



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

CHURCH HOUSE, 90 DEANSGATE, MANCHESTER
CHANGE OF USE OF VACANT OFFICE BUILDING TO HOTEL

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: Piccadilly Construction Ltd.

VERSION A: 21/05/2025

REFERENCE: 2011/0420/CIS/01

Church House, 90 Deansgate, Manchester

URN: 2011/0420/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security improvements/additions required


This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Given that there will be no reception desk/formal staff presence at ground floor level directly overlooking all access to and egress from the building via the main entrance, measures must be put in place to:
 - Ensure staff/guest-only access to the upper bedroom floors;
 - Prevent unauthorised access/mis-use to the ground floor entrance foyer during the evening and at night; and
 - Allow concierge staff to overlook all access to/egress from the building via CCTV.
- Control of access to basement back-of-house/staff facilities and secure line to common servicing areas to prevent unauthorised access between hotel and commercial uses.
- Access controls and ability to store belongings securely within the capsule rooms/shared bathroom to minimise opportunities for offenders to exploit.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime Summary	
	2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Hotels): Risk Analysis	
	2.3 Theft (Manchester Hotels): Risk Analysis	
	2.4 General Risk Factors	
	2.5 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	8
	3.1 Proposed Development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Points for Further Consideration	
4	Physical Security	10
	4.1 Doors	
	4.2 Access Controls	
	4.3 Windows	
	4.4 Glazing	
	4.5 Alarm	
	4.6 Lighting	
	4.7 CCTV	
	4.8 Other	
5	Management & Maintenance	13
6	Construction	13
7	Useful References	13
	7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix

A	Contact Register	14
B	Associated Documents.....	14
C	CIS Version History	14
D	Glossary	15

1 Visual Audit

The site is bounded by Deansgate to the east, St. Mary's Street to the south and College Lane to the west, in Manchester city centre. It is occupied by a 5 storey building named Church House.

The ground floor of the building is occupied by a number of commercial premises, including Timpson and Toni & Guy fronting onto Deansgate and Deansgate Barbers and Gaucho restaurant fronting onto St. Mary's Street. There are also a number of vacant units, including at the junction of Deansgate and St. Mary's Street, as well as fronting onto St. Mary's Street.




The upper floors of the building – previously in use as office space but currently vacant – are accessed through an entrance fronting onto Deansgate.

Deansgate is a busy pedestrian and vehicular route through the city and accommodates a mixture of commercial uses including retail, offices, restaurants/cafes and drinking establishments. As a result, the site benefits from good levels of footfall, activity, overlooking and passive surveillance throughout the day and into the late evening. However, the numerous bars along the route do result in a concentration of alcohol-related disorder issues – particularly late at night and over the weekend.

St. Mary's Street is a narrower route, with the largely blank ground floor façade of the House of Fraser building opposite – providing little/no overlooking over the site.

College Lane to the rear of the building is a narrower service route featuring largely blank facades at ground floor level with service and emergency egress doors/shutters. It benefits from more limited levels of activity, surveillance and overlooking and there are large amounts of graffiti and window/door openings fortified with bars/grilles or shutters – indicating the presence or crime and disorder issues. There are many similar 'back' streets within the city centre, which have limited levels of pedestrian footfall and vehicular movement, particularly at night, and this can leave buildings potentially vulnerable to unauthorised access or damage unseen, as well as to nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues, and can leave pedestrians using them somewhat remote/isolated.

Beyond College Lane is Parsonage Gardens – a small landscaped green space crossed by pedestrian routes and surrounded by commercial buildings.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime Summary

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st May 2024 to 30th April 2025.



Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
16	90	159	1,322	428	85	29	234	33	26

- 2.1.1 In the local area, the volume of crime is very high, particularly the levels of violence and theft, reflecting the site's location within the city centre. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of city centres – where there is a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of such crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding offences have occurred throughout the local area, with particular concentrations around/off Quay Street, Deansgate and Market Street - the majority of which have involved disputes between known associates or customers within retail outlets, restaurants and bars, with alcohol consumption often being a factor. Recorded thefts have been concentrated in the same areas, which have a high volume of footfall due a concentration of public transport links, licenced premises, restaurants and retail premises. Offenders have primarily used pick-pocketing techniques and distraction methods to obtain personal belongings, mostly mobile phones, bags and purses/wallets. Offenders have also targeted insecure items (particularly mobile phones) left on or under tables in bars and restaurants.
- 2.1.3 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed hotel, the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and theft.


2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Hotels): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.2.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary at Manchester hotels fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Tuesday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning. It is likely that offenders target hotels at these times when guests are likely to be out of their rooms or when staffing levels are likely to be lower – allowing offender's time to attempt to gain unauthorised access without being detected.

Manchester Hotel Burglary – Point of Entry




2.2.2 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of burglaries at Manchester hotels, the point of entry has not been determined. It is likely that these burglaries have occurred when offenders have entered hotels posing as legitimate guests and have gained access to back-of-house areas or hotel rooms without using force – possibly when they have been left insecure by guests/cleaners or by using stolen or forged keys/cards. Doors have also been forced open, using bodily pressure and implements/tools to gain entry.


2.3 Theft (Manchester Hotels): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.

Manchester Hotel Theft – Day Range



Manchester Hotel Theft – Time Range



2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft at Manchester hotels generally increases over the weekend. It is possible that the risk increases at these times when hotels typically have more guests and the opportunity to carry out such offences is greater. However, offenders do also target hotels between Monday and Friday, when they are typically less busy and they perceive a lower risk of being caught/challenged. The risk of theft is greatest around lunchtime and in the evening/early hours of the morning. This is when hotel restaurants, bars and gyms are likely to be at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Thefts of personal property (such as mobile phones, bags and purses/wallets) are the most routinely stolen items.

2.4 General Risk Factors

2.4.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary of hotel rooms
- Robbery to business
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Violence towards staff
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.5 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.5.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting hotels in Manchester are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **Manchester Hotels:** Offenders, posing as guests or legitimate customers, accessing staff-only/restricted areas to steal property
Possible Solution - The main reception should be located to have full view of everyone entering and leaving the premises and all routes to bedrooms and staff areas. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour. Access controls should be used to restrict access to vulnerable areas and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work (see Sections 4.1/4.2).
- **Manchester Hotels:** Offenders entering rooms using forged or stolen electronic key-cards/fobs or by exploiting insecure doors
Possible Solution - Auditable electric locking systems (such as Vingcard, Salto or similar) should be used, which can be easily activated/disabled electronically by reception staff (see Sections 4.1/4.2).
- **Manchester Hotels:** Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tool/implements to gain entry
Possible Solution - All external doors and ideally individual bedroom doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Access controls should also be utilised to prevent non-guest access to bedroom areas/floors (see Sections 4.1/4.2) and CCTV covering access corridors should be monitored at the staffed reception desk to ensure there can be an immediate response to any issues recorded (see Section 4.7).
- **Manchester Hotels:** Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables
Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The layout of any bars/restaurants/lounges can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. External seating areas should be enclosed to clearly define them as separate from adjacent pedestrian routes.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to change the use of part of the basement level, part of the ground floor level and the upper floors of the building to form a hotel, comprising of 125 no. guest bedrooms and 32 no. 'capsules' (spread across 2 no. capsule rooms).
- 3.1.2 The main entrance to the hotel will front onto Deansgate at ground floor level – leading to a lift and stair lobby. The hotel reception and check-in desk will be located at basement level, along with a plant room, a secure luggage room, bin store, staff facilities, security office, secure bike store and general stores. A separate lift/stair lobby will serve the back-of-house entrance on the College Land side of the building. The first floor of the building will house 16 no. guest bedrooms and a staff room – with the second floor housing 31 no. bedrooms, the third floor housing 30 no. bedrooms and the fourth floor housing 29 no. bedrooms. The fifth floor of the building will house 19 no. guest bedrooms and 2 capsule rooms and a shared capsule bathroom (with 5 no. lockable shower cubicles). Inspired by Japanese capsule hotels, each capsule will feature a lockable roller shutter and bed – aiming to provide a more affordable overnight stay.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The building is in a prominent position on the street within the city centre. The main entrance to the proposed hotel benefits from good levels of overlooking and natural surveillance from the surrounding buildings/public realm, particularly during the day and into the evening.
- 3.2.2 The proposed development will result in additional activity, surveillance and overlooking to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.3 The basement reception area will allow staff to overlook and greet guests coming down from ground level, as well as monitor/control access to luggage and cycle storage areas.
- 3.2.4 The scheme will be staffed and managed on a 24/7 basis, with a CCTV system installed throughout the building to allow staff to monitor movement of guests and identify potential intruders.
- 3.2.5 The layout of the hotel corridors provide clear views and contain no recessed areas that could conceal criminal activity.
- 3.2.6 The hotel bedrooms will be provided above street level, reducing the potential impacts of any noise, nuisance or anti-social behaviour.
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The control of access into and around the hotel is paramount to the security of the development. As proposed, the reception desk will be located at basement level and there will be no formal staff presence at ground level directly overlooking all access to and egress from the building via the main external entrance on Deansgate. This could provide opportunities for criminals to exploit to gain access to the ground floor entrance lobby space and the upper bedroom floors of the building without passing or being observed by staff. It is highly recommended that the following measures are incorporated to address these risks:
- During the day (when the main entrance is to be left open), all new guests should be directed to the basement reception area via the lifts, to allow them to check-in and be greeted by staff. The lifts and staircore should only be accessible/operate up to the upper bedroom floors via staff or guest key-card (issued once they have checked-in) – see Sections 4.1 & 4.2 for more information.

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- During the evening/at night (or at any other time when the basement reception desk is not staffed), the main entrance to the building should be secured and operated by guest key-card or via an access control system linked to the basement concierge, in order to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in or around the entrance lobby (again, see Sections 4.1/4.2 for more information).
 - The doors off the main stair/lift lobby at each level should also be operated by key-card to further deter unauthorised access/tailgating and prevent guests at one level from accessing another (see Sections 4.1/4.2 for more information). The secondary stair/lift core to the rear of the building should be for staff use and emergency egress purposes only.
 - The ground floor entrance lobby and all lift/stair lobbies and corridors at each level should be covered by a CCTV system capable of being monitored by reception/concierge staff – ensuring there can be an immediate response to any issues recorded (see Section 4.7 for more information).
- 3.3.2 Access to the basement luggage and cycle stores should be controlled either remotely by reception staff or via guest key-card. Any staff-only/back-of-house facilities at basement and upper floor levels should also be access-controlled to prevent unauthorised access. It is noted that there will be some staff access/refuse/servicing routes within the basement shared between the hotel and the ground floor commercial premises. However, it must not be possible for staff and guests of the hotel to gain unauthorised access into back-of-houses areas serving the commercial premises. Similarly, it should not be possible for commercial staff or customers to gain access to hotel back-of-house areas or up to bedroom levels. A robust and secure access control strategy will be key to achieving this (see Sections 4.1/4.2 for more information). Where staff-only access is required to common basement areas, interconnecting doors to other parts of the building should be security-certified (see Sections 4.1) and alarmed, with signage to deter mis-use.
- 3.3.3 The proposed 'capsule' rooms will result in multiple guests sharing access to communal areas and facilities, which could provide opportunities for offenders to exploit. The doors to the capsule rooms (as well as the shared capsule bathroom) must be to the same physical security standard as the main bedroom doors off the access corridors (see Section 4.1) and the capsules themselves must be capable of being adequately secured to allow guests to store their belongings safely.
- 3.3.4 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in guests and staff.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to be Secured by Design (SBD) compliant.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All new external doors should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ Reception staff should be able to remotely secure and control access through the main entrance door if/when required (e.g. into the evening/at night). The main entrance itself should ideally be security-certified to one of the above standards, including a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. It should be self-closing and controlled by guest key-card (for guests that have already checked-in) or by means of a video entry phone system linked to the basement reception desk/concierge office.
- ☐ The internal doorsets into/off the main stair/lift core at each level (including at ground and basement levels) should be security-certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2 and should be self-closing, secured with electronically operated locks (permitted under the security certification of the product), operated by staff and guest key-card (which also fail safe in the event of a fire alarm). This will ensure that only guests who have checked in at reception can access bedroom floors.
- ☐ The internal doors to the secondary stair/lift core to the rear of the building should be similarly secured and only accessible/usable by staff (operated by staff key-card). These doors should be alarmed and clearly signed to deter casual/public use. Once the secondary escape core is accessed by a member of the public in an emergency, the only means of egress should be at ground floor level onto the street.
- ☐ Individual hotel bedroom doorsets/frames should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick), self-closing and secured with 3 hinges and an electronically operated lock, controlled by Vingcard, Salto or similar. They should also be fitted with door viewers and chain limiters.
- ☐ The doorsets/frames to the proposed fifth floor capsule rooms, as well as the shared capsule bathroom, should also be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick), self-closing and secured with 3 hinges and an electronically operated lock, controlled by Vingcard, Salto or similar. The capsules themselves should be secured with a robust metal roller shutter door – also with an electronically operated lock, controlled by Vingcard, Salto or similar. If they do not include a secure space for belongings, secure lockers should be provided for guests. The shower cubicles within the shared bathroom should be fitted with a courtesy lock for privacy, with external staff override in case of emergency. Staff should undertake frequent inspections of communal facilities.
- ☐ The doors leading to shared back-of-house/staff-only areas at basement level should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2, operated by hotel staff key-card only, preventing unauthorised access between uses. Doors to hotel luggage and cycle stores should also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2, operated by hotel staff/guest key-card. Dedicated internal doors to any other hotel offices, staff rooms, stores, bin stores or plant areas should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock controlled by staff key-card. Careful consideration should be given to the design of any cash office, which should have solid masonry walls, no false/suspended ceilings, a security-certified doorset and a safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover, certified to LPS 1183. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs.

4.2 Access Controls

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by staff key-card/fob or by guest key-card, and not numeric key pads that can be easily observed/shared and are rarely changed. The following doors should operate on access control:
 - The main entrance doors to the hotel off Deansgate – operated remotely by reception staff and via guest/staff key-card.

- The rear service entrance doors off College Land – operated by staff key-card only.
- The main lifts – operated by staff/guest key card only to reach upper bedroom floors.
- The doors into/off the main stair/lift core at all levels – operated by guest/staff key-card.
- The doors into/off the secondary stair/lift core at each level – operated by staff key-card only (publicly accessible when fire alarm is triggered).
- The doors to guest bedrooms, capsule rooms and the shared capsule bathroom - operated by guest/staff key-card.
- The doors to the basement guest luggage store and cycle store - operated by guest/staff key-card.
- Access to all other basement/first floor back-of-house/staff facilities, stores, bin stores and plant rooms - operated by staff key-card only.

- ☐ The electric locking system to be used throughout the building should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff and guest key-cards should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled by staff to ensure that mis-use is prevented. Staff keys/key-cards should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.3 Windows

- ☐ Any new ground/first floor windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be fixed with a secure glazing retention system (e.g. with security glazing tape, with a dedicated security sealant/gasket or a secure mechanical fixing system from the glazing retention tests within the BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 standards). Windows should either be non-opening or fitted with fixed/lockable opening restrictors.

4.4 Glazing

- ☐ Any new ground/first floor glazing should incorporate an internal pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. Any new upper floor glazing should incorporate an internal pane rated as at least P1A under EN 356. The remaining external pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.5 Alarm

- ☐ All external doors and internal doors to guest and emergency egress stair/lift cores should be fitted with alarm contacts, linked to a 24/7 intruder alarm system. Alarm activations should be relayed to the hotel reception/concierge office, so staff can investigate or call the authorities as appropriate.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors and building facades and should complement any CCTV system (see below).
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light, and fixtures must not be positioned where they may provide climbing aids up to high level windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

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- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
 - ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
 - ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an **acceptable standard** that will allow for **identification** of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are **overview** and **recognition**, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
 - ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: **all external facades/doors, the main ground floor entrance lobby, the basement reception area and luggage/cycle storage areas, all lift/stair lobbies and bedroom corridors on each level, bar/seating areas and the bedroom corridors on each floor.** The CCTV system should be monitored by reception/concierge staff, to ensure there can be an immediate response to any incidents recorded.

4.8 Other

- ☐ Each guest bedroom and capsule should have a small wall or floor safe, operated by a personal identification number (PIN) selected by each new guest.
- ☐ The secure basement cycle store should include either secure lockers or stands that allow staff to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/>

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the hotel must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the development. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Repair to communal areas (such as access controls, CCTV, lighting, signage etc.)
 - Litter/graffiti removal
- 5.1.3 The hotel management should consider membership of the Manchester Hoteliers Association (MHA), who share best practice in security management and recruitment.
- 5.1.4 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, projectors, flat screen monitors/televisions, tools etc.) should be properly marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 5.1.5 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to back-of-house/staff-only areas.
- 5.1.6 A strategy should be prepared to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
25 th April 2025	Savills	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
28 th April 2025	Savills	Quote issued & request for additional info
28 th April 2025	Savills	Confirmation of instruction/fee
29 th April 2025	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment
29 th April 2025	Savills	Receipt of additional info re: access arrangements & capsules

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
10036-BUT-XX-XX-DR-A-01050	Existing Site Location Plan	25.04.25	SK01
10036-BUT-XX-XX-DR-A-01051	Existing Site Plan	25.04.25	SK01
10036-BUT-XX-B1-DR-A-01000	Existing Basement Plan	24.04.25	SK04
10036-BUT-XX-00-DR-A-01001	Existing Ground Floor Plan	24.04.25	SK03
10036-BUT-XX-01-DR-A-01002	Existing First Floor Plan	24.04.25	SK04
10036-BUT-XX-02-DR-A-01003	Existing Second Floor Plan	24.04.25	SK03
10036-BUT-XX-03-DR-A-01004	Existing Third Floor Plan	24.04.25	SK03
10036-BUT-XX-04-DR-A-01005	Existing Fourth Floor Plan	24.04.25	SK03
10036-BUT-XX-05-DR-A-01006	Existing Fifth Floor Plan	24.04.25	SK03
10036-BUT-XX-B1-DR-A-04000	Proposed Basement Plan	24.04.25	SK07
10036-BUT-XX-00-DR-A-04001	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	24.04.25	SK06
10036-BUT-XX-01-DR-A-04002	Proposed First Floor Plan	24.04.25	SK06
10036-BUT-XX-02-DR-A-04003	Proposed Second Floor Plan	24.04.25	SK06
10036-BUT-XX-03-DR-A-04004	Proposed Third Floor Plan	24.04.25	SK06
10036-BUT-XX-04-DR-A-04005	Proposed Fourth Floor Plan	24.04.25	SK06
10036-BUT-XX-05-DR-A-04006	Proposed Fifth Floor Plan	24.04.25	SK06
-	Zedwell Accommodation Types	-	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk