



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Northern Pathology Development

550 Wilmslow Road

FOR: Northern Pathology Development Ltd

VERSION A: 6th June 2025

REFERENCE: 2013/0709/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security



Northern Pathology Development

2013/0709/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The proposed development will replace the existing building presently on the development site and will be of a similar use, which is acceptable for this area. The existing building is of temporary construction and likely has poor security credentials, a new building can include robust security measure to reduce the risk of crime. The proposed development has many positive features that will reduce the potential for crime and antisocial behaviour and has the potential to create an active frontage to Wilmslow Road. The Christie has an onsite security team which can respond quickly to any incidents of potential threats and will deter offenders from operating.

It is highly recommended that the recommendations made in section 3.3 of this report are implemented where possible and the physical security of the building is aligned with section 4 of this report.



Patrick Babb

Consultant

e: patrick.babb@designforsecurity.org

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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is positioned within the wider Christie Hospital site, which is located within the Withington area of Manchester.

The site boundaries are roughly defined by a parade of retail units to the North, to the East by Wilmslow Road, to the West the site is bound, to the South is a service road serving the hospital, and to the West appears to be vacant, overgrown, land.

The local area is typically defined by The Christie Hospital and wider campus, including the Manchester Cancer Research Centre. The local area does have a high number of residential properties, including houses, apartments, and HMOs. There are also numerous retail/commercial uses on Wilmslow Road, which is one of the main routes through the area.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st June 2024 to 31st May 2025.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
29	<5	44	188	43	11	<5	25	<5	13




- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the past 12 months is average for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding, criminal damage and theft having been the most reported offences taking place. These offences have taken place all throughout the local area, particularly at a large hotspot of offences to the north of the proposed site at the junction of Wilmslow Road with Palatine Road.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have mostly occurred at the hotspot mentioned above, as well as at locations along Palatine Road and at the junction of Wilmslow Road and Parkville Road. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most reported less serious woundings taking place, with the majority of offences involving disputes between known associates, as well as some cases of domestic violence.
- 2.1.3 Criminal damage against vehicles has accounted for the majority of criminal damage offences taking place. In most cases offenders have used objects or implements to smash the glazing in the windows and damage the bodywork of cars or vans. There have also been instances of damage being done to the front doors and windows of both dwellings and retail outlets.
- 2.1.4 The majority of theft offences have occurred at the hotspot around the junction of Wilmslow Road with Palatine Road. Offenders have primarily targeted insecure items on tabletops and benches in public spaces or restaurants, as well as having used pickpocketing techniques in order to remove items stored on the person such as mobile phones, wallets and purses.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure
Possible Solution - Although the location of doors should be considered (ideally placed where they can be readily observed, so that potential criminals would be more easily detected), it is inevitable that some will be located where they will benefit from lower levels of natural surveillance. All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. The use lighting, CCTV, and security patrols can also deter criminals.
- 2.2.2 Windows have been prised open, glazing has been smashed to gain entry or have been targeted when left insecure
- 2.2.3 *Possible Solution – All ground floor/easily accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3).*
- 2.2.4 Breaking glazing in doors and windows, mainly to the front of the premises, using implements to gain access.
Possible Solution – Any ground floor or easily accessible glazing should contain a pane of laminate glazing, which cannot be easily smashed or shattered to gain entry.
- 2.2.5 Entering premises as legitimate customer and tailgating staff/ exploiting insecure doors to access staff only areas.
Possible Solution – Personnel gates or turnstiles should restrict access from the office foyer into the circulation core of the building. Any external doors should operate on an access control system.

2.3 Healthcare Facility Burglary Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against healthcare facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.





2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Saturday during the early hours of the morning into the late morning. Offenders are likely to operate at these times when staff are busy tending to patients and they can attempt to gain unauthorised access to restricted areas/rooms to steal property unnoticed.

2.3.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:

- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Posing as a legitimate visitor, gaining access to restricted areas by means of insecure doors, and tailgating staff.
- In entry points recorded as "unknown", it is likely that offenders have targeted insecure doors.

2.4 Healthcare Facility Theft Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against healthcare facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at hospitals in Manchester remains consistently high across the week, but is slightly lower on Wednesday and Saturday. The risk of theft at hospitals in Manchester is highest during the day, peaking between 12.30pm and 5pm. During these times, hospital sites are at their busiest, with patients attending appointments and members of the public visiting friends and family. This allows offenders to gain anonymous access to hospital sites. Bags, cash, mobile phones and IT equipment belonging to patients and staff are the most routinely stolen items.

2.5 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on Saturday in the evening (20:00-21:00). Offenders often target vehicles at this time when they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is the redevelopment of the existing Derek Crowther Building. The proposed building will be three storeys and will house the Christie site wide pathology services. The building will have a link bridge at first floor to the main Christie building. The building will be a staff only facility with the exception of deliveries and organised visitors.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The existing building appears to be of temporary/semi-temporary construction and likely towards the end of its lifespan. Older buildings, particularly those of temporary construction can have poor security credentials which can leave them vulnerable to criminality. The replacement of the building will allow for a higher level of security to the building.
- 3.2.2 The current building does not have an active frontage to Wilmslow Road, the proposed replacement building will look out on to Wilmslow Road which will allow for higher levels of natural surveillance.
- 3.2.3 The proposed building will be for staff members only with no access for members of the public, which will reduce the potential for criminals to enter the building under the guise of being legitimate users of the building.
- 3.2.4 The main entrance into the development will be taken from the front elevation of the building which can easily be viewed from the public highway where it will be subject to high levels of passive surveillance.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and should be addressed.

- 3.3.1 Frequently used rooms should be positioned on the front elevation of the building at ground floor level, to provide an active frontage with Wilmslow Road.
- 3.3.2 The main entrance door into the building should operate on an access control system, to restrict access into the building to staff and authorised visitors.
- 3.3.3 The proposed link bridge should have access control to restrict access into the building, and into the wider Christie hospital, to the relevant members of staff and prevent misuse/illicit access.
- 3.3.4 Staff should be provided with lockers so that they can store their personal items whilst working, to reduce the potential for theft. There should be secure lockers available to patients/visitors to store their belongings when necessary. Any lockers positioned in public areas of the building should be well overlooked or subject to CCTV coverage.
- 3.3.5 Individual offices/labs/scanning facilities should be locked when not in use and operate on an access control system so that unauthorised personnel cannot access these areas unless permitted.
- 3.3.6 All external doors should be illuminated to a high standard, to deter loitering and criminal activity. All external service and emergency escape doors should be certified to the relevant security standards.
- 3.3.7 The building should be covered with a comprehensive CCTV system which can be monitored by security staff. Key areas for CCTV coverage would be the main entrance to the building, reception area, circulation cores, doors into sensitive areas, external doors, and the building elevation.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. (including any access control system). It is crucial that the door ironmongery to

any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. Any escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery, with signage to deter casual use.

- ☐ Any revolving/sliding doors should be tested and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2 or BS ENV 1627 (RC2+).
- ☐ The internal entrance doors into each floor should be secured with self-closing, solid-core doorsets (minimum 44mm thick) operated by staff key-fob/card.
- ☐ All other internal doors/frames to individual rooms, offices, stores, back-of-house areas, utility/plant rooms etc. should be solid core with 3 hinges and a 5 lever mortice deadlock or similar, so that they can be secured when unoccupied.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ All windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.
- ☐ Any ground floor and other easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All accessible glazing (i.e. below a height of 2000mm from external ground level) must incorporate an internal pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining external pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any lightweight cladding to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.
- ☐ Any louvres at ground floor level to plant areas/refuge stores should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed or damaged. Security-certified louvred doorsets are also available if required (see <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search> for SBD approved suppliers).

4.4 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or proximity reader/fob, and not numeric keypads which can be easily observed and are rarely changed. The following doors should operate on access control:
 - The main entrance into the building
 - All other external doors
 - The internal doors off the main entrance lobby
 - The internal entrances into each floor
 - Any rooms with access restrictions (i.e. blood bank, walk in fridge/freezers, specimen storage, offices, meeting rooms)
- ☐ The electric locking system to be used throughout the building should ideally be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff key-fobs/cards should be capable of being quickly activated or disabled when required, to ensure they are not misused. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work.

4.5 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all new vehicular/pedestrian routes, in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ External lighting must also be provided to all external doors, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments or up to upper floor windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.6 CCTV

- ☐ The proposed development should be covered with a comprehensive, high quality, digital, CCTV system. Cameras should be positioned to maximise coverage and to cover high risk areas such as: main entrances, external elevations, reception areas, emergency escape doors, and any rooms with valuable equipment/medical records/controlled drugs.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the building. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up to date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.2 An operating/maintenance plan should also be prepared, focussing on issues such as:
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. any boundary treatments, lighting, access controls, CCTV cameras, alarm system etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees.
- 5.1.3 Any high value equipment should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
27/05/2025	Michael Vaughan (Renaker)	CIS instruction

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
200100	Level 00 Proposed General Arrangement Plan	23/05/25	P04
200101	Level 00 Proposed General Arrangement Plan	23/05/25	P04
200102	Level 00 Proposed General Arrangement Plan	23/05/25	P04
202101	Proposed General Arrangement Elevations (1 of 2)	27/05/25	P02
202102	Proposed General Arrangement Elevations (2 of 2)	27/05/25	P02

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		