



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Yard 2, Mauldeth Road West

2 No. Storage Units

FOR: AGHA GROUP

VERSION A: 20th March 2025

REFERENCE: 2025/0068/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Yard 2, Mauldeth Road West

2025/0068/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed industrial development is broadly suitable for this site, which is positioned to the rear of commercial/residential properties. The proposed site layout and building footprints are relatively straight forward and shouldn't adversely affected by criminal/antisocial behaviour. There are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3 of the report which would enhance the security of the development and it is highly recommended that these are considered, including:

- The side/rear of the industrial units should be restricted to staff/authorised persons where possible.
- The buildings should be built to Secured by Design standards to ensure a high level of security is achieved.

Subject to the recommendations being implemented where feasible we would generally be supportive of the proposals.



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
1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edge in red. The site is located in the Withington area of Manchester.

The site is roughly rectangular and it is bound by the Fallowfield Loop to the North, to the East by Limehurst Avenue, to the South and West by existing passageways to the rear of the properties on Mauldeth Road West/Princess Road. The site is accessed between 238 and 240 Mauldeth Road West.

The site is well defined with a ~2000mm high palisade fence & blockwork wall. The site is currently in use as storage for vehicles / vehicle sales.

There was some evidence of criminal/antisocial behaviour on the day of my visit with some flytipping in the passageways and discarded alcohol containers.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st March 2024 to 28th February 2025.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
30	<5	22	120	12	6	<5	6	10	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the past 12 months has been below average for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding and domestic burglary having been the most reported offences taking place. The majority of these offences have occurred in the residential neighbourhoods to the east of the proposed site, particularly to the southeast around the junction of Rudheath Avenue with Springhead Avenue.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding offences have occurred at the locations mentioned above, as well as at a small hotspot around Whalley Range High School to the west. Assaults, public order and harassment offences have been the most reported offences taking place, with the majority of incidents involving disputes between known associates, often neighbours or students, as well as some cases of domestic violence.
- 2.1.3 Domestic burglary offences have also mainly occurred in the residential areas to the east of the site. Offenders have in most used implements in order to gain access to properties via secure doors and windows.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open shutters using bodily pressure and implements/ tools to gain access.

Possible Solution – A security-certified shutter (see Section 4.2) should be installed. If external shutters are used, the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering or attack. Avoid locating openings in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed.

- 2.2.2 Opening secure doors using bodily force and implements/tools to gain entry to property.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1). External doors should be illuminated and be covered with CCTV to deter offenders.

- 2.2.3 Theft of staff property or unattended / insecure items of personal property.

Possible Solution - There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that visitors to the building are vetted and / or met and escorted before being allowed further access to all areas.

- 2.2.4 Damaging fencing and gates using tools in order to access the industrial unit

Possible Solution – A robust boundary treatment should be used to define the site perimeter. The boundary treatment should be capable of withstanding opportunistic attacks with hand tools. Boundary treatments should be installed on hardstanding so that offenders cannot crawl under and of a height sufficient to deter climbing.

Gates should be of robust material and to the same height as surrounding boundaries. The gap between the gate and the ground should be minimised to reduce the potential of an offender crawling under. The design of the gate should not include any horizontal bars or exposed hinges that could assist climbing.


2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Theft of fuel, company stock, tools and IT equipment
- Theft of employee personal belongings
- Criminal damage the buildings and vehicles
- Arson
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Bicycle and motorcycle theft
- Theft of plant and machinery and criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Industrial/Storage Units Burglary Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against industrial units, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary at industrial units in the Manchester area peaks on a Monday and Sunday during the evening and into the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target industrial



properties in the evening and early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less foot fall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure shutters using bodily pressure and implements (mostly metal bars and vehicles) in order to gain access to doors and windows located beneath.
- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Posing as a legitimate customer/ visitor and accessing restricted areas.
- Forcing open perimeter fencing and gates using tools and vehicles.
- Climbing onto the roof of the building and using tools in order to remove tiles and enter the property.
- Removing bricks from the wall using tools in order to gain access.

2.5 Industrial/Storage Units Theft Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against industrial units, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft from industrial units in the Manchester area peaks on a Saturday during the morning and into the afternoon (9am – 4pm). There are two common occurrences of theft – the theft of personal property from within buildings (e.g. cash, bags, wallets/purses etc.) and the theft of tools, materials and plant stolen from service yards.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



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- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Thursday in the evening (18:00-19:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is of 2 no. storage units with associated car parking area.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed building footprints are uncomplicated with no recessed areas or potential for concealment.
- 3.2.2 There is a small car parking area which will allow users to park on the site within the compound, rather than in the local area.
- 3.2.3 There is bicycle parking which is visible from the proposed units.
- 3.2.4 The activity the units will generate will potentially deter antisocial and criminal behaviour from occurring in the area (such a flytipping and congregation).
- 3.2.5 The development is positioned to the rear of existing properties but will be visible from upper floor windows.
- 3.2.6 The existing boundaries form a secure perimeter to the site, restricting it from being easily accessed.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Consideration should be given to securing the rear of the units, to prevent offenders from loitering to the rear of the properties if they gain access to the site.
- 3.3.2 The existing boundaries should be inspected for any damage and repaired/replaced where necessary. Any new fencing/walls should be to a similar height/style of the existing perimeter.
- 3.3.3 The entrances to the buildings should be illuminated to deter offenders from targeting the buildings at night.
- 3.3.4 There should be the appropriate infrastructure for tenants/owners to easily fit an alarm, CCTV, and access control.
- 3.3.5 The gates into the site should be secured with a padlock certified to Sold Secure Gold, to prevent the site from being accessed if the padlock is broken by a determined offender.
- 3.3.6 The roller shutters should be secured to a burglary resistant standard (see section 4 below) to prevent the shutters from being forced open easily by an offender to gain entry (which is a common MO in the local area).
- 3.3.7 Bins should be secured away from the buildings to reduce the potential for fires spreading to the building in the event of one being set on fire.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors



External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222.

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- ☐ Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to RC2, LPS 1175 SR2 or STS202.
 - ☐ Solid block walls should be provided behind any lightweight cladding to a height of 2400mm to prevent attacks to the cladding to gain access to buildings.

4.2 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.3 Alarms/CCTV/Access Control

- ☐ There should be the infrastructure provided so that tenants/owners can easily install an intruder alarm, CCTV system, and access control.

4.4 Boundaries

- ☐ The existing retained boundaries are acceptable to secure the site.

4.5 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes and car parking areas within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications

and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
26/02/2024	Liam Dolman	CIS application confirmed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
7511 - PS01	Existing Site Plan		
7511 - PS02	Proposed Site Plan		
7511 - PS03	Proposed Plans		
7511 - PS04	Proposed Elevations		
7511 - PS05	Existing & Proposed Site Section		
7511 - PS06	Existing & Proposed Site		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
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