



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Land off Hinchley Road and Caspian Road
106 residential homes, comprising of a mix
of dwellings.

Greater Manchester Police
designforsecurity

For: **MILLER HOMES**

Version B: **31/03/25**

Ref: **2025/0072/CIS/01**

Land off Hinchley Road and Caspian Road

2025/0072/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported - Minor recommendations for security additions required.

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

We consider the residential scheme appropriate and are happy to support the proposals.

From a crime prevention perspective, the positive features of the development include an appropriate number of dwellings on the site; the orientation of the houses will focus activity in appropriate areas whilst also facilitating passive surveillance of the public realm; off-street car parking has been included in the scheme.

Advice is included in the report, which we consider will enhance security of the development and this set out in sections 3.3 and 4. The principal recommendations are:

- install doors, locks, windows, glazing, and, ideally, intruder alarms that meet a recognised security standard.
- provide secure cycle parking to all dwellings; and,
- install dusk to dawn lighting to all external doors of the houses.
- General boundary definitions to secure private garden spaces and define/segregate front gardens/driveways of dwellings.
- Rear off-road parking spaces at some plots securely enclosed or treated to ensure they can be overlooked by the residents themselves.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition to achieve Secured by Design accreditation is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is located in the Charlestown district of Manchester, a district on the outskirts of M/cr city centre. Bounded by Hinchley Road to the southeast and Mcr Coop Academy to the northwest. The site has been unused open greenspace for some time.

The immediate area combines a mix of education/leisure/residential uses which provide high levels of activity throughout the day & evening.

Surrounding the site are several well-established residential estates within the vicinity.


The proposed development site contains a series of informal pedestrian paths/tracks.

There was evidence of fly-tipping and the disposal of drug paraphernalia on the site from Hinchley Road.

A series of parked and stored vehicles are located at the south western corner of the site, some of which appeared to have been tampered with.

The nearby Charlestown Road provides good access to the M60 motorway.

The topography of the site appears relatively level with minor undulations.



1 – View towards the site.



2 – View SW along Hinchley Rd.




3 – View NE along Hinchley Rd.



4 – View into the site, informal pedestrian tracks.



5 – Evidence of discarded drug paraphernalia and fly-tipping.



6 – Stored/parked vehicles.



7 – Dense & overgrown self-seeded landscaping.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st March 2024 to 28th February 2025.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
8	<5	25	214	18	12	9	13	<5	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the past 12 months has been below average for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding having been the most reported offence taking place. The offences have occurred all throughout the local area in the residential neighbourhoods surrounding the site, particularly around Wenfield Drive to the east and along Moston Lane to the west. Assaults, public order and harassment offences have been the most reported less serious woundings taking place. The majority of these incidents have involved disputes between known associates and neighbours, as well as some cases of domestic violence.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 **There have been a number of incidents where the means of entry was unknown/legitimate – this is likely to have been when offenders have targeted insecure doors or windows unnoticed or have tailgated/posed as legitimate visitors to gain access to apartment blocks.**

Possible Solution - All external doors and windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1/4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

The locks to the front doors of houses should be fitted with split-spindles, essentially meaning they are key only entry and are secure from the exterior of the dwelling when shut. This will ensure that they cannot be left open and accessible (see Section 4.1). All ground floor/accessible windows should be fitted with key-operated locks and opening restrictors (see Section 4.2).

Clearly defined defensible space between dwelling frontages and the 'street' can a degree of separation between public and semi-private space and act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are more likely to feel under observation/scrutiny from the street or overlooking properties. Such boundary definitions can also reduce the risk of criminal damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour.

All private spaces to the sides/rears of the dwellings should be robustly enclosed (see Section 4.5), particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access. Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the front and rear of the buildings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime (see Section 4.6).

- 2.2.2 **Doors have either been forced open with implements/bodily pressure or have been targeted when left insecure by residents.**

Possible solution – see above.

- 2.2.3 **Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.**

Possible solution - All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Any glazed panels in or around doors should ideally be small and set well-away from locking points. **Vehicles have been targeted for theft of, theft from and damage, particularly when parked in open car parks or on-street.**

Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that resident's vehicles are secured and overlooked. It is preferable that all houses either have the provision to garage vehicles or have in-curtilage car parking arrangements, well-overlooked from habitable room windows. Any surface

communal parking areas serving apartments or groups of houses should be located directly in front of the dwellings they serve, clearly separated from the streets or any areas of adjacent open space/pedestrian routes. Any side, rear, undercroft or basement communal parking areas must be secured with automatic gates/shutters to prevent unauthorised access to where hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **72% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **64% lower** than Greater Manchester and **63% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **28% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **2% lower** than Greater Manchester and **87% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **55% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **41% lower** than Greater Manchester and **28% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **56% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **28% lower** than Greater Manchester and **13% lower** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on Thursday in the morning (04:00-05:00). Offenders often target dwellings at this time when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as 'unknown' it is likely that the offender has exploited insecure windows and doors.
- Using bodily pressure or implements to force open secure windows and doors.
- Accessing sheds by snapping locks and smashing glazing in the windows.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on Thursday and Friday around midday (12:00-13:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time during the working week when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time whilst they are work, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The site will comprise of 106 residential homes, comprising of a mix of dwelling ranging between 3 bed Mews to 4 bed detached homes to 3 Bed Mews homes. Out of the 106 units, there will be 22 affordable homes of which 11 are social rented and 11 are shared ownership. The affordable mix comprises of 2 bed mews to 3 bed semi-detached homes.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring additional activity, surveillance and overlooking to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The proposed houses will front onto the proposed access roads/cul-de-sacs/shared driveways, resulting in good levels of surveillance of and from dwellings and parked vehicles.
- 3.2.3 The majority of the proposed dwellings will have rear gardens that back onto one another or onto existing dwellings – leaving their rear boundaries inaccessible and less vulnerable to damage/scaling.
- 3.2.4 The houses will have habitable room windows to their front elevations (at ground floor level), maximising surveillance opportunities over the street, parked vehicles and between dwellings.
- 3.2.5 The design of the dwellings has been kept simple, with no front doors hidden in deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack).
- 3.2.6 The proposed houses will be served by in-curtilage off-road parking spaces, allowing residents to secure/overlook their own vehicles and limiting opportunities to criminals.
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the dwellings, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Definition of boundaries / ownerships. Front garden boundaries should be well defined to indicate ownership, using low walls, railings, planting and / or surface materials, and discourage intruders from approaching the dwellings or taking short cuts (particularly on corner plots).
- 3.3.2 Alleyways serving the rear of terraced properties should be gated in line with the front elevation of the building. The locking mechanism should be capable of being operated from either side of the gate.
- 3.3.3 Rear garden gates to the terraced houses should be 1800mm high. The locking mechanism should be capable of being operated from either side of the gate so that, for example, cyclists can enter or leave the garden easily. Ideally, the gates should be self-closing and self-locking.
- 3.3.4 Verges should be protected to prevent vehicles parking on the grass or damaging trees.
- 3.3.5 Street furniture and landscape features should be used to prevent unwanted parking or access onto pedestrian only surfaces. It should be very clear in which spaces, or on which streets, vehicle parking is authorised.
- 3.3.6 Cycle parking should also be provided for residents of the houses in the rear gardens. The doors to the storage sheds in the rear gardens should be secured with a Sold Secure™, padlock and hasp and staple, and fitted with a Sold Secure™, ground anchor.
- 3.3.7 Vegetation Management. The proximity of bushes and trees to the fence line can undermine the security of the boundary by creating cover for an intruder or providing potential climbing aids. Overhanging branches and dense vegetation should be removed where it could be exploited in this way. Care must be taken to ensure the proposed landscaping to the perimeter of the site is maintained at an appropriate height (see Section 4.8), in order to prevent it impeding views to and from the site and avoid the creation of hiding places that could be exploited by offenders.
- 3.3.8 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed in section 4 are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ Any rear French/double doors, sliding doors or bi-folding doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key. Full instructions should be provided to residents to ensure that they understand that the key must be used to fully lock/secure the door.
- ☐ Front doors should also have either fixed sidelights or door viewers. Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential. Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Any integral garage doors to houses (if there is a connecting internal door with the dwelling) must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR1. Alternatively, the internal connecting door must be to the same burglary resistant specification as the front door (normally BS PAS 24). If there is to be no internal connecting door (or the garage itself is detached), the garage door should be of robust construction with a multi-point locking mechanism.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ All ground floor and any other easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside), limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ All ground floor/easily accessible glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.


4.4 Alarms

- ☐ Each house should ideally have an intruder alarm to comply with BS EN 50131 (wired and wire free systems). Alarms should be linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors should cover any accessible rooms with windows.
- ☐ If intruder alarms are not to be provided, there should at least be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur installed to each dwelling, to allow future residents to connect an alarm if required.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The sides (including gables up to/as close as possible to the front building line) and rears of the houses should generally be enclosed with 2100mm high close-boarded timber fencing (1800mm high fencing with 300mm robust integral trellis above would also be acceptable). Boundaries to private space that are adjacent to publicly accessible space should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base. Any side/rear pedestrian gates to the private spaces of the houses should also be 2100mm high and should be fitted with either a pad-lockable bolt (to the mid-point of the internal face) or a key operable deadlock. Sub-divisional rear boundaries should be 1500-1800mm high.
- ☐ Any side/rear boundaries exposed to/accessible from the existing/proposed surrounding open space or any public rights of way should be formed by a 2100mm high walls or close-boarded timber fencing (with a masonry base), with defensive planting (i.e. densely branched, thorny shrubs) provided on the publicly accessible side of the boundaries to deter casual access, damage and scaling. The location of boundaries should be amended if necessary to allow for this requirement.

- ☐ Any off-road parking spaces located to the rear of the properties/gardens themselves, such as on corner plots, should ideally be incorporated into the rear gardens behind 2100mm high steel-framed vehicular gates (either double-gates or bi-folding gates) that are lockable from both sides (see opposite for example). If not, the rear boundaries of the dwellings should be formed by 1200mm high walls and 900mm railings above, in order to allow the residents to overlook their own vehicles. Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls/railings should have railing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.
- ☐ Any communal side/rear access alleyways serving the mews dwellings should be gated at their outermost point to prevent unauthorised access to where the dwellings could be attacked unseen. The gates themselves should be 2100mm high and ideally self-closing and 'slam to lock' (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, key operated from both sides), which cannot be left unlocked when shut.
- ☐ Any access roads/shared drives immediately adjacent to existing/proposed areas of public open space, multi-user paths or pedestrian links should be defined and separated from them by low-level railings (to an approximate height of 1200-1400mm) and defensive planting, in order to deter casual access and funnel pedestrian movement along formalised routes.
- ☐ The front gardens/driveways of the houses should be defined/segregated by low-level railings or timber picket fencing and low-level planting/hedging, to an approximate height of 1000-1200mm.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher (see opposite for example).



4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to all roads/footpaths should be to adoptable standards (to comply with BS 5489).
- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the front and rear of dwellings, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 Landscaping & Public Realm

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around dwelling entrances/frontages, around parking areas and along pedestrian routes, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Any landscape features (hard or soft) to areas of landscaping along streets/pedestrian routes should not impede natural surveillance of/from dwellings or reduce the effectiveness of lighting. Bollards or similar hard/soft landscaping features should be incorporated to prevent vehicles from accessing pedestrian-only routes. There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within designated/intended areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people, dwellings and vehicles (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over any boundary treatments. The security of fences and buildings can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

-
- ☐ The robust management of any communal landscaping areas is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour. If signs of disorder (such as criminal damage, graffiti, littering etc.) are not repaired/removed immediately, they can often attract further abuse.

4.8 Other

- ☐ If timber sheds are to be provided within rear garden spaces, they should have a concrete foundation, minimum 38x50mm planed timber frame; floor and roof constructed from minimum 11mm boards; and minimum 11x125mm tongue & grooved board walls and doors. The doors should have coach-bolted hinges and hasp and stables/padlocks to meet at least Sold Secure Silver standard and there should be a secure ground anchor system or a cycle stand to lock cycles to within the structure.
- ☐ Ideally, meter cupboards should be located to the fronts of houses only and not in the private areas, in order to deter bogus callers.
- ☐ There should be no features of the dwellings (such as projecting window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes, projecting brickwork/cladding features etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as trees, lighting columns, street furniture etc.) that may provide climbing aids over boundaries to private space or up to upper floor windows.
- ☐ The phasing of building works and bringing into use parts of the site while others are undeveloped or under construction can significantly affect security. Uncompleted access roads/footpaths should be secured until such time as they are completed, and surveillance opportunities are maximised from occupied dwellings. Care should also be taken to ensure that any hoardings erected around development sites do not create secluded passageways and blind spots or become targets for criminal damage. It is recommended that while construction work progresses and occupancy levels of completed properties are low, an on-site security presence is maintained.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (such as boundaries, lighting, signage etc.)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings. Low-level defensive planting beds can be used to great effect to funnel pedestrians away from vulnerable areas.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
27/02/25	Miller Homes	CIS application submitted
28/02/25	Miller Homes	Client confirmation
28/02/25	DfS	Invoice issued
25/03/25	DfS	Site visit
21/03/25	Miller Homes	Payment received
25/03/25	DfS	CIS completed
31/03/25	DfS	CIS amended & issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
HR-BTP-01 -	Boundary Treatments Plan		
HR-CSL-01 -	SITE LAYOUT PLAN (COLOUR)		
LOC-01 -	LOCATION PLAN		
	TYPE A - GASKELL - PLANNING DRAWING		
	TYPE B - WINTERSON - PLANNING DRAWING		
	TYPE C - JOULE - PLANNING DRAWING		
	TYPE D - MCKELLEN - PLANNING DRAWING		
	TYPE E - LOWRY - PLANNING DRAWING		
	TYPE F - PANKHURST - PLANNING DRAWING		
	TYPE F - PANKHURST - PLANNING DRAWING		
	TYPE H - M4(3) - PLANNING DRAWING		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Minor text amendment to Contact register	31/03/25

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk