



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

CIS Tower, Miller Street

Refurbishment of the CIS Tower

For: **DEVONSHIRE (CIS TOWER) LIMITED**

Greater Manchester Police

Version A: **31/03/25**

design**for**security

Ref: **2019/0639/CIS/02**

CIS Tower, Miller Street

2019/0639/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor Design changes/security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The scheme has been very well designed from a crime prevention perspective. The proposed uses seem appropriate and will make a positive contribution to the redevelopment of the area. The mix of uses has the potential to create a very vibrant location. Developments where there is an active use mix tend to be better managed and less prone to crime and disorder issues.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Robust control of access in/and around the buildings.
- Robust control of access to back-of-house areas
- Include access controls to cycle store/changing rooms.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The CIS tower has been an iconic building for the Co-operative organisation and the city of Manchester since its completion in the 1960's. The surrounding area is currently undergoing significant regeneration, within the existing Co-op estate and NOMA district across Miller St.

As the building is vacant it has been subjected to ABS issues including graffiti, rough sleeping, drug taking and outdoor toilet.

The wider area contains a mix of development types, comprising residential, commercial, and hotel buildings. There are a number of vacant plots used for surface grade car parking pending redevelopment under the wider NOMA masterplan, much of which is currently under transition.

The Manchester Victoria train station is approx. 250m west of the site and is a major transport hub for people entering and leaving the city centre.

In addition to Victoria station Shudehill transport interchange (Bus station & tram stop), is located directly to the south from the site.

The existing building is Grade II listed and is currently vacant. However, as part of the redevelopment works the building will engage with the immediate streetscape, offering greater activation through different uses.

Miller St & Dantzic St. form part of the newly developed public realm connecting Victoria train station, the Arndale centre and the city centre to the Co-op HQ and the NOMA district. Both these routes have considerable footfall across the day.




7 – Side access to BOH & stair access to neighbouring car park.




6 – Evidence of rough sleeping, drug taking & toilet use.



5 – Existing GF elevation from Dantzic St.



1 – Main entrance from Miller St.,



2 – Adjacent surface car park access from Hanover St.



3 – Level changes on Hanover St.



4 – Service and plant area to South & East GF areas.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st April 2024 to 31st March 2025.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
32	90	241	1,381	451	135	29	297	28	24

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the past 12 months has been high, which is to be expected given that the site is located in the city centre. Less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime have been the most reported offences taking place. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres where there is a higher concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a higher number of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding offences have occurred all throughout the local area, particularly to the south of the proposed site towards the city centre. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most reported less serious woundings taking place, with incidents most commonly occurring in the evening/late at night and alcohol consumption often being a factor.
- 2.1.3 Theft offences have also taken place throughout the local area with a higher concentration towards the city centre. Offenders have predominantly targeted insecure items such as mobile phones, wallets and purses left on benches and tabletops in public spaces, restaurants and bars. There have also been cases of parcels being stolen from communal areas of apartment buildings.
- 2.1.4 Theft from motor vehicle has been the most reported vehicle crime taking place. Offenders have in most targeted vehicles parked on the streets and within parking facilities throughout the local area by using implements in order to smash glazing in the windows before removing items from within, as well as removing vehicle parts and registration plates using tools.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Secure windows and doors have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools to gain access to the building.

Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Avoid locating openings in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed.

- 2.2.2 Organised burglars targeting expensive I.T. equipment.

Possible Solution - Secure store rooms, where such items can be kept, should be incorporated into the design of the building. These rooms should have solid blockwork walls or be reinforced with expanded metal mesh and certified door sets (to BS PAS 24). Valuable items should not be easy to remove, and should be uniquely identified using an appropriate property marking system. Portable equipment should not be positioned in communal areas where there may be regular visitor access. Effective access controls within the building should assist in restricting entry of visitors and potential intruders.

- 2.2.3 Offenders posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas to steal property.

Possible Solution - There should be a robust access control system in place to ensure that visitors to the buildings are vetted and / or met and escorted before being allowed further access into the building. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work.

- 2.2.4 Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.

Possible Solution - All ground floor or otherwise accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Windows in secluded locations may require additional protection from criminal damage, such as shutters or grilles.

- 2.2.5 Shutters have been prised open to target doors / windows behind them.

Possible Solution - All shutters should be certified to a recognised burglary-resistant standard (i.e. LPS 1175 SR 2). Shutters certified to this standard can resist most attempts by offenders to gain access with the use of force. In high risk situations, shutters rated to a higher standard of resistance should be installed, and retractable bollards can be used to protect section overhead doors and shutters.

- 2.2.6 Entering premises and removing personal items (mostly mobile phones and bags) belonging to customers.

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with ‘Chelsea Clips’ to reduce the opportunities to steal bags / coats. The internal layout of the premises can also increase surveillance opportunities and help deter offenders. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.

2.3 Risk Factors - Offices

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft

2.4 Retail Premises

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer/staff property
- Criminal damage to property

2.5 Leisure


The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Unauthorised access to non-public areas
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Cycle security


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- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
 - Controlled access (staff/user only)
 - Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
 - Employee theft
 - Theft of personal belongings at work
 - Unauthorised access to buildings/private space

2.6 Non-Domestic Burglary (Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.




- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester is greatest on Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday. During the day, the risk of burglary at Manchester office premises rises into the evening/late at night. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.



- 2.6.2 **Point of Entry:** The majority of burglaries at offices in Manchester have been committed through doors. Burglaries against office buildings in this area do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing tools with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks. Offenders have also smashed glazed panels in doors and windows to gain entry. A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' and 'legitimate' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.

2.7 Theft (Offices): Risk Analysis




The data below relates to thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.7.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest on Monday and Tuesday and is generally lower over the weekend (when many are shut). During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.

2.8 Non-Domestic Burglary (Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.8.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed, and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.8.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:

- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating / exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.
- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

2.9 Theft (Retail): Risk Analysis


The data below relates to thefts within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.9.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses, and bags.

2.10 Non-Domestic Burglary Leisure Facilities: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area.





2.10.1 Day/ Time Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at Greater Manchester leisure facilities peaks on Thursday/Friday and is slightly lower on Saturday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the late afternoon/early evening and during the early hours of the morning. During the late afternoon/early evening, leisure facilities are often at their busiest, meaning offenders can take advantage of busy staff and anonymity among higher numbers of legitimate customers. Offenders often target commercial properties at night, when they are often closed (or operate with a reduced number of on-site staff), it is dark and the streets/areas in which they are typically located are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

2.10.2 Point of Entry: The following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently by offenders targeting Greater Manchester leisure facilities:

- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using bodily pressure and implements.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Where the point of entry is 'legitimate' or 'unknown', this is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas without being noticed.

2.11 Theft Leisure Facilities: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area.



- 2.11.1 **Day/ Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Greater Manchester leisure facilities peaks on Tuesday, but remains consistently high throughout the week. During the day, the risk of theft rises in the afternoon and peaks in the evening. This is when leisure facilities are typically at their busiest and the opportunities to offend are greater. Personal property belonging to staff and customers, such as mobile phones and cash, are the most routinely targeted items – taking place most often in changing/locker rooms and staff-only areas.

2.12 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.12.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Friday and Saturday in the early evening (17:00-18:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time when they are often left unattended for long periods of time on the streets or within parking facilities whilst the owners are visiting the city centre, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 Refurbishment of the CIS Tower for continued use as an office (Use Class E c)); construction of a 3-storey extension to the podium for additional office accommodation (Use Class Ec)); change of use at floor 24 and 25 from Use Class E c) (office) to Use Class E b) (F&B); and change of use to basement and ground floor from Class E c) (office) to Use Class E a) (retail)/ Use Class E d) (gym)/ Sui generis (leisure). To include creation of new entrance; hard landscaping and planting; and creation of 2x DDA parking spaces.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 Building footprint. The building footprint at ground floor level is relatively simple and contains no areas of potential concealment. All doors and shutters appear to be flush with the external elevations of the buildings, removing areas of potential concealment that could be subject to abuse.
- 3.2.2 The main pedestrian entrances to the buildings are located in prominent locations, which are readily apparent on approaching from the surrounding public realm.
- 3.2.3 Glazed elevations surrounding the new build at ground floor level will help to enliven the street scene and enhance natural surveillance of and from the building.
- 3.2.4 Storage and servicing functions, including refuse stores, are contained within secure enclosures within the footprint of the building.
- 3.2.5 The proposals for the development clearly define the different uses of the building and all entrances can be easily located and navigated.
- 3.2.6 The foyer/reception zones provide the opportunity for good levels of security at a central control point for the commercial/office spaces.
- 3.2.7 The internal layout of the building appears capable of being divided into identifiable zones, allowing separation of accessible and restricted areas.
- 3.2.8 The large expanse of glazing allows staff to monitor customer and public behaviour in reception and the adjacent public realm.
- 3.2.9 Security measures carefully incorporated into the building design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

Public realm

- 3.3.1 The layout appears generally free of obstacles to vision allowing people to see and be seen within the area and maintains sight lines across the site. Planting and street furniture has been aligned to avoid creating potential hiding places and avoids blocking sight lines. However, the choice of trees and other plant species should allow some visible permeability through the canopies and foliage so that people cannot be concealed within the public spaces.
- 3.3.2 Street furniture and landscape features should be used to prevent unwanted parking or access onto pedestrian only surfaces. It should be very clear in which spaces, or on which streets, vehicle parking is authorised.
- 3.3.3 The junctions between newly formed traffic free/controlled pedestrianised zones and existing traffic roads should be carefully considered. Maintenance of newly installed control measure (rising bollards, lighting, gates and all access control features), should be incorporated into the management & maintenance procedures.
- 3.3.4 Level changes. The proposal contains some external changes in level across the site and the developer should be careful not to inadvertently allow retaining features to facilitate climbing aids that would allow easy access into otherwise secure areas. Care needs to be taken in detailing and construction / installation of features such as fencing which could compromise the general security of boundaries or create potential hiding places. Junctions of fence lines, walls and the buildings need particular attention. Raised planting beds and retaining walls can provide opportunities for informal seating and gathering that may be attractive to antisocial individuals or groups.
- 3.3.5 Restrictions for public access to the South & East façade and lower-level access stairs at ground floor level should be considered. Currently these areas are easy to gain access to and are being used by rough sleepers and drug users. Access to these areas should be restricted to onsite management only.

Commercial office

- 3.3.6 Subdivision of Floor Space. Where the upper floor office areas are subdivided into smaller individual units, each suite of offices should be capable of separation with their own individual access controls.
- 3.3.7 Access beyond the reception lobby should be controlled so that intruders cannot easily reach restricted parts of the building. Access to the stair core and lifts from the entrance lobby should require passage through access-controlled turnstiles or doors. The main entrance doors should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if required, to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobbies.
- 3.3.8 It should not be possible for the staff/visitors of one office floor/suite to access another. All individual office levels or suites should be fitted with self-closing access-controlled doors, operated by staff swipe cards/fobs or by intercoms linked to individual receptions and all rooms within office suites should be capable of being deadlocked when unoccupied. Access to plant/service/storage areas should also be fitted with auditable access controls (authorised personnel only).
- 3.3.9 Staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day and night. The main entrance doors should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if required, to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobbies. If the building is to be open at any time without a concierge or security presence in the lobby area, the main entrance doors should be secured and one of the single-leaf entrance doors should be controlled by means of a video access control system linked to each individual office suite (allowing staff to vet callers before allowing them entry).
- 3.3.10 Any short-stay cycle parking should be located within sight of entrances and overlooked by reception staff and CCTV.
- 3.3.11 The basement service road and service area should be secured with a high-speed automatic shutter (to reduce the potential for tailgating), certified to LPS 1175. The location of the shutter should not create a sheltered recess within the building line that may foster loitering/gathering etc. The car park shutter

itself should be operated by access controls (either by swipe or, preferably, proximity reader), both on access and egress (i.e. no automatic egress).

- 3.3.12 The access-control strategy adopted for the development should be capable of confining movement into and through the building, thus allowing staff and visitors to only enter parts of the site to which they have legitimate reason to be present. Access permissions should be fully auditable and regularly reviewed.
- 3.3.13 Access controls and flexibility of use within the building. When accommodating customer requirements for increased flexibility of space within the building, the security of these areas must not be compromised nor impact on other parts of the building. Space shared by a variety of users at varying times means that an intruder is less likely to be identified – it is therefore essential that accommodation is provided for the secure storage of personal items, for instance while staff are away from their workspace. Facilities intended for use by external visitors (e.g. cafes / conference and meeting rooms), must be designed so that further access to the building is rigorously controlled. It should not be possible for the staff/visitors of one office floor / suite to access another. All individual office levels or suites should be fitted with self-closing, access-controlled doors, operated by staff swipe cards / fobs or by intercoms linked to individual receptions and all rooms within office suites should be capable of being deadlocked when unoccupied. Where the upper floor office areas are subdivided into smaller individual units, each suite of offices should be capable of separation with their own individual access controls. Access to plant / service/storage areas should also be fitted with auditable access controls (authorised personnel only).
- 3.3.14 Post. Reception and distribution of post within the building should be considered. Incoming post and deliveries should be processed at one single point, in an area that can be easily isolated. Post rooms should not be located close to main exit routes as this could affect prompt evacuation.
- 3.3.15 Current drawings show cycle parking for building users is contained in a dedicated room at ground floor. Entry into this space should be strictly limited via the access-controlled system under the building management system ensuring only genuine cyclists can gain access. Racks within the cycle stores should allow bikes to be locked by the frame and both wheels and should be obtained from a Secured by Design approved supplier (see www.securedbydesign.com).
- 3.3.16 The refuse store arrangement should allow bins to be collected without the need to leave bins out on the street for long periods of time; and operated so that the building can be secured while collections are taking place.

Café / Bar / Restaurant

- 3.3.17 The most frequently occurring crime in restaurants, and licensed premises, is the theft of personal property (i.e. handbags, purses, mobile phones) placed on tables/chairs, or the floor, for this reason it is highly recommended that tables and chairs are designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats.
- 3.3.18 Casual access to the rear of the bars/service counters should be restricted (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled) to prevent unauthorised access.
- 3.3.19 Licensed premises are often the scene of violent disorder. A comprehensive CCTV system should be installed so that any incidents will be recorded. The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: the main entrances in to the premises, all bar/service areas, toilet lobbies and customer circulation/seating areas.
- 3.3.20 Restaurants and bars in the area have frequently been targeted by burglars. It is highly recommended that the premises should be covered with a monitored alarm (with response).
- 3.3.21 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work. There should also be a secure cash office – which should have solid masonry walls (with no adjacent false/suspended ceilings), a doorset certified to BS PAS 24 and a safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs. Consideration should also be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind the bar area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in the till during busy periods.
- 3.3.22 Non-cash payment methods are preferred and should be encouraged. The food stalls/kiosks and bar should either be cleared at the end of an evening or should be capable of being secured out-of-hours (with no cash left within them).

-
- 3.3.23 It is essential that all the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Sliding doors should be tested and certified to BS PAS 24, ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ Revolving doors (if used), should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ If the building is to be occupied by multiple tenants, all individual office levels or suites should be fitted with self-closing access-controlled solid-core doors (minimum 44mm thick), operated by staff swipe cards/fobs or by intercoms linked to individual receptions and any rooms within office suites should be capable of being deadlocked when unoccupied. The doors into the emergency escape cores at each level should be fitted with electromagnetic locks, connected to the fire alarm, so that people at one level cannot access other levels. Once an emergency escape core is accessed, the only means of egress should be at ground floor level.
- ☐ Internal doors to storage rooms should be solid core, minimum 44mm thick with a multi-point locking mechanism.

4.2 Shutters

- ☐ Where grilles or shutters are required for additional protection the minimum certification required is:
 - LPS 1175: Issue 7 Security Rating 1
 - STS 202: Issue 3, Burglary Rating 1

4.3 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Security ratings higher than those listed above may be required dependant on:
 - type of risk,
 - level of crime risk,
 - location of building *or*
 - security level of the door or window to be protected.

4.4 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass. It is recommended that glazing to elevations adjoining public areas or evacuation routes should also be laminated.

4.5 Wall Construction

Glazed curtain walling and window walls

- ☐ Secured by Design recognises four distinct types of glazed wall systems. These are:
 - Large glazed units connected by 'spider clamp' system.
 - Glazed units directly retained within a framing system (usually aluminium)
 - Framed windows installed within a separate framing system.
 - Framed windows connected to other framed windows to create a window wall.
- ☐ Glazed curtain walling must be installed using a secure glazing retention system. The method of retaining glass must include one or more of the following:
 - Security glazing tape
 - Dedicated security sealant or gasket
 - A secure mechanical fixing system (Evidence will be required to prove the system is secure. This may be achieved by utilising the specific glazing retention test within PAS 24:2012 or by indicative test on the retention system to LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR1 or STS 202: Issue 3, BR1)
- ☐ Framed windows (3 and 4 above) used within the construction of a window wall must be certified to one of the following requirements:
 - BS PAS 24:2016
 - STS 204 Issue 3: 2012
 - LPS 1175 Issue 7:2010 Security Rating 1
 - LPS 2081 Issue 1:2014 Security Rating A

4.6 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover all building on the site, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.7 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
 - Main Entrance Doors
 - Turnstiles / doors off reception lobby
 - Doors to each individual level / suite
 - Refuse / service areas
 - Doors into cycle store
 - Conference / meeting rooms
- ☐ The electric locking system to be used throughout the building should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated / disabled to ensure that misuse is prevented.

4.8 Lighting

External lighting

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

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- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
 - ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

Internal Lighting

- ☐ Internal lighting should be operated by detection devices which will automatically switch lights on with movement activity in each room.

4.9 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Entrances to site, external areas all around the new building and ancillary facilities, external doors including emergency egresses / hatches, access-controlled doors & cycle parking areas.

4.10 Fit out

- ☐ Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their buildings once complete, and therefore the end-users requirements. Typical components which are subject to fit-out are:
 - Internal access control
 - Internal doors into premises
 - Alarm systems
 - ATM cash dispensers
- ☐ These features can be critical to a secure environment, and we would urge the client to provide would-be tenants with the contact details for Design for Security, who will provide free advice on internal security matters so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

4.11 Other

- ☐ Reception desk and staff. Reception staff should have a clear view of the approaches to all entrances. Reception desks require restricted access from the public side the desk should be deep enough to afford protection for the receptionist. Access beyond a public reception area should be controlled by the receptionist or fob.
- ☐ Effective signage is important to help customers / visitors navigate around the area, so they can easily find the various facilities and locate exit points.

5 Internal Layout Guidance (Café/bar/restaurants)

The internal layout of licensed premises, cafes & restaurants and bar spaces should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

5.1.1 Licensed premises, cafes & restaurants and bar spaces can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- Opportunities - Large numbers of people congregating in such premises generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- Lack of attention - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- Cohesion – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent such premises means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- Customer turnover – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- Valuable goods – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys etc.
- Stealth - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.


5.1.2 The incidence and severity of disorder issues in large licensed/event venues and their environs are often linked to physical features of these locations, such as:

- High concentration of people;
- Crowd congestion;
- Services that do not cater for demand, i.e. insufficient serving staff;
- Physical hazards arising from type and placement of furniture/ancillary structures; and
- Insufficient and unclean toilets.

In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

- 5.1.3 The main entrance(s) to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.
- 5.1.4 Customers entering/leaving the premises should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.
- 5.1.5 The internal layout of premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.
- 5.1.6 Consideration should be given to high/wide bars/service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable doors or hatches that cannot be easily scaled). Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.
- 5.1.7 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 4.2) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

- 5.1.8 It is highly recommended that any customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



- 5.1.9 Adequate signage should be deployed to direct people throughout the venue, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.

- 5.1.10 Public toilets can give rise to crime and disorder issues and the following issues should be considered:

- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
- Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
- Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
- Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
- Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
- Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

6 Management & Maintenance (Café/bar/restaurants)

- 6.1.1 The success of the proposal will be dependent on effective management of the premises and a zero tolerance policy should be adopted with customers who behave inappropriately. Comprehensive risk assessments should be carried out in advance of all events/uses, in order to identify and address potential security issues.
- 6.1.2 During any specific events, the control of people entering the venue will be essential to maintaining order, both inside and outside the premises. Strict monitoring of numbers entering the venue must be undertaken, as overcrowding inside will facilitate criminal activity. Management of people awaiting entry will also be important, in order to prevent frustrations building up that could create disorder. Signage to any appropriate location will assist in directing people to appropriate queuing locations, but sufficient security staff will be needed to supervise the entry process and an outside security presence will be required at busy times.
- 6.1.3 Security staff should also ensure the swift and safe dispersal of visitors away from the venue after an event. Trained security staff should be positioned at the exits and entrances to site as visitors leave. Suitable notices should be displayed on all exits from the site advising visitors to keep noise to a minimum when leaving the venue.
- 6.1.4 All door/security staff engaged at the premises should be provided by an SIA ACS approved security company. Security staff should regularly patrol the entire site to ensure a visible presence to visitors and potential offenders.
- 6.1.5 The setting up, dismantling and operational processes involved in events can provide many opportunities for criminal activity, as an offender can act anonymously within the relatively transient community of temporary workers/delivery personnel, and gain access to otherwise secure areas. It is therefore essential that effective identification and verification procedures are put in place for the whole period of events.
- 6.1.6 The applicant should engage in dialogue with the local neighbourhood policing team in Manchester and should give advance notice of events, so that an appropriate policing consideration and arrangement(s) can be made.
- 6.1.7 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the venue must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the building. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Cash management within the premises - including a chute deposit safe behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods;
 - Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
 - Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. fencing, access controls, alarm systems, CCTV cameras etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti and litter (regular litter patrols should be carried out inside and outside the premises, to prevent discarded bottles, glasses, cans etc. from being used to cause criminal damage or used as weapons); and
 - Refuse collection arrangements (which should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods).

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- 6.1.8 The opening hours of the venue should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses.
- 6.1.9 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers/TVs, music/DJ equipment, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- ☐ Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to back-of-house/staff-only areas.

7 Management & Maintenance

- 7.1.1 The designer must ensure that this report is included within the BIM management model so that all parties are aware of the requirements for construction and management.
- 7.1.2 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 7.1.3 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
 - Regular inspection, service and repair to communal security features (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV, alarms, fencing & gates)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees to ensure that sight lines are maintained and coverage of lighting and CCTV is not impaired.
- 7.1.4 Ensure that the site management is for which the building / site was designed able to cope with the remains in place, such as 24 hour concierge / security patrols.
- 7.1.5 Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.
- 7.1.6 All communal or amenity areas not under the ownership of individual residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space is not detrimental to its surroundings.

8 Construction

- 8.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 8.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

9 Useful References

9.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 9.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
04/12/2024	SHA	Meeting with architect
24/02/2025	Deloitte LLP	CIS instruction received
11/03/2025	DfS	Invoice issued
01/04/2025	DfS	Site visit
03/04/2025	DfS	CIS version A issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
10518-SHA-Z0-A-G100-PL-00-003	Site Plan - Overall Red Line Boundary	07/03/25	
10518-SHA-Z1-A-G200-PL-00-001	General Arrangement Proposed Ground Floor Plan	07/03/25	
10518-SHA-Z1-A-G200-PL-01-001	General Arrangement Proposed Level 01 Plan	07/03/25	
10518-SHA-Z1-A-G200-PL-02-001	General Arrangement Proposed Level 02 Plan	07/03/25	
10518-SHA-Z1-A-G200-PL-03-001	General Arrangement Proposed Level 03 Plan	07/03/25	
10518-SHA-Z1-A-G200-PL-04-001	General Arrangement Proposed Level 04 Plan	07/03/25	
10518-SHA-Z1-A-G200-PL-05-001	General Arrangement Proposed Level 05 Plan	07/03/25	
10518-SHA-Z1-A-G200-PL-06-001	General Arrangement Proposed Level 06 Plan	07/03/25	
10518-SHA-Z1-A-G200-PL-07-001	General Arrangement Proposed Level 07 Plan	07/03/25	
10518-SHA-Z1-A-G200-PL-08-001	General Arrangement Proposed Level 08 Plan	07/03/25	
10518-SHA-Z1-A-G200-PL-09-001	General Arrangement Proposed Level 09 Plan (Representative of Levels 10-13)	07/03/25	
10518-SHA-Z1-A-G200-PL-14-001	General Arrangement Proposed Level 14 Plan	07/03/25	
10518-SHA-Z1-A-G200-PL-15-001	General Arrangement Proposed Level 15 Plan	07/03/25	
10518-SHA-Z1-A-G200-PL-16-001	General Arrangement Proposed Level 16 Plan (Representative of Levels 17-22)	07/03/25	
10518-SHA-Z1-A-G200-PL-23-001	General Arrangement Proposed Level 23 Plan	07/03/25	

10518-SHA-Z1-A-G200-PL-24-001	General Arrangement Proposed Level 24 Plan	07/03/25	
10518-SHA-Z1-A-G200-PL-25-001	General Arrangement Proposed Level 25 Plan	07/03/25	
10518-SHA-Z1-A-G200-PL-26-001	General Arrangement Proposed Level 26 Plan	07/03/25	
10518-SHA-Z1-A-G200-PL-27-001	General Arrangement Proposed Level 27 Plan	07/03/25	
10518-SHA-Z1-A-G200-PL-28-001	General Arrangement Proposed Level 28 Plan	07/03/25	
10518-SHA-Z1-A-G200-PL-29-001	General Arrangement Proposed Level 29 Plan	07/03/25	
10518-SHA-Z1-A-G200-PL-30-001	General Arrangement Proposed Level 30 Plan	07/03/25	
10518-SHA-Z1-A-G200-PL-B1-001	General Arrangement Proposed Basement Level 01 Plan	07/03/25	
10518-SHA-Z1-A-G200-PL-B1L-001	General Arrangement Proposed Basement Lower-Level Plan	07/03/25	
10518-SHA-Z1-A-G200-PL-B1U-001	General Arrangement Proposed Basement Upper-Level Plan	07/03/25	
10518-SHA-Z1-A-G200-PL-B2-001	General Arrangement Proposed Basement Level 02 Plan	07/03/25	
10518-SHA-Z1-A-G200-PL-B3-001	General Arrangement Proposed Basement Level 03 Plan	07/03/25	
10518-SHA-Z1-A-G200-PL-M0-001	General Arrangement Proposed Ground Floor Mezzanine	07/03/25	
10518-SHA-Z1-A-G200-PL-RF-001	General Arrangement Proposed Roof Plan	07/03/25	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for doorsets and windows, which certifies that a particular doorset is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk