CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

102 Sherbourne Street, Manchester

Mosque / Events / Learning Centre and a Sports Hall / Swimming Pool Building

FOR: NK ARCHITECHTURAL

VERSION A: 06/11/2024

REFERENCE: 2024/0364/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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102 Sherbourne Street, Manchester

2024/0364/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security improvements recommended.

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, if the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- There is an obscured area at ground floor level to the rear of the mosque which could generate misuse, as it offers concealment. It is highly recommended that this area is illuminated to a high standard and covered with CCTV.
- It is highly recommended that the perimeter of both buildings is illuminated from dusk-till-dawn.
- The buildings should be covered with a monitored intruder alarm.
- The development should have a comprehensive CCTV system covering both the external and internal areas of the buildings.

If the identified issues are addressed as described within this report and the other physical security measures in section 4 are incorporated into the proposed scope of work, we would be happy to support the development. GMP will recommend the inclusion of a condition requiring the development to adhere to the recommendation in sections 3.3 and 4 of this report.

Matthew Granelli

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located on the edge of Cheetham Hill, Manchester.

The site is roughly rectangular, and it is bound by a residential development to the North and the East. To the South the site is bound by a vacant brownfield site and to the West the site is bound by Sherborne St with Cheetham Park opposite.

The site is currently occupied by an unfinished development and several site cabins. The site is unsecure and has been subject to a number of acts of anti-social behaviour, evident in the graffiti and condition of the site.



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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st October 2023 to 30th September 2024.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
6	20	36	215	43	5	<5	23	14	7

2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the past 12 months is above average for the City of Manchester division, with less serious wounding, theft and criminal damage having been most commonly reported. Offences have taken place throughout the local area, particularly at a hotspot of offences to the east of the proposed site around the junction of Elizabeth Street with Cheetham Road.

2.1.2 Less serious wounding offences have occurred in the residential neighbourhoods and in retail outlets in the local area. Assaults, public order and harassment offences have been the most reported. The majority of less serious wounding offences taking place, have involved disputes between neighbours or customers and staff within retail stores.

2.1.3 In cases of theft offences, offenders have primarily targeted insecure items such as mobile phones, wallets and bags left on tabletops and benches in public spaces, restaurants and retail outlets. There has been many cases of parcels being stolen from doorsteps.

2.1.4 Criminal damage has been committed against both vehicles and properties. Offenders have used objects to damage cars by smashing the glazing in windows and denting the bodywork. Damage has also been done to the external windows and doors to dwellings by offenders using bodily pressure.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified door sets have resisted a series of professional attacks (using a variety of tools) including to the door itself, the frame, the locks, and the fittings. They are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by staff, security personnel or passers-by. Consideration should also be given to security-certified shutters (see Section 4.1) to protect particularly vulnerable/hidden doors.

2.2.2 Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.

Possible Solution - An appropriate glazing specification should be used to adequately secure the building. All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.1).

2.2.3 Posing as a legitimate customer and entering employee only areas through insecure doors or tailgating staff members.

Possible Solution – The main entrance to the gym should be staffed at all times or a robust access control system should be in place to ensure that the proposed gym unit is only accessible to members. There should be secure lockers for the use of customers and any staff only areas should be fitted with self-closing, solid-core doors fitted with auditable access controls, in order to prevent unauthorised access.

2.2.4 Opening of secured lockers using stolen or copied keys.

Possible Solution - Typically thefts occur at sports facilities when customers leave property unattended in communal areas or in unsecured lockers whilst taking part in activities, returning to find property

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missing. The main entrance to the gym should be staffed at all times or a robust access control system should be in place to ensure that the gym unit is only accessible to members. There should be secure lockers for the use of customers and clear signage to encourage their use. Lockers should ideally be located where they can be well-overlooked and where potential offenders are more likely to be witnessed (see Section 4.2).

2.2.5 Theft of valuable items such as phones, wallets and laptops from changing rooms that have been left insecure.

Possible Solution – Typically theft occurs at sports facilities when customers leave property unattended in communal areas or in unsecured lockers whilst taking part in activities, returning to find property missing. Provide sufficient secure lockers for customers to store valuable items. Locate lockers where they are not hidden from view, so a potential offender is more likely to be witnessed. Changing rooms should be locked when not in use and no members of public should be allowed past the reception area.

2.3 Risk Factors – Place of Worship

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Cash robbery
- Burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Anti-social behaviour / Loitering groups
- Unauthorised access to non-public areas
- Other theft from premises
- Cycle security
- Controlled access
- Acts of criminal damage during the construction period
- Theft of user / staff belongings

2.4 Risk Factors – Leisure Centres

- Burglary
- Theft of user/staff belongings
- Other theft from premises
- Theft of/from parked cars
- Uncontrolled access
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Arson
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Cycle security
- Cash robbery/attacks on vending machines
- Anti-social behaviour
- Loitering groups
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

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2.5 Risk Factors - Educational

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Criminal damage to property
- Unauthorised access to buildings and private spaces
- Antisocial behaviour
- Loitering groups
- Internal theft
- Theft of staff / pupil belongings
- Staff, pupil and parent safety
- Acts of criminal damage during the construction period

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2.6 Non-Domestic Burglary (Places of Worship): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against places of worship, recorded in the Greater Manchester area.

Burglary Other – Day Range



Burglary Other – Time Range



Burglary Other – Point of Entry



2.6.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of burglary of places of worship in the Greater Manchester area peaks on a Tuesday and Friday during the evening (6:30pm – 8:30pm) and early hours of the morning (12am – 4am). Offenders often target properties in the early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less foot fall in the area.

2.6.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain access to the property.
- Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- In cases where access has been recorded as unknown, offenders often pose as legitimate users and access restricted areas, removing goods.
- Forcing open secure shutters using implements and tools to access windows and doors located beneath.
- Entering the grounds of the property and using implements and tools to access sheds and outhouses.

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2.7 Theft (Places of Worship): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against places of worship, recorded in the Greater Manchester area.

Misc Theft – Day Range



Misc Theft – Time Range



2.7.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of theft at places of worship in the Greater Manchester area peaks on a Thursday, Friday and Sunday during the afternoon and into the evening. Offenders have targeted building materials, mostly lead flashing, copper piping and paving slabs as well as personal property stored within the property, with laptops and bags/ purses being the most common target. Offenders have posed as legitimate service users and entered restricted areas, removing property belonging to the place of worship and service users. Offenders have mostly targeted unsecure items.

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2.8 Non-Domestic Burglary (GM Leisure Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.

GM Leisure Facilities Burglary – Day Range



GM Leisure Facilities Burglary – Time Range



2.8.1 Day/Time Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at leisure facilities in the Greater Manchester area peaks on Thursday/Friday and is slightly lower on Saturday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the late afternoon/early evening and during the early hours of the morning. During the late afternoon/early evening, leisure facilities are often at their busiest, meaning offenders can take advantage of busy staff and anonymity among higher numbers of legitimate customers. Offenders often target commercial properties at night, when they are often closed (or operate with a reduced number of on-site staff), it is dark and the streets/areas in which they are typically located are quieter than during the day.

GM Leisure Facilities Burglary – Point of Entry



2.8.2 Point of Entry: The following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently by offenders targeting leisure facilities:

- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using bodily pressure and implements.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Where the point of entry is 'legitimate' or 'unknown', this is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas without being noticed.

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2.9 Theft (GM Leisure Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.

GM Leisure Facilities Theft – Day Range



GM Leisure Facilities Theft – Time Range



2.9.1 Day/Time Range: During the week, the risk of theft at leisure facilities within the Greater Manchester area remains consistently high throughout the week. During the day, the risk of theft rises in the afternoon and peaks in the evening. This is when leisure facilities are typically at their busiest and the opportunities to offend are greater. Personal property belonging to staff and customers, such as mobile phones and cash, are the most routinely targeted items – taking place most often in changing/locker rooms and staff-only areas.

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2.10 Non-Domestic Burglary Educational Facility: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against educational facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.

Educational Facility Burglary – Day Range



Educational Facility Burglary – Time Range



Educational Facility Burglary – Point of Entry



2.10.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of burglary at education facilities in the local area peaks on a Sunday. The risk is relatively high throughout the day, peaking in the late evening and early hours of the morning (9pm – 5am). Offenders target educational facilities during the evening when it is dark, streets are quieter as the risk of being caught / identified lessens.

2.10.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain access to the premises.
- Exploitation of insecure doors and windows to gain entry to the property.
- Climbing perimeter fencing to gain access to the grounds and approaching secure sheds use implements and bodily pressure to gain access.
- Climb onto roofing and remove tiles to gain entry to the premises.
- Force open shutters using bodily pressure and implements to gain access.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to the property.
- In cases where the point of entry in unknown, offenders have often posed as legitimate students/ visitors and entered restricted areas by means of insecure doors.

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2.11 Theft Educational Facility: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within / against educational facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018-2019.

Educational Facility Theft – Day Range



Educational Facility Theft – Time Range



2.11.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of theft at educational facilities peaks on a Tuesday during the morning and into the afternoon (8am – 4pm.) The thefts carried out involve thefts of personal items, mostly mobile phones and bags, as well as equipment owned by the facility, mostly laptops and computing equipment.

2.12 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.12.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Monday around midday (11:00-13:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time during the working week when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time whilst they are at work, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development is to construct a 2-storey Mosque with an event space and learning centre. The site will also have a 2-storey leisure centre with a sports hall and swimming pool. The building will be linked by the leisure centre entrance which will have a door from the prayer room.

3.1.2 The site will have a total of 54 no. parking spaces and capacity to park 24 no. cycles. The main entrance to the site will be located on Sherborne Street.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposal will bring additional legitimate activity to a currently vacant site. Redevelopment of the site should help to generate a sense of ownership and responsibility and improve informal policing of the area.

3.2.2 The proposed development will bring activity, overlooking and surveillance to the area during the day and night.

3.2.3 New parking areas will allow users to park in close proximity rather than relying on nearby car parks and on street parking.

3.2.4 The proposed customer parking area will be visible from the street, increasing natural surveillance opportunities. The parking areas will also be laid out in straight rows, with relatively few obstacles to views across them, further aiding surveillance opportunities.

3.2.5 The main entrances to the Leisure Centre and Mosque will be located in prominent positions, where they can be easily seen from the car park as well as the street.

3.2.6 There will be separate external entrances serving the Leisure Centre and Mosque uses proposed, which reduces the opportunities for confusion and conflict and reduces the opportunities for criminals to exploit.

3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design/construction of the scheme. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design/specification of the scheme can ensure it is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 There is an obscured area at ground floor level to the rear of the mosque building which can generate misuse as it will offer concealment to view for those criminally, or antisocially, minded leading to issues such as alcohol/drug consumption, loitering, public urination, and loitering. It is highly recommended that this area is fenced and gated as shown in black below (in accordance with section 4.7) or at the very least illuminated to a high standard and covered with CCTV.



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3.3.2 The perimeter of both buildings are easily accessible and could potentially generate loitering, particularly in areas which are not well overlooked. It is highly recommended that the perimeter of the buildings is illuminated with dusk-till-dawn lighting to deter antisocial, and criminal behaviour.

3.3.3 Landscaping should be carefully considered so that good sightlines can be maintained throughout the site and to facilitate natural/passive surveillance from the surrounding areas. Shrubbery should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall now lower than 2000mm.

3.3.4 Landscaping to the front of the building should be designed so that the main entrance can be seen from the public highway, to allow for surveillance opportunities and deter misuse of the main entrance area by those antisocially minded.

3.3.5 Secure lockers must also be provided for all users and all back-of-house/staff-only areas should not be publicly accessible, with a secure area for staff to also store their belongings whilst at work.

3.3.6 Car parking areas and pedestrian routes should be illuminated to a high standard and in accordance with BS 5489.

3.3.7 Cash should not be kept on the premises overnight or stored in an insurance rated safe. Regular banking should be carried out to minimise the amount of cash on site at any one time.

3.3.8 The building should be covered with a monitored intruder alarm.

3.3.9 The development should have a comprehensive CCTV system covering both the external and internal areas of the building.

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4 Physical Security

The below recommendations relate to both buildings, It is strongly recommended that the recommendations are incorporates into the development:

4.1 External Security

- ☐ External doors should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. Escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ Windows should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 where possible. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should ideally be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns. Ideally, any glazed system should be non-opening. If opening panels must be provided, they should be above 2400mm high and should be fitted with opening restrictors to prevent unauthorised access.
- ☐ Glazing should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any ground floor glazed elevations of the building should be protected by anti-ram bollards (to LPS 1246 or BS PAS 68) or re-enforced steel risers, or other vehicle mitigation such as planters and street furniture, to deter against ram-raid type attacks.
- ☐ If shutters are to be installed, they should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Ideally, any shutters should have shutter-boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building – where they would be less vulnerable to attack and less visually intrusive.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any cladding to the buildings, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.

4.2 Internal Security

- ☐ The main entrances should be staffed at all times in the absence of physical access control measures (i.e. turnstiles).
- ☐ To mitigate the risk of theft, lockers should be provided for the leisure centre users. The lockers themselves must be robust/secure and all visitors must be encouraged to use them and not leave belongs unattended in changing areas. Staff should undertake regular inspections of all areas of the building, including changing facilities and the locker areas.
- ☐ All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work. Any cash office should have solid masonry walls (with no adjacent false/suspended ceilings), a door set certified to BS PAS 24 and a safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs. Consideration should also be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any counter areas, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in the till during busy periods.
- ☐ Internal access doors/frames to all other back-of-house areas and equipment stores should also be solid-core (min. 44mm thick) and fitted with either auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with key operated locks (carried by staff only if required for duties and accounted for at all times) to secure them when unoccupied. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.

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4.3 Alarm

☐ An alarm should be installed to cover both buildings, linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (e.g. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre, who will alert the key holder).

4.4 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following doors should operate on access control:

- Main entrances into the buildings
- The main office entrance doors (out-of-hours and if reception is not staffed)
- Individual offices, as required
- Equipment stores

4.5 Lighting & Car Park

☐ Dusk till dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors/lobbies. Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light.

☐ Lighting to all parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, with an average lux level 20 and a uniformity level of no less than 25%. Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments.

☐ The surface of the car park should be even tarmac. The integrity of the surface treatment should be maintained to ensure that there is no loose material that can be used to commit crime.

☐ Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated to avoid confusion or conflict, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.

4.6 CCTV

☐ A CCTV system should include cameras capable of identifying all vehicle and pedestrian movements into and around the site. Cameras should also be capable of monitor all building entrances and elevations.

☐ The CCTV system should be monitored by an appropriate security company and, ideally, include a public address system, allowing monitoring staff to issue an audible warning to alert to intruders that they have been detected and a response generated.

4.7 Boundaries

☐ The boundary along Sherbourne St should be demarcated by low boundaries such as planting and/or railings to an approximate height of 1000mm.

☐ Existing site boundaries around the reminder of the site should be inspected for any damage and replaced or repaired where necessary. Replacement boundaries should be in keeping with the existing boundaries or to the specification below.

☐ Secure boundary treatments should generally be 2100mm high and of welded wire mesh construction. It is recommended that a 358-type fence panel is used in higher risk situations.

☐ Care should be taken to ensure that any new panels are fixed securely to the posts (preventing tampering/removal) and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and any gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, lighting columns, trees etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided or fitted with shrouding/protective plates to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.

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☐ The site boundary treatments should be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary.

☐ Perimeter fencing (where exposed) should be protected on the inner side from potential damage from large vehicles, using crash barriers or rails to deflect any encroachment and maintain a secure boundary. The position of any ancillary structures (e.g. bin stores) and any external storage areas should be carefully considered in relation to the following:

- Their potential to block sight lines and create hiding places.
- Their potential to obscure CCTV and lighting.
- Their potential to create climbing aids that would assist unauthorised exit/entry over boundary fencing.
- Their potential to obscure damage to fence lines.

Any proposed lighting columns, street furniture, tree/shrub planting etc. within or external to the site perimeter should also be reviewed in relation to the above issues.

☐ Gates should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:

- A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
- A key operable deadlock

☐ Double gates should have lockable (or externally inaccessible) drop bolts to each leaf.

☐ The frontages of the site should be secured with bollards and retractable bollards/vehicle barriers at the vehicular entrances to the customer car parks/display areas, in order to prevent theft of vehicles and unauthorised vehicles getting close to the buildings out-of-hours.

4.8 Landscaping

☐ In vulnerable locations such as around entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots, as such features can encourage loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour.

4.9 Other

☐ Any cycle parking area should incorporate ‘Sheffield’ style racks, or similar, in a highly visible location. Cyclists should be encouraged to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand rather than just the crossbar and, therefore, a design of cycle stand that enables this method of locking is recommended (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: http://designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/

☐ Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only areas.

☐ Staff should have clear views of changing facilities and W/Cs to monitor their use. Public toilets themselves can give rise to crime and anti-social behaviour issues and the following issues should be considered:

- Avoid areas where items such as drug paraphernalia can be hidden (e.g. suspended ceilings). Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work, etc. should be used. Services where possible should be accessed from outside the facility.

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- Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
- Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening. This will aid gaining access to collapsed persons. Opaque panels can be used to great effect to ensure no persons are collapsed inside, whilst preserving privacy. This measure discourages drug taking and facilitates staff checks. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 20 centimetres from the floor and to reduce the top height.
- Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
- Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karabiner style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.

4.9.1 Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 Active continuous management and maintenance of the premises can reduce the likelihood of crime and disorder occurring. An operating/maintenance plan should be created to promote good management of the premises, this plan should focus on issues such as:

- Opening and closing of the building, including staff arrival and departure.
- Cash management within the premises.
- Any cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs).
- Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods).
- Details of staff security training.
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc.
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter, etc. and
- Refuse collection arrangements.

There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable, and up to date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures, and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.

5.1.2 All high value equipment (e.g. high value portable sporting equipment, computers, flat screen monitors/televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

5.1.3 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to back-of-house areas.

5.1.4 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

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6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
07/10/24	NK Architectural	CIS Application
10/10/24	DfS	CIS Fee Proposal
23/10/24	NK Architectural	CIS Confirmation
01/11/24	DfS	Site Visit

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
A100	PROPOSED GF MAIN BUILDING		
A104	MAIN BUILDING - PROPOSED ELEVATIONS v1.1		
A112	PROPSOED SITE PLAN AND 3D VISUALS		
A114	SHERBORNE STREET PROPOSED SWIMMING POOL BUILDING ELEVATION AND 3D VISUAL		
A115	SHERBORNE STREET SPORTS HALL SWIMMING POOL GA GF PLAN AND LINK CORRIDOR		
A118	SHERBORNE STREET SPORTS HALL LINK CORRIDOR PROPOSED ELEVATIONS AND 3D VISUAL		
A120	SITE AND LOCATION PLAN - REV A		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

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