



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

LAND OFF CLUB STREET & GRANS Moor AVENUE, OPENSHAW
RESIDENTIAL (24 no. APARTMENTS & 28 no. HOUSES)

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: KMM Homes Ltd.

VERSION A: 15/01/2024

REFERENCE: 2022/0105/CIS/02

Land off Club Street & Gransmoor Avenue, Openshaw

URN: 2022/0105/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Design changes/security improvements required


This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is only considered acceptable if the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Off-road parking spaces serving Plots 49 to 52 remote from dwellings and potentially vulnerable. It is highly recommended that the dwellings should be redesigned to allow for in-curtilage parking driveways between them. If absolutely unachievable, at least some of these proposed plots should be re-orientated to front towards the access road off Club Street and the parking spaces, with treatment to the remaining spaces to distinguish them as separate from the street, define them as in ownership/control of the residents themselves and deter pedestrian movement around/between them.
- Potentially vulnerable pedestrian link between the site and Gransmoor Avenue should be omitted, with all pedestrian movement is funnelled along the new access road/Club Street – where all movement/activity can be concentrated, surveillance opportunities are maximised and pedestrian movement would be separated from residential windows and parked vehicles.
- The communal amenity space to the west side and rear of Block B must be securely enclosed and defined as private space, particularly to prevent unauthorised access to the potentially vulnerable ground floor balcony. The addition of kitchen windows to the front elevation of the block is recommended, to increase levels of overlooking over the parking area.
- Robust access controls for visitor access to apartment blocks and a secure system for the delivery of post/parcels.
- General boundary treatments, including secure enclosure of private gardens/communal bin and cycle stores, defined defensible space to dwelling frontages and a symbolic barrier at the entrance to the communal parking area serving Block A and the Cottage Flats.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime Summary	
	2.2 Crime Rate Comparison (Local Area)	
	2.3 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis	
	2.4 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis	
	2.5 General Risk Factors	
	2.6 Crime Summary	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	9
	3.1 Proposed Development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Points for Further Consideration	
4	Physical Security	12
	4.1 Doors & Access Controls	
	4.2 Windows	
	4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric	
	4.4 Alarms	
	4.5 Boundaries	
	4.6 Lighting	
	4.7 Landscaping	
	4.8 Other	
5	Management & Maintenance	16
6	Construction	16
7	Useful References.....	16
	7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix

A	Contact Register.....	17
B	Associated Documents.....	17
C	CIS Version History	17
D	Glossary	18

1 Visual Audit

The site lies to the north of Club Street and Gransmoor Avenue, off Ashton Old Road (A635), in the Openshaw area of East Manchester.

It was formerly occupied by the Openshaw A.E.U. Club – a members only social club comprising of a hard standing parking area, a single storey club house (now demolished) and a bowling green enclosed with high walls. The western portion of the site is formed by an area of overgrown scrub vegetation to the rear of the terraced residential properties fronting onto Backwell Street and Burnam Street. The eastern portion is also formed by another area of scrub vegetation at the end of Gransmoor Avenue.

Club Street itself is a short cul-de-sac route off Ashton Old Road with gable ends and high boundaries along it – meaning it benefits from limited levels of activity, footfall, passive surveillance and direct overlooking. The adjacent residential property fronting towards Ashton Old Road has extended boundary treatments, a grille to the ground floor gable window and CCTV cameras – indicating it may have experienced crime and disorder issues.



At the end of Club Street is a pedestrian link (fitted with a concrete bollard) onto Backwell Street, with terraced residential properties fronting towards the link and the site itself. The news/semi-detached residential properties fronting onto Ashton Old Road are served by a communal car park, enclosed with high walls and an automatic sliding vehicular gate, accessed off Backwell Street.

Gransmoor Avenue is an unmade/unadopted cul-de-sac route fronted onto by large terraced residential properties, some of which are in a state of disrepair. The end terrace property adjacent to the site has been demolished and the land secured with welded-wire mesh fencing/gates. There is a large amount of dumped refuse/litter at the end of the route.

The eastern boundary of the site abuts St. Anne's Catholic Church, hall and car park, enclosed with Pallsade fencing and gates and accessed off Ashton Old Road and Victor Mann Street

The adjacent residential properties along Backwell Street and Burnam Street to the west of the site are terraced, which front directly onto the street, meaning their front elevations are not protected by any defensible space – leaving windows/doors exposed to nuisance, anti-social behaviour, unauthorised access (if left insecure) and attack. On such terraced streets, resident's vehicles must be parked on-street as they cannot be parked within the curtilage of the dwellings – leaving them exposed to damage/attack. Rear communal alleyways can also leave terraced dwellings vulnerable to unseen rear access and many of them in the locale have been fitted with high communal alleygates as a result.

To the north of the site is a site compound (accessed off Burnam Street) and the fields of Fairfield High School for Girls (accessed off Fairfield Avenue).



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st December 2022 to 31st November 2023.



2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
15	<5	42	186	16	<5	<5	11	7	<5



- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime over the past 12 months in the local area has been slightly lower than average for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding and criminal damage being the most commonly reported offences. The majority of these incidents have occurred around/off the main arterial routes of Ashton Old Road and Fairfield Road.
- 2.1.2 Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious wounding offences taking place, with incidents between known associates most commonly reported, as well as some cases of domestic violence. Criminal damage against properties has accounted for the majority of criminal damage offences taking place in the local area. Offenders have primarily smashed windows and damaged the external doors of both residential dwellings and business/retail premises.
- 2.1.3 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed residential development, the more detailed analysis below will focus on local residential burglary and vehicle crime.

2.2 Crime Rate Comparison (Local Area)

The rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January to December 2022.






- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **53% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **39% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **38% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **45% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **25% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **43% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.



- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **32% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **11% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **9% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **69% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **32% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **39% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks on Friday.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks during the early hours of the morning and early afternoon. Offenders often target residential properties at night when it is dark, streets are typically quieter than during the day and they perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected. During the day, more residential properties are likely to be unoccupied, while residents are at work etc, meaning that offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed.
- 2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:
- Doors have been targeted most frequently, particularly front doors (a common M.O. when apartments or terraced properties are targeted), and have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.
 - Offenders have gained access to rear gardens and targeted sheds.

2.4 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.4.1 Criminal damage to vehicles and theft from vehicles have been the highest recorded vehicle offences taking place in the area. Offenders have smashed glazing to cause damage and gain access to vehicles to steal items. They have also removed car parts and registration plates, as well as damaged tyres and vehicle paintwork.
- 2.4.2 **Day Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks over on Tuesday and Thursday.
- 2.4.3 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of vehicle crimes peaks during the early hours of the morning, when offenders perceive a lower risk of being identified. Vehicles parked within open communal areas or on-street, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within the curtilages of individual properties or within secure garages/car parks.

2.5 General Risk Factors

- 2.5.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:
- Domestic burglary
 - Bogus callers and distraction burglary
 - Criminal damage to property and vehicles
 - Anti-social behaviour
 - Theft of/from parked vehicles
 - Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
 - Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
 - Neighbour disputes
 - Poor maintenance of access control systems

- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Crime Summary

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent MOs (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting residential properties and parked vehicles are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Doors have been targeted most frequently, particularly front doors (a common M.O. when apartments or terraced properties are targeted), and have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1 for more information), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

A robust audio-visual access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to any apartment block before allowing them access. The main communal entrance to the block should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed. All individual internal apartment entrance doors should be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (see above), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

The locks to the front entrance doors of houses should be fitted with split-spindles or fixed external handles, essentially meaning they are key only entry and are secure from the exterior of the dwelling when shut. This will ensure that they cannot be left open and accessible.

- Offenders have gained access to rear gardens and targeted sheds.

Possible Solution – All private spaces to the sides/rears of the dwellings should be robustly enclosed, particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access (see Section 4.5). Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the front and rear of dwellings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime.

Any sheds should be of robust construction (i.e. minimum 38x50mm planed timber frame; floor and roof constructed from minimum 11mm boards; and minimum 11x125mm tongue & grooved board walls and door), with coach-bolted hinges, two hasp and staples to meet 'Sold Secure' Silver and two padlocks to meet 'Solid Secure' Silver or LPS 1654 SR1.

- Vehicles have been targeted when parked on the street or within publicly accessible communal parking areas

Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that resident's vehicles are secured and overlooked. It is preferable that all houses either have the provision to garage vehicles or have in-curtilage car parking arrangements, well-overlooked from habitable room windows. Ideally, any surface communal parking areas serving apartment buildings or groups of houses should be located directly in front of the dwellings they serve, clearly separated from the streets or any areas of adjacent open space/pedestrian routes. Any side, rear, undercroft or basement communal parking areas must be secured to prevent unauthorised access to where hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect 2 no. 2/3 storey apartment blocks (comprising of a total of 18 no. 1 & 2 bed apartments), 3 no. 2 storey cottage flat blocks (comprising of 6 no. 1 & 2 bed cottage flats) and 28 no. 2 storey 2/3/4 bed mews and semi-detached houses, with associated parking and landscaping.
- 3.1.2 Vehicular access will be via Club Street, with pedestrian links onto Backwell Street and Gransmoor Avenue. The majority of the houses will front onto the new cul-de-sac route off Club Street (as well as short private drives off it), with 4 no. houses fronting onto Backwell Street. They will have enclosed rear garden spaces and off-road parking driveways directly in front/to the side of them, with the exception of the 4 no. properties fronting onto Blackwell Street, which will be served by parking spaces along the new access road (along the gable end of Plot 52).
- 3.1.3 Apartment Block A and the cottage flat dwellings will be located to the east of the scheme, fronting onto a communal parking area serving all of the units (including refuse and cycle stores), accessed off Club Street. A separate pedestrian link through to Gransmoor Avenue is also proposed. Apartment Block B will front onto a short drive off the new access road, with 4 no. off-road parking spaces along its frontage.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will provide additional activity, surveillance and overlooking to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The proposed houses and apartment blocks will front towards the proposed access road/private drives and each other, allowing for clear views of/between existing and proposed dwellings.
- 3.2.3 The houses and apartments will have habitable room windows to their street frontages, maximising surveillance opportunities over the street, parked vehicles and between dwellings.
- 3.2.4 The majority of the houses will be served by in-curtilage, off-road parking spaces – allowing residents to directly overlook their own vehicles. The apartment blocks will also be served by communal parking areas directly in front/to the side of them.
- 3.2.5 The footprint of the buildings has been kept simple, with no doors hidden in deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack).
- 3.2.6 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the dwellings and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the buildings are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

Houses

- 3.3.1 As proposed, Plots 49 to 52 front towards Backwell Street and are served by on-street parking spaces along the new access road off Club Street. These parking spaces are remote from the dwellings and do not allow the residents to directly overlook them - leaving the vehicles vulnerable. Although they are overlooked to some degree from the dwellings of the opposite side of the access road, this is not as effective as the owners themselves acting as 'capable guardians' overlooking their own immediately adjacent vehicles. It is highly recommended that these dwellings are redesigned to allow for in-curtilage parking driveways between them. Vehicles parked on in-curtilage driveways are often much less vulnerable to damage/theft, as they are closer to the houses, can be directly overlooked by the residents themselves and offenders are more likely to feel under observation/scrutiny when approaching them. Where possible, in-curtilage parking is always preferable. If this is absolutely unachievable, it is highly recommended that at least some of these proposed plots are re-orientated to front towards the

access road off Club Street and the parking spaces. The remaining spaces must be treated to distinguish them as separate from the street (e.g. different surface texture/colour from the street, broken up with areas of soft landscaping that do not impede surveillance, signage to indicate they are for the use of residents only etc.), defining them as in ownership/control of the residents themselves and deterring pedestrian movement around/between them.


- 3.3.2 The boundary treatments to the houses are vitally important to secure them, any parked vehicles and prevent unauthorised access to private spaces. The sides (including gables up to or as close as possible to the front building line) and rears of the houses should be defined as private space and adequately secured with 2100mm high walls/close-boarded timber fencing and gates (see Section 4.5 for more information), in order to prevent unauthorised access. Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of low walls and close-boarded timber fencing should have fencing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid. The front elevations of houses should be protected by some defensible space, creating garden areas/driveways that are clearly defined as separate from the adjacent public highway and each other, in ownership/control of the residents themselves (also see Section 4.5 for more information).
- 3.3.3 Any shared/communal side and rear access alleyways serving the dwellings should be gated at their outermost point to prevent unauthorised access to where the dwellings could be attacked unseen. The gates themselves should be 2100mm high and ideally self-closing/locking that cannot be left unlocked when shut.

Apartment Block A & Cottage Flats

- 3.3.4 At present, there is a pedestrian route proposed between the site and Gransmoor Avenue. This is likely to encourage through-access between the scheme/Backwell Street and Ashton Old Road and result in pedestrian movement in close proximity of the ground floor residential windows along the frontage elevation of Block A or around/between parking vehicles within the communal parking area (where damage could easily occur – both accidentally and maliciously). As such, it is highly recommended that this pedestrian link is omitted from the scheme and all pedestrian movement is funnelled along the new access road/Club Street – where all movement/activity can be concentrated, surveillance opportunities are maximised and pedestrian movement would be separated from residential windows and parked vehicles.
- 3.3.5 The communal entrance to Block A should be formed by a single-leaf, self-closing doorset secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the security-certification, which is easier to secure and operate remotely via an access control system (see Section 4.1). There should also be a secure system for the delivery of post that does not require access to all floors of the Block. Given the emerging trend of parcel thefts (particularly at apartment blocks) there should also be a secure system for depositing parcels, such as the smart parcel boxes used by the major internet shopping companies, incorporated within a secure postal lobby (also see Section 4.1 for more information).
- 3.3.6 The private amenity spaces to the sides and rears of the blocks should be enclosed and defined as private space by 2100mm high walls, railings or close-boarded timber fencing, to prevent unauthorised access to the hidden windows and doors that could be vulnerable to unauthorised access/attack unseen if left open and accessible (see Section 4.5 for more information). The front elevations, which include residential windows adjacent to parking areas and pedestrian routes, should be protected by some low-level railing and hedging/defensive planting beds to provide some protection to the ground floor windows and funnel pedestrian movement away from them.
- 3.3.7 There should be a symbolic barrier at the entrance to the communal parking area serving Block A and the Cottage Flats (i.e. between Plots 4 & 26), formed by brick pillars and a change of road surface texture/colour etc, to encourage a feeling of territoriality among the residents - psychologically giving the impression that the area beyond is private and discouraging anyone without a purpose from entering. The communal cycle and bin stores within the parking area should also be securely enclosed to prevent theft or mis-use (again, see Section 4.5).

Apartment Block B

- 3.3.8 As proposed, the communal amenity space to the west side of Block B is left open/accessible and the rear of the building is defined by low-level railings. This would leave the proposed ground floor balcony area potentially accessible - leaving the doors themselves vulnerable to damage, being forced open or being left insecure. If attacked or left insecure, they could be used by offenders to gain unauthorised access to both the ground floor apartment itself, as well as the whole building (by circumnavigating the access-controlled communal entrance). The communal space to the west side and rear of the block should be defined and enclosed as private space (see illustration opposite and Section 4.5 for more information), in order to prevent unauthorised access. The proposed communal bin and cycle store should also be securely enclosed. The windows to the street frontages of the block should be protected by some defensible space, clearly defined as separate from the adjacent public highway.
- 3.3.9 It is highly recommended that kitchen windows are added to the front elevation of the building at all levels to increase the levels of direct overlooking over the parking area serving the building.
- 3.3.10 The communal entrance to the building should be defined and controlled as described above (also see Section 4.1 for more information), with a secure system for the delivery of post.
- 3.3.11 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.



4 Physical Security

In addition to the layout issues highlighted in Section 3, the following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

Houses & Cottage Flats

- ☐ The front and rear doors to the houses and cottage flats must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. Any external french/double doors, sliding doors or bi-folding doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Front entrance doors should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key. Full instructions should be provided to residents to ensure that they understand that the key must be used to fully lock/secure the door.
- ☐ Front doors should also have either fixed sidelights or door viewers. Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential. Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

Apartment Blocks

- ☐ All external doorsets should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery. Security-certified louvered doorsets are available if required to plat areas or bin stores (see www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search for SBD-compliant products).
- ☐ The main communal entrance doorsets serving Blocks A & B must be security-certified to one of the above standards, including a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. They should be single-leaf, self-closing and controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet callers to the buildings before allowing them access.
- ☐ There should be a secure system for the delivery of post without needing to provide access to all floors of the blocks. Ideally, postal delivery arrangements should allow for external deposits and internal withdrawals by residents. If not, there should be a 'secure lobby' arrangement with a secondary communal door to the same security specification as the outer door, to allow for deliveries to postboxes within a secure postal lobby without providing access to other areas/floors of the blocks. The postboxes themselves should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). There should also be a secure system for depositing parcels within the secure postal lobby, such as the smart parcel boxes used by the major internet shopping companies. All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access control system.
- ☐ Any communal doorsets to rear garden areas should be security-certified, single-leaf, self-closing/locking doorsets secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, operated by resident key-card only on access and egress.
- ☐ All individual internal apartment entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights and are provided with door viewers instead. Chain limiters are recommended, but not generally essential.
- ☐ Any ground and first floor external patio doors to individual apartments must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 and should include laminated glazing (see below).
- ☐ Internal doors to any cycle stores, bin stores or plant rooms should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock controlled by resident/staff key-fob. Please see Section 4.8 below for more information relating to cycle and bin stores.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ All ground floor and potentially accessible first floor windows (i.e. above any single-storey elements or to first floor balconies) should be certificated to BS PAS 24. Any ground floor/accessible curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed.
- ☐ All ground floor and potentially accessible first floor opening lights must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground floor and potentially accessible first floor glazing (i.e. above any single-storey elements or to first floor balconies) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any louvres to refuge stores should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid to reach upper floor windows. Security-certified louvered doorsets are also available if required (e.g. <http://www.securedbydesign.com/members/premier-ss-ltd/>).
- ☐ There should be no features of the buildings (such as projecting brickwork/cladding features, projecting window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby lighting columns, trees, handrails, street furniture etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper level windows or over boundaries to private space.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ Each house and apartment should ideally have an intruder alarm to comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems; or
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems.

Alarms should be linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors should cover any accessible rooms with windows.

- ☐ If intruder alarms are not to be provided, there should at least be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur installed to each house and apartment, to allow future residents to connect an alarm if required.

4.5 Boundaries

Houses & Cottage Flats

- ☐ The sides (including gables up to/as close as possible to the front building line) and rears of the houses and cottage flats should generally be enclosed with 2100mm high walls or robust close-boarded timber fencing (with the top 300mm consisting of robust integral trellis if required). Boundaries to private space that are adjacent to publicly accessible open space should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base. Any side or rear pedestrian gates to the private spaces of houses and cottage flats should also be 2100mm high and should be fitted with either a pad-lockable bolt (to the mid-point of the internal face) or a key operable deadlock. Sub-divisional rear boundaries should be 1500-1800mm high.
- ☐ Any communal side/rear access alleyways should be gated at their outermost point to prevent unauthorised access to where the dwellings could be attacked unseen. The gates themselves should be 2100mm high, self-closing and 'slam to lock' (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, key operated from both sides), which cannot be left unlocked when shut.
- ☐ The gardens/driveways to the front/side of the houses should be defined/segregated by low-level walls or railings to an approximate height of 1200mm. The design of any low boundaries should be carefully considered to discourage comfortably sitting on or leaning against them – which could potentially cause nuisance and intimidation to residents.

- ☐ Any external communal bin and cycle stores should be located within the private space and should themselves be defined and enclosed by 2100mm high railings with a self-closing, 'slam to lock' steel gate (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, fob operated from both sides). See Section 4.8 for more information on the communal cycle and bin stores.

- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should also have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

Apartment Blocks

- ☐ The sides (including gables up to/as close as possible to the front building line) and rears of the buildings should be defined and enclosed as a private, resident-only spaces with 2100mm high walls, close-boarded timber fencing or railings and lockable gates. Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and there should be no immediately adjacent climbing aids, such as low walls, projecting elements of the building, lighting columns, junction boxes etc, which may form a climbing aid. Any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and close-boarded timber fencing/railings should have railing or fencing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.

- ☐ Any pedestrian gates to private space should also be 2100mm high, self-closing and self-locking, operated by staff/resident key or fob on access and egress. They should also be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, planters/street furniture, lighting columns etc. Mid-point horizontal elements, exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points to any gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates to avoid the creation of footholds (see illustration opposite).



- ☐ The street frontages of the apartment blocks should be protected by some defensible space defined by low-level walls or railings (designed so that they cannot be comfortably sat on or leant against, causing nuisance to the residents) and planting/hedging erected to/maintained to an approximate height of 1200mm, in order to provide some protection and funnel any pedestrian movement away from ground floor residential windows. Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

- ☐ Any external communal bin and cycle stores should be enclosed and secured as described above.

- ☐ Communal parking areas serving apartment blocks/cottage flats should have a symbolic barrier at the entrance (e.g. brick pillars, change of road surface texture/colour etc.) to encourage a feeling of territoriality among the residents, psychologically giving the impression that the parking area is private and discouraging anyone without a legitimate purpose from entering.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to all access roads/footpaths should be to adoptable standards (to comply with BS 5489). Lighting to all communal parking areas should display an average lux level of 10, with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the front and rear doors of all apartment blocks, houses and cottage flats, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around dwelling entrances/frontages, around parking areas and along pedestrian routes, low planting should not exceed 1200mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people, dwellings and vehicles (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.8 Other

- ☐ Ideally, meter cupboards should be remotely read or located to the fronts of houses/apartments only and not in the private areas, in order to deter bogus callers.
- ☐ Secure communal cycle stores (both internal and external) should include cycle lockers or 'Sheffield' style racks (that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar) or cycle storage lockers. For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.
- ☐ A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (such as boundaries, access controls, lighting, signage etc.)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings. Low-level defensive planting beds can be used to great effect to funnel pedestrians away from vulnerable areas (such as gable walls, boundaries to private space or parking bays).

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
7 th December 2023	Bramhall Town Planning	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
	Bramhall Town Planning	Quote issued
11 th December 2023	Bramhall Town Planning	Confirmation of instruction/fee
18 th December 2023	Bramhall Town Planning	Receipt of D&A Statement
5 th to 8 th January 2024	Bramhall Town Planning	Email correspondence re: timescales & payment
15 th & 17 th January 2024	Bramhall Town Planning	Email correspondence re: report completion & payment
18 th January 2024	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
OCS-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7002	Proposed Site Plan	28.11.23	P3
OCS-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7003	Proposed Block Plan	28.11.23	P3
OCS-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7004	Proposed Structured Landscape Plan	28.11.23	P4
OCS-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7005	Proposed Principal Boundary Treatments Plan	28.11.23	P3
OCS-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7100	Proposed House Type A.03	10.10.23	P1
OCS-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7101	Proposed House Type A.03 (alt)	10.10.23	P1
OCS-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7102	Proposed House Type B.03	10.10.23	P1
OCS-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7103	Proposed House Type B.03 (alt)	10.10.23	P1
OCS-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7104	Proposed House Type C.03	10.10.23	P1
OCS-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7105	Proposed House Type D.03	10.10.23	P1
OCS-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7106	Proposed House Type D.03 (alt)	10.10.23	P1
OCS-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7200	Proposed Floor Plans (Block A – Ground Floor)	19.10.23	P1
OCS-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7201	Proposed Floor Plans (Block A – First Floor)	19.10.23	P1
OCS-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7202	Proposed Floor Plans (Block A – Second Floor)	19.10.23	P1
OCS-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7203	Proposed Elevations (Block A – West and North)	20.10.23	P1
OCS-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7204	Proposed Elevations (Block A – East and South)	20.10.23	P1
OCS-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7300	Proposed Floor Plans (Block B – Ground Floor)	19.10.23	P1
OCS-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7301	Proposed Floor Plans (Block B – First Floor)	19.10.23	P1
OCS-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7302	Proposed Floor Plans (Block B – Second Floor)	19.10.23	P1
OCS-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7303	Proposed Elevations (Block B)	20.10.23	P1
T1180_OCS_KMA-XX-XX-RP-A-0001-A3-P3_DAS	Design & Access Statement	13.12.23	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk