



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Land at Barnhill Street/Raby Street, Moss Side

212 Residential properties (205 Apartments and 7 Houses)

For: **MSV/Caddick**

Version B: **17/07/25**

Ref: **2023/0385/CIS/02**

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

Land at Barnhill Street/Moss Lane East, Moss Side.

2023/0385/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

We consider the residential scheme, public realm and community uses appropriate and are happy to support the proposals.

From a crime prevention perspective, the positive features of the development include:

- An appropriate number of dwellings on the site.
- The orientation of the houses and apartments will focus activity in appropriate areas whilst also facilitating passive surveillance of the public realm.
- The proposals have incorporated community uses within the public realm and aim to establish strong residential communities through the design and orientation of the built environment.
- Off street car parking has been included in the scheme.

Advice is included in the report, which we consider will enhance security of the development and this set out in sections 3.3 and 4. The principal recommendations are:

- install doors, locks, windows, glazing, and, ideally, intruder alarms that meet a recognised security standard.
- to emphasise the private nature of the apartment residents' car park and access road, we recommend enhancing the quality of the surfacing of both and including signs to clarify terms of use.
- provide secure cycle parking to all dwellings; and,
- install dusk to dawn lighting to all external doors of the houses and apartments.
- Post & delivery arrangements for the apartment blocks.
- Defensible space around ground floor windows
- Robust landscaping furniture

If these points can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, Design for Security would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation as included within the Physical Security specification listed in Section 4 of this report.

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Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is bounded by A5103 Princess Road to the west, Moss Lane East to the north, Barnhill St to the east and Raby St to the south.

The site is partly occupied by a series of terraced houses, all apart from one are unoccupied. The remaining land is open green space and has been been for a long period of time.

Princess Road is a wide dual-carriageway, busy with vehicular traffic, which leads to Manchester city centre.

The neighbouring apartment building to the south offers good levels of natural surveillance, however the remaining neighbouring sites offer limited or no current opportunities for natural surveillance.

The land to the east of the site is occupied by an apartment building.

On-street parking in the locality is high, with evidence of car crime. Vehicles parked on-street, particularly when they are remote from their owners and are adjacent to publicly accessible open space, can often be more vulnerable to damage (both malicious and accidental).

The existing bus stop on Princess Road (adjacent to the middle of the site), provides a variety bus routes, this in-turn makes for a busy bus stop and pedestrian activity.




1 – Proposed site off Bold St.




2 – View west along Bold St and on-street parking issues




3 – Existing boundary treatments




4 – Existing entrance off Bold St.



5 – Example of fly-tipping within the site.



6 – View along Maher Gardens.



7 – Existing boundary treatments with neighbouring college.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st June 2024 to 31st May 2025.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
18	<5	71	268	49	15	9	19	14	17

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the past 12 months has been above average for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding, criminal damage and theft having been the most reported offences taking place. These offences have taken place throughout the residential neighbourhoods surrounding the site, particularly to the south of the site at locations around Great Western Street. There has also been a hotspot of offences to the northwest of the site where there is a number of retail outlets with a high footfall leading to an increased likelihood of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding offences have occurred throughout the local area, particularly at the locations mentioned above. Assaults, public order and harassment offences have been the most recorded less serious woundings taking place, with the majority of incidents involving disputes between known associates or customers in retail outlets/restaurants as well as cases of domestic violence.
- 2.1.3 In the majority of cases of criminal damage, offenders have targeted dwellings in the residential neighbourhoods to the south by using bodily pressure and objects in order to damage the external doors and gates, as well as smash windows. Offenders have also targeted vehicles in car parks by smashing the glazing and denting/scratching the bodywork.
- 2.1.4 Theft offences have predominantly occurred at the hotspot of offences to the northwest, where offenders have targeted insecure items and bags in restaurants and public spaces. Offenders have also used pickpocketing and distraction techniques in order to remove items stored on the person such as mobile phones and wallets.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access.
Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see section 4.1 & 5.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors into apartment blocks before allowing them access to the building (also see section 4.1). The main communal entrances should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access.
- 2.2.2 Gaining access to secure apartment complexes by means of tailgating residents and insecure doors, gaining access to resident only areas (mail rooms, bicycle storage and apartment doors).
Possible Solution - All individual apartments should be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.), cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection. A staffed 24/7 concierge desk will support the management and security of the entrance lobby.
- 2.2.3 Breaking of glazing in windows and doors using implements.
Possible Solution - An appropriate glazing specification should be used to adequately secure the building. All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking

points. In vulnerable locations, shutters or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection. However, the layout of the building and position of windows should be designed to avoid vulnerabilities as much as possible. Any damage arising from vandalism should be repaired quickly in order to maintain a culture of care and respect, as a lack of maintenance can often attract further abuse.

- 2.2.4 Forcing open secure shutters using implements and tools (mostly metal bars) in order to gain access to the windows and doors located below.

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.

- 2.2.5 Prising open of windows, including windows on balconies and on the ground floor, using implements most likely screwdrivers, crowbars or similar at residential properties.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.4), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 5.4). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **55% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **42% lower** than Greater Manchester and **40% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **36% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **13% lower** than Greater Manchester and **66% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **8% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **21% higher** than Greater Manchester and **47% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **47% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **13% lower** than Greater Manchester and **5% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on Sunday around midnight (23:00-01:00) and in the evening (18:00-19:00). Offenders tend to target dwellings at these times when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using bodily pressure and implements.
- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as 'unknown' it is likely that the offenders has exploited insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Wednesday and Sunday in the early morning (00:00-02:00) and afternoon (17:00-18:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles at these times when they tend to be left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposals seek to construct a new residential development with a mix of houses and apartment types within the site and area of Moss Side, Manchester.
- 3.1.2 Overall the scheme provides 212 dwellings of mixed tenures (205 apartments, 7 Townhouses), residents amenities including, landscape gardens and private resident courtyard gardens, secure cycle stores and car parking. The development also incorporates resident's car parking spaces.
- 3.1.3 The proposals will be enhanced by a comprehensive landscaping of the public realm works to the street space which will complement each building plot within the proposal.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposal will generate additional legitimate activity into a neighbourhood which has been subject to criminal damage and other abuse. Redevelopment with housing and public realm spaces will support the repopulation of the site and should help to create a sense of ownership and responsibility and improve informal policing of the area (see also 3.3.1).
- 3.2.2 The building footprints at ground floor level is relatively free of recesses or projections that could provide cover for criminal or antisocial activity.
- 3.2.3 The apartments will have routinely occupied rooms overlooking the adjacent public areas, which will help to increase natural surveillance of accessible areas around the block.
- 3.2.4 The buildings provide ground floor activity in the form of residential entrances and reception spaces, and in-turn these uses offer good levels of activity and natural surveillance of the adjacent public realm.
- 3.2.5 The proposed buildings clearly define the different uses of the building, and all entrances can be easily located and navigated.
- 3.2.6 The foyer/reception zone provides the opportunity for good levels of security at a central control point for the development.
- 3.2.7 The internal layout of the apartment buildings appears capable of being divided into identifiable zones, allowing separation of accessible and restricted areas. The access-control strategy adopted for the development should be capable of confining movement into and through the buildings, thus allowing residents and visitors to only enter parts of the site to which they have legitimate reason to be present. Access permissions should be fully auditable and regularly reviewed.
- 3.2.8 Current drawings show secure cycle parking rooms for residents is contained in dedicated rooms off the ground floor via a series of secure doors. Entry into these spaces should be strictly limited via the access-controlled system under the building management system ensuring only genuine cyclists can gain access. Racks within the cycle stores should allow bikes to be locked by the frame and both wheels and should be obtained from a Secured by Design approved supplier (see www.securedbydesign.com).
- 3.2.9 The car parking has been well laid out, avoiding potential hiding spaces for intruders.
- 3.2.10 Security measures carefully incorporated into the building design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

3.3 Public Realm influences over crime patterns

- 3.3.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:
- How easy will it be to enter the area?
 - How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
 - What are the chances of being seen?
 - If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
 - Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?
- 3.3.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:
- being located on well-trafficked streets and overlooked by routinely occupied buildings. The site is subject to surveillance by local businesses, transport infrastructure and residents as well as passers-by on foot and in cars. The casual observations by residents and passers-by may deter some offenders.
 - the site is well connected to the core of the city centre. Pedestrian routes are generally busy during the daytime, particularly that they pass along Princess Road (A5103) and include commercial spaces with some 'active' frontages and regular pedestrian flows, especially during the working day.
- 3.3.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder and the fear of crime, these include:
- A development in this location, is very likely to attract the interest of criminals should they become aware of it whilst going about their everyday activities. Opportunists, criminal damage to buildings, theft and bicycle crime are all likely to affect a development on this site.
 - vacant buildings and plots of vacant land in the vicinity of the site sometimes attract those intent on criminal damage (e.g., smashing glazing and graffiti), burglary and theft (particularly metals).
 - A site wide management strategy should work in tandem with existing and new commercial and any leisure uses.
- 3.3.4 The design and layout of the public realm surrounding the blocks should be carefully considered. It should not include any hard/soft landscaping features that may impede surveillance opportunities or foster nuisance, anti-social behaviour or misuse. The following issues should be addressed with the public realm/landscaping strategy (also see Section 4.7):
- These features, as well as benches and any other hard landscaping features, should be designed to deter and withstand any such treatment and to maximise surveillance opportunities off/from them.
 - Public realm furniture items should be robust to sustain constant daily use and form part of the management and maintenance regime. Damaged features which are not tended to over a period of time can lead to further decline and respect for the area.
 - In particular, the potential to foster nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues at night. The public realm area will benefit from levels of footfall, activity and will rely on passive surveillance from the residential properties overlooking this area. The streets must be well-lit and designed to maximise surveillance opportunities and eliminate hiding places. Any windows or doors adjacent to these areas may also need additional protection.
- 3.3.5 Any cycle parking areas located throughout the public realm area should be located where they can be overlooked from routinely occupied areas.
- 3.3.6 The development of this public realm space would encourage further significant pedestrian footfall in the area, with people spending longer in the area, rather than it simply being passed through as part of a

journey from A to B. The aspirations of the plans also seek to extend the use of this space beyond event times.

- 3.3.7 Engagement at the very early RIBA stages has previously proven to afford those involved in the development the opportunity to 'build-in' protective measures, which often results in more aesthetically pleasing, cost-effective measures in the long-run.

3.4 Recommendations to support security & safety.

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

Houses and apartments

- 3.4.1 Security-certified, external, front and rear doors, and ground/lower ground floor window frames should be installed at each property. Laminate glass should be fitted to ground floor external doors. Fitting an intruder alarm to each property is recommended, particularly the houses and ground floor apartments.

Car parking

- 3.4.2 In order to emphasise ownership and suggest that a threshold has been crossed into a space that is more private, where one's actions may be under greater scrutiny, the application of a high-quality surfacing of the access road and the car park is recommended.
- 3.4.3 Where necessary, car parking should be illuminated with low intensity lighting working with the ecological aspect of the site.
- 3.4.4 Measures should be installed to prevent damage to boundary fencing around the fringe of the car park as a result of vehicles manoeuvring.
- 3.4.5 Install planters, bollards or knee-rails to prevent any vehicles parking in undesignated areas, particularly on the pathways and greenspaces.
- 3.4.6 Install signs to indicate the private nature of the car park and sanctions for misuse.

Cycle parking.

- 3.4.7 Cycle parking should be provided for apartment residents in a secure part of the site. Provision should include a secure, weatherproof shelter with Sheffield stands set in concrete. A mesh enclosure or wooden enclosure with a steel rail gate would be appropriate. The door/gate should be self-closing and lock upon closure.
- 3.4.8 Cycle parking should also be provided for residents of the houses in the rear gardens. The doors to the storage sheds in the rear gardens should be secured with a Sold Secure™, padlock and hasp and staple, and fitted with a Sold Secure™, ground anchor.

Boundary fencing

- 3.4.9 Definition of front gardens. Definition of frontage. Front and side garden boundaries should be well-defined to indicate ownership, using low walls, railings, planting and / or surface materials, and discourage intruders from approaching the dwellings and parked vehicles, or taking short cuts.
- 3.4.10 900mm high railings defining adjoining garden boundaries at the front of the houses are ideal.
- 3.4.11 The proposed fences defining rear garden boundaries of the houses are also ideal.
- 3.4.12 Rear garden gates to the terraced houses should be 1500mm high with 300mm trellis above. The locking mechanism should be capable of being operated from either side of the gate so that, for example, cyclists can enter or leave the garden easily. Ideally, the gates should be self-closing and self-locking.

Public realm and Landscaping

- 3.4.13 Street furniture and landscape features should be used to prevent unwanted parking or access onto pedestrian only surfaces. It should be very clear in which spaces, or on which streets, vehicle parking is authorised.
- 3.4.14 It is important to formalise the proposed road and pedestrian links across the new development.
- 3.4.15 As the proposed public spaces and plots are developed consideration needs to be given towards external lighting. The proposals are to incorporate a lighting scheme that will distribute illumination evenly around the space without areas of shadowing or pooling and work coherently with the wider security requirements of the site such as any CCTV for apartment entrances and car parking courts.
- 3.4.16 Consideration for safe bicycle storage should be embedded within the landscape design. Short-stay cycle parking stands should be located where they can be readily observed. The location of cycle stores

within proposed buildings should consider the position, inherent physical security and safety of cyclists using the facility.

- 3.4.17 Poor design, management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour. Any landscape features (hard or soft) should not impede natural surveillance of/from the buildings or reduce the effectiveness of lighting or any CCTV system. The design of any hard landscaping features or street furniture, in particular any steps, ramps or benches, should be designed to withstand and discourage the potential for mistreatment and damage (e.g. from vandalism, skateboarding, rough sleeping etc.). Bollards or similar hard/soft landscaping features should also be incorporated to prevent unauthorised vehicles from accessing the courtyard.
- 3.4.18 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

3.5 Points for Further Consideration

- 3.5.1 Graffiti on surfaces. Expanses of blank wall exposed to public areas should be formed of a graffiti-resistant surface or have a resistant coating applied to enable easy removal of any unauthorised markings.
- 3.5.2 Vegetation Management. The proximity of bushes and trees to the fence line can undermine the security of the boundary by creating cover for an intruder or providing potential climbing aids. Overhanging branches and dense vegetation should be removed where it could be exploited in this way. Care must be taken to ensure the proposed landscaping to the perimeter of the site is maintained at an appropriate height (see Section 4.8), in order to prevent it impeding views to and from the site and avoid the creation of hiding places that could be exploited by offenders.
- 3.5.3 Residential post/parcel/grocery room. Arrangements for the delivery of post should not allow postal or grocery delivery staff to have access to internal areas of the residential block beyond the GF reception space. Postal workers should not be given unfettered access to the entire building as this could potentially leave apartments and residents vulnerable. (see Section 4.1 for more information)
- 3.5.4 Any play areas within the amenity spaces should be located at an appropriate distance from residential property (see “Planning and Design for Outdoor Sport and Play” published by Fields in Trust www.fieldsintrust.org).
- 3.5.5 Communal facilities and amenity space. The robust management of such areas is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors (Houses)

- ☐ Front and rear doors to dwellings must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ French/double doors or sliding patio doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.
- ☐ Front doors should have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.
- ☐ Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

4.2 Doors (Apartments)

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system - these features should be permitted under the scope of the security certification.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to STS202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ Communal doors located within the corridors should include glazed elements to assist sight lines.
- ☐ Ground floor external French/double doors or sliding patio doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012.
- ☐ Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended but not generally essential.
- ☐ Any external escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ The main entrance door and doors off the lobby area should be controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access.

4.3 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.4 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.5 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.6 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following doors should operate on access control:
 - All external doors where regular staff access is required.
 - Doors separating internal zones / lobbies.
 - Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g. storage / server / locker rooms)
 - Cycle stores.

4.7 Boundaries

- ☐ Inward opening automatic gates to provide access to the sports courtyard area must be certified to one of the following standards:
 - LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR2
 - STS 202: Issue 3, BR2
 - Sold Secure Gold
 - PAS 68: 2013
- ☐ Any ground floor townhouse/apartment windows to the Street/courtyard elevations that will not front onto the front garden spaces described above must be protected by defensive planting beds. The windows themselves should preferably have as high cills as possible and be non-opening. If not, they should have only small opening lights fitted with opening restrictors to avoid providing opportunities to criminals.
- ☐ Boundary treatments to front gardens should be designed to discourage comfortably sitting on or leaning against them, which could potentially cause nuisance and intimidation to residents.
- ☐ The ground floor townhouses and apartments which front onto the public realm and the landscaped courtyard, must be protected by some defensible space, defined by dense low-level planting, creating front gardens areas in ownership/control of the residents themselves.

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by

4.9 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.

4.10 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- ☐ Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal.
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
23/05/2025	Caddick Construction	CIS instruction received
03/06/2025	Caddick Construction	Commission confirmed / fee agreed
06/06/2025	DfS	Invoice Issued
26/06/2025	Todd Arch + Ashton	Design team presentation
30/06/2025	DfS	Site visit
03/07/2025	DfS	CIS completed
17/07/2025	DfS	Version B issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	MOSS SIDE MSV- PLANNING DESIGN AND ACCESS STATEMENT-	25/06/25	
	SITE CONTEXT	25/06/25	
	SUMMARY OF THE SCHEME	25/06/25	
	Landscape boundary conditions	25/06/25	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Minor text updates	17/07/25

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk