



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

THE SHERIDAN, 371 OLDHAM ROAD, MANCHESTER

CHANGE OF USE OF PART OF THE GROUND FLOOR OF THE EXISTING
BUILDING TO FORM A FOODHALL (WITH SMALL FOOD OUTLETS AND
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL SEATINGS AREAS), A SUPERMARKET & OTHER USE
CLASS E UNITS (TOTTALLING 2,170sqm.)

FOR: Plans Drawn

VERSION A: 25/04/2025

REFERENCE: 2016/0295/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

The Sheridan, 371 Oldham Road, Manchester

URN: 2016/0295/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/improvements required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Control of access during busy periods. Consideration should be given to how access to the proposed supermarket is managed in the evening/at night when the main entrance to the foodhall is staffed/monitored – to ensure it cannot be circumnavigated.
- Given that Oldham Road is a wide, busy route with the potential for high speed vehicular movement, the proposed external seating areas along the street frontage of the building should be protected from damage from vehicles. The seating areas themselves must be set-out and managed effectively to deter mis-use, crime and anti-social behaviour from occurring - with tables, chairs and other removable items stored internally within the building when not in use to prevent theft and mis-use.
- No internal access between foodhall premises and ground floor/upper floor events venue. Ideally, any access to back-of-house areas or fire escapes should also be entirely separate. Where this is not possible, any internal doors/walls between uses must be to a secure standard.
- Secure enclosure of the service yard to the east and the narrow space to the north of the building, to prevent unauthorised access to where doors and shutters could be attacked unseen or exploited when left insecure during servicing activities.
- Management of multiple entrances of proposed supermarket.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
2.1	Crime Summary	
2.1	Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis	
2.2	Theft (Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis	
2.3	Non-Domestic Burglary (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis	
2.4	Theft (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis	
2.5	Non-Domestic Burglary (Retail Premises): Risk Analysis	
2.6	Theft (Manchester Retail): Risk Analysis	
2.7	General Risk Factors	
2.8	Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	12
3.1	Proposed Development	
3.2	Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
3.3	Recommendations to Improve Security	
4	Physical Security	14
4.1	Any External Alterations	
4.2	Internal Security & Access Controls	
4.3	Alarms	
4.4	Boundaries	
4.5	External Seating Areas	
4.6	Lighting	
4.7	CCTV	
4.8	Other	
5	Internal Layout Guidance	18
6	Management & Maintenance	20
7	Construction	21
8	Useful References	21
8.1	Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix

A	Contact Register.....	22
B	Associated Documents.....	22
C	CIS Version History	22
D	Glossary	23

1 Visual Audit



The site lies on the north side of Oldham Road (A62), near to Monsall Metrolink Station on the north-east side of Manchester city centre.

The eastern portion of the site is occupied by a large two-storey building housing a first floor level wedding venue/event space. The warehouse space occupying the majority of the ground floor is currently vacant. To the east of the building is a small servicing compound (accessed off Queens Road) and to the west is a large car park for approximately 300 vehicles (accessed off Oldham Road). The main entrance to the building fronts onto the car park to the west.

The southern elevation of the building is set back off the street (with the exception of a projecting stairwell) behind an open grassed verge and the ground and first floor window openings along the facade have been blanked out – impeding views as well as preventing damage. The door openings along this façade (presumably fire escape doors) also feature no glazing.

The service space at the eastern end of the building is enclosed with walls, timber fencing and advertising billboards, concrete panel fencing and two very large swing gates – accessed off a short route off Queens Road serving the large concrete and aggregates plant and rail freight compound to the north of the site (beyond which is the Metrolink/railway line). The gates are lower in height than other parts of the perimeter and were open at the time the site visit was carried out – leaving hidden rear service doors, steel storage containers and refuse enclosures potentially accessible. There is also a short run of chain link fencing and barbed wire above, which is not as effective as a secure means of enclosure and could leave the hidden, narrow route and fire doors along the north side of the building (between it and the retaining all along the northern perimeter) potentially accessible and vulnerable to attack unseen.

On the opposite side of Oldham Road from the site is a housing estate and a high-rise block of flats, although they are set some way off Oldham Road behind a wide area of grassland with some mature trees – limiting the levels of direct overlooking over the site. With that said, Oldham Road itself is a wide route busy with vehicular traffic and pedestrian footfall – meaning the site benefits from good levels of activity and passive surveillance.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime Summary

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st April 2024 to 31st March 2025.



Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
7	<5	48	145	14	6	9	25	8	<5

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is slightly below average for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding and criminal damage being the most prevalent types of recorded crime. Crimes have occurred throughout the local area, with particular concentrations around the primarily residential neighbourhoods of Collyhurst and Monsall to the north-west and north of the site, the primarily residential neighbourhoods of Miles Platting to the south and south-west and around/off the junction of Oldham Road/Hulme Hall Lane.
- 2.1.2 Assaults, public order and harassment offences have been the most commonly reported less serious woundings taking place, with the majority of incidents involving disputes between known associates and neighbours, as well as some cases of domestic violence. In cases of criminal damage, offenders have targeted vehicles parked throughout local residential neighbourhoods – smashing windows and denting bodywork. Offenders have also targeted dwellings by using objects to damage the windows, doors and furniture - mainly during disputes.
- 2.1.3 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed licensed food market, as well as other retail and commercial uses, the more detailed analysis below will focus on use-specific burglary and theft.


2.1 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018-2019.



- 2.1.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at restaurants/cafes in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday, Thursday and Sunday.
- 2.1.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed.

M/cr Restaurant/Cafe Burglary – Point of Entry




- 2.1.3 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered Manchester restaurants/cafes through external doors. Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools/implements and glazing within doors/windows has been smashed to gain entry. Offenders have also posed as legitimate customers before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas when premises are open to the public.


2.2 Theft (Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018-2019.

M/cr Restaurant/Cafe Theft – Day Range




M/cr Restaurant/Cafe Theft – Time Range



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester restaurants/cafes peaks over the weekend. Many premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants/cafes are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Offenders have also targeted I.T equipment within premises, particularly tablets and laptops, as well as alcohol from storage rooms.

2.3 Non-Domestic Burglary (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018-2019.



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** In Manchester, the risk of burglary at licensed premises between Monday and Wednesday and is lowest on Friday.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary is highest in the early hours of the morning. Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the areas/streets where they are typically found are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive the risk of being detected or identified as low.
- 2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered licensed premises through external doors. Most commonly, doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and hand tools/implements. In a number of cases, glazing in doors and windows has been smashed by offenders to gain unauthorised access. Where the point of entry was legitimate/unknown, this is likely to have been when offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas.

2.4 Theft (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis


The data below relates to thefts within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018-2019.



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester licensed premises peaks over the weekend. On these days, many premises within the city centre area experience higher levels of attendance than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunity for offenders to commit theft is greater.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft peaks late at night and into the early morning. This reflects the times when licensed premises are at their busiest and therefore the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets, cash and phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items - usually stolen from table tops, from bags hung on chairs/stored under tables or via pickpocketing and distraction methods. Theft of property belonging to staff is also common, with offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain access to unauthorised areas.


2.5 Non-Domestic Burglary (Retail Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.5.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester peaks slightly on Wednesday, but remains relatively consistently high across the week.
- 2.5.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary peaks late at night and during in the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target commercial premises at these times when they are closed, it is dark and the areas in which they are typically located are quiet - all of which contribute to offenders perceiving a lower risk of being observed or detected.

Manchester Retail Burglary – Point of Entry




2.5.3 **Point of Entry:** In burglaries at Manchester retail premises, the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them.
- Offenders have also routinely forced open doors with bodily pressure and tools, as well as smashing glazed panels within them to gain unauthorised access.
- Windows have also been prised open or smashed by offenders.
- A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed.
- Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls.


2.6 Theft (Manchester Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.

Manchester Retail Theft – Day Range



Manchester Retail Theft – Time Range



2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester retail premises remains consistently high across the week. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the afternoon and early evening. This is when retail premises are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to offend are greater. The majority of thefts are either of staff property or of/from the handbags of shoppers (such as mobile phones, purses etc.). Theft of staff property are more likely to be noticed at

either midday, when lunch breaks are taken, or during the late afternoon when staff are leaving for the day.

2.7 General Risk Factors

2.7.1 **Restaurants & Cafes/Licensed Premises:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.7.2 **Retail:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery
- Shoplifting
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Employee theft
- Loitering groups
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.8 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.8.1 Having looked at the crime data for the proposed uses, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting Manchester restaurants/cafes, licenced premises and retail premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **Manchester Restaurant/Cafes, Licensed Premises & Retail:** Doors have been forced open with tools/implements and bodily pressure

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries (see Section 4.4), lighting (see Section 4.6) and CCTV (see Section 4.7) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

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- **Manchester Restaurant/Cafes & Licensed Premises:** Glazing in doors and windows has been smashed to gain unauthorised access
Possible Solution – All new ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.1), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.
 - **Manchester Restaurant/Cafes & Licensed Premises:** Offenders posing as legitimate customers, gaining access to staff only areas to steal items
Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Sections 4.2).
 - **Manchester Restaurant/Cafes, Licensed Premises & Retail:** Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables
Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats (see Section 5). The layout of any bars/restaurants/lounges can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. External seating areas should be enclosed to clearly define them as separate from adjacent pedestrian routes.
 - **Manchester Retail:** A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them
Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 4.1) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.
 - **Manchester Retail:** Windows have also been prised open or smashed by offenders
Possible Solution - All external windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1) where possible, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.1), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Vulnerable shopfronts should be secured with security-certified shutters out-of-hours. It may also be necessary for more windows to be fitted with bars, grilles or perforated metal/polycarbonate panels, in order to provide some additional protection.
 - **Manchester Retail:** Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls.
Possible Solution - Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas or upper floor windows are not accessible, for example, with the use of high-level/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard/soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any 'accessible' skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing and should be secured with internally fixed grilles/bars to prevent unauthorised access. The construction of the roof itself and all external walls should also be robust enough to withstand penetration.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to change the use of the vacant ground floor of the existing building (with the exception of the existing main entrance and offices off the car park serving the first floor wedding venue/event space, which will be retained and entirely separate from the proposed scheme) to form a licensed foodhall with small food outlets and internal/external seating areas, a supermarket and other Class E units.
- 3.1.2 The existing ground floor wedding venue main entrance and offices will be retained at the western end of the building and will be separate from the proposed uses at ground level. The ground floor foodhall/shopping centre will be served by a new main entrance fronting onto Oldham Road and will incorporate 30 no. units of various sizes. The majority will house small food outlets, but will also include a bar, a KTV café lounge, a massage spa, 2 no. nail supply units, a solicitors and a travel office. Units 5 and 6 will house a large supermarket with internal entrances and its own dedicated external entrance off Oldham Road (with adjacent trolley bay). There will also be an office and store room at ground level and a mezzanine with a security room, office and additional stores. In the communal areas between the units will be internal seating areas for 196 no. customers, with additional external seating areas along the Oldham Road frontage of the building (enclosed with a raised dwarf/retaining wall). New fire doors are proposed along the Oldham Road frontage and the rear/northern elevation of the building.
- 3.1.3 The proposed opening hours of the foodhall will be 08:00 to 22:00 Monday to Saturday and 12:00 to 18:00 on Sunday. Security staff will patrol internal and external areas when the facility is operational, with radio contact to the mezzanine security room. CCTV covering all internal and external areas, as well as the car park, will also be capable of being monitored from the security room.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposal will bring back into use a currently vacant ground floor space and will provide additional activity, natural surveillance and overlooking to the area, at all times of the day and into the evening/night.
- 3.2.2 The building/external seating areas will present an active frontage along Oldham Road - enlivening the street scene and helping to provide useful natural surveillance over the surrounding public realm.
- 3.2.3 The proposed foodhall will be served by a limited number of external entrances off Oldham Road, allowing security to be focussed on these locations and staff to monitor arrival and departure from the premises.
- 3.2.4 The proposed ground floor foodhall and the existing first floor wedding venue (with supporting ground floor entrance lobby and offices) will be entirely separate – preventing patrons of one use gaining unauthorised access to the other (and vice versa). Back-of-house/staff only areas should also be capable of being secured to prevent unauthorised access.
- 3.2.5 The venue will be required to apply for a Premises Licence, which will include a comprehensive set of conditions designed to regulate any negative impact that the proposed uses of the building may otherwise bring. Adherence to the conditions set out in the Premises Licence and a Dispersal Policy will be essential to prevent/deter crime and disorder incidents and limit disturbance to local residents.
- 3.2.6 The building will be staffed by a security team, which will have a presence during operational hours, allowing for an immediate response to any incidents experienced.
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the scheme and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Recommendations to Improve Security

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The main external entrance to the proposed licensed foodhall should be staffed with security personnel at busy periods/into the evening to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising. The entrance itself should be clearly defined and well illuminated, with any potential customer queues well defined and controlled. Any door/security staff engaged at the premises should be provided by an SIA ACS approved security company. Consideration should be given to how access to the proposed supermarket is managed in the evening/at night when the main entrance to the foodhall is staffed/monitored – to ensure it cannot be circumnavigated (i.e. the external entrance to the supermarket is utilised and the internal entrances are secured, or vice versa).
- 3.3.2 Given that Oldham Road is a wide, busy route with the potential for high speed vehicular movement, the proposed external seating area along the street frontage of the building could be vulnerable to damage from vehicles – both accidental and deliberate (i.e. to target mass casualties). Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HMV) measures should be incorporated to prevent vehicular access (see Section 4.5). For further information and advice, please contact the GMP Counter Terrorism Security Advisor (CTSA) team at ctpnw.protect@gmp.pnn.police.uk. The proposed external seating areas themselves must be set-out and managed effectively to deter mis-use, crime and anti-social behaviour from occurring (again, see Section 4.5). They should be defined as separate from adjacent pedestrian footways/public realm, to ensure that pedestrians cannot pass too close-by to the tables/chairs. The layout of the tables/chairs should be configured so that they are not located directly adjacent to the perimeter, where it would be easy reach over and steal any items of value. Tables, chairs and other removable items should be stored internally within the building when not in use to prevent theft and mis-use.
- 3.3.3 It should not be possible for members of the public to gain internal access between the ground floor foodhall (and ancillary first floor staff areas) and the upper floor events venue (including any external entrances, stair/lift cores and emergency escape cores) or vice versa, which could provide opportunities for offenders to exploit. Ideally, any access to back-of-house areas or fire escapes should also be entirely separate. Where this is not possible, any internal doors between uses (e.g. to allow for staff-only servicing activities or emergency egress) should be security-certified (see Section 4.2) and alarmed, with signage to prevent mis-use. Internal walls between uses should also be robust enough to withstand penetration (again, see Section 4.2).
- 3.3.4 The service yard to the east of the building and the narrow space along the northern façade should be securely enclosed with 2400mm high walls, railings or high-security welded-wire mesh and gates (see Section 4.4), to prevent unauthorised access to where doors and shutters could be attacked unseen or exploited when left insecure during servicing activities. Chain link fencing is not considered an effective secure boundary, as it can be easily scaled, cut or flexed to create gaps underneath or to aid climbing over.
- 3.3.5 As proposed, there will be multiple external and internal entrances to the proposed supermarket. Care should be taken with units with multiple entrances, as they can be difficult to manage and observe all customer access/egress. The staff/pay points should be appropriately located to ensure staff can easily observe a limited number of entrance/exit points, with any internal aisles or product displays aligned to assist surveillance and avoid blind-spots. It is also advised that there are no items of high-value displayed close to the entrances of units. All back-of-house/staff only areas serving the general foodhall, as well as its individual units, should also be capable of being secured to prevent unauthorised access.
- 3.3.6 It is essential that the physical security measures listed below are incorporated where appropriate into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in staff and customers.

4 Physical Security

4.1 Any External Alterations

It is strongly recommended that any external alterations to be carried out as part of the proposed scope of works, or in the future, should incorporate the following physical security measures:

- ☐ Any new external doorsets (including single-leaf, double-leaf, sliding or bi-folding) should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. Escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ Any new windows should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2/3 where possible. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any new curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be fixed with a secure glazing retention system (e.g. with security glazing tape, with a dedicated security sealant/gasket or a secure mechanical fixing system from the glazing retention tests within the BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 standards).
- ☐ Any new shutters to be installed should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Ideally, any external shutters should have shutter-boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building – where they would be less vulnerable to attack and would be less visually intrusive.
- ☐ Any new external glazing should incorporate an inner pane with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.2 Internal Security & Access Controls

- ☐ All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work. Internal access doors/frames leading to dedicated back-of-house staff areas should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and fitted with either auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards). Any internal doorsets to communal servicing/emergency egress areas serving both the foodhall and the upper floor events space must be security-certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. Doors to any individual offices, storage areas or plant areas serving the foodhall should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and key operated locks to secure them when unoccupied/when access is not required. First floor level staff areas should not be accessible to the public.
- ☐ Internal doorsets to individual units should be security-certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2, with any glazing laminated to P1A under EN 356. Internal walls between units/communal areas should either be formed by robust masonry, laminated glazed screens or should incorporate timber sheathing (minimum 9mm thick) or expanded metal, in order to ensure that the walls themselves are not vulnerable to attack/penetration.
- ☐ Ideally, cash-free forms of payment should be adopted. Where this is absolutely unachievable, large amounts of cash should not be stored on the premises overnight. Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any till areas, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods. Any safes should provide adequate capacity and overnight cover - the correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs.
- ☐ Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Any electric locking system to be used throughout the building should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Any access control cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times. The use of numeric keypad locks are not advised, as codes can be easily observed or shared and are rarely changed.

4.3 Alarms

- ☐ A comprehensive intruder alarm system should be installed to cover the foodhall (or each individual unit), linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (i.e. linked to the on-site security team or an Alarm Receiving Centre).
- ☐ The alarm system should incorporate personal attack buttons for the use of staff in identified locations, such as behind bars/serveries, at the main entrance/s to the premises and in any cash office.

4.4 Boundaries

- ☐ The service yard to the east of the building should be enclosed and defined by 2400mm high walls, railings or high-security, rigid-panel, welded-wire mesh fencing and gates (please see [Product Category Search](#) for a list of Police approved perimeter security suppliers). Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts (preventing tampering/removal) and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates.
- ☐ A sliding vehicular gate is preferred, but if double gates are used they should overlap when closed and should not be capable of being forced open. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points to any gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.
- ☐ The narrow route along the northern façade of the building should also be enclosed with 2400mm high railings or high-security, rigid-panel, welded-wire mesh fencing and gates (please see [Product Category Search](#) for a list of Police approved perimeter security suppliers) to prevent unauthorised access. If panic mechanisms are required on the inner face of any pedestrian gates (for escape purposes), they should not be capable of being reached/operated from the external face of the fence/gate.
- ☐ Care should be taken to ensure there are no trees or any other hard/soft landscaping features (such as lighting columns, street furniture, retaining walls etc.) immediately adjacent and on the publicly accessible side of any secure boundaries that could be used as a climbing aid to scale the fencing. Any such features should be pruned or removed where possible. The site boundary treatment should also be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary.
- ☐ It is highly recommended that condition of the fencing along the perimeter of the site is regularly inspected for signs of damage/attack and is repaired immediately if any incidents are experienced.



4.5 External Seating Areas

- ☐ The external seating areas along the Oldham Road frontage should be protected by PAS 68 rated bollards to an appropriate performance level – please contact ctpnw.protect@gmp.pnn.police.uk for more information/advice.
- ☐ The external seating areas should be clearly defined as separate from the pedestrian footway/access routes to the entrances of the building by screens, barriers or planters. The layout of any external tables/chairs should be configured so that, as much as possible, they are not located directly adjacent to barriers where it would be easy reach over and steal any items of value. External seating areas should be capable of being clearly overlooked from internal staff positions.
- ☐ Tables and chairs, as well as any removable canopies, heaters or screens/barriers should be stored within the premises out-of-hours, in order to prevent damage or mis-use and prevent the space from fostering loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour when the premises are closed. Any awnings should also be retracted out-of-hours.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' (see Section 5) to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats.
- ☐ Care should be taken to ensure that any advertising A-boards signs do not inadvertently provide additional features that may narrow the footway and funnel pedestrians into close proximity of the proposed external seating areas.

- ☐ The success of the external seating areas is largely dependent on the effective management of the space, particularly at peak times. Staff should closely monitor customer use/behaviour and should regularly clear away used crockery/cutlery to prevent theft or mis-use.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to all parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, with an average lux level 20 and a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors and shutters. External lighting should also be provided to the external seating areas to an adequate and uniform level, with no areas of pooling or shadowing.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments or to scale building structures. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- ☐ Internal lighting should be controlled from behind bars or in a security/management room, away from public access. Zoned dimmers should be used to increase the control of areas from the bar/management office. An override should be provided, within easy reach of security staff, so that if an incident occurs the lighting level can be raised. This will also help at closing time so that staff can more easily clear up, and patrons have no doubt that it is closing time and they should make their way out of the premises. The lighting override can also be linked to any music controls so that, in the event of an incident, any music can be turned off immediately as well as lighting increased.

4.7 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an [Acceptable Standard](#) that will allow for [Identification](#) of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
[Acceptable Standard](#) - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
[Identification](#) – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are [Overview](#) and [Recognition](#), which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [vehicle/cycle parking areas](#), [the main entrance/s to the premises](#), [all external elevations](#), [all external/internal circulation spaces and seating areas](#) and [all sales counters/till positions](#).
- ☐ The proposed CCTV system should be capable of being monitored by the on-site security team, so there can be an immediate response to any incidents being recorded.

4.8 Other

- ☐ It is preferable to have cycle lockers for customers to use. If not, there should be 'Sheffield' style racks (or similar) provided in a highly visible location. Cyclists should be encouraged to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand rather than just the crossbar and, therefore, a design of cycle stand that enables this method of locking is recommended (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.
- ☐ Any external bin/recycling stores should be secure, lockable and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- ☐ It is preferable for any shopping trolleys should be secured at night/when the store is closed to prevent theft/mis-use.

5 Internal Layout Guidance

The internal layout of the premises should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

5.1.1 Such premises can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- **Opportunities** - Large numbers of people congregating in such premises generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- **Lack of attention** - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- **Cohesion** – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent such premises means that such a venue would lack ‘community territoriality’ (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- **Customer turnover** – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- **Valuable goods** – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys etc.
- **Stealth** - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

5.1.2 The incidence and severity of disorder issues in large licensed venues and their environs are often linked to physical features of these locations, such as:

- High concentration of people;
- Crowd congestion;
- Services that do not cater for demand, i.e. insufficient serving staff;
- Physical hazards arising from type and placement of furniture/ancillary structures; and
- Insufficient and unclean toilets.


In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

5.1.3 The main entrances to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.

5.1.4 Customers entering/leaving the premises should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.

5.1.5 Consideration should be given to a high/wide service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers’ reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of service counters should be prevented (e.g. with a lockable hatch/door that cannot be easily scaled). The areas directly in front of counters should be clearly defined to provide an easy queuing system to help prevent against queue jumping, which can lead to conflict. Consideration should be given to Internal floor demarcations (such as different coloured floor tiles) to direct people and encourage efficient circulation within the premises (i.e. defining separate queuing/waiting and seating areas). Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.

- 5.1.6 Designing the interior of the premises to improve traffic flow and prevent congestion can reduce the opportunities for accidental bumps that may escalate into fights and limit the opportunities for personal theft during busy periods. The internal layout the premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and visibility. Clear views should also remain from the premises through to the public highway, i.e. large promotional signs and menus should not obstruct views.
- 5.1.7 Ideally, internal signage and furniture should be securely fixed to the ground to prevent them being used as weapons/missiles.
- 5.1.8 Any self-service fridges or counters should be in full view of staffed positions and covered by CCTV cameras.
- 5.1.9 It is highly recommended that all both internal and external customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



- 5.1.10 Adequate signage should be deployed to direct people throughout the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.
- 5.1.11 Public toilets can give rise to crime and disorder issues and the following issues should be considered:
- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
 - Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
 - Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
 - Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
 - Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
 - Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 The success of the proposal will be dependent on effective management of the premises and a zero tolerance policy should be adopted with customers who behave inappropriately. Comprehensive risk assessments should be carried out in advance of all events/uses, in order to identify and address potential security issues.
- 6.1.2 During busy periods, the control of people entering the premises will be essential to maintaining order, both inside and outside the building. Strict monitoring of numbers entering the premises may be required at busy periods, as overcrowding will facilitate criminal activity. Management of any people awaiting entry will also be important, in order to prevent frustrations building up that could create disorder. Sufficient security staff will be needed to supervise entry and maintain a security presence at busy times. They should also ensure the swift and safe dispersal of visitors away from the premises at closing time. All door/security staff engaged at the premises should be provided by an SIA ACS approved security company. Security staff should regularly patrol internal areas and the external seating area to ensure a visible presence to visitors and potential offenders.
- 6.1.3 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the premises must be prepared and remain in place for its day-to-day running. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of the premises, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Any cash management within the premises - including a chute deposit safe behind any bar/till areas, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods;
 - Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
 - Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. fencing, access controls, alarm systems, CCTV cameras etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti and litter (regular litter patrols should be carried out inside and outside the premises, to prevent discarded bottles, glasses, cans etc. from being used to cause criminal damage or used as weapons); and
 - Refuse collection arrangements (which should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods).
- 6.1.4 The opening hours of the premises should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses.
- 6.1.5 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers/TVs, music/DJ equipment, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
12 th March 2025	Plans Drawn	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
13 th March 2025	Plans Drawn	Additional info requested to provide quotation
13 th March 2025	Plans Drawn	Receipt of additional info & plans. Quotation issued
14 th March 2025	Plans Drawn	Confirmation of instruction & fee
25 th April 2025	Plans Drawn	Email sent re: report completion & payment
7 th to 9 th May 2025	Plans Drawn	Email correspondence re: payment
9 th May 2025	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment – should clear by 12/05/25

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
-	Site Location Plan	11/11/24	-
DR 371 60	Proposed Ground Floor – Proposed Fire Drawing	Jan 2025	-
DR 371 62	Proposed First Floor – Security Review	-	-
DR 371 354	Proposed Elevations	-	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk