

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

RESTAURANT AND TAKEAWAY
BRITISH DONER 87 PICCADILLY MANCHESTER

For: BD kebab limited

Version A: 07/10/25

Ref: 2025/0335/CIS/01

designforsecurity

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GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE

British Doner, 87 Piccadilly, Manchester

URN: 2025/0335/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The development is modest in size and the re-use of vacant premises is welcomed.

There are no significant issues to address from a crime prevention perspective but, to improve the overall security of the premises, a number of recommendations are included, the main ones are summarised as follows:

- Essential when replacing the shop entrance door and means of escape doors with security-rated doors
- consider the installation of access controls (for night-time use) at the shop entrance door to allow staff to vet customers prior to releasing the door and allowing *bona fide* entry
- access controls should be employed to prevent entry to the staff area
- appropriate CCTV and alarm systems should be installed
- an operating policy should be developed

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will support the application and are likely to recommend that a condition requiring the change of use to be implemented in accordance with the recommendations set out within this report be imposed.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is in central Manchester, close to Piccadilly railway station and Piccadilly Gardens. The Minshull Street crown court complex and probation office is also nearby.


The area contains a varied mix of premises, with old warehouse buildings having been converted or replaced with residential, commercial and other hotel buildings. There are also a number of licensed premises in the area, including the adjacent Waldorf public house, where incidents of violent disorder involving rival football fans have occurred – the proximity to Piccadilly railway station makes licensed premises in the area particularly vulnerable to this type of incident.


There is a multi-storey car park very close to the site on Chatham Street, and the stairwells / landings have been subject to abuse or used by rough sleepers.


Piccadilly is a very busy pedestrian route and high traffic location for bus services with the area immediately fronting the site containing four bus stops, offering a variety of routes & destinations. The anonymity provided by the high footfall along Piccadilly gives offenders plenty of potential opportunities to commit crime.


The site is located on the ground floor of an existing building (circa 1980's). The building is serviced from the rear on Back Piccadilly. This street is a narrow single direction road which can instil a fear of crime due to its service street qualities, poorly lit, graffiti, litter and refuse bins.




1 – The site & existing building on Hyde Road.


2 – View west along Hyde Road.


3 – Existing bus depot on Hyde Road.


4 – Linear Green space on Hyde Road


7 – New residential development off Bennett Street.


6 – View west into the existing site at far end of the site.


5 – View west into the existing site.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Local Crime Summary

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st September 2024 to 31st August 2025.

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
30	98	270	2,066	742	249	59	242	26	72

2.1.1 In the local area, the volume of crime is very high, particularly the levels of less serious wounding and theft. This is to be expected given that the site is located within the city centre, where there is a higher concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to an increased likelihood of crime and disorder issues.

2.1.2 Less serious wounding offences have occurred throughout the local area, with a higher concentration of offences taking place to the west of the proposed site closer to the city centre. These incidents have involved disputes between both known and unknown associates within public spaces, retail outlets, restaurants and bars, with alcohol consumption often being a factor.

2.1.3 In cases of thefts, offenders have used pickpocketing and distraction techniques in areas with high footfall to remove items such as mobile phones or wallets form the person without them noticing until a later time. Offenders have also targeted insecure items (particularly mobile phones) left on or under tables in bars and restaurants.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 The breaking of windows/glass doors to gain entry to premises.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 5.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

2.2.2 Forcing open of shutters by levering rolling shutters open, breaking locks off of shutters or using vehicles to ram shutters and damage them, allowing access.

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc) have been scrutinised by professionals. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines.

2.2.3 Offenders posed as customers to shoplift or target business property (clothes & food) or personal property (mobile phones).

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to interior design, It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. The internal layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities.

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2.3 Risk Factors – Cafes / Restaurants

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:


- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence / conflict if licensed
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery / wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

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
2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area.


M/cr Restaurant/Cafe Burglary – Day Range



M/cr Restaurant/Cafe Burglary – Time Range



M/cr Restaurant/Cafe Burglary – Point of Entry



2.4.1 Day Range: The risk of burglary at restaurants/cafes in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday, Thursday, and Sunday.

2.4.2 Time Range: The risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed.


2.4.3 Point of Entry: In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered Manchester restaurants/cafes through external doors. Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools/implements and glazing within doors/windows has been smashed to gain entry. Offenders have also posed as legitimate customers before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas when premises are open to the public.

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
2.5 Theft (Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area.

M/cr Restaurant/Cafe Theft – Day Range



M/cr Restaurant/Cafe Theft – Time Range




2.5.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester restaurants/cafes peaks over the weekend. Many premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater.

2.5.2 Time Range: The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants/cafes are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets, and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Offenders have also targeted I.T equipment within premises, particularly tablets and laptops, as well as alcohol from storage rooms.


2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.6.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Saturday and in the afternoon (14:00-15:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time when they are often left unattended for long periods of time whilst the owners are visiting the city centre to shop, eat or work, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 Change of use of the ground floor to a hot food take-away restaurant together with minor associated elevational alterations.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 he proposed development will provide additional activity and natural surveillance/overlooking to the area when the facility is in operational.

3.2.2 The perimeter of the site will be defined by the existing building and security arrangements of the wider shopping precinct.

3.2.3 The footprint of the building is simple, with no recesses that could provide cover for covert criminal activity and external façades that should provide little opportunity to scale the structures.

3.2.4 The main entrance to the unit will be located in a prominent position, where they can be easily seen from the access road.

3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the dwellings, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 Further Recommendations

- The CCTV system and site lighting should be adapted to reflect the changing layout of the site. CCTV cameras should be capable of identifying all pedestrian movements into and out of the site. An audible warning system should be employed to alert to intruders that they have been detected, and a response has been generated. Signage should be located at the rear site entrance to inform visitors that their movements will be recorded.
- Signage should be used to direct people through the development - to the appropriate service areas and office entrances.
- Staff lockers should be provided, and in a location where there is a high level of activity and surveillance, so that staff can safely store personal items during the working day.
- Internally, the building should be capable of zoning so that entry to parts of the premises can be effectively controlled. Movements in and out of the buildings should be confined to specific areas and access controls used to ensure only authorised staff can enter controlled areas.

3.3.2 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

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4 Physical Security (Commercial Use)

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation in addition to the layout issues highlighted within Section 3.3.

4.1 Doors

☐ All external doors (single and double leaf) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.

☐ Internal doors/frames to any offices, meeting rooms, back-of-house plant/service/stores etc. within the building should be robust/solid-core (minimum 44mm thick) and capable of being secured when unoccupied. Staff should be able to store their belongings in a secure area while at work.

4.1 Windows & Shutters

☐ All windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed.

☐ Any opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

☐ Any shutters should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Shutters should either be provided internally or, if they are to be externally mounted, shutter boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building (where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage).

4.2 Glazing & Building Fabric

☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.3 Alarms

A monitored alarm system should be installed, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room. It is understood that this would be responsibility of the end owners/occupiers of the unit to install.

4.4 Access Controls

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following doors/gates should operate on access control:

- Any internal doors providing access to obvious high-risk areas (e.g. server rooms, storage areas, staff changing facilities/lockers etc.). It is understood that this would be responsibility of the end owners/occupiers of the unit to install.

☐ The electric locking system to be used throughout the site/units should be fully auditable (i.e. allowing the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that misuse is prevented. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work and keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

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4.5 Boundaries

☐ It is highly recommended that condition of the fencing along the rear perimeter of the site is regularly inspected for signs of damage/attack and is repaired immediately if any incidents are experienced. Where exposed, the perimeter fencing to the service yards should be protected on the inner side from potential damage from large vehicles, using crash barriers or rails, to deflect any encroachment and maintain a secure boundary.

4.6 Lighting

☐ External lighting must be provided to all access road, parking areas and service yards within the site, in accordance with BS 5489.

☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *Acceptable Standard* that will allow for *Identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *Overview* and *Recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: the entrance to the site, all external facades of the buildings and all service/parking areas. It is understood that this would be responsibility of the future management company overseeing the site to install. CCTV coverage is also advised to the main entrance lobby. It is understood that this would be responsibility of the end owners/occupiers of the units to install.

4.8 Other

☐ There should be no features of the buildings (such as projecting window cills/cladding features, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to roof areas.

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☐ The position of ancillary structures, parked trailers and any external storage areas should be carefully considered in relation to the following:

- Their potential to block sight lines and create hiding places.
- Their potential to obscure CCTV and lighting.
- Their potential to create climbing aids that would assist unauthorised exit/entry over boundary fencing.
- Their potential to obscure damage to fence lines.
- Any proposed lighting columns, street furniture, tree/shrub planting etc. within or external to the site perimeter should also be reviewed in relation to the above issues.

☐ Any proposed cycle stores should include 'Sheffield' style racks, or similar, that allow staff to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: http://designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.

☐ Any external bin/recycling stores should be a secure, lockable and fire resistant enclosure. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

☐ Any lockers within staff changing facilities must be robust/secure and all users should be encouraged to use them and not leave belongs unattended in changing areas.

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5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the units must be prepared by the future management company overseeing the site and remain in place for its day-to-day running. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up to date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures, and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:

- Opening and closing the units, including staff arrival and departure.
- Management of deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods).
- Details of staff security training.
- Location and management of any smoking areas.
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access control systems, alarm systems, CCTV cameras, lighting etc.
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
- Refuse collection arrangements.

5.1.2 All high value equipment within communal areas (e.g. computers, televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

5.1.3 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.

5.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the units, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.

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6 Commercial Internal Layout Guidance

The internal layout of any commercial units should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their units once complete, and therefore, the end-users requirements. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

6.1 Restaurants/Cafes/Licensed Premises

6.1.1 Restaurants/cafes/licensed premises can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- Opportunities - Large numbers of people congregating in restaurants/licensed premises generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- Lack of attention - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- Cohesion – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent restaurants/licensed premises means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- Customer turnover – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- Valuable goods – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys etc.
- Stealth - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

6.1.2 The main entrances to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.

6.1.3 Customers entering/leaving the premises through the main entrances should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.

6.1.4 The internal layout of premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.

6.1.5 Consideration should be given to high/wide bars/service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable hatches that cannot be easily scaled).

6.1.6 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.

6.1.7 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 6.4) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

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6.1.8 It is highly recommended that any customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



6.1.9 Public toilets can give rise to problems and the following issues should be considered:

- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
- Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
- Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
- Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
- Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
- Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

6.2 Retail Units

6.2.1 Clear views should also remain from the premises through to the public realm, i.e. large promotional signs should not obstruct views.

6.2.2 Careful consideration should be given to the location of pay points to ensure that staff have full surveillance over the entrance to the unit.

6.2.3 Internal aisles and product displays should be aligned to assist surveillance from pay points and avoid blind-spots. There should be no items of high value displayed close to the entrance of the unit.

6.2.4 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any tills, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.

6.2.5 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 6.4) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

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7 Management & Maintenance

7.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the commercial units must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the units. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:

- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
- Cash management within the premises - consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods;
- Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
- Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
- Details of staff security training;
- Location and management of any smoking areas;
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
- Refuse collection arrangements.

7.1.2 The opening hours of any restaurants, licensed premises or retail units should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses. Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.

7.1.3 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers/TVs, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

7.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the site and each of the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to resident or staff-only areas.

7.1.5 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods. Servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.

8 Construction

8.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

8.1.2 Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

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9 Useful References

9.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

9.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see Secured by Design - Secured by Design for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security.

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A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
31/08/25	Russell Adams	CIS Application
03/09/25	Russell Adams	CIS Confirmation
16/09/25	DfS	Site Visit
14/10/25	Client	Invoice paid
14/10/25	DfS	CIS Rev A Issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
A101_	Site Location Plan _ Block Plan_A3		
A102_	Existing Layout and Ceiling Plan_A3		
A103_	Proposed Layout and Ceiling Plan_A3		
A104_	Demolition Plan _ Existing Interior Elevations_		
A105_	Proposed Interior Elevations		
A106	- Exterior Elevations & Entrance Details [1]		
A106	- Exterior Elevations & Entrance Details (A3 Fitted)[1]		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A	14/10/2025	

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D Glossary

Physical Security Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999
General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for doorsets and windows, which certifies that a particular doorset is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012
General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)
Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)
Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012
Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011
Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT
Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS
Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT
Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)
A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)
A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)
The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org
CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk

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