
Crime Impact Statement

Site/Project:	Development of three floors of existing office space into a series of self-contained flats. A rear roof extension and the addition a further floor in the roof space.
Location:	82-84 Market Street, Manchester, M1 1PD.
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Contents

1. Introduction	2
2. Executive Summary	2
3. Proposal Overview	3
4. Site Analysis.....	4
5. Crime Analysis	8
6. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design	11
7. Recommendations	13
8. Conclusion	14
9. Appendices.....	14
1. References	14
2. Secured by Design testing standards.....	15
3. Assessor/Author Qualifications	16

1: Introduction

This Crime Impact Statement:

- Has been produced by Dobson Owens Security Consultants, an independent consultancy who have not been involved in the design process prior to this instruction.
- Analyses the existing crime and disorder in the surrounding areas to the site and any potential impacting factors.
- Assesses the proposed development against the principles of CPTED (Crime Prevention through Environment Design) to offer proposals to reduce opportunities and the negative perception or fear of crime.
- Provides recommendations to reduce the proposed development's and the surrounding area's vulnerability to crime.
- Provides physical security standards based upon the Secured by Design test standards and British Standards/PAS.
- Will assist in reducing resistance to the development from the local communities and help maintain positive links between the developer and the affected stakeholders.

2: Executive Summary


This application has been assessed against the existing crime environment and the potential concerns created by project activity and proposed residential use. It is concluded that efforts have been made to negate such concerns through thoughtful design and to reduce opportunities for crime and fear of crime.

A crime analysis in the immediate vicinity of the proposed site and broader neighbourhood area has been conducted in line with the anticipated use and controls from the proposal. Based on this intelligence and given the existing vacant status and deteriorating condition of the external areas, and the similar function/design of neighbouring/nearby properties, this development will not negatively impact crime. Indeed, it will likely have a positive influence on the site and area by providing a more formal function that creates community reinforcement.

3: Proposal Overview


The proposed site is located in the city centre of Manchester at 82-84 Market Street, M1 1PD. Transport links are therefore excellent, with strong road networks, including the inner-city ring road, bus, tram, and rail, which are easily accessible.

The site falls into the Greater Manchester Police jurisdiction within the City of Manchester area and the Commercial District policing team. This is part of the Nth Manchester Division which is indicated on the below right map.



The building lies on Market Street, but also straddles Sickle Street as indicated in yellow below. Market Street is a pedestrianised route and access is gained by turning south onto Sickle Street and then entering the property at the rear.

Fountain Street to the east offers a vehicular access route, although this is part of a one-way system that flows south to north (indicated by blue arrows on the below right image). Access is provided by turning west onto Phoenix Street and then north onto Sickle Street. There is no through road onto Market Street and this is blocked by passive bollards.



The site is currently occupied by Greggs bakers at the ground floor level, but the remaining three floors are vacant offices. This application is to develop the existing office space into six self-contained flats (three one-bedroom and three two-bedroom) with a rear roof extension that will allow for a further two flats to be installed into the roof space. The Greggs/retail space is outside of the remit of this application.


4: Site Analysis

The proposed development is located in Manchester city centre within a main shopping/commercial district. National chain stores/services are abundant such as Barclays Bank, TK Max, O2, Marks and Spencer and Primark, which are all situated nearby. The Arndale Shopping Centre and food court are also a short distance away. The area obviously has a very urban feel, but there are pockets of residential areas in the upper levels of buildings as well as high-rise apartment blocks. The River Irwell is 500m to the west where there is a higher concentration of domestic properties. The upper levels of the neighbouring building (86-88 Market Street) have also recently been renovated into apartments.

Being in the city centre, the transport links are excellent with the with the A57(M) inner Manchester ring road 650m away. There are numerous bus and tram stops nearby with the St. Peter's Square Tram Interchange being 300m to the south. Manchester Picadilly and Manchester Victoria rail stations are also less than 750m from the site. Whilst such transport links provide easy access and multiple escape routes for adversaries, the prevalence of ANPR and associated traffic and public CCTV cameras in the area will offer additional detection capabilities.

As discussed above the buildings in the immediate vicinity of the site are largely commercial retail outlets with the shop fronts being located on the Market Street elevation. The Sickle Street entrance has very much a service feel. This area is currently quite unpleasant with large amounts of litter, refuse cages, waste skips and extensive graffiti markings, some of which have been recently painted over. Such characteristics are known to attract crime as they suggest that the area is uncared for and deviant behaviour will either go unnoticed or is tolerated. Sickle Street also facilitates rear access/emergency egress for several neighbouring buildings and some of these have developed secure refuse areas that improve the aesthetics of the area.

The pathway from Market Street has a similarly rundown feel with graffiti markings, and service cages and litter blocking access in areas. It is proposed that a street art mural be installed on the east wall (below right image) to help improve aesthetics and deter graffiti. Whilst there is some security and emergency lighting in the area, this would be isolated and quite dark overnight. The development of a residential facility, additional legitimate activity in the area and residual lighting from the residences on the east side of the building will aid this situation.



Given the central Manchester location, there are numerous notable venues and buildings of historical significance in the area. These include Manchester Cathedral, St. Peter's Square, the AO Arena and several museums and galleries. There are also two universities in the area; the University of Manchester and Salford University. Such attractions and organisations draw a broad dynamic of people, along with the commercial and business activities large cities such as this attract.

Greater Manchester Police City Centre Public Enquiry Counter is 500m to the south of the site. Whilst this is open 24 hours, it is not a fully operational police station and there are no longer prisoner cells in Manchester City Centre. A new high-tech custody suite at Pendleton, approximately two miles from the proposed site, is the main police hub for the area.

Being a city centre location there is a plethora of restaurants, bars and pubs and the proposed site would be on a through route to and from these. Similarly, being a large city in England, numerous festivals and events are held that draw people into the central areas. This makes terrorism a threat for the city.

Piccadilly Gardens is located 200m east of the proposed site and this is regularly used as a meeting/ending point for protest marches. There have been several violent and disruptive protests over the last two years and it is anticipated that these will continue for the foreseeable future.

Such activities from good-natured partiers to protest marches could lead to anti-social behaviour in the area or criminal damage against the building. However, this is deemed less likely if renovated, regularly occupied and fully maintained.

Pedestrian activity in this area will likely peak between 0830-0930 in the morning and 1600-1730 in the evening for people travelling into the city centre for work. However, given the shopping precinct, range of restaurants and bars, and the broad range of financial and business services operating in the proximity of the site, there will likely be steady activity throughout the day and evening, as well as on weekends. This provides the benefit of casual surveillance which is a key crime preventor.

However, the Sickle Street section of the site will be quieter and vehicular activity in this area is likely to be restricted to business hours. There is the potential for Phoenix Street and Sickle Street to be used as a pedestrian shortcut from Fountain Street to Market Street which will increase activity in the area. Improving the lighting and aesthetics along this route will encourage wider use and this will help reduce the fear of crime.

Site Perimeter and Building Shell

The building shell of the proposed site depicts the perimeter with the west elevation attached to the neighbouring building via a party wall.

The east side of the building lies on Sickle Street. This currently incorporates a rendered wall at ground level with no windows, which has suffered significantly from graffiti (see above image). The upper levels of the building are red brick with sash windows.



The north elevation features the Greggs shop front that lies on Market Street. This is outside of the remit for this development. The upper levels are again, red brick with sash windows with the top floor having an attractive arch style.

However, the roof is multi-layered and complex and offers climbing aids and potential access points. For example, there are multiple flat areas, including a roof garden, on adjacent buildings. For example, the below image shows how the roof next to the site can be accessed from the Market Street property, but also the office building off Marble Street. The layered roof subsequently provides multiple climbing points that will facilitate easy access onto the proposed site's roof and into the building.

The proposal includes a roof extension that will close off the roof patio area on the southeast side of the building where access could be gained into the building. However, the provision of roof lights and dormer windows potentially create a vulnerability. These should meet the minimum security standards outlined in Appendix 2, as should the planned service hatches into the plant equipment areas.





The south side of the building feeds off Sickle Street and is accessible from both Market Street from the north and Phoenix Street from the south.

The red brick façade continues on this side of the building and this is where the main entrance to the existing office facilities is located. However, there is also an internal access point from the rear of the Greggs shop. The entrance is currently caged with welded mesh panels and palisade fencing and an adjacent bin store.

Proposed Building Design and Footprint

The building footprint is consistent across all levels with a one-bedroom and a two-bedroom flat on each floor. Access will be via the south Sickle Street entrance. A new entrance porch will be installed with glazed double doors installed. Given the location and lack of natural surveillance in this area, especially overnight, it is advised that these are installed to the minimum security standards outlined in Appendix A and secured. Whilst this leads into a low-risk zone, anyone gaining access will subsequently be out of view from any passing pedestrian traffic and can subsequently spend time defeating the inner door unnoticed.

A porch canopy will be installed above this door and this should be thoughtfully designed so as not to provide a climbing aid to the first-floor windows (albeit these lead into the stairwell).



The porch provides access to the waste area, which allows refuse services to collect without accessing the main building.



The porch leads to the existing main entrance of the building, which will be widened. This door should be installed to external standards and robustly secured, preferably electronically with mechanical redundancy in case of system outage/failure. The door should be installed with an auto closer.

The main entrance feeds into a lobby area where a lift or stairs provide access to the upper levels of the building.

There are no ground floor windows and the access from the Greggs retail unit into the rear of the building will be blocked off. This limits the risk of Greggs staff, customers or an adversary breaking into the shop and subsequently gaining access to the residential areas.

On each level, there is an access door into a dedicated lobby for the two flats and this incorporates cycle storage. The lobby door will ideally be secured to restrict access to the residents of the two flats.

There is no parking allocated for the site, but there are numerous nearby car parking facilities. The robust public transport system would negate the need for a car for most residents and the small number of units proposed would likely have minimal impact on parking capacities for the area.





As previously highlighted, the application includes a roof extension that will cover the existing roof patio on the southeast side of the building. This will facilitate the renovation of the roof space into additional flats. This also has a positive impact on the vulnerabilities created by neighbouring roofs and potential access being gained into the building from these.

Given the accessibility of the roof, especially the retained flat roof section, the skylights, dormer windows and access hatches should fully meet security installation and locking standards.

5: Crime Analysis

5.1 Crime Statistics – Immediate site vicinity



A crime analysis of a 1.6kilometre (one mile) radius around the Market Street site has been completed. The above-left map demonstrates the area captured within this.

The map to the right shows the relative deprivation (English Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 2019) of the area of the proposed site. This highlights a very mixed picture with the immediate surroundings falling into the fourth most deprived decile. However, the one-mile radius around the site incorporates levels of deprivation from the eighth most deprived decile to the most deprived. This is indicative of a large city where there are very affluent areas such as the west side of central Manchester, as well as deprived areas such as those to the east and south. This is an important consideration as most crime and anti-social behaviour are likely to be constrained to more built-up areas and to be proportionally elevated in deprived areas.

Wider research from the Police.uk and the Greater Manchester Police websites have been used to establish policing priorities for the area and key crime threats.

Statistics have been compared between January 24 and December 24, and January 23 and December 23.

Crime Type	Total No. Crimes Jan 24 – Dec 24	Total No. Crimes Jan 23 – Dec 23	+/- %
Anti-social behaviour	4,536	4,385	+3%
Burglary	900	1,054	-15%
Robbery	774	878	-12%
Vehicle	2,305	3,362	-31%
Violent/sexual	5,882	5,949	-1%
Shoplifting	2,311	1,752	+32%
Criminal damage and arson	1,431	1,832	-22%
Other theft	3,180	3,833	-17%
Drugs	1,825	1,459	+25%
Cycle theft	339	371	-9%
Theft from person	2,688	3,745	-28%
Weapons	297	299	-1%
Public order	2,658	2,928	-9%
Other	2,296	2,750	-17%
Total	31,422	34,597	-9.1%

(Other crime includes crimes such fraud, forgery, going equipped and other Home Office notifiable crimes. Other theft includes theft from building and handling crimes). Statistics obtained from Greater Manchester Police

The above statistics show a very high level of crime with over 30,000 offences in both reporting periods. However, there has been a positive reduction of 9.1% (3,175 incidents) between 2023 and 2024. Crime rates generally decrease as you move away from London, but the prevalence of crime in this instance is indicative of the size of Manchester and the city centre location.

The data highlights violent and sexual crime as the most frequent category and this has shown a slight reduction of 1% or 67 incidents. Whilst this initially appears concerning, this category covers a variety of offences ranging from common assault to murder. This means that the offence does not necessarily need to be physically violent and can be threatening language or gestures that make another person think that they may be about to be attacked.

Anti-social behaviour is the second most common crime in the area and has increased by 3% or 151 occurrences. This category includes actions that harm or lack consideration for the well-being of others or any type of conduct that violates the basic rights of another person or considered to be disruptive to others in society. Given the city centre location of the site and the breadth of activities taking place in such a vibrant and multi-cultural area, these types of incidents would be expected.

It should also be noted that there is some crossover between anti-social behaviour and public order offences and these are often a precursor to the commission of other offences. For example, they could lead to or involve an assault, unlawful possession of a weapon or the causing of criminal damage.

Other categories of crime that are likely to impact the site include burglary, which has shown an encouraging decrease of 15% or 154 instances. It should be noted that this statistic includes both domestic and commercial burglary.

Similarly, criminal damage/arson also has the potential to impact the site, although this has also shown a considerable decrease of 22% or 401 crimes. Crimes involving drugs have increased by 25% or 366 incidents. Both of these categories of crime could be attracted by the site if it remains in its current unoccupied condition and the rear of the building having a generally unpleasant aesthetic.

5.2 Analysis of Impact of Proposed Site on Crime

Violent/Sexual Crime

As discussed above, this is the most prevalent crime in the reporting area and whilst the existing site in itself would likely have minimal negative impact on this, the rear access via a narrow alley and the subsequent blind entrance may create concern. Whilst there is some lighting in this area, it is likely still dark overnight with limited activity. It is undesirable to encourage use of such areas and cleaning and effective illumination of the access routes is essential to deter this type of crime and the fear of it.

However, the creation of residential units will help to increase legitimate activity and the flats with windows overlooking Sickle Street and the property entrance will provide residual illumination into the space when occupied. Residents are also likely to care for the adjacent areas and report issues which have not been previously highlighted. This negates the Rational Choice crime motivation theory that infers criminals

will be deterred if an activity is noticed and somebody reacts.

It should also be noted that the entrance area is a nicely sheltered environment that may attract vagrants, especially during the cold winter months. Whilst in many instances, vagrants are not violent and move on without contention, there may be occasions where this is not the case. The presence of vagrants also increases the perception and fear of crime.

It is therefore recommended that porch double doors are secured as this entrance lobby will offer a similarly attractive place for a vagrant to sleep.

It is important to be mindful that alcohol consumption can often lead to anti-social behaviour and violent incidents and whilst the site itself will not influence this, it could impact its users leaving or returning on an evening.

Anti-social Behaviour/Public order/Criminal Damage

There are extensive indicators of anti-social behaviour and criminal damage near the site, particularly along the Sickle Street access path and Pheonix Street. Contagion crime theory states that a lack of supervision or care of a space can lead to a rapid increase in lawlessness as it is perceived as unnoticed and accepted.

It is important to break this perception with well-maintained areas and a defined function for the building. The provision of a formal residential facility where tenants/owners actively maintain their property will help deter this type of crime.

Again, improved illumination and legitimate activity will also assist in this regard.

Within the application is a proposal to install a street art mural on the east elevation wall to enhance the aesthetics of the area and deter vandalism and graffiti. If this is completed by local artists, it will help instil pride and any locals who deface it will likely be shunned by the community.

Consideration as to how alcohol and the surrounding local environment may impact this type of crime at the site is similarly important. Being on a main thoroughfare through the city, it connects many routes from the local bars and restaurants to residential areas. Criminal damage or public order issues could occur on the journey home when perpetrators are under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

Crimes involving Drugs

Crimes involving drugs have increased by 25% over the reporting period. Drug dealing and use are prevalent in city centres, especially where there are affluent people and a thriving nightlife. Whilst the use of lower-category drugs such as marijuana is becoming more frequent and users are less cautious as to how they use it in public, efforts are still made to conceal the higher-category drug activities.

Hidden areas such as the Sickle Street elevations of the site are attractive for these types of transactions and actions as they will go relatively unnoticed and detected. This has a considerable impact on the perception and fear of crime.

Again, the provision of a well-lit and maintained area where there is a legitimate function and activity will deter this type of issue in the area.

Burglary

As highlighted in the overview section, burglary in the area has decreased by 15%.

The design of the proposed development provides a single formal entrance point off Sickle Street. This helps to control and monitor entry and exit arrangements. The current thoroughfare through the Greggs retail space will be blocked off to further funnel access through the main entrance.

There are no ground-floor windows that can be used to gain entry, although whether the proposed porch canopy provides a climbing aid to the first-floor windows should be considered (albeit these lead into the stairwell as opposed to directly into a residence).

Whilst the existing roof patio on the southeast corner of the building will have a new roof installed to mitigate access via neighbouring rooves, the provision of skylights and dormer windows creates vulnerabilities. These should be installed to minimum security standards.

Blocks of flats such as the ones proposed in this project tend to be less targeted than individual houses due to the community development and increased activity on site; it would be rare for all of the units to be unoccupied at the same time and so this increases the likelihood of an adversary being detected. The design of the building also allows enhanced compartmentalisation by floor if desired.

However, it is again noted that the main entrance is hidden from view and reinforces the need for security standard installations and locks as well as effective illumination.

Terrorism

Due to the location of the site being in Manchester city centre, the risk of terrorism cannot be discounted. Manchester has been targeted on previous occasions and there have been several high-profile arrests for commission, preparation and instigation of acts of terrorism.

However, the development of this property is not assessed to impact this type of crime.

5.3 Building Site

During the construction phase of the proposed site, there is a risk of burglary, theft (internal and external) and potentially sabotage of the site if the plans have been disputed publicly.

The site should be robustly hoarded with a single point of access and supplementary emergency exits as needed for health and safety. CCTV and security signage should be utilised to provide an active deterrent.


Care should also be taken to not leave facilitators for crime in view and accessible (e.g., tools, ladders, scaffold, pipes, bricks etc.).

6: Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)

The following section will analyse the proposed site in relation to the five core principles of CPTED.

Natural Surveillance

This principle is about increasing visibility to help ensure that deviant behaviour is noticed and this subsequently provides an active deterrent to potential adversaries. In this instance, creating clear lines of sight and providing visibility of the external areas from windows will increase the feeling of safety for legitimate users of the space.



The image to the left shows the surveillance achieved. The green arrows show observation points and natural surveillance into and out of the proposed site. The orange arrows provide good surveillance, but likely at limited times of the day. The red arrows show limitations in observation.

The general footprint of this building is challenging from a natural surveillance perspective, but all elevations of the building where there is an external wall, have numerous windows that offer visibility of the public streets outside. Due to the width of the path from Market Street to Sickie Street, upper-level windows may struggle to see this.

There are four windows on the first and second levels that look out into the external recessed entrance area, but these feed into the stairwell and so will have limited/part-time surveillance.

In addition, due to the accommodation being flats, the active zones are intermittent in terms of window visibility. For example, a kitchen is usually an active zone as it is frequently occupied and is often a thoroughfare to other areas of the property. In this instance, all of the kitchens are located in the core of the flat without a clear view through a window.

The building adjacent (86-88 Market Street – above Barclays Bank) has recently been renovated to create a series of apartments. However, these are holiday rentals via Kula Manchester and so occupancy will be intermittent. However, there are windows that point directly down the Sickie Street path and the top-floor apartments have balconies.

The building to the west that lies on Spring Gardens also has two windows that overlook the entrance area into the proposed site. These again appear to offer only part-time surveillance due to them being service areas or an emergency stairwell.

To the south on Phoenix Street, there is a high-rise multitenant office building. When occupied this provides clear views down Sickie Street, although these do not reach the recessed entrance area.

The activity at all times of the day, evening and to an extent, overnight on Market Street, will help deter adversary action on this side of the site. Criminals will be deterred where they feel they may be noticed. It should be noted that the upper levels of the adjacent properties are commercial as opposed to residential which again, will reduce a sense of guardianship in the area.

Overall, there are elements of good natural surveillance, but the entrance remains rather hidden from view and points of visibility are intermittent. However, given the existing arrangement where access is gained through a cage with no lighting, the proposal does reflect improvement for an awkward space. It is important that wider mitigations, such as effective illumination and CCTV, are considered to help deter adversaries and reinforce that they will be seen and detected.

Natural Access Control

This is the control of vehicles and pedestrians through structures such as physical barriers, lighting or landscaping. Where possible, access routes should be clearly delineated.

The proposed site complies well with this principle as there is only one access point into the building which is off Sickle Street. This makes control of access and monitoring of such much more effective.

The entrance porch door should be kept secure to minimise the lobby area being used by vagrants and to aid natural surveillance of the outer building shell. An adversary entering the lobby would be completely hidden from view and they could then spend time trying to defeat the inner door unobserved, which should also be robustly secured.

Management and Maintenance

One of the most positive reinforcers from a crime perspective is the provision of a formal function for a space and subsequently maintaining this. As areas of the site are currently unoccupied, their condition could deteriorate and attract crime. It is important that on completion, the physical environment is maintained to give the impression of care. Markers such as graffiti, litter or abandoned personal belongings can lead to an impression that this type of behaviour is tolerated and encourage further and elevated levels of criminal activity.

As a modern residential development, this is less likely to occur as in a commercial site as occupants will take pride in their new homes and develop a community feel. However, given the prevalence of retail and wider commercial activity in the area, the waste generated and management of this in the immediate area of the building should be monitored to ensure it does not detract from the aesthetics and environment for residents, and consequently attract crime.

Natural Territorial Reinforcement

There are two parts to Natural Territorial Reinforcement:

- Creation of a sense of ownership and security culture within the site
- Create a sense of owned space where space is clearly defined and strangers stand out

As mentioned above, a small residential development such as the proposed site will generally create a community and can identify out of the normal activity. Users get to know the routines of their neighbours and unusual activity is noticed.

The entrance to the site should be defined with good-quality signage that offers clear guidance as to the authority to enter.

Compartmentalisation

This is a fundamental security principle that develops concentric layers of protection around assets to delay an adversary and increase the likelihood of detection.

The compartmentalisation of the building is generally good with each area segregated from the next via formal doors that can be secured. This begins at the building shell with the entrance porch and then a subsequent door into the main building lobby. A stairwell/lift provides access to the upper floors of the building where there is an access door into the hallway where the entrances into the individual flats are subsequently secured. This creates nice layering and opportunities for wider protection as required.

7: Recommendations

The following recommendations have been synthesised from the previous analysis and are also based on the standards outlined in Appendix 1.

Site Perimeter/External Areas/Building Shell

- Porch canopy, down pipes and other external furniture should be thoughtfully designed to minimise climbing opportunities to the first-floor windows of the building.
- Installation of effective, uniform lighting that does not create pools of intense illumination, create silhouettes of oncoming people or temporarily blind through glare.
- Where possible, create external wall surfaces that are resistant to graffiti.
- Access doors into the porch should be kept secure. These should not be open access.
- The inner door and frame into the building stairwell/lift lobby should be of industry-standard quality (BS6375-2:2009) and access managed (electrical or mechanical) with a door closer effected to ensure security at all times.
- Apartment entrance doorsets should be to the same standard as an external front door situated on a street and should incorporate a suitable door opening restrictor (for example, door chain/bar) and some means whereby residents can observe who is at the door before it is opened. For example, a vision panel or fire-rated door viewer.
- A door entry system with a vandal-resistant external door entry panel with a linked camera should be provided at the main communal entrance of each block to enable audio/visual communication between visitors and residents within their apartments. There should be the ability to display the image of the caller before the call is answered and an automatic release button.
- Skylights, dormer windows and service hatches on the roof should meet minimum security requirements.
- Appropriate signage to advertise restricted access arrangements at the residential entrance.

Internal Areas

- Installation and commissioning of at least a Grade 2 intruder alarm system by an NSI Gold accredited contractor to each residential unit. This should not include any wireless devices.
This should provide BMS shell protection to the access door with volumetric redundancy installed adjacent to the door internally. Areas where windows or skylights are potentially accessible from external climbing aids should also have volumetric protection.

CCTV

- Due to the isolation of the main entrance to the building and lack of direct surveillance, it is advised that fixed CCTV units be installed to observe the external entrance area. These should be installed at a height that will resist vandalism, but not so high as to only capture the top of people's heads (circa 3m).
- An identify image purpose (100% target height) fixed unit should be installed inside the porch and inside the lift/stair lobby to obtain an image of all persons entering the building.

Wider Recommendations

- Consider securing the compartmentalising doors from the stairwell/lift lobby to the different floors in the apartment blocks. The number of apartments in each building falls below the threshold where this would normally be required, but is good practice and would enhance the security within the building.
- Installation of a bank of secure mailboxes located in an area that allows secure mail delivery accessed via a private dedicated entrance door. This should facilitate the delivery of mail and small packages.

Construction Phase

- Site perimeter should be fully hoarded with a single access and egress point for vehicles and pedestrians (emergency exits may be added, but these should remain secured from the inside and used only for emergency escape).
- Gates should effectively fit the openings and there should be no gaps to the side or underneath that are large enough for a small person to crawl through.
- Site offices should have good-quality locks installed and grilles on windows.
- Storage containers should be secured via a steel locking box and shutter padlock or a steel container lock.
- Consideration to be given to employing a site security officer, perimeter illumination and CCTV.
- Display a contact board outside the site at all times giving names and telephone numbers of staff who can easily be contacted to respond to any concerns of the Police.
- The contractor should endeavour to maintain a tidy site that minimises loose debris that could be used as a facilitator of a crime by vandals.

8: Conclusion

This application has been assessed against the existing crime environment and the potential concerns created by the proposed site. It is concluded that given the existing vacant status and deteriorating condition of the external areas, and the similar function/design of neighbouring/nearby properties, this development will not negatively impact crime. Indeed, it will likely have a positive influence on the site and area by providing a more formal function that creates community reinforcement.

Recommendations have been made throughout this document to address vulnerabilities identified at the site and to increase resilience to crime and compliance with the relevant Secured by Design standards.

Appendix 1: References

- www.ismi.org.uk
- www.police.uk
- www.gmp.police.uk
- www.googlemaps.com
- www.wiki.com
- www.securedbydesign.com
- www.data.cdrc.ac.uk/dataset/index-multiple-deprivation-imd
- www.gridreferencefinder.com
- www.staykula.com
- Secured by Design Homes Guide 2024
- The Police Crime Initiatives Guide to Compartmentalisation
- Site and floor plans as provided by NC Architecture

9: Appendix 2: Standards

The following standards and features are recommended and are required for this development to demonstrate appropriate physical security to meet Secured by Design test standards.

Doors

- All external doors (including balconies), internal access doors to the individual units (single and double leaf) and windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 (2016), LPS 2081 SRB *BS PAS 24 (2016) supersedes PAS 24 (2012) and provides a method for testing and assessing all security performance requirements of doorsets and windows, providing an easier specification requirement for developments).*
- Glazing in doorset and lower level windows should be compliant with BS EN 356: 2000.
- External doors and access doors into the individual units should have 3 hinges and a 5-lever mortice deadlock (to BS 8621: 2017) – assumed keyless egress.
- Multipoint locking assemblies equivalent to BS8621, including those on double or folding doors.
- Door viewers to be compliant with DHF TS 002: 2009
- Door chains and limiters to be compliant with DHF TS 008: 2015

Windows

Note that BS7950 (1997) has now been withdrawn. Where stated, BS7950 must be supported by the following performance standards relevant to the material used:

- BS 4873 (2005) Specification for aluminium windows
- BS 7412 (2007) Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.
- BS 644-1 (2003) Wood windows. Specification for factory-assembled windows – various types.
- BWF: TWAS Timber window accreditation scheme.
- BS 6510 (2005) Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.
- LPS 1270 (2010) Burglary resistance of security glazing and glazing films. Based on LPS 1175, this standard enables specifiers to select glazing films that offer resistance to manual attack equivalent to the building products in which the glass or film is to be used.

Illumination

- External areas of the proposed site should be illuminated to BS5489-1.

Mail delivery

- Mail delivery via a secure external letter box meeting the requirements of the Door and Hardware Federation standard Technical Standard 009 (TS 009) or delivery through the wall into a secure area of the dwelling.

Building Intruder Detection System

- Each individual unit should have a building intrusion detection system installed in line with BS EN 50131 (wired system). This should not include any wireless devices.

Access Controls

- AACS should be installed in line with BN EN 60839 – 11-1: 2013 and 11-2: 2015

Video Surveillance (CCTV)

- BS EN 62676-4:2015: Video surveillance systems for use in security applications
- BS EN IEC 62676-5:2018: Video surveillance systems for use in security applications - data specifications and image quality performance for camera devices.

Appendix 3: Assessor/Author Qualifications

Assessor/Author

This report was completed by Andrea Dobson BSc CSMP® F.ISMI®

Relevant Qualifications

- Degree of Bachelor of Science in Criminal Justice
- Subsidiary Degree of Bachelor of Science in Sociology
- Certified Security Management Professional (Level 6) (Distinction)
- NEBOSH Certificate (Distinction)
- Level 4 Award in the Internal Quality Assurance of Assessment Processes and Practice (RQF)
- Level 3 Award in Assessing Vocationally Related Achievement

Professional Memberships

- Fellow of the International Security Management Institute
- Full member of the Association of Security Consultants (ASC) and has achieved Registered Independent Security Consultant (RISC) status

Experience

- 28 years within the security industry, 16 of which in a management role with direct crime prevention responsibilities

Ongoing Personal Development

- Attendance at exhibitions, conferences and online training sessions/webinars
- Actively teach and coach crime prevention and security design topics in a Level 6 security programme
- Development of new materials and library sources for students on a Level 6 security management programme

Additional details of the author's qualifications, experience and competencies available at:

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