



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

263 Wilmslow Road

New Lidl foodstore

FOR: RAPLEYS LLP

VERSION A:16/09/2024

REFERENCE: 2024/0279/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

263 Wilmslow Road

2024/0279/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported

The scheme has been well designed, will add activity, natural surveillance, and incorporate crime prevention measures and generate retail business to this area.

The layout of the proposed development is an improvement on that which currently occupies the site. There is also an opportunity to include measures which will greatly improve the security of the site more generally, and of the quality of the environment on and around the site.

We are happy to support the development subject to suitably addressing the recommendations that are set out in section 3.3 of this report and following the physical security specification set out in section 4. The principal recommendations include:

- The appointment of a security guard in the Lidl store
- The inclusion of suitable boundary fencing and secure gate
- Installing security rated entrance and escape doors, glazing and shutters
- Securing the staff welfare area and manager's office
- Installing appropriate lighting, CCTV and intruder alarm systems

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will support the application and request that conditions be included requiring any outstanding security issues are appropriately addressed and requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

Matthew Granelli

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit



The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is located on the busy Wilmslow Road a residential district located in the district of Rusholme.

The perimeter of the site to Wilmslow Road is defined with a metal fence and two metal gates. The remaining boundaries are formed mainly of masonry walls. Part of the north boundary which is shared with the surface level carpark next door in a mixture of metal railing and concrete panel infills between concrete posts.

The site is served by bus routes along the Wilmslow Rd, with bus stops in close proximity.

The surrounding area is predominately residential and retail, offering a mixture of private and social housing typologies. There are a number of retail premises to the north of the site.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st September 2023 to 31st August 2024.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
66	16	49	315	50	38	16	65	19	19

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the past 12 months is above average for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding, domestic burglary and vehicle crime having been most commonly reported. These offences have taken place all throughout the local area, particularly to the north of the site at locations along and close to Wilmslow Road.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding offences have occurred in the residential neighbourhoods surrounding the site, particularly to the north along Wilmslow Road. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most reported, with the majority of incidents involving disputes between known associates and neighbours, as well as some cases of domestic violence.
- 2.1.3 Domestic burglary offences have also occurred throughout the residential areas surrounding the site. Offenders have in most used implements in order to gain access to properties via secure doors and windows.
- 2.1.4 Theft from motor vehicle has been the most reported vehicle crime taking place, whereby offenders have targeted vehicles parked on the streets throughout the local area, particularly at a hotspot of offences to the northeast around Claremont Road. Offenders have in most cases used implements in order to bypass the locks on car doors or smashed glazing in the windows before removing items from within, as well as used tools to remove vehicle parts and registration plates.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Offender's scaling buildings to gain unauthorised access to/through roof areas.

Possible Solution – care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas are not accessible, for example with the use of high-level/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard/soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any 'accessible' skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing and should be secured with internally fixed grilles/bars to prevent unauthorised access. The construction of the roof itself should be robust enough to withstand penetration.

2.2.2 Use of implements or power tools to force open or cut through shutters.

Possible Solution – Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see appendix 2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines

2.2.3 Doors have been forced open with tools and locks have been smashed to gain entry.

Possible Solution - To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 sr2 standard; and
- external doors should be placed where they can be readily observed by staff or monitored by CCTV and fitted with alarm contacts.

2.2.4 Shutters have been forced upwards by offenders.

Possible Solution - To minimise the risk of offenders forcing shutters:

- *security-certified roller shutters (to LPS 1175) should be used wherever possible;*
- *where size limits the availability of certified shutters, intruder alarms, CCTV and lighting should be deployed to increase the security of these larger openings; and*
- *anti-ram bollards or barriers should be deployed to help secure the most vulnerable shutters.*

2.2.5 Smashing through walls using implements such as sledgehammers to break through walls.

Possible Solution - To minimise the risk of offenders forcing walls, roofs shutters and gates:

- *security-certified fencing/gates (to LPS 1175) and should be used to secure service areas - sliding gates tend to be more secure than hinged gates;*
- *steel frame buildings, faced with a proprietary cladding system, should include a 2000mm high brick or blockwork base or a suitably robust inner layer of attack resistant material, e.g. expanded metal panels;*
- *roofs should be high enough that they are not easily accessible, comprise of a security-rated roofing system or include a sandwich of materials which makes them difficult to penetrate;*
- *secluded public passageways to the sides and rear of building should be avoided wherever possible; and*
- *all external doors should be illuminated by dusk-to-dawn lights.*

2.2.6 Offenders posing as legitimate customers before gaining access to unauthorised 'staff-only' areas to commit theft.

Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that callers to the building/site are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.

2.3 Risk Factors - Retail


The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer / staff property
- Criminal damage to property


2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary Risk Analysis – Retail Premises

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.


Retail Burglary – Day Range



Retail Burglary – Time Range



Retail Burglary – Point of Entry





2.4.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed, and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:

- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating / exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.
- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

2.5 Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.5.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses, and bags.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Tuesday and Sunday in the evening (21:00-01:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development involves clearing the land of the existing building and the perimeter wall. Following this, a new Lidl store will be constructed on the site.
- 3.1.2 The building will feature shop floor areas, offices and staff facilities, deliveries yard and visitors car parking.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The new development will locate the retail building in the southern area of the site, set back from Wilmslow Road.
- 3.2.2 Front-of-house customer areas and back-of-house staff-only area are well-defined.
- 3.2.3 The main entrances to the proposed building will be in prominent, highly visible locations.
- 3.2.4 A combination of boundary treatments low brick walls to the site frontage presents an open & approachable development without stressing on the security measures. Additional fencing and boundary treatments prevent unfettered access out-of-hours to the bin store compound and secure fencing to the rear of the site, to prevent unauthorised access at all times.
- 3.2.5 Access to the rear of the site will be controlled by lockable gate, meaning the public will not have access to waste/recycling areas and rear of the building. Customer-only areas are well-defined.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 A thorough review of all boundaries and adjacent landscaping should be undertaken. Any proposed or existing landscaping should be maintained & managed so that it does not provide a climbing aid or hiding space.
- 3.3.2 Signage should be used to direct people through the development - to the appropriate parking spaces, service areas and office entrances.
- 3.3.3 Staff lockers should be provided, and in a location where there is a high level of activity and surveillance, so that staff can safely store personal items during the working day.
- 3.3.4 Internally, the buildings should be capable of zoning so that entry to parts of the premises can be effectively controlled. Movements in and out of the buildings should be confined to specific areas and access controls used to ensure only authorised staff can enter controlled areas.
- 3.3.5 The position of ancillary structures and temporary facilities, external storage, gardening and parking areas should be carefully considered in relation to the following:-
 - Potential to block sight lines and create hiding places
 - Potential to obscure CCTV and lighting
 - Potential to create climbing aids that would assist unauthorised exit / entry over boundary fencing.
 - Their potential to obscure damage to fence line.
- 3.3.6 It is essential that the back-of-house area to the rear of the site is enclosed with a robust, secure fencing system (see Section 4.5). High security rigid-panel welded-wire mesh fencing can often be less visually intrusive and provides much greater security than Palisade fencing, as it is harder to scale, penetrate or damage. Care should be taken to ensure any ground level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing over boundaries or leave space underneath fencing/gates that could leave the perimeters vulnerable to penetration. Any vegetation directly adjacent to fencing will need to be managed (see Section 4.8), in order to prevent it from causing/hiding damage to the fence line, forming a climbing aid or impeding surveillance.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors (single and double leaf) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery
- ☐ If the main entrances to the buildings are to be formed by sliding doors, these cannot be certified to the above standards. Any sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+), should incorporate laminated glazing, have multi-point locking (preventing sliding and lifting) and be protected by a shutter (certified to LPS 1775 SR2) out-of-hours.
- ☐ Any shutters/sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ A robust access control system should be employed, operable by staff swipe card or fob (rather than numeric key pads) preventing unauthorised access to staff-only areas. The following doors and gates should operate on access control:
 - Staff-only personnel doors;
 - Staff rest rooms/locker rooms;
 - Management/cash offices;
- ☐ Any cash offices/key stores should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false/suspended ceilings and a security-certified doorset (see above). A time-delay safe, certified to LPS 1183, is advised. The doors/frames to all other internal areas, offices, meeting rooms, general stores etc. should be robust/solid-core (minimum 44mm thick) and capable of being secured when unoccupied. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ All windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.
- ☐ Any ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should be lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind or within any cladding to the main showroom/workshop buildings, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the building fabric itself is not vulnerable to attack.
- ☐ Any louvres to the buildings should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid to reach upper floor windows or onto roof areas. Security-certified louvred doorsets are also available if required (e.g. <http://www.securedbydesign.com/members/premier-ss-ltd/>).

- ☐ The construction of any potentially accessible roof areas should also be carefully considered to prevent criminal intrusion. Certificated lightweight roof systems are available to LPS 1175 SR1. Alternatively, expanded metal or welded mesh should be incorporated between the skins of double-skinned roof coverings or within the roof space. The eaves of any single-storey elements should be as high as possible and design of the eaves themselves should also discourage climbing e.g. rounded/overhanging eaves. There should be no other features of the buildings (such as projecting window cills, canopies below the level of the single storey eaves, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids onto roof areas.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover each building, linked to contacts on all external doors/loading bay doors, PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows and the back-of-house perimeter fencing, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The back-of-house area to the rear of the site should be enclosed with high-security, rigid-panel welded-wire mesh fencing (ideally 358 gauge, with small apertures making it difficult to cut/scale and deterring throwing items to damage vehicles), to a minimum height of 2400mm. Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts (with anti-tamper fixings) and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points to gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The fencing/gates should also be located away from any other climbing aids, such as lighting columns, trees, junction boxes etc.
- ☐ The automatic vehicular sliding gate to the back-of-house area should also be 2400mm high, operated on access and egress by staff proximity reader/key fob or operated remotely by staff within the buildings (via a video access control system – so that delivery drivers can be vetted before being allowed access into the site). Any personnel gates should also be 2400mm high, self-closing/locking and fob-in/fob-out.
- ☐ The site boundary treatments should be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary.
- ☐ A perimeter protection system should be installed to relay information to the CCTV/alarm monitoring centre that there has been a perimeter security breach. The condition of fencing along the perimeter of the site should be regularly inspected for signs of damage/attack.
- ☐ Perimeter fencing (where exposed) should be protected on the inner side from potential damage from large vehicles, using crash barriers or rails to deflect any encroachment and maintain a secure boundary. The position of any ancillary structures (e.g. bin stores) and any external storage areas should be carefully considered in relation to the following:
 - Their potential to block sight lines and create hiding places.
 - Their potential to obscure CCTV and lighting.
 - Their potential to create climbing aids that would assist unauthorised exit/entry over boundary fencing.
 - Their potential to obscure damage to fence lines.

Any proposed lighting columns, street furniture, tree/shrub planting etc. within or external to the site perimeter should also be reviewed in relation to the above issues.

- ☐ The frontages of the site should be secured with bollards and retractable bollards/vehicle barriers at the vehicular entrances to the customer car parks/display areas, in order to prevent theft of vehicles and unauthorised vehicles getting close to the buildings out-of-hours.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all vehicular/pedestrian access routes and parking areas, in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting to all parking/vehicle display areas should display an average lux level of 20, with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors/shutters.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an [acceptable standard](#) that will allow for [identification](#) of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are '[Overview](#)' and '[Recognition](#)', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [all building entrances, circulation spaces \(internal and external\), key and parts/tools/materials stores and all vehicle parking/display areas.](#)

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around/adjacent to entrances, parking areas and footpaths any low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people, premises and vehicles (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

-
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.9 Other

- ☐ Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the site and the buildings, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only areas.
- ☐ Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- ☐ Any cycle parking areas should be well-overlooked from the buildings and should include 'Sheffield' stands, which both wheels and the crossbar can be locked to rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/downloads>

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
30/07/24	Rapleys	CIS Application
30/07/24	DfS	CIS Fee Proposal
27/08/24	Rapleys	CIS Confirmation
11/09/24	DfS	Site Visit

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
P402	Proposed Setting Out Site Plan		
F413	Proposed Setting Out Site Plan- Option 10 2x5m parking		
F101	Proposed Ground Floor Plan		
F102	Proposed First Floor Plan		
F103	Proposed Roof Plan		
F301	Proposed Sections		
F200	Proposed Elevations		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		