

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

College View, 410-418 Moss Lane East

Student accommodation development

For: **Cheshire Homes Residential Limited**

Version B: **08/04/25**

Ref: **2024/0205/CIS/01**

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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College View, 410-418 Moss Lane East

2024/0205/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported - Minor security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Robust control of access in/and around the buildings.
- Managed secure cycle store.
- Additional cycle provision within the redline boundary.
- Ground floor external material protection against graffiti.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will support the application subject to the design team suitably addressing the recommendations contained in the report (Sections 3.3, 4 & 5), and will seek the inclusion of a planning condition requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

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Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.
The development site is bound by Moss Lane East to the North and Acomb St to the West.
To the immediate southern boundary is an alleyway providing access to the residential at the rear and leading onto Playfair St. The alleyway in places is overgrown and contains fly-tipping & discarded furniture.
Moss Lane East is a busy road linking two main arterial roads into M/cr; Princess Rd and Oxford/Wilmslow Rd.
To the south of the site the area is made up of traditional residential terrace streets.


Directly opposite the site is Manchester Academy High School. The school is set back from the main road and provides a good vehicle entry & exit route for drop-off & pick-up.
A pedestrian crossing to the northeast of the site provides a good means of crossing a busy Moss Lane East Road.
To the immediate northern boundary, in front of the site is a bus stop providing services west.
To the east of the school is Whitworth Park

The site is near central Manchester (approx. 4km). Oxford Road is well served with several public transport bus routes. A series of footpaths connect into the University campus and a short walk to Oxford Road and further bus routes.

The site is presently a series of residential apartment blocks with a rear car park and service area.




1 –Proposed development site on Moss Lane East.


2 –Neighbouring residential building on Moss Lane East.


3 – View West along Moss Lane East.


4 – Substation & example of graffiti in the area.

7 – View East along alleyway to rear of the site.

6 – Vehicle access to the rear car park from Acomb St.

5 – Existing boundaries of the site.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2023 to 30th June 2024.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
104	14	70	475	92	44	17	32	16	30

2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the past 12 months is above average for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding, criminal damage and theft having been most commonly reported. These offences have been occurring all throughout the local area, particularly in the residential neighbourhoods to the south of Moss Lane East, as well as at a large hotspot of offences to the east around the junction of Oxford Road with Hathersage Road.

2.1.2 Less serious woundings have mostly occurred at the locations mentioned above, where assaults, harassment and public order offences have been most reported. These incidents have mainly involved disputes between known associates and neighbours, as well as cases of domestic violence.

2.1.3 Domestic burglary offences have occurred throughout the residential neighbourhoods to the south of the proposed site. Offenders have in most used implements in order to gain access to properties via secure doors and windows.

2.1.4 The majority of theft offences have taken place at the large hotspot of offences at the junction of Oxford Road with Hathersage Road. Offenders have used pickpocketing and distraction techniques in order to remove items stored on the person such as mobile phones, wallets and purses. They have also targeted insecure coats and bags on tabletops and benches, as well as parcels left on doorsteps and in communal areas of apartment buildings.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Opening of secured doors using bodily force or implements to gain entry.

Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. A robust access control system should be in place to allow reception and security staff to vet visitors allowing them access to the building (also see section 4.1). The main entrance should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access.

2.2.2 Offenders used implements to force shutters upwards.

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc) have been scrutinised by professionals. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines.

2.2.3 Smashing of glazing in windows and doors to gain entry, at the front of the premises.

Possible Solution – All ground floor / accessible glazing should include a laminated pane which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Ensure that rubbish and loose material is removed from the areas around the site. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

2.2.4 Offenders targeted entrance apartment doors by 'tailgating' or posing as legitimate visitors, before forcing open individual apartment doors or targeting those left insecure by residents.

2.2.5 Possible Solution - All individual apartments should be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g.

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by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.), cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection. A staffed 24/7 concierge desk will support the management and security of the entrance lobby.

2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:


- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

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
2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.


Comparison of Domestic Burglary Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester




Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **148% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **220% higher** than Greater Manchester and **227% higher** than England & Wales.

2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **8% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **47% higher** than Greater Manchester and **180% higher** than England & Wales.

2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **14% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **13% higher** than Greater Manchester and **37% higher** than England & Wales.


2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **32% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **12% higher** than Greater Manchester and **36% higher** than England & Wales.

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
2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.5.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of domestic burglary is highest on Friday and Saturday in the late evening and around midnight (22:00-01:00). Offenders tend to target dwellings late at night when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:


- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as 'unknown', it is likely that the offenders have exploited insecure windows or doors.
- Smashed glazing in the windows and doors.
- Using bodily pressure or implements in order to force open secure windows and doors.

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
2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.6.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime peaks on Tuesday around midday (11:00-13:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time during the working week when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development comprises the demolition of existing buildings and the construction of a new purpose-built student accommodation development, associated amenity, service and storage spaces. The key elements of the scheme are set out below:

- Total room numbers: 132 (126 regulars studios (95%)/6 DDA studios (5%))
- Total cycle spaces racks: 40 spaces in an external secure store.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The building plot provides ground floor activity in the form of residential reception space and communal workspace, in-turn this use offers additional levels of activity and natural surveillance of the adjacent community space and public realm.

3.2.2 It is welcomed that the external gate will incorporate access control as the first line of security for the site & building. However, the building is capable of zoning to further prevent access internally, reducing the opportunity for tailgating, and thus if an offender does manage to enter the building, their movement is restricted. Corridor doors off the reception area should incorporate access control measures. All rooms containing facilities for residents should have access controls managed by the building management.

3.2.3 The ground floor amenity spaces provide opportunities for residents to meet and foster community relations within the development. Schemes which have good social communities are less likely to tolerate inappropriate behaviour and are more willing to challenge unfamiliar faces in the development.

3.2.4 The entrances to the apartments on the typical upper floors appear to be flush with the corridor walls, so an intruder could not be hidden from view.

3.2.5 Refuse disposal arrangements. Refuse and servicing functions can be carried out without compromising the overall security of the site perimeter. The layout of the residential bin store area allows collection staff to access the bins without needing to enter the internal secure areas.

3.2.6 Cycle storage – Provision for residents is contained within secure enclosures located within the building. Access must be restricted to genuine cyclists only, on application to the managers of the building. Racks within the enclosure should allow cyclists to lock the frame and both wheels and should be obtained from a Secured by Design-approved supplier (see www.securedbydesign.com for details). Any short-stay cycle parking intended for visitors / shoppers should be located within sight of entrances and / or overlooked by reception / security staff and CCTV.

3.2.7 Security measure carefully incorporated into the building design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

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3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 An intercom should be provided from the entrance door to a reception desk. Visitors need to sign in at reception from where residents will collect them.

3.3.2 The main entrance from Moss Lane East should be controlled by access control measures. The building is capable of zoning internally to further prevent access, reducing the opportunity for tailgating beyond the reception area. Corridor doors off the GF reception area should incorporate access control measures. This arrangement provides additional security opportunities for residents to challenge an intruder within the main reception area.

3.3.3 Given the prolific high levels of graffiti within and around the site, it is important that external cladding materials at ground floor are sealed, protected and supports the removal of graffiti.

3.3.4 All elevations of the new building should be monitored by CCTV with a complementary lighting system to illuminate it throughout the hours of darkness.

3.3.5 Post. Postal theft is a significant problem within apartment blocks. If the mailboxes are to be located within the building itself, they should be situated within the entrance lobby area so that postal delivery staff do not have access to the whole of the building. Mailboxes should be easily monitored from the concierge desk and / or covered by CCTV.

3.3.6 The development should take into account the security of residents, guests and staff approaching and leaving the building, particularly at quiet times and late at night. The areas outside the premises should be well-illuminated without creating areas of shadow or pooling. A monitored CCTV system covering all elevations of the premises is also recommended.

3.3.7 Currently the proposals show provision for 40 cycle spaces within a secure cycle store at the rear of the building. Residents should apply to the management company for access to the cycle store. Any further additional cycle hoop prevision should be located in clear view of the main entrance area allowing for good natural surveillance opportunities.

3.3.8 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

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4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.

☐ Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves, visitors to be greeted in reception by the resident.

☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to STS202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.

☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS01, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights and are provided with door viewers instead.

☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

☐ Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621/8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.

☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.

Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P2A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:

- BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
- BS 6799 for wireless systems

☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.5 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:

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- Main Entrance doors
- Secondary entrance doors off internal lobbies
- Bin stores
- Cycle stores.
- Staff-only areas
- Cluster apartment access.

4.6 Landscaping

☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

4.7 Lighting

☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.

☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).

☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.

4.8 CCTV

☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images, then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Main entrances, foyer, stairs, lift lobbies, landings, cycle stores, bin store entrances.

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4.9 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- ☐ Any externally mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal.
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible, and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
04/06/24	Innov8 Development Solutions	CIS instructed
17/07/24	Innov8 Development Solutions	CIS confirmed
17/07/24	GMP	Invoice issued
14/08/24	DfS	Site visit
04/03/25	Client	Invoice paid
19/03/25	DfS	CIS issued
08/04/25	DfS	CIS revised & issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
MLE-TOD-20-00-DR-A-20002-P05-Level 00-	GA Floor Plan	15/01/25	
MLE-TOD-20-01-DR-A-20003- P05-Level 01 -	GA Floor Plan	15/01/25	
MLE-TOD-20-02-DR-A-20004- P05-Level 02 -	GA Floor Plan	15/01/25	
MLE-TOD-20-03-DR-A-20005- P05-Level 03 -	GA Floor Plan	15/01/25	
MLE-TOD-20-04-DR-A-20006- P05-Level 04 -	GA Floor Plan	15/01/25	
MLE-TOD-20-05-DR-A-20007- P05-Level 05 -	GA Floor Plan	15/01/25	
MLE-TOD-20-B1-DR-A-20001- P05-Level-B1 -	GA Floor Plan	15/01/25	
MLE-TOD-20-RF-DR-A-20008- P05-Level RF -	Roof Plan	15/01/25	
MLE-TOD-30-ZZ-DR-A-30001-P04-	Elevations -North & South	15/01/25	
MLE-TOD-30-ZZ-DR-A-30002- P04-	Elevations - East & West	15/01/25	
MLE-TOD-40-ZZ-DR-A-40001- P01-	Proposed Sections A & B	15/01/25	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Amendments made to 3.2.2 / 3.3.2 / 3.3.7	08/04/25

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999
General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012
General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)
Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)
Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012
Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011
Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT
Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS
Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT
Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)
A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)
A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.
UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)
The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org
CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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