shared entrance/access serving the first floor jewellers premises and upper floor apartments could provide opportunities for offenders to exploit. There must be entirely separate external entrances, entrance lobbies and stair/lift access cores serving the residential and commercial uses of the building. The residential entrance itself should be operated via robust video access controls, with a secure system for the delivery of post/parcels. Access to the first floor commercial space should be gained through the existing ground floor retail premises or via an entirely separate entrance and access core.
- It should not be possible to gain internal access between the commercial uses (including at basement, ground and first floor levels) and the residential use within the building or vice versa.
- The courtyard to the rear of the building must be secured and access to it robustly controlled, in order to prevent unauthorised access.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site is bounded by St. Ann Street to the south, St. Ann's Square to the east and Barton Square to the west, in the heart of Manchester city centre.




It is formed by the Equitable Building – a 4 storey building at the south-west corner of St. Ann's Square. The ground floor of the building is occupied by 2 no. jewellery stores with retail frontages onto St. Ann's Square and St. Ann Street. The upper floors are largely vacant or in use for storage related to the ground floor retail uses. There is a narrow service courtyard to the rear of the building (shared with other premises), secured with an ornate full-height gate off Barton Square.

The building sits within the St. Ann's Square Conservation Area, including a number of listed buildings and the Grade I St. Ann's Church (to the south-east), but is not listed itself.

The southern and eastern elevations of the building abut busy routes/public squares that benefit from good levels of activity, footfall, passive surveillance and direct overlooking – particularly during the day. There is a mix of retail, commercial, food & beverage and office uses surrounding and opposite the site.

Barton Square to the immediate west of the building is a much narrower rear access/servicing route that benefits from limited levels of activity, surveillance and overlooking. It largely serves the rear of the commercial premises fronting onto St. Ann's Square and Deansgate and is flanked by largely blank facades, featuring rear door and window openings secured by shutters/bars/grilles or blocked up altogether. It also features sheltered, recessed doorways that have been the subject of some abuse (such as damage/graffiti and mis-use) and many of the units along the route store their bins externally along the street – further impeding surveillance opportunities and providing opportunities for mis-use and scaling.

There are many similar 'back' streets within the city centre, which have limited levels of pedestrian footfall and vehicular movement, particularly at night, and this can leave buildings potentially vulnerable to unauthorised access or damage unseen, as well as to nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues, and can leave pedestrians using them somewhat remote/isolated.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st August 2023 to 31st September 2024.



2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
12	185	270	2,050	771	171	48	311	34	81



- 2.1.1 In the local area, the volume of crime is very high, particularly the levels of violence and theft, reflecting the site's location within the city centre. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of city centres – where there is a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of such crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding offences have occurred throughout the local area, with particular concentrations around/off Quay Street, Deansgate and Market Street - the majority of which have involved disputes between known associates or customers within retail outlets, restaurants and bars, with alcohol consumption often being a factor. Recorded thefts have been concentrated in the same areas, which have a high volume of footfall due a concentration of public transport links, licenced premises, restaurants and retail premises. Offenders have primarily used pick-pocketing techniques and distraction methods to obtain personal belongings, mostly mobile phones, bags and purses/wallets. Offenders have also targeted insecure items (particularly mobile phones) left on or under tables in bars and restaurants.
- 2.1.3 As this CIS report relates to a proposed residential development, the more detailed analysis below will focus on local domestic burglary.

2.2 Crime Rate Comparison (Local Area)

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **93% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **91% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **90% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **87% higher** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **154% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **385% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.



- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **45% higher** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **90% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **131% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **256% higher** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **487% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **613% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.

- 2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** There have been relatively few incidents of domestic burglary within the study area and, as can be seen above, the local rate of residential burglary is much lower than the average rates for Manchester and Greater Manchester as a whole. This likely because there are relatively few residential units within the study area (which is dominated by commercial uses) and that these are formed largely by apartments – which are typically the target of burglaries less frequently than houses.
- 2.3.2 When analysing those that have occurred, the risk peaks on Sunday during the week and around late morning and late at night during the day. During the day, residents are more likely to be away from home (at work or otherwise) and offenders can attempt to gain access without fear of being disturbed. At night, when it is dark and streets are typically quieter than during the day, offenders can perceive a lower risk of being observed or identified.
- 2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:
- In the majority of cases, the entry point is unknown. Offenders are likely to have exploited insecure doors or windows, posed as legitimate visitors or tailgated residents to gain unauthorised access without being noticed.
 - Doors have been forced open with implements and/or bodily pressure.

2.4 General Risk Factors

- 2.4.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:
- Domestic burglary
 - Bogus callers and distraction burglary
 - Criminal damage to property and vehicles
 - Anti-social behaviour
 - Theft of/from parked vehicles
 - Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
 - Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
 - Neighbour disputes
 - Poor maintenance of access control systems

-
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.5 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.5.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting residential properties are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- In the majority of cases, the entry point is unknown. Offenders are likely to have exploited insecure doors or windows, posed as legitimate visitors or tailgated residents to gain unauthorised access without being noticed.

Possible Solution - A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to the apartment block before allowing them access (see Section 4.1). The main communal entrance to the block should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed.

- Doors have been forced open with implements and/or bodily pressure.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to convert (and potentially extend) the upper floors of the Equitable Building to form residential apartments, including the formation of a new entrance, building repairs and associated works.
- 3.1.2 Part of the ground floor of the building is currently occupied by jewellers David M Robinson, who are proposing to expand to the first floor of the building (to provide additional luxury retail space and a Service Centre). As the expansion remains within Use Class E, planning permission is not required. The proposed entrance will be located at the junction of St. Ann Street and Barton Square and is proposed to be shared between David M Robinson and the residential apartments. There will be an entrance foyer at ground level, providing access to a stair and lift for DMR staff and apartment residents/visitors. A first floor landing will provide access to the commercial spaces and a stairwell serving the 1, 2 & 3 bed upper floor apartments.
- 3.1.3 A new residential fire escape stair will be added within the existing gated courtyard space to the rear of the building, along with a new single-storey infill to accommodate cycle and bin stores. The basement of the building will house plant/water tanks for the development, alongside other areas serving the ground floor commercial units.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring the largely vacant upper floors of the building back into use and will provide additional activity, overlooking and surveillance to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The main entrance to the scheme will be in a prominent position, capable of being well-overlooked from the adjacent routes/public realm.
- 3.2.3 The proposed apartments will be provided well-above street level, meaning that residents' possessions cannot be easily observed and unauthorised entry is more effectively deterred. This also reduces the potential impacts of excessive noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).
- 3.2.4 The rear courtyard space, containing the residential cycle/bin stores, is capable of being secured to prevent unauthorised access.
- 3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design/construction of the scheme. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design/specification of the scheme can ensure it is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 As proposed, the main communal entrance serving the upper floor residential apartments (located at the junction of St. Ann Street and Barton Square) will also serve the proposed first floor commercial space (to be occupied by the existing ground floor jewellers). This arrangement could provide opportunities for offenders to exploit. Residents and visitors (and anyone who may have gained illegitimate access e.g. forced entry, posed as legitimate visitor, tailgated etc.) will be able to gain access to the internal entrances of the commercial premises and attempt to gain access to them without being noticed. This is particularly of concern given the high-end jewellery nature of the business, meaning the premises will contain desirable/high value items that could be targeted by non-opportunist offenders. The arrangement will could also provide the opportunity for commercial staff/visitors to gain access to residential floors. There must be entirely separate external entrances, entrance lobbies and stair/lift access cores serving the residential and commercial uses of the building. This will eliminate any confusion/conflict, prevent any residents or visitors gaining unauthorised access to the commercial areas and prevent commercial staff or patrons gaining unauthorised access to the residential floors. The main residential entrance itself should be formed by a single-leaf, self-closing, security-certified

doorset secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, which is easier to secure and operate remotely via an access control system (see Section 4.1). There should also be a secure system for the delivery of post that does not require access to all floors of the building. Given the emerging trend for parcel thefts, there should also be a secure system for depositing parcels (again, see Section 4.1 for more information). Access to the first floor commercial space should be gained through the existing ground floor retail premises or via an entirely separate entrance and access core.

- 3.3.2 It should not be possible to gain internal access between the commercial uses (including at basement, ground and first floor levels) and the residential use within the building or vice versa. Ideally, the residential and commercial uses, including any access to escape cores or to plant areas, should be entirely separate to prevent unauthorised access. Where this is not possible, any internal doors between uses (e.g. to allow emergency egress or service access) should be security-certified (see Sections 4.1) and alarmed, with signage to prevent mis-use. Internal walls between uses should also be robust enough to withstand penetration (see Section 4.3).
- 3.3.3 The courtyard to the rear of the building must be robustly secured to prevent unauthorised access (see Section 4.4) and access to the resident-only cycle and bin stores should also be robustly controlled to prevent theft or mis-use.
- 3.3.4 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All external doorsets should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery. Security-certified louvered doorsets are also available if required to cycle/bin store (see www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search for SBD-compliant products).
- ☐ The main communal entrance serving the apartments should be security-certified (see above), single-leaf, self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The entrance should be controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access.
- ☐ There should be a secure system for the delivery of post without needing to provide access to all floors of the building. Where possible, postal delivery arrangements should allow for external deposits and internal withdrawals by residents. Where this is not practical, there should be a 'secure lobby' arrangement, with a secondary communal door to the same security specification as the outer door, to allow for deliveries to postboxes within a secure postal lobby without providing access to other areas/floors of the building. The postboxes themselves should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). There should also be a secure system for depositing parcels within the secure postal lobby, such as the smart parcel boxes used by the major internet shopping companies. All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access control system.
- ☐ All internal apartment entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead. Chain limiters are recommended, but not generally essential.
- ☐ Any internal doorsets between residential and commercial uses (e.g. at basement level providing emergency egress/service access) should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 201/2 or LPS 1175 SR2, in order to prevent unauthorised access between the residential and commercial uses of the building. The escape ironmongery should be permitted under the security certification of the product and they should be alarmed (and signed as such) to deter casual use. Once a resident/visitor/staff member enters a dedicated escape core, the only means of egress should be externally at ground level.
- ☐ The external doorset to cycle/bin stores should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2, self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, operated by resident key-fob. The gate into the courtyard space should also be secured in the same way (see Section 4.4 below). Further information relating to the cycle store can be found within Section 4.7.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ All ground floor/accessible windows should be certificated to BS PAS 24 where possible. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be fixed with a secure glazing retention system (e.g. with security glazing tape, with a dedicated security sealant/gasket or a secure mechanical fixing system from the glazing retention tests within the BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 standards).

- ☐ If any existing ground floor/accessible windows are to be retained, there should be internal secondary glazing units installed certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR1 (e.g. <http://www.selectaglaze.co.uk/benefits/security-secondary-glazing>), which should incorporate laminated glazing (see below).

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Any ground floor/accessible glazing should incorporate an inner pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining outer pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Internal walls between the residential and commercial portions of the building should either be of robust masonry construction or should incorporate timber sheathing (minimum 9mm thick) or expanded metal, in order to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack/penetration.

4.4 Boundaries

- ☐ The existing courtyard to the rear of the building should be secured with a full-height steel/wrought-iron vehicular gate off Barton Square as it is at present, secured with key operated locks. It should only be used when required for servicing activities, must never be left insecure/unattended and should be secure at all other times.
- ☐ A smaller pedestrian wicket gate within the larger vehicular gate should be utilised for residential access to the cycle/bin store. It should also be of steel/wrought-iron construction, self-closing/locking and 'slam-to-lock' (i.e. secured with an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, fob/key operated from both sides) that cannot be left insecure. If a release mechanism is required on the internal side of the gate for emergency egress purposes, it must not be capable of being reached/operated from the external face of the gate.
- ☐ Mid-point horizontal elements, exposed hinges and large apertures/locking points to any gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates to avoid the creation of footholds (see illustration opposite). The gaps at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.
- ☐ The gates should be regularly maintained and immediately repaired/replaced if they fail, in order to continue preventing unauthorised access to the courtyard.



4.5 Alarms

- ☐ Each apartment should have an intruder alarm to comply with BS EN 50131 for wired or wireless systems. They should be linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors should cover any accessible rooms with windows.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must also be provided to all external doors/gates, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light, and fixtures must not be positioned where they may provide climbing aids up to high level windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

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- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
 - ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
 - ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an **acceptable standard** that will allow for **identification** of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are **overview** and **recognition**, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
 - ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: **the main residential entrance doorset/lobby, the rear courtyard and access to the residential cycle/bin stores and any internal doorsets between residential and commercial uses (for emergency egress/servicing access only).**

4.8 Other

- ☐ The secure residential cycle store should include either secure lockers or stands that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.
- ☐ A strategy should be prepared to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of any residential development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Repairs to communal areas (access controls, lighting, CCTV, signage etc.)
- Litter/graffiti removal

Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
28 th August 2024	Iceni Projects	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
28 th August 2024	Iceni Projects	Quote issued & request for additional info
28 th August 2024	Iceni Projects	Confirmation of instruction/fee & receipt of additional plans/info
11 th September 2024	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment
18 th to 23 rd September 2024	Iceni Projects	Email correspondence re: timescales
25 th September 2024	Iceni Projects	Version A of CIS report issued
31 st October 2024	Iceni Projects, Jeffrey Bell Architects & PH Property Holdings	Teams meetings to discuss issues raised in CIS
27 th to 28 th November 2024	Iceni Projects	Email correspondence outlining Security Strategy discussed and agreed in principle at meeting
12 th December 2024	Iceni Projects	Receipt of email re: two planning applications to be submitted – one with rooftop extension & one without. Plans received for each application & request to amend CIS accordingly

B CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Minor amendments to wording so that CIS can accompany both planning applications – one with rooftop extension and one without	16/12/2024

C Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk