



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Land at 6, 8 & 10, Little Peter Street

9 No. Apartments

FOR: TORSION HOMES LTD

VERSION A: 10th July 2025

REFERENCE: 2025/0219/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Land at 6,8 & 10, Little Peter Street

2025/0219/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported with recommendations

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the recommendations discussed within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- External access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock operating with an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- Access into the building should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- There should be a secondary access-controlled door into the circulation cores of the building to reduce the potential for tailgating.
- A secure mail delivery system should be supplied, to allow delivery without access to the whole building. Given the emerging trend of parcel thefts (particularly at apartment blocks).
- The door to the bicycle store should be security-certified and be self-closing and self-locking. It should also operate on an access control system, operated with resident's key card/fob. Bicycle racks should allow both wheels and the frame to be secured.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated into the proposed scope of work where appropriate, we would be happy to support the development. GMP will seek the inclusion of a planning condition requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

Matthew Granelli

Consultant

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


1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is located at the road junction of Little Peter St & Constance St. The site is currently used as a surface car park.

The site is bound by Little Peter St & Constance St with the above roads forming the north and east boundaries respectively. The west boundary is shared by an existing office building and south boundary is shared by a surface car park.

The surrounding buildings are mixture of commercial, retail and residential developments, it benefits from good levels of natural surveillance. Deansgate is one of the main night time economy areas in the city centre and one of the main vehicular/pedestrian routes into the city centre.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2024 to 30th June 2025.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
9	27	88	423	127	20	8	171	17	19

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime over the past 12 months has been high for the Manchester division, which is to be expected given that the site is located close to the city centre. Less serious wounding, criminal damage and theft have been the most recorded offences taking place. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity to district, town or city centres where there is a higher concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a higher number of crime and disorder issues. Whilst the offences occur throughout the city centre there is a higher concentration occurring around Whitworth Street West between the Deansgate tram and train stations.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding offences have taken place throughout the local area, particularly at the locations mentioned above. Assaults and public order offences have been the most reported less serious woundings, with incidents involving disputes between both known and unknown associates within public spaces and retail outlets, often between staff and customers.
- 2.1.3 Theft from motor vehicle has been the most reported vehicle crime taking place, whereby offenders have targeted vehicles parked on the streets and within parking facilities throughout the local area. Offenders mainly used implements in order to smash the windows before removing items from within, as well used tools to remove vehicle parts and registration plates.
- 2.1.4 In cases of theft offenders have targeted insecure items, bags or coats on tabletops and benches in public spaces, retail outlets and restaurants, as well as parcels left on doorsteps and in communal areas of apartment buildings. Offenders have also used distraction and pickpocketing techniques to remove items from the person in crowded areas.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.

- 2.2.2 Using bodily pressure or implements in order to force open secure windows and doors or have been targeted when left insecure by residents .

Possible Solution – All external doors and windows should be certified to recognised security standards, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and locking, thus reducing the opportunity of them being left insecure.

All individual apartments should also be secured with a robust entrance doorset, to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

- 2.2.3 Posing as a legitimate resident and gaining access to communal areas of apartment buildings by tailgating residents and via insecure doors.

Possible Solution – A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to the building before allowing them access. The main communal entrance should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access.

Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Crime Rate Comparison




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **95% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **94% lower** than Greater Manchester and **93% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **78% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **70% lower** than Greater Manchester and **43% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **75% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **67% lower** than Greater Manchester and **60% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **42% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **4% lower** than Greater Manchester and **16% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary is highest on Sunday and Tuesday, at various times throughout the morning (05:00-06:00 and 9:00-11:00). Offenders often target dwellings in the morning when it tends to be darker and there is less footfall in the area, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as 'unknown' it is likely that the offenders has exploited insecure windows and doors.
- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using bodily pressure and implements.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Sunday in the evening (22:00-23:00), Offenders often target vehicles at this time when they tend to be left unattended and out of sight of the owner for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The development will see the construction of a 5.5 storey apartment building with a small basement. The building will have 9 no. apartments on the ground and upper floors, with the basement housing a cycle store, bin store and other amenities.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposal will bring additional legitimate activity to a currently vacant site. Redevelopment with housing and repopulation of the site should help to generate a sense of ownership and responsibility and improve informal policing of the area.
- 3.2.2 The proposed development will bring activity, overlooking and surveillance to the area during the day and night.
- 3.2.3 The internal areas of the building appears to be generally free of obstacles, thus an intruder would find difficulty in hiding within the communal parts of the buildings. All communal doors within the corridors should include glazed elements to improve sight lines. Installation of mirrors should be considered to improve sight lines around blind corners in certain locations. The proposed development will bring additional activity and surveillance to the area, at varying times of the day and night.
- 3.2.4 Access controls can easily be deployed at the communal entrance door to the property, in order to restrict access to residents and authorised visitors only.
- 3.2.5 The principal entrance to the building will be located in a prominent position and will be capable of being clearly seen from the public realm.
- 3.2.6 Secure cycle and bin storage will be located within the building serving the properties, reducing the potential for misuse.
- 3.2.7 The ground floor residential windows to the existing building will front directly onto the street and will be protected by planter to provide enclosed defensible space – this prevents leaving them exposed and vulnerable to unauthorised access, damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour (i.e. people banging on windows as they walk by - particularly late in the evening/at night when the surrounding bars/public houses in the city centre are busy), as well as a lack of privacy for residents..

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 External access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock operating with an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- 3.3.2 Access into the building should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- 3.3.3 There should be a secondary access-controlled door into the circulation cores of the building to reduce the potential for tailgating.
- 3.3.4 A secure mail delivery system should be supplied, to allow delivery without access to the whole building. Given the emerging trend of parcel thefts (particularly at apartment blocks).
- 3.3.5 The door to the bicycle store should be security-certified and be self-closing and self-locking. It should also operate on an access control system, operated with resident's key card/fob. Bicycle racks should allow both wheels and the frame to be secured.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access into the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. Apartment entrance doors must have a door viewer.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The post-boxes themselves should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). The Royal Mail should be allowed access to the lobby to allow for deliveries to the building. Consideration should also be given to a secure system for depositing parcels within a secure area, such as the smart parcel boxes used by the major internet shopping companies. All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access control system.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Construction of internal walls surrounding internal apartment entrance doors (600mm either side of the door set) should incorporate a resilient layer to reduce the risk of anyone breaking through the wall to access the locking mechanism. The resilient layer should be timber (minimum thickness of 9mm) or expanded metal.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm. Windows can be fully openable from the inside to allow ventilation of the dwellings in accordance with Approved Document O but the window restrictor must reengage when the window is closed.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either: BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems or BS 6799 for wireless systems.
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, (including internal doors into garages) and, PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - Communal entrance door
 - Secondary communal entrance door
 - Staff only areas
 - Bicycle store

4.6 Bicycle Parking Areas

- ☐ Doors into the cycle parking area(s) must be certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, with access restricted to registered residents (i.e. genuine bicycle owners).
- ☐ Cycle stands should either be U-profile or Sheffield style stands. If rack storage is used it should be possible for both wheels and the frame to be secured.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting must be provided to all entrance doors for the development and the Hart Street elevation.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.

4.8 CCTV

- ☐ A modest CCTV system should be installed. Cameras should be placed where they are able to monitor:
 - all external doors.
 - mail room.
 - the cycle store.

4.9 Other

- ☐ Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
17/06/25	Torsion Homes	CIS Application
18/06/25	DfS	CIS Fee Proposal
18/06/25	Torsion Homes	CIS Confirmation
19/06/25	DfS	Site Visit

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
A886_P_100-	SITE PLAN		
A886_P_110-	BASEMENT FLOOR PLAN		
A886_P_111-	GROUND FLOOR PLAN		
A886_P_112-	1ST TO 3RD FLOOR PLAN		
A886_P_113-	4TH FLOOR PLAN		
A886_P_114-	FIFTH FLOOR PLANS		
A886_P_310-	NORTH ELEVATION		
A886_P_311-	EAST ELEVATION		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		