



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Deansgate - Castlefield Viaduct, Altrincham Street to the North, London Road to the East. Plot C

Public realm, Retail, Restaurant, Community, Offices

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

For: ID MANCHESTER Limited &

University of Manchester

Version D: 24/04/25

Deansgate Castlefield Viaduct, Altrincham Street to the North, London Road to the East. Plot C

2025/0043/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported - Design elements to be considered

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The scheme has been very well designed from a crime prevention perspective. The proposed uses seem appropriate and will make a positive contribution to the redevelopment of the area. The mix of uses has the potential to create a very vibrant location. Developments where there is an active use mix tend to be better managed and less prone to crime and disorder issues.

The overall masterplan layout is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more depth within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed when developing detailed proposals for future development, and these include: -

- Existing routes and connections
- Access & maintenance
- Landscaping design and features
- Quality of public spaces to complement planned developments & vice versa
- Public squares located in activity nodes to promote passive surveillance
- Street lighting
- Streetscape furniture, landscaping and HVM features

The proposed masterplan has been assessed in its entirety and understands that individual plots will come forward for development in due course. Our recommendations within the document cover the identified site within the red line boundary. Further Crime Impact Statement reports will be required for each development plot as and when required. However, we recommend that Design for Security is consulted during the early stages of design development in order to embed the security and safety requirements.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the overall strategy for development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

David Maher *Dip Arch*
Consultant

e: david.maher@gmp.police.uk

Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	5
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	6
	2.1 Crime Summary	
	2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
	2.3 Risk Factors- Offices	
	2.4 Risk Factors - Retail	
	2.5 Risk Factors – Cafes / Restaurants	
	2.6 Non-Domestic Burglary (Offices): Risk Analysis	
	2.7 Theft (Offices): Risk Analysis	
	2.8 Non-Domestic Burglary (Retail): Risk Analysis	
	2.9 Theft (Retail): Risk Analysis	
	2.10 Non-Domestic Burglary (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis	
	2.11 Theft (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis	
	2.12 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	15
	3.1 Proposed development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Public Realm influences over crime patterns	
	3.4 Considerations and Recommendations	
4	Physical Security	21
	4.1 Doors	
	4.2 Shutters	
	4.3 Windows	
	4.4 Glazing	
	4.5 Alarms	
	4.6 Access Control	
	4.7 Lighting	
	4.8 CCTV	
5	Management & Maintenance	22
6	Internal Layout Guidance (Café/bar/restaurants).....	23
7	Management & Maintenance (Café/bar/restaurants).....	25
8	Construction	26
9	Useful References	26
	9.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix

A	Contact register	27
B	Associated Documents.....	27
C	CIS Version History	27

D	Glossary	28
---	----------------	----

1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

This study area contains the landmark feature of the Deansgate to Castlefield Viaduct and a number of former Manchester University campus buildings.

The development site is located south of Piccadilly train station. The area in and around the site is synonymous as part of the wider University of Manchester campus and historic transport infrastructure.





The railway viaduct creates a dominant structure cutting through the area. A number of the arches are used by the university and other provide pedestrian & vehicle access between Vimto Park and Altrincham St.

Pedestrian activity and public realm are presiding features across the campus with service roads located further south in the campus.

Altrincham Street provides the main pedestrian access between London Road and Sackville St. with roads, bridges and staircases providing access into existing buildings.

The site is within a short distance to the City centre and further public transport routes are provided on the local road networks within 100m of the site; bus, tram and train networks.

Graffiti is a prominent feature to the railway arches and with poor artificial lighting along Altrincham St this route could be perceived to enhance the fear of crime.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st March 2024 to 28th February 2025.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
34	52	149	1,028	469	104	17	224	18	33

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is high for Manchester, which is to be expected given that the site is located within Manchester City Centre where there is a high volume of retail outlets and licenced premises which accounts for an increase in crime and disorder issues within the area. Less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime have been the highest recorded offences within the area. Whilst crime has taken place throughout the local area, there has been a larger concentration of offences to the west of the proposed site towards the city centre.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place all throughout the local area, particularly at locations along Whitworth Street to the northwest. Assaults and public order offences have been the most reported less serious woundings, with these offences mainly involving disputes between known associates and domestic incidents, and the majority of these taking place in the late evening and early hours of the morning when licenced premises are closing.
- 2.1.3 Offences of theft have also mostly occurred to the west of the proposed site, where offenders have used pick pocketing and distraction methods in order to obtain mobile phones and bags/purses/wallets. Offenders have also targeted insecure property within bars and restaurants, posing as legitimate customers and removing insecure items from tables and the backs of chairs.
- 2.1.4 Theft from a motor vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle crime offence taking place. Offenders have targeted vehicles parked on streets and within parking facilities throughout the local area by using implements to break glazing and remove objects from within the vehicle, as well as using tools to remove vehicle registration plates and vehicle parts.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 **Existing crime patterns:** In and around the site, the levels of the following crime types are average rates for Greater Manchester. Below are associated crime types within and around the site boundary with further detailed examples of common M.O's:
- Miscellaneous theft (frequently occurring in shops or in cafes / bars where customers leave property unattended).
 - Less serious wounding (much of this kind of disorder is alcohol-related).
 - Theft of pedal cycles (most of these crimes occur where bikes have been left in public areas, either locked to fencing or cycle stands).
 - Criminal damage (the principle targets have been parked vehicles).
 - Personal robbery (a large proportion of victims have lost mobile phones, purses, handbags and electronic devices).
- 2.2.2 **General: Offenders posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas to steal property.**
- Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 4.4).
- 2.2.3 **General: Shutters have been prised open to target doors/windows behind them.**

Possible Solution - To minimise the risk of offenders forcing shutters:

- security-certified roller shutters (to LPS 1175) should be used wherever possible;
- where the size limits the availability of certified shutters, CCTV and lighting should be deployed to increase the security of these larger openings.

2.2.4 **General: Broken glazing in windows and doors.**

Possible Solution – All new ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters, grilles or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection.

2.2.5 **General: Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.**

Possible Solution - Front doors should include a split spindle mechanism which locks on closure and can only be opened from outside with a key.

2.2.6 **General: Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry to the property.**

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.4), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 5.4). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.

2.2.7 **General: Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.**

Possible Solution – All ground floor / accessible glazing should include a laminated pane which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Ensure that rubbish and loose material is removed from the areas around the site. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

2.2.8 **Commercial/Retail: Posing as a legitimate customer and entering restricted areas by means of insecure doors and tailgating employees.**

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 5.1).

2.2.9 **Café/Restaurant: Theft of personal property from tabletops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables.**

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The internal layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment.

2.2.10 **Office: Organised burglars targeting expensive I.T. equipment.**

Possible Solution - Secure storerooms, where such items can be kept, should be incorporated into the design of the building or fit-out. These rooms should have solid blockwork walls or be reinforced with expanded metal mesh and certified door sets (to BS PAS 24). Valuable items should not be easy to remove and should be uniquely identified using an appropriate property marking system. Portable equipment should not be positioned in communal areas where there may be regular visitor access. Effective access controls within the building should assist in restricting entry of visitors and potential intruders.

2.3 **Risk Factors- Offices**

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary

-
- Violence towards staff
 - Theft of personal belongings at work
 - Criminal damage to property and vehicles
 - Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
 - Arson
 - Cycle theft
 - Employee theft
 - Theft of/from parked vehicles
 - Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Risk Factors - Retail

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer / staff property
- Criminal damage to property


2.5 Risk Factors – Cafes / Restaurants

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:


- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence / conflict if licensed
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery / wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Non-Domestic Burglary (Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.




- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester is greatest on Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday.
- 2.6.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary at Manchester office premises rises into the evening/late at night. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.



- 2.6.3 **Point of Entry:** The majority of burglaries at offices in Manchester have been committed through doors. Burglaries against office buildings in this area do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing tools with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks. Offenders have also smashed glazed panels in doors and windows to gain entry. A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' and 'legitimate' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.

2.7 Theft (Offices): Risk Analysis




The data below relates to thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.7.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest on Monday and Tuesday and is generally lower over the weekend (when many are shut).
- 2.7.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out:

2.8 Non-Domestic Burglary (Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.





2.8.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed, and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.8.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:

- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating / exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.
- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

2.9 Theft (Retail): Risk Analysis




The data below relates to thefts within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.9.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses, and bags.

2.10 Non-Domestic Burglary (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.10.1 **Day/Time Range:** In Manchester, the risk of burglary at licensed premises peaks between Monday and Wednesday and is lowest on Friday. The risk of burglary is highest in the early hours of the morning. Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the areas/streets where they are typically found are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive the risk of being detected or identified as low.
- 2.10.2 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered licensed premises through external doors. Most commonly, doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and hand tools/implements. In a number of cases, glazing in doors and windows has been smashed by offenders to gain unauthorised access. Where the point of entry was legitimate/unknown, this is likely to have been when offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas.

2.11 Theft (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.11.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester licensed premises peaks over the weekend. On these days, many premises within the city centre area experience higher levels of attendance than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunity for offenders to commit theft is greater. The risk of theft peaks late at night and into the early morning. This reflects the times when licensed premises are at their busiest and therefore the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets, cash and phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items - usually stolen from table tops, from bags hung on chairs/stored under tables or via pickpocketing and distraction methods. Theft of property belonging to staff is also common, with offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain access to unauthorised areas.

2.12 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.12.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Saturday in the evening (20:00-21:00). Offenders often target vehicles at this time when they tend to be left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposals comprise the demolition of Barnes-Wallis, Wright Robinson, Manchester Meeting Place, Morton, Moffat Buildings and the construction of two office buildings (Use Class E). At the base of the building the buildings will be connected via an open shared lobby space, which shall comprise a variety of uses including social amenity spaces, as well as food and beverage establishments (Use Class E, Sui Generis – drinking establishment). The proposals will also include interventions to the Hollaway Wall, incorporating it into the new commercial element. Additionally, the proposals will involve the change of use of the railway arches to retail and food and beverage uses (Use Class E and Sui Generis– drinking establishment). The proposals will also include the creation of a new public square, access and other associated works.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed building plots will see the re-use (arches) and/or demolition of long-standing redundant buildings/structures. The redevelopment of the sites will remove disused structures which have been a generator of criminal activity.
- 3.2.2 Each of the building plots should provide good levels of ground floor activity; in-turn the building uses will offer good levels of activity and natural surveillance of the adjacent community space and public realm.
- 3.2.3 All doors and shutters appear to be flush with the external elevations of the buildings, removing areas of potential concealment that could be subject to abuse. The main entrance doors into the commercial office reception are accessed via revolving doors.
- 3.2.4 Glazed elevations to most of the public elevations will help to enliven the street scene and enhance natural surveillance of and from the building.
- 3.2.5 The reception lobby has been laid out to allow staff at the desks to effectively monitor personnel entering or leaving the building through the main entrance. Reception staff will also have a good view of the area immediately in front of the building allowing activity in this area to be easily supervised.
- 3.2.6 The main public realm circulation routes are obvious, leading people directly to where they need to go. The proposals are intended to integrate with surrounding circulation routes.
- 3.2.7 The redevelopment of the area will provide an interesting and diverse use; offering opportunity for employment, interesting and safer public realm with a chance to create an exciting destination.
- 3.2.8 The new shared surface road layouts, pedestrian routes and re-opening of Altrincham Street will create an interesting landscape opportunity across the Masterplan. The hard & soft landscaping will help to generate a sense of place, pride and ownership in the community and create new links to existing neighbourhoods.
- 3.2.9 The proposed development will result in an increase in footfall in the area, improving vitality across the wider area, providing additional natural surveillance, which can help promote a greater sense of safety on the street.
- 3.2.10 The recognised approach to creating a safer public realm and cycle corridors supports an environment in which people want to work and visit.
- 3.2.11 Cycle storage for staff is provided in a designated room within the basement floor of the buildings. Entry to this area must be restricted to genuine cyclists only and requires access-controlled doors. There should be sufficient secure storage lockers provided for cyclists to store “day wear”.
- 3.2.12 The public realm of the proposal is permeable, allowing pedestrian movement to be concentrated on the newly created boulevards (Altrincham St) and spaces between development blocks. Building use activities are strategically placed to animate new streetscapes and open public spaces. Communal public realm and commercial facilities are also well located helping to promote activity and surveillance across new vistas.

-
- 3.2.13 Security measure carefully incorporated into the environment and building design can ensure that buildings and the environment is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime or safety. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

3.3 Public Realm influences over crime patterns

- 3.3.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:
- How easy will it be to enter the area?
 - How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
 - What are the chances of being seen?
 - If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
 - Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?
- 3.3.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:
- being located on well-trafficked streets and overlooked by routinely occupied buildings. The site is subject to surveillance by local businesses and residents as well as passers-by on foot and in cars. The casual observations by residents and passers-by may deter some offenders.
 - the site is well connected to the core of the City centre. Pedestrian routes are generally busy during the daytime, particularly that they pass along Altrincham St between London Rd & Sackville St and Vimto Park through the arches and include university spaces with largely 'active' frontages and regular pedestrian flows, especially during the working day.
- 3.3.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder and the fear of crime, these include:
- A development in this location, is very likely to attract the interest of criminals should they become aware of it whilst going about their everyday activities. Opportunists, criminal damage to buildings, theft and bicycle crime are all likely to affect a development on this site.
 - vacant buildings and plots of vacant land in the vicinity of the site sometimes attract those intent on criminal damage (e.g. smashing glazing and graffiti), burglary and theft (particularly metals).
 - A site wide management strategy should work in tandem with existing and new retail/bar/restaurant and any leisure uses. Any door staff should be present to monitor queues and keep them flowing when appropriate, as patrons enter and leave the premises.
- 3.3.4 The design and layout of the public realm surrounding the blocks should be carefully considered. It should not include any hard/soft landscaping features that may impede surveillance opportunities or foster nuisance, anti-social behaviour or misuse. The following issues should be addressed with the public realm/landscaping strategy (also see Section 4.7):
- The proposed public realm features and any changes in ground levels, with step/ramp features to accommodate them. Such features can sometimes impede surveillance opportunities and provide features that can be mis-used. These features, as well as benches and any other hard landscaping features, should be designed to deter and withstand any such treatment and to maximise surveillance opportunities of/from them.
 - Public realm furniture items should be robust to sustain constant daily use and form part of the management and maintenance regime. Damaged features which are not tended to over a period can lead to further decline and respect for the area.
 - In particular, the potential to foster nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues at night. The central public realm area along Altrincham St, Sister Square and Mill Lane will benefit from levels of footfall, activity and will rely on passive surveillance from the commercial properties overlooking

these areas. The areas must be well-lit and designed to maximise surveillance opportunities and eliminate hiding places. Any windows or doors adjacent to these areas may also need additional protection.

- 3.3.5 Any cycle parking areas located throughout the public realm area should be located where they can be overlooked from routinely occupied areas.
- 3.3.6 The long-term redevelopment of the area should seek to address and remove the concealment and shelter provided by structures and improve visual links between spaces, green spaces, bridges, buildings, and adjacent streets / premises.
- 3.3.7 The development of this public realm space would encourage further significant pedestrian footfall in the area, with people spending longer in the area, rather than it simply being passed through as part of a journey from A to B. The aspirations of the plans also seek to extend the use of this space beyond event times.
- 3.3.8 Engagement at the very early RIBA stages has previously proven to afford those involved in the development the opportunity to 'build-in' protective measures, which often results in more aesthetically pleasing, cost-effective measures in the long-run.

3.4 Considerations and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

Public realm

- 3.4.1 The layout appears generally free of obstacles to vision allowing people to see and be seen within the area and maintains sight lines across the site. Planting and street furniture has been aligned to avoid creating potential hiding places and avoids blocking sight lines. However, the choice of trees and other plant species should allow some visible permeability through the canopies and foliage so that people cannot be concealed within the public spaces.
- 3.4.2 Street furniture and landscape features should be used to prevent unwanted parking or access onto pedestrian only surfaces. It should be very clear in which spaces, or on which streets, vehicle parking is authorised.
- 3.4.3 The junctions between newly formed traffic free/controlled pedestrianised zones and existing traffic roads should be carefully considered. Maintenance of newly installed control measure (rising bollards, lighting, gates and all access control features), should be incorporated into the management & maintenance procedures.
- 3.4.4 Level changes. The proposal will introduce some external changes in level across the site and the developer should be careful not to inadvertently allow retaining features to facilitate climbing aids that would allow easy access into otherwise secure areas. Care needs to be taken in detailing and construction / installation of features such as retaining walls and fencing which could compromise the general security of boundaries or create potential hiding places. Junctions of fence lines, walls and the buildings need particular attention. Raised planting beds and retaining walls can provide opportunities for informal seating and gathering that may be attractive to antisocial individuals or groups.
- 3.4.5 Measures to control the speed of bicycles and motorcycles should also be considered in order to reduce potential hazards to pedestrians.
- 3.4.6 The principal entrances should be located in prominent positions, which are readily apparent from the street. Approaches to the buildings for pedestrians are along routes that have good sightlines.
- 3.4.7 When considering the positions and density of tree planting the design team should be cognisant of the need to allow casual supervision of space from the adjacent premises and improve the spread of lighting and CCTV coverage.
- 3.4.8 Lighting should provide good visual guidance and orientation, and support visibility for pedestrians, and cyclists.
- 3.4.9 As the proposed public spaces and plots are developed consideration needs to be given towards external lighting. The proposals are to incorporate a lighting scheme that will distribute illumination evenly around the space without areas of shadowing or pooling and work coherently with the wider security requirements of the site such as CCTV.
- 3.4.10 Consideration for safe bicycle storage should be embedded within the landscape design. Short-stay cycle parking stands should be located where they can be readily observed and, ideally, monitored by CCTV. The location of cycle stores within proposed buildings should consider the position, inherent physical security and safety of cyclists using the facility.
- 3.4.11 Future developments should exploit the public realm, ensuring that there are active edges to the streetscape which can help to increase the accessibility of such spaces to user groups who may feel more vulnerable in such spaces and who are of lower mobility. The greater the use of these spaces the less likely they will be populated by those acting anti-socially.
- 3.4.12 Consider the creation of a '*Friends of*' and '*Local business*' groups, to support the management and maintenance of the public realm.
- 3.4.13 The development of this public realm space will encourage further significant pedestrian footfall in the area, with people spending longer in the area, rather than it simply passing through as part of a journey from A to B. The aspirations of the plans also seek to extend the use of this space beyond traditional Commercial/retail business hours. It is therefore recommended that planners, developers, and architects concerned with this development consult with Counter Terrorism Security Advisors

throughout the planning and implementation of this development with a view to ensure protection from VAW attacks is as comprehensive as realistically possible. This engagement will also afford the opportunity to consider other attack methodologies and potential mitigations against them.

- 3.4.14 Event spaces and external dining areas - Martyn's Law - [Martyn's Law | ProtectUK](#) (not yet reached Royal Assent however we believe it's not far off). The link will take you to the most up to date information.

Commercial office

- 3.4.15 Subdivision of Floor Space. Where the upper floor office areas are subdivided into smaller individual units, each suite of offices should be capable of separation with their own individual access controls.
- 3.4.16 Access beyond the reception lobby should be controlled so that intruders cannot easily reach restricted parts of the building. Access to the stair core and lifts from the entrance lobby should require passage through access-controlled turnstiles or doors. The main entrance doors should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if required, to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobbies.
- 3.4.17 It should not be possible for the staff/visitors of one office floor/suite to access another. All individual office levels or suites should be fitted with self-closing access-controlled doors, operated by staff swipe cards/fobs or by intercoms linked to individual receptions and all rooms within office suites should be capable of being deadlocked when unoccupied. Access to plant/service/storage areas should also be fitted with auditable access controls (authorised personnel only).
- 3.4.18 Staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day and night. The main entrance doors should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if required, to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobbies. If the building is to be open at any time without a concierge or security presence in the lobby area, the main entrance doors should be secured and one of the single-leaf entrance doors should be controlled by means of a video access control system linked to each individual office suite (allowing staff to vet callers before allowing them entry).
- 3.4.19 Any short-stay cycle parking should be located within sight of entrances and overlooked by reception staff and CCTV.
- 3.4.20 Post. Reception and distribution of post within the building should be considered. Incoming post and deliveries should be processed at one single point, in an area that can be easily isolated. Post rooms should not be located close to main exit routes as this could affect prompt evacuation.
- 3.4.21 The basement service road and service area should be secured with a high-speed automatic shutter (to reduce the potential for tailgating), certified to LPS 1175. The location of the shutter should not create a sheltered recess within the building line that may foster loitering/gathering etc. The car park shutter itself should be operated by access controls (either by swipe or, preferably, proximity reader), both on access and egress (i.e. no automatic egress). Blast resistant measures and recommendations can be found in the following locations - [Blast Resistant Measures | NPSA](#) , [Protection from blast | NPSA](#).
- 3.4.22 As and when building plots and sites within the wider masterplan come forward for development, we recommend the engagement of Design for Security involvement at the earliest opportunity during design development.

Café / Bar / Restaurant

- 3.4.23 The most frequently occurring crime in restaurants, and licensed premises, is the theft of personal property (i.e. handbags, purses, mobile phones) placed on tables/chairs, or the floor, for this reason it is highly recommended that tables and chairs are designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats.
- 3.4.24 Casual access to the rear of the bars/service counters should be restricted (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled) to prevent unauthorised access.
- 3.4.25 Licensed premises are often the scene of violent disorder. A comprehensive CCTV system should be installed so that any incidents will be recorded. The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: the main entrances in to the premises, all bar/service areas, toilet lobbies and customer circulation/seating areas.

-
- 3.4.26 Restaurants and bars in the area have frequently been targeted by burglars. It is highly recommended that the premises should be covered with a monitored alarm (with response).
 - 3.4.27 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work. There should also be a secure cash office – which should have solid masonry walls (with no adjacent false/suspended ceilings), a doorset certified to BS PAS 24 and a safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs. Consideration should also be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind the bar area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in the till during busy periods.
 - 3.4.28 Non-cash payment methods are preferred and should be encouraged. The food stalls/kiosks and bar should either be cleared at the end of an evening or should be capable of being secured out-of-hours (with no cash left within them).
 - 3.4.29 It is essential that the physical security measures listed below are incorporated where appropriate into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in staff and customers.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS02, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Internal doors to storage rooms should be solid core, minimum 44mm thick with a multi-point locking mechanism.

4.2 Shutters

- ☐ Where grilles or shutters are required for additional protection, the minimum certification required is:
 - LPS 1175: Issue 7 Security Rating 1
 - STS 202: Issue 3, Burglary Rating 1

4.3 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.4 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.5 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover all building on the site, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room. Additional fuse spurs should be incorporated into each apartment to allow residents the option of installing a private alarm for their property.

4.6 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following doors should operate on access control:
 - All external doors where regular staff access is required.
 - Doors separating internal zones / lobbies
 - Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g., storage / server / locker rooms)
 - Cycle store

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- ☐ Internal lighting should be operated by detection devices which will automatically switch lights on with movement activity in each room.

4.8 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g., trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images, then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Entrances to site, external areas all around the new building and ancillary facilities, external doors including emergency egresses / hatches, access-controlled doors & cycle parking areas.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

- Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Internal Layout Guidance (Café/bar/restaurants)

The internal layout of licensed premises, cafes & restaurants and bar spaces should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

6.1.1 Licensed premises, cafes & restaurants and bar spaces can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- Opportunities - Large numbers of people congregating in such premises generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- Lack of attention - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- Cohesion – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent such premises means that such a venue would lack ‘community territoriality’ (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- Customer turnover – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- Valuable goods – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys etc.
- Stealth - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

6.1.2 The incidence and severity of disorder issues in large licensed/event venues and their environs are often linked to physical features of these locations, such as:

- High concentration of people;
- Crowd congestion;
- Services that do not cater for demand, i.e. insufficient serving staff;
- Physical hazards arising from type and placement of furniture/ancillary structures; and
- Insufficient and unclean toilets.

In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

- 6.1.3 The main entrance(s) to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.
- 6.1.4 Customers entering/leaving the premises should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.
- 6.1.5 The internal layout of premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.
- 6.1.6 Consideration should be given to high/wide bars/service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers’ reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable doors or hatches that cannot be easily scaled). Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.

- 6.1.7 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 4.2) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.
- 6.1.8 It is highly recommended that any customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



- 6.1.9 Adequate signage should be deployed to direct people throughout the venue, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.
- 6.1.10 Public toilets can give rise to crime and disorder issues and the following issues should be considered:
- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
 - Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
 - Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
 - Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
 - Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
 - Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

7 Management & Maintenance (Café/bar/restaurants)

- 7.1.1 The success of the proposal will be dependent on effective management of the premises and a zero tolerance policy should be adopted with customers who behave inappropriately. Comprehensive risk assessments should be carried out in advance of all events/uses, in order to identify and address potential security issues.
- 7.1.2 During any specific events, the control of people entering the venue will be essential to maintaining order, both inside and outside the premises. Strict monitoring of numbers entering the venue must be undertaken, as overcrowding inside will facilitate criminal activity. Management of people awaiting entry will also be important, in order to prevent frustrations building up that could create disorder. Signage to any appropriate location will assist in directing people to appropriate queuing locations, but sufficient security staff will be needed to supervise the entry process and an outside security presence will be required at busy times.
- 7.1.3 Security staff should also ensure the swift and safe dispersal of visitors away from the venue after an event. Trained security staff should be positioned at the exits and entrances to site as visitors leave. Suitable notices should be displayed on all exits from the site advising visitors to keep noise to a minimum when leaving the venue.
- 7.1.4 All door/security staff engaged at the premises should be provided by an SIA ACS approved security company. Security staff should regularly patrol the entire site to ensure a visible presence to visitors and potential offenders.
- 7.1.5 The setting up, dismantling and operational processes involved in events can provide many opportunities for criminal activity, as an offender can act anonymously within the relatively transient community of temporary workers/delivery personnel, and gain access to otherwise secure areas. It is therefore essential that effective identification and verification procedures are put in place for the whole period of events.
- 7.1.6 The applicant should engage in dialogue with the local neighbourhood policing team in Manchester and should give advance notice of events, so that an appropriate policing consideration and arrangement(s) can be made.
- 7.1.7 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the venue must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the building. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Cash management within the premises - including a chute deposit safe behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods;
 - Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
 - Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. fencing, access controls, alarm systems, CCTV cameras etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti and litter (regular litter patrols should be carried out inside and outside the premises, to prevent discarded bottles, glasses, cans etc. from being used to cause criminal damage or used as weapons); and
 - Refuse collection arrangements (which should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods).

-
- 7.1.8 The opening hours of the venue should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses.
 - 7.1.9 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers/TVs, music/DJ equipment, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
 - Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to back-of-house/staff-only areas).

8 Construction

- 8.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 8.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

9 Useful References

9.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 9.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
31/01/2025	Deloitte LLP	CIS instruction received
05/03/2025	Deloitte LLP	Fee / authorisation confirmed
05/03/2025	GMP	Invoice issued
24/02/2025	Design Team	Design presentation
11/03/2025	DfS	Site visit
20/03/2025	GMP	CIS completed
02/04/2025	GMP	Version B CIS completed & issued
17/04/2025	GMP	Version C CIS completed & issued
24/04/2025	GMP	Version D CIS completed & issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
SISC0-AAM-ZZ-01-DR-AR-06101	PROPOSED LEVEL 01 PLAN		
SISC0-AAM-ZZ-02-DR-AR-06102	PROPOSED LEVEL 02 PLAN		
SISC0-AAM-ZZ-06-DR-AR-06106	PROPOSED LEVEL 06 PLAN		
SISC0-AAM-ZZ-09-DR-AR-06109	PROPOSED LEVEL 09 PLAN		
SISC0-AAM-ZZ-10-DR-AR-06110	PROPOSED LEVEL 10 PLAN		
SISC0-AAM-ZZ-11-DR-AR-06111	PROPOSED LEVEL 11 PLAN		
SISC0-AAM-ZZ-12-DR-AR-06112	PROPOSED LEVEL 12 PLAN (C1 Roof)		
SISC0-AAM-ZZ-18-DR-AR-06118	PROPOSED LEVEL 18 PLAN		
SISC0-AAM-ZZ-19-DR-AR-06119	PROPOSED LEVEL 19 PLAN		
SISC0-AAM-ZZ-20-DR-AR-06120	PROPOSED LEVEL 20 PLAN		
SISC0-AAM-ZZ-B1-DR-AR-06098	PROPOSED BASEMENT		
SISC0-AAM-ZZ-LG-DR-AR-06099	PROPOSED LOWER GROUD FLOOR PLAN		
SISC0-AAM-ZZ-R1-DR-AR-06121	PROPOSED ROOF PLAN		
SISC0-AAM-ZZ-UG-DR-AR-06100	PROPOSED UPPER GROUD FLOOR PLAN		
SISC0-AAM-ZZ-ZZ-DR-AR-06103	PROPOSED TYPICAL LOW LEVEL (03-05)		
SISC0-AAM-ZZ-ZZ-DR-AR-06107	PROPOSED TYPICAL MID LEVEL (07-08)		
SISC0-AAM-ZZ-ZZ-DR-AR-06113	PROPOSED TYPICAL UPPER LEVEL (13-17)		
SISC0-AAM-ZZ-ZZ-DR-AR-09000	Gross External Area (GEA)		
SISC0-AAM-ZZ-ZZ-DR-AR-09001	Gross Internal Area(GIA)		
SISC0-AAM-ZZ-ZZ-DR-AR-09002	Net Internal Area (NIA)		
SISC0-SLA-LA-ZZ-DR-LA-00001	lowres		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Minor text amendments	02/04/25
C	Minor text amendments to section 3.1	17/04/25
D	Front cover amendment to client title	24/04/25

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a

6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk