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To Whom this may concern

20th May 2025

RE: UPPER CAMPFIELD – CONDITION 22 – SECURE BY DESIGN

We are writing to confirm that the principles of Secured by Design have been incorporated into the development, as per the attached report reference 2023/0429/CIS/01 dated 28/09/23.

If you require any further information, please do not hesitate to contact the writer

Yours Faithfully

Adam Burrows

Contracts Manager

FUL 22 - Planning Conditions

Statement from Amspec Ltd

Crime Impact Statement

Lower Campfield, Manchester, M34FP

Amspec have completed the checklist contained within the crime impact statement section 4 as evidence that work has been carried out in line with the CIS report.

Report reference; 2023/0429/CIS/01 – Version A 28th September 2023

LOWER CAMPFIELD Crime Impact Checklist

Checklist	Response
External doors must be compliant with and certified to RC2, BS PAS 24, STS02, or LPS 1175 SR2.	Yes, except the sliding door (Lower Byrom Street) which has a timber frontage.
External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.	Note these are existing doors within a grade II listed building
Windows must be compliant with and certified to RC2 or BS PAS 24	✓
Windows positioned behind ornamental railings do not have to be certified	All windows are positioned behind ornamental railings
Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm	N/A
Shutters (if provided) must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.	N/A
Glazing behind ornamental railings does not have to be certified.	All are behind ornamental railings
A suitably designed, fit for purpose, monitored intruder alarm system must be installed. For police response, the system must comply with the requirements of the NPCC Security Systems policy. System designers may wish to specify component products certificated to LPS 1602/3.	✓
Individual offices (if applicable) should be fitted with a monitored alarm system (as above) or there should be the infrastructure for one to be easily installed by the end user	✓
Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads	Swipe cards/gates have been installed
Individual offices/units should have the infrastructure to allow an access control system to be easily fitted.	✓
External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes and car parking areas in accordance with BS 5489.	✓
Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide	✓

(or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.	
Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.	✓
Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy: • CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective. • Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing. • With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period. • Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court. • Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is). • Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of	✓

the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender. • The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals.	



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Upper & Lower Campfield, Liverpool Road

Redevelopment of Grade II Listed Upper and Lower Campfield Market Hall Buildings (7,799sqm – Use Class E Floorspace)

FOR: Allied London Campfield Developments Limited

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

VERSION A: 28th September 2023

REFERENCE: 2023/0429/CIS/01

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Liverpool Road

2023/0429/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed redevelopment of the site is suitable for this city centre area. Further consideration should be given to the following points to enhance the security of the buildings:

- Consideration should be given to providing secure bicycle storage for staff of the building.
- There should be a robust access control system, CCTV, and intruder alarm, to both buildings.
- Where possible, alterations to the building should be to Secured by Design standards to ensure a high level of security is achieved.

Additionally, there are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3 of this report which would enhance the security of the development and it is highly recommended that these are considered for the proposed units and the wider outline proposals.



Patrick Babb

Consultant



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Contents

1 Visual Audit 4

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis 5

2.1 Crime Summary

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.3 Risk Factors

2.4 Burglary Risk Analysis – Retail Premises

2.5 Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

3 Layout Appraisal 9

3.1 Proposed development

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

4 Physical Security 10

4.1 Doors

4.2 Windows and Shutters

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

4.4 Alarms

4.5 Access Control

4.6 Lighting

4.7 CCTV

5 Management & Maintenance 12

6 Construction 12

7 Useful References 12

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

Appendix

A Contact register 13

B Associated Documents 13

C CIS Version History 13

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
1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site(s) can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The sites are located in the city centre area of Manchester, in close proximity to Deansgate (to the East) and Spinningfields (to the North), with Castlefield to the South of the site.

Both sites are currently developed as Upper and Lower Campfield, which are Grade II listed market halls. The buildings directly abut the pavement and adjacent buildings with no landscaped areas or parking on site.

Both buildings are roughly rectangular/square with no concealed areas, recesses, or projections in the building line which could conceal an offender. The facades of both buildings comprise of wrought iron railings which has blockwork walls behind. Existing doors appear to be timber.













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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st September 2022 to 31st August 2023.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
35	54	221	1111	533	79	31	555	41	27

2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is high; however, the proposed site is located within Manchester City Centre. Less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime have been the highest recorded crimes within the local area. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues.

2.1.2 Less serious woundings are taking place throughout the local area, with a high concentration taking place to the north of the proposed site, along Deansgate, Quay Street and Peter Street, in which a large proportion of licenced premises are located. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings with the majority of offences taking place within the late evening and early hours of the morning, often when licenced premises in the area are closing, verbal and physical assaults have mostly been carried out by unknown offenders.

2.1.3 Thefts in the local area have mostly been taking place in the local licenced premises and restaurants located throughout the area, particularly along Deansgate and peter street, with offenders targeting mobile phones, wallets/ purses and cash. Offenders are using pick pocketing and distraction methods to obtain the personal belongings.

2.1.4 Vehicle crime has been taking place throughout the local area with vehicles parked on the local streets and in secure car parks being targeted. Thefts from motor vehicles is the highest recorded vehicle crime taking place in the area with smashed glazing being the most common entry point, where items from the vehicle are being removed, as well as the use of tools in order to remove vehicle registration plates.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Opening secure doors (all door types) using bodily pressure and implements to access the premises.

Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (see section 4.2) which are designed to withstand a prolonged attempt to gain entry.

2.2.2 Breaking glazing in doors and windows, mainly to the front of the premises, using implements to gain access.

Possible Solution – Any ground floor or easily accessible glazing should contain a pane of laminate glazing, which cannot be easily smashed or shattered to gain entry.

2.2.3 Entering premises as legitimate customer and tailgating staff/ exploiting insecure doors to access staff only areas.

Possible Solution – Personnel gates or turnstiles should restrict access from the office foyer into the circulation core of the building. Any external doors should operate on an access control system.

2.2.4 Forcing open shutters using implements and bodily force to gain access.

Possible Solution – Any shutters should be certified to a recognised security standard (i.e. LPS 1175 SR2). Shutters certified to a burglary resistant standard are able to withstand prolonged, opportunist, attacks by criminals.

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2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:


- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer / staff property
- Criminal damage to property

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
2.4 Burglary Risk Analysis – Retail Premises

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.


Retail Burglary – Day Range



Retail Burglary – Time Range



Retail Burglary – Point of Entry



2.4.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed, and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.4.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:


- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating / exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.
- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

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
2.5 Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.

Retail Theft – Day Range



Retail Theft – Time Range




2.5.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses, and bags.


2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.6.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Thursday and Saturday during the evening (6pm – 10pm). Offenders often target vehicles during the evening as they are likely to be left unattended and out of sight of the owner for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development is to sensitively repair and repurpose the Grade II listed Upper and Lower Campfield market hall buildings to create a dynamic new workspace destination for Manchester. The proposals include for the formation of a technology incubator hub which will provide flexible, high quality, low-cost workspaces for start-ups and early-stage tech, digital, media and creative companies with associated retail leisure, event and amenity spaces.

The proposed floor spaces/uses are as follows:

Upper Campfield	**Lower Campfield**
Ground floor – 1,635 sq.m. (Use Class E)	Ground floor – 2,935.6 sq.m (Use Class E)
Mezzanine – 790 sq.m. (Use Class E)	Mezzanine – 2,438.1 sq.m (Use Class E)

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposed development will bring these historic buildings back into use, restoring them and not letting them fall into disrepair which could generate anti-social and criminal behaviour.

3.2.2 The buildings are located in a busy area of the Manchester city centre, surrounding by buildings of various uses which generate significant levels of footfall and vehicular traffic (during the day and through the night) which will deter criminals from targeting the building.

3.2.3 The mix of uses within the building will generate activity during different times of the day.

3.2.4 New windows will be introduced to the façade which will create active frontages to these buildings which currently do not overlook the surrounding streets.

3.2.5 The reception desk of Upper Campfield will overlook the main entrance. There will be a secondary access door between the reception and the circulation areas of the building, restricting access to staff and legitimate visitors.

3.2.6 The main entrance to Lower Campfield will be overlooked by the proposed café and event space, allowing staff to monitor those entering the building. Further access into the building will be restricted with speed-gates/turnstiles into the garden galleys. The mezzanine level offices doors could operate on an access control system to restrict access if necessary.

3.2.7 Liverpool Road and the nearby streets are illuminated to a good standard.

3.2.8 There are apartments to the North of the site which overlook both Upper and Lower Campfield and will provide some natural surveillance.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 Consideration should be given to providing secure bicycle storage within the development rather than staff relying on the provision of cycle parking on local streets where bicycles will be more vulnerable to theft if left for longer periods of time.

3.3.2 There should be a video/audio intercom on the main entrance of each building to allow staff to vet visitors to the building when the main reception is not staffed and to allow visitors access into the building.

3.3.3 A large number of thefts in office developments are of personal items from desks/workspaces. It is highly recommended that lockers are provided for staff when the offices are being fitted out.

3.3.4 A suitably designed, fit for purpose, monitored intruder alarm system must be installed. For police response, the system must comply with the requirements of the NPCC Security Systems policy. System designers may wish to specify component products certificated to LPS 1602/3.

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3.3.5 There should be a comprehensive CCTV system that covers the main entrance, external doors, accessible elevations, office lobby, and ground floor space. CCTV systems must be installed to BS EN 50132-7: CCTV surveillance systems for use in security applications.

3.3.6 The main entrance, external doors, and the accessible elevations of the building, should be illuminated with dusk-til-dawn lighting, to deter antisocial behaviour such as congregation/loitering. Lighting levels to the rear of the building where there is a narrow passageway should be reviewed to ensure it can be used safely during the hours of darkness.

3.3.7 Vegetation adjacent to the footpath to the rear of Lower Campfield should be maintained so that the passageway is not narrowed by overgrown vegetation. Lighting should be provided to this route (see above) and the route and doorways on this elevation should be covered by CCTV.

3.3.8 Where possible, given the heritage/listed status of the building, any new external doors, windows, and glazing should conform to burglary resistant standards (see section 4 for more details). Where glazing is protected by external ironwork it does not need to be certified to a burglary resistant standard.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

Where possible it is highly recommended that any new doors, windows, glazing, or other security features, be certified to the following security standards. Due to the heritage/listed status of the building, there might not be suitable products that meet these standards and if this is the case, we recommend that the developer contact Design for Security to agree an alternative product or mitigation.

4.1 Doors

☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to RC2, BS PAS 24, STS02, or LPS 1175 SR2.

☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows and Shutters

☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to RC2 or BS PAS 24.

☐ Windows positioned behind ornamental railings do not have to be certified.

☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

☐ Shutters (if provided) must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

☐ Glazing behind ornamental railings does not have to be certified.

4.4 Alarms

☐ A suitably designed, fit for purpose, monitored intruder alarm system must be installed. For police response, the system must comply with the requirements of the NPCC Security Systems policy. System designers may wish to specify component products certificated to LPS 1602/3.

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☐ Individual offices (if applicable) should be fitted with a monitored alarm system (as above) or there should be the infrastructure for one to be easily installed by the end user.

4.5 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:

- Main entrance
- External doors
- Speed gates
- Staff only\BoH areas

☐ Individual offices/units should have the infrastructure to allow an access control system to be easily fitted.

4.6 Lighting

☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes and car parking areas in accordance with BS 5489.

☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

4.7 CCTV

☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals.

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5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the buildings must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable, and up to date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures, and it should be made east for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:

- Opening and closing the building, including staff arrival and departure.
- Management of deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods).
- Details of staff security training.
- Location and management of any smoking areas.
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access control systems, alarm systems, CCTV cameras, and lighting.
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti and litter; and
- Refuse collection arrangements.

5.1.2 All high value equipment within publicly accessible areas (e.g. computers, televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

5.1.3 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.

5.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
21/08/2023	Teddy Hewins	CIS application confirmed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	Campfield Pre-App		
	Upper Campfield – Work in Progress Planning Drawings		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

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