



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

1 Sportcity Way

Restaurant/Bar and Leisure/Events space

For: **Eastlands Arena Ltd**

Greater Manchester Police

Version A: **20/05/25**

design**for**security

Ref: **2019/0841/CIS/02**

1 Sportcity Way

2019/0841/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Application supported

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' in order to identify any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. In general the proposed scheme has been found acceptable, but further consideration of some aspects is advised, as stated in section 3.3 of this report:

- Staffing and monitoring of main entrances to event space to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.
- Employ management staff/security staff to assist event building staff and monitor customers, especially at the busier times on event days, evenings and weekends in particular.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

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Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime Summary	
	2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
	2.3 Risk Factors – Cafes / Restaurants	
	2.4 Risk Factors - Retail	
	2.5 Non-Domestic Burglary (Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis	
	2.6 Theft (Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis	
	2.7 Non-Domestic Burglary (Leisure Facilities): Risk Analysis	
	2.8 Theft (Leisure Facilities): Risk Analysis	
	2.9 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	12
	3.1 Proposed development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations	
4	Physical Security	14
	4.1 Doors	
	4.2 Locks	
	4.3 Roller Shutters	
	4.4 Access Control	
	4.5 Glazing	
	4.6 Security Staff, 'StoreNet' and Intruder Alarm	
	4.7 Boundaries	
	4.8 Refuse Store	
	4.9 Lighting	
	4.10 CCTV	
5	Management & Maintenance	15
6	Construction	15
7	Useful References	15
	7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix

A	Contact register	16
B	Associated Documents.....	16
C	CIS Version History	16
D	Glossary	17

1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

This study area is bounded, Coop LIVE Arena (North), Joe Mercer Way (West) and the Ashton Canal (South).



The wider area contains a mix of uses ranging from private residential (semi-detached streets and apartment blocks) to the east, large retail & food outlets, sports facilities, public realm and associated car parking.

The site is located within the Coop LIVE Arena estate and is a key destination on the periphery of the city centre. The surrounding area of SportsCity contains sporting attractions such as; the Etihad stadium, an athletics stadium, indoor tennis & the national squash centre.

The proposed site is afforded excellent public transport links; with local bus routes and two tram stops in close vicinity. Vehicle transport routes to the site are provided along Alan Turing Way; with good links to, in and around the city. In addition to the public transport & vehicle routes there are two public walking routes from the city to SportsCity, approx. 1.5miles from Piccadilly train station.

There are notable level changes across the site, rising up from the north to the south along the canal.


The entire eastern & southern boundaries of the site are currently fenced off with 2.4m+ high weld-mesh fencing. There are two gated vehicle access point from Sports City Way onto the site. There is no direct access to the site from the canal tow path.




1 – View of site from Alan Turing Way.




2 – Etihad Stadium from Alan Turing Way.




3 – Pedestrian route to canal tow path from Alan Turing Way.




7 – Metrolink stop.



6 – Sport City Way towards Alan Turing Way.



5 – Existing car park.



4 – Canal tow path.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st May 2024 to 30th April 2025.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
<5	9	33	199	31	7	<5	12	<5	6

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the past 12 months has been average for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding, criminal damage and theft having been most commonly reported. The site is located close to a number of sports and events venues which often increases the likelihood of crime and disorder issues. The majority of offences have taken place at hotspots within these venues, as well as at the Etihad Campus tram stop and around Bradford Road to the north.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, particularly at the hotspots mentioned above. Assaults and public order offences have been most reported less serious woundings, with incidents often involving altercations between fans attending sports and music events, as well as disputes between staff and customers in retail outlets. There have also been some cases of domestic violence in the residential neighbourhoods in the wider area.
- 2.1.3 Criminal damage offences have also occurred all throughout the local area, whereby offenders have targeted vehicles parked on streets or within parking facilities by using implements to dent or scratch the bodywork and smash the glazing in the windows of cars. There have also been cases of offenders damaging the external doors and windows of properties, which have mainly happened during disputes with alcohol consumption often being a factor.
- 2.1.4 Theft offences have predominantly occurred within the sports and events venues where offenders have targeted insecure items, coats or bags left on or under tables and benches, as well as used pickpocketing and distraction techniques in order to obtain items stored on the person such as mobile phones, wallets and purses.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Exploitation of insecure doors, in particular rear and fire doors, to gain entry to premises.
- Possible Solution* - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified door-sets have resisted a series of professional attacks (using a variety of tools) including to the door itself, the frame, the locks and the fittings. They are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by staff, security personnel or passers-by. Consideration should also be given to security-certified shutters (see Section 4) to protect particularly vulnerable doors
- 2.2.2 Breaking of glass windows or doors to gain entry to property using large objects such as bricks or paving stones.
- Possible Solution* - An appropriate glazing specification should be used (incorporating at least one pane of laminated glazing) to adequately secure the building (see Section 4.2). Any damage arising from vandalism should be repaired quickly in order to maintain a culture of care and respect, as a lack of maintenance can often attract further abuse. In vulnerable locations, shutters or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection.
- 2.2.3 Forcing open of shutters by levering rolling shutters open, breaking locks off of shutters or using vehicles to ram shutters and damage them, allowing access.

Possible Solution - To minimise the risk of offenders forcing shutters:

- security-certified roller shutters (to LPS 1175) should be used wherever possible;
- where the size limits the availability of certified shutters, CCTV and lighting should be deployed to increase the security of these larger openings;
- use of high perimeter fencing, lighting and CCTV can deter offenders from entering a site and prevent access to vulnerable areas, and CCTV can increase the chances of offenders being seen by security personnel or evidence gathered which might lead to a prosecution; and,
- anti-ram bollards or barriers should be deployed in the most vulnerable areas.

- 2.2.4 Entering premises legitimately as customers and then exploiting insecure internal doors to gain entry to restricted areas such as staff rooms or behind the bar.

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access.

- 2.2.5 **Café/Bar:** Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags / coats. The internal layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment.

2.3 Risk Factors – Cafes / Restaurants

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence / conflict if licensed
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery / wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Risk Factors - Retail


The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery
- Shoplifting
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson

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- Employee theft
 - Loitering groups
 - Theft of/from parked vehicles
 - Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.5 Non-Domestic Burglary (Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis


The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary at restaurants/cafés in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday, Thursday, and Sunday. The risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed.
- 2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered Manchester restaurants/cafés through external doors. Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools/implements and glazing within doors/windows has been smashed to gain entry. Offenders have also posed as legitimate customers before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas when premises are open to the public.

2.6 Theft (Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis




The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester restaurants/cafés peaks over the weekend. Many premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater. The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants/cafés are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets, and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Offenders have also targeted I.T equipment within premises, particularly tablets and laptops, as well as alcohol from storage rooms.

2.7 Non-Domestic Burglary (Leisure Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area.





2.7.1 Day/Time Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at leisure facilities in the Greater Manchester area peaks on Thursday/Friday and is slightly lower on Saturday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the late afternoon/early evening and during the early hours of the morning. During the late afternoon / early evening, leisure facilities are often at their busiest, meaning offenders can take advantage of busy staff and anonymity among higher numbers of legitimate customers. Offenders often target commercial properties at night, when they are often closed (or operate with a reduced number of on-site staff), it is dark and the streets/areas in which they are typically located are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

2.7.2 Point of Entry: The following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently by offenders targeting leisure facilities:

- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using bodily pressure and implements.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Where the point of entry is 'legitimate' or 'unknown', this is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas without being noticed.

2.8 Theft (Leisure Facilities): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area.



- 2.8.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at leisure facilities within the Greater Manchester area peaks on Tuesday and remains consistently high throughout the week. During the day, the risk of theft rises in the afternoon and peaks in the evening. This is when leisure facilities are typically at their busiest and the opportunities to offend are greater. Personal property belonging to staff and customers, such as mobile phones and cash, are the most routinely targeted items – taking place most often in changing / locker rooms and staff-only areas.

2.9 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.9.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Monday in the afternoon and evening (17:00-19:00 and 20:00-21:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at these times when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 Full planning application for Canalside destination at Co-op Live. The space would be a place for private events and community use, as well as a destination for event goers to enjoy before they enter the arena. The space has max capacity of 650 people and is open from 10am-10pm on both event and non-event days at Co-op Live. The design isn't completely finalised but current GIA are circa 220m².

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will be within range of the existing comprehensive CCTV system for the wider Coop LIVE estate.
- 3.2.2 Access into the area will be controlled at specific locations on Joe Mercia Way via security staff during event hours.
- 3.2.3 The 'Canalside' event space will help to support event goers to meet up in a managed and safe environment for all.
- 3.2.4 The increased activity and natural surveillance associated with the development will greatly enhance the fan experience within the immediate Coop LIVE arena estate and the wider Etihad campus.
- 3.2.5 The proposed containers will be suitably secure and incorporate the latest technologies allowing for an auditable tracking system for the operators.
- 3.2.6 A comprehensive operating management plan has been prepared and developed in relation to the event team(s), estate management team and the existing security team.
- 3.2.7 The proposal will generate greater legitimate activity over longer periods and will help to increase informal policing of the area.
- 3.2.8 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures and design features carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Containers used to accommodate the businesses, and any storage containers, should meet the LPS 1175 standard (or at least adhere to the principles of LPS 1175 certification), to securely store stock when the businesses are closed.
- 3.3.2 Employ management staff and security staff to assist traders and regulate customer behaviour, especially at the busier times of an event day - evenings in particular.
- 3.3.3 Licensed premises can often be the scene of violent disorder. A comprehensive CCTV system should be installed so that any incidents will be recorded. The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: the main entrances in to the premises, all bar/service areas and customer circulation/seating areas.
- 3.3.4 Install lighting to illuminate the development.
- 3.3.5 Provide a secure place for staff to store personal property whilst working.
- 3.3.6 Installing Grippa™ clips or other similar property security clips to tables to allow customers in the food and beverage units and outdoor seating to secure their bags or coats/jackets.
- 3.3.7 Ensure the refuse storage area is appropriately secure.
- 3.3.8 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work. There should also be a secure cash office or management plan for cash storage with a safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs. Consideration should also be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind the bar area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in the till during busy periods.
- 3.3.9 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ Ideally, entrance and service doors should be compliant with, and certified to, LPS 1175 SR2 or be steel doors within a steel frame with two locking points to each door leaf.

4.2 Locks

- ☐ Locks generally should meet the BS 3621 or 8621 standard.
- ☐ Padlocks should meet the Secure Gold™ standard.

4.3 Roller Shutters

- ☐ Wherever applicable and feasible, roller shutters should meet the LPS 1175 standard. If hinged shutters are used to protect window openings, they should be secured with locks that meet one of the above standards.

4.4 Access Control

- ☐ Access into service areas and the back of house of the larger units should, should be controlled. The use of numeric key pads is ideal for high traffic doors and gates. It is understood that, generally, lock and key will be the most common method of controlling access. Doors and gates to secure areas should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.

4.5 Glazing

- ☐ Laminate glass should be used in all glazed openings
- ☐ Glazed openings should be protected with retractable shutters when closed for business.

4.6 Security Staff, 'StoreNet' and Intruder Alarm

- ☐ A security guard presence is advised on the busier days and evenings.
- ☐ The adoption of a 'StoreNet' style radio link system is advised.
- ☐ Ideally, a monitored intruder alarm system should be installed to all units.

4.7 Boundaries

- ☐ Where the development has openings for egress these points should be secured with a gate/fencing at least 2100mm high and include self-closing, self-locking, service doors/gates of a similar height and design.

4.8 Refuse Store

- ☐ The gates/doors to the store should be secured with a padlock or integrated lock.

4.9 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk-to-dawn lighting, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to illuminate the entrance doors of the units. Fittings should produce 'white' light.

4.10 CCTV



The CCTV system should be capable of monitoring the front of each unit, customer entrance gates/shutter and service access gates, the courtyard, licensed premises internally and externally, the sales counter within the retail units, and the approaches to the development from the north and south. Recording equipment may be securely stored on-site or off-site. Images should, ideally, be monitored but at least recorded and stored for 28 days by a suitable monitoring/management company.

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
11/02/25	Eastlands Arena Ltd	CIS instructed
07/05/25	Eastlands Arena Ltd	CIS confirmed
08/05/25	GMP	Invoice issued
24/04/25	DfS	Site visit
20/05/25	DfS	CIS completed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
BGP040-03c	Canalside site plan	16/05/25	
BGP040-01j	Canalside Container layout - ground floor	16/05/25	
BGP040-02g	Canalside container layout - first floor	16/05/25	
BGP-040-011	Canalside furniture plan	16/05/25	
BGP040-05h	Canalside external elevations	16/05/25	
BGP040032	Canalside - GF internal elevations	16/05/25	
BGP040-033	Canalside - FF internal elevations	16/05/25	
	Operating Plan Overview - Canalside	30/04/25	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door / window assemblies.

A performance standard for door-sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door / window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French / double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a

6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk