



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

LAND AT PARKHOUSE STREET/KELBROOK ROAD, OPENSHAW, MANCHESTER
INDUSTRIAL BAKERY WITH ANCILLARY OFFICES, PARKING & SERVICING

Greater Manchester Police
designforsecurity

FOR: Sheldon's
VERSION A: 09/06/2025
REFERENCE: 2025/0178/CIS/01

Land at Kelbrook Road/Parkhouse Street, Openshaw, Manchester

URN: 2025/0178/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/improvements recommended

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Consideration should be given to the use of secure welded-wire mesh perimeter fencing rather than Palisade. If not, any new fencing should at least be sourced from a police preferred SBD supplier. Any existing fencing to be retained should be repaired/replaced where necessary.
- Control of access to/from the serve yards and the car park, both during the normal working day and when the site is operational outside of normal working hours.
- Control of access into/around the building itself.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime Summary	
	2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Industrial): Risk Analysis	
	2.3 Theft (Manchester Industrial): Risk Analysis	
	2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Offices): Risk Analysis	
	2.5 Theft (Manchester Offices): Risk Analysis	
	2.6 General Risk Factors	
	2.7 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	10
	3.1 Proposed Development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Points for Further Consideration	
4	Physical Security	12
	4.1 External Doors	
	4.2 Windows & Shutters	
	4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric	
	4.4 Access Controls & Internal Security	
	4.5 Alarm	
	4.6 Boundaries	
	4.7 Parking Areas	
	4.8 Lighting	
	4.9 CCTV	
	4.10 Landscaping	
	4.11 Other	
5	Management & Maintenance	17
6	Construction	17
7	Useful References	17
	7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix

A	Contact Register.....	18
B	Associated Documents.....	18
C	CIS Version History	19
D	Glossary	20

1 Visual Audit


The site is bounded by Parkhouse Street to the south, Kelbrook Road to the east and Clayton Lane to the west, in the Openshaw area of east Manchester. It is currently formed by vacant open space with dense vegetation and mature trees. There are signs of disorder, such as flytipping, which can often occur when an offenders presence is unlikely to attract attention and a place feels like it is not under supervision. If signs of disorder are not repaired/removed immediately, they can often attract further abuse and trigger a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality - giving the impression that crime and disorder is tolerated.

To the east of the site (on the opposite side of Kelbrook Road) and to the immediate north are industrial sites enclosed with high Palisade fencing/gates, which provide little activity along or overlooking over the street. The existing Sheldon's factory lies to the north-east.

To the south of the site is St Barnabas Primary School and playing fields (fronting onto Wood Street) and Grace Life Church and grounds (fronting onto South Street), which again provide little direct overlooking over the street and the site itself.

Along the immediate western boundary of the site is a large electrical substation, a used car sales compound and terraced housing (with gated rear access alleyway) fronting onto Clayton Lane, with a car servicing garage and industrial buildings on the opposite side of the street. These buildings have been heavily fortified with shutters and barbed wire – indicating the presence of crime and disorder issues.

To the south-west of the site, on the opposite side of Parkhouse Street are residential properties in a Radburn style layout, featuring pedestrian routes separated from vehicular movement (often to the rear of dwellings), communal areas of landscaping and communal parking areas remote from the dwellings they serve. This type of layout can result in a lack of definition between public and private space, creating areas which can attract nuisance, anti-social behaviour and criminal damage. The networks of the pedestrian access routes through such estates often make them extremely permeable and also provide easy access/escape routes for criminals to utilise – particularly those which benefit from little/no natural surveillance and are likely to be infrequently used.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime Summary

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st June 2024 to 31st May 2025.



Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
10	<5	23	104	16	<5	<5	9	5	<5

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area over the past 12 months has been approximately average for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding being the most prevalent. These offences have mainly occurred in the residential neighbourhoods to the west and east of the proposed site. Assaults and public order offences have been the most commonly reported less serious wounding offences, with the majority of incidents involving disputes between known associates, neighbours or students from nearby schools. There have also been some cases of domestic violence.
- 2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed industrial scheme with ancillary office use, the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary/theft.


2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Industrial): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against industrial units, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Manchester industrial premises peaks on Sunday/Monday.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks late at night and during the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target such commercial premises at these times when it is dark, industrial areas/streets are typically quiet, units are usually closed or operate with fewer staff and offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

Manchester Industrial Burglary – Point of Entry




2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** At Manchester industrial premises, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure shutters using bodily pressure and implements (particularly metal bars and vehicles) in order to gain access.
- In a number of cases, the point of entry was 'unknown'. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers, visitors or employees before gaining access to back-of-house/staff areas and stealing property unnoticed.
- Doors have been forced open using tools/implements or when they have been left insecure by members of staff.
- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Offenders have penetrated through walls and roofs to gain unauthorised access.


2.3 Theft (Manchester Industrial): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against industrial units, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.

Manchester Office Theft – Day Range



Manchester Office Theft – Time Range






2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft from industrial units in Manchester peaks on Saturday.

2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks during the late morning/afternoon. There are two common occurrences of theft – the theft of personal property within buildings (e.g. cash, bags, wallets/purses etc.) and the theft of tools, materials and plant stolen from service yards.

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Offices): Risk Analysis


The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester is greatest on Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary at Manchester office premises rises into the evening/late at night. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.
- 2.4.3 **Point of Entry:** The majority of burglaries at offices in Manchester have been committed through doors. Burglaries against office buildings in this area do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing tools with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks. Offenders have also smashed glazed panels in doors and windows to gain entry. A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' and 'legitimate' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.

2.5 Theft (Manchester Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.5.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest on Monday and Tuesday and is generally lower over the weekend (when many are shut).
- 2.5.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.

2.6 General Risk Factors

- 2.6.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery of businesses
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Employee theft
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.7 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.7.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting Manchester industrial and office premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **Manchester Industrial:** Forcing open secure shutters using bodily pressure and implements (particularly metal bars and vehicles) in order to gain access.

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Sections 4.1/4.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from

an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines.

- **Manchester Industrial & Offices:** In a number of cases, the point of entry was 'unknown'. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers, visitors or employees before gaining access to back-of-house/staff areas and stealing property unnoticed.

Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that callers to units are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access into them (see Section 4.1/4.4). All individual rooms/areas should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.

- **Manchester Industrial & Offices:** Doors have been forced open using tools/implements or when they have been left insecure by members of staff.

Possible Solution - Although the location of doors should be considered (ideally placed where they can be readily observed, so that potential criminals would be more easily detected), it is inevitable that some will be located where they will benefit from lower levels of natural surveillance. All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV (see Sections 4.6, 4.8 & 4.9) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- **Manchester Industrial & Offices:** Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Windows that are particularly vulnerable should be secured with security-certified shutters out-of-hours (see Section 4.2).

- **Manchester Industrial:** Offenders have penetrated through walls and roofs to gain unauthorised access.

Possible Solution - Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas or upper floor windows are not accessible, for example, with the use of high-level/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard/soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any 'accessible' skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing and should be secured with internally fixed grilles/bars to prevent unauthorised access. The construction of the roof itself and all external walls should also be robust enough to withstand penetration (see Section 4.3).

- **Manchester Industrial:** Theft of externally stored materials, tools and plant equipment

Possible Solution - The integrity of the boundary treatments should be evaluated and regularly checked for defects. Inappropriately parked vehicles/trailers and other externally stored items can obscure the spread of lighting and CCTV coverage, creating potential areas of intense shadowing and blind spots. It is recommended that this is considered in the external arrangement, and 'no store/park' areas specifically identified to avoid inadvertently blocking surveillance. Storage/parking areas close to boundaries should also be avoided as they may mask any damage to perimeter fencing (see Section 4.11).

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a new 7,432sqm. factory (bakery) with ancillary offices, with associated parking and service yards. The site will be operational on a 24h hour basis, 365 days a year, with delivery vehicles arriving and leaving the site throughout the day and at night.
- 3.1.2 The proposed building will occupy the northern portion of the site, with the main entrance fronting towards Kelbrook Road and an office car park comprising of 40 no. spaces accessed off Kelbrook Road. There will also be motorcycle/bicycle parking areas, a small external seating area/amenity space, landscaped areas and a sub-station along the street frontage of the building. There will be a large service yard to the south of the building (incorporating a fuel stop, waste/recycling area, a turning circle and 15 no. HGV docks/roller shutter doors) and a smaller one to the north (including flour silos, yeast tanks, a turning circle and additional HGV docks/roller shutter doors and parking areas), linked by a service route to the west of the site. HGV access and egress will be via a security booth on Parkhouse Street. Some existing palisade fencing to the perimeter of the site will be retained, with new palisade and acoustic fencing is proposed to enclose the perimeter of the site and separate the parking and servicing areas.
- 3.1.3 The building itself will incorporate a goods in area to the north and a goods out area to the south, with bakery areas/production lines between. Along the eastern (front) elevation of the building will be an office block, comprising of a ground floor entrance lobby/reception and post room/store, staff entrance, staff W/Cs and showers, a canteen and admin, quality and production offices. Additional technical and general offices will be located a first floor level, along with a boardroom and meeting rooms/break out spaces and stores. At second floor level will be additional shared offices, a large breakout space and a large archive room. On the opposite (western) side of the building, additional offices, storage rooms, archives and a plant room, workshop and washroom will provided at ground, first and second floor levels.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring a vacant site into use and provide additional activity and surveillance to the area when the site is operational.
- 3.2.2 All vehicular and HGV access to and egress from the site will be via Parkhouse Street/Kelbrook Road, allowing all activity, surveillance and security to be focussed in two formalised locations.
- 3.2.3 The sides and rear of the building and the proposed service yards will be enclosed within a dedicated secure perimeter fenceline, with access-controls to prevent unauthorised access.
- 3.2.4 The building will front towards the car park to the front of the building, allowing employees to partially overlook the vehicles from routinely occupied rooms. The main entrance will be located in a prominent position, where it can be clearly seen from the parking areas and the street.
- 3.2.5 The proposed car parking areas will have spaces laid out in rows and few obstacles to views across them - protecting the parked vehicles and aiding surveillance opportunities.
- 3.2.6 The footprint of the building is simple, with no recesses that could provide cover for covert criminal activity. The building will also be sufficiently tall enough to make unauthorised access to the roof difficult.
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design/construction of the scheme. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design/specification of the development can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 As proposed, some of the existing Palisade fencing to the perimeter of the site will be retained. It is highly recommended that a comprehensive survey of the existing perimeter fenceline is undertaken, to ensure that any external features (such as any immediately adjacent trees/branches) that may form climbing aids are removed or pruned and that any damaged/missing pales are repaired or replaced where necessary. The pales of Palisade fencing can often be vulnerable to damage or penetration, particularly when they are secured with rivets, rather than anti-tamper bolts. Where new perimeter fencing is to be installed, consideration should be given to the use of Secured by Design (SBD) compliant high security, rigid panel, welded-wire mesh fencing (please see [Product Category Search](#) for a list of Police approved perimeter security suppliers), to a minimum height of 2400mm, which would offer a greater level of security and is much harder to scale, penetrate or damage than Palisade fencing. If Palisade fencing must be used, it should be of rivetless construction and also sourced from an SBD supplier. Care should also be taken to ensure that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, streetlights, trees etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points to gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see above for example) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.
- 
- 3.3.2 The access and egress points to and from the service yards (on Parkhouse Street) should ideally be secured with automatic vehicular gates at all times, or at least heavy-duty vehicle barriers during the working day when the gatehouse is staffed. Outside of normal working hours (e.g. 6pm to 7pm), or if the gatehouse is not staffed at any point, the access to/from the service yard should be secured with automatic vehicular gates, operated via the gatehouse or via an access-control system linked to the reception or a transport office (see Sections 4.4/4.6 for more information) – in order to more effectively prevent unauthorised access. Similarly, the vehicular and pedestrian gates to the office car park/main entrance to the building (on Kelbrook Road) could be left open and accessible during the day/normal working hours, but should at least be secured and operate automatically outside of normal working hours – protecting the parked vehicles and providing an additional layer of security to the building shell (again, see Sections 4.4/4.6).
- 3.3.3 The control and management of access into and around the building itself will also be paramount to the security of the scheme (see Section 4.4 for more information). The reception desk adjacent to the main entrance of the building should be staffed at all times when the building is operational (or at least during normal working hours), allowing staff to have full surveillance of everyone entering/leaving the building. All visitors should report to the reception desk for vetting by staff before gaining access to the rest of the building. A high, wide reception desk increases the distance between reception staff and any potential aggressive visitors and aids surveillance of all parts of the entrance lobby. The main entrance doors to the building should also be capable of being controlled remotely by reception or security staff if/when required to prevent unauthorised access (e.g. outside of normal working hours). Any other external doors (such as to the amenity space adjacent to the canteen) should not be left open/unattended at any time, which may allow offenders to circumnavigate the staffed/access-controlled main entrance. Internal access controls should be incorporated to offices, archive rooms, storage rooms and back-of-house plant/service areas, to ensure access by authorised personnel only and all individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied (again, see Section 4.4).
- 3.3.4 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

In addition to the layout issues highlighted within Section 4, the following checklist forms the physical security requirements for the scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.

4.1 External Doors

- ☐ All external doors (single and double leaf) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ Access through the main entrance to the building should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if/when required or by office staff if the reception desk is not staffed at any point), to ensure any visitors are vetted or are greeted/escorted before being allowed access into the building (see Section 5.4 for more information).
- ☐ Any staff entrance doorsets should also be security-certified to one of the above standards and should be secured with a multi-point electronic lock, permitted as part of the certification, operated by staff key-card/fob only (see Section 5.4 for more information).
- ☐ Any sectional loading bay doors or dock level doors should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

4.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ All ground floor/accessible windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be fixed with a secure glazing retention system (e.g. with security glazing tape, with a dedicated security sealant/gasket or a secure mechanical fixing system from the glazing retention tests within the BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 standards)
- ☐ All ground floor and any other easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ If any shutters are to be installed, they should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Ideally, any external shutters should have shutter-boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building – where they would be less vulnerable to attack and less visually intrusive.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ The inner pane within double-glazed glazing units at ground floor level (or where otherwise accessible) should have no less than a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under BS EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ If there are to be any vision panels within loading bay doors that cannot include laminated glazing, they should include a material of a similar strength (e.g. multi-layer acrylic/polycarbonate or hammerglass) to ensure they are resistant to shattering and penetration.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or a material of similar strength, such as welded-steel or expamet mesh) behind any cladding to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from external ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.
- ☐ Any louvres to plant areas should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid to reach upper floor windows. Security-certified louvered doorsets are also available if required (search SBD compliant products at [Secured by Design](#)).

- ☐ There should be no features of the building (such as projecting canopies/window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes, projecting steel frame/cladding features etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby lighting columns, handrails, street furniture etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper floor windows or over boundaries.
- ☐ Where glazed elevations are potentially accessible to vehicles, they should be protected by anti-ram bollards.

4.4 Access Controls & Internal Security

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by staff key-card or fob, and not numeric key pads (as codes can be easily observed or shared and are rarely changed). The following barriers, gates and doors should operate on access control:
 - The pedestrian gate and vehicular gate/s at the car park entrance on Kelbrook Road – operated remotely by security/reception staff outside of normal working hours (via an audio/visual access-control system) or by staff key-card/ANPR.
 - The vehicular arm-barriers and/or gates at the service yard entrance on Parkhouse Street – operated remotely by security gatehouse staff or by transport/security office staff if/when the gatehouse is not staffed (via an audio/visual access-control system).
 - The external main entrance doorset to the building – capable of be operated remotely by reception staff (via an audio/visual access-control system) or by staff key-card outside of normal working hours/when required.
 - Any external staff entrance doorsets - operated by staff key-card only.
 - Any internal doors providing access to obvious high risk areas (e.g. office suites, storage areas, workshops, plant areas etc.) - operated by staff key-card.
 - Doors to any staff changing facilities/lockers operated by staff key-card.
- ☐ The electric locking system to be used throughout the building should be fully auditable (i.e. allowing the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff key-cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work and keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.
- ☐ All internal doors/frames to individual rooms, offices, meeting rooms, board rooms, archive rooms, staff rooms, stores and plant rooms should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a deadlock, so that they can be secured when unoccupied.

4.5 Alarm

- ☐ A monitored intruder alarm system should be installed linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a staffed security office or a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC).

4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ The perimeter of the site should ideally be enclosed with high-security, rigid-panel, welded-wire mesh fencing and gates to a minimum height of 2400mm (ideally 358 gauge, with small apertures to deter scaling and cutting), with anti-tamper fixings to secure the panels to posts (please see [Product Category Search](#) for a list of Police approved perimeter security suppliers). If not, any new Palisade fencing should be a minimum of 2400mm high, of rivetless construction and sourced from an SBD supplier (see link above). Where any existing Palisade fencing is to be retained, any damaged/missing pales must be repaired or replaced where necessary. Any acoustic fencing should also be to a minimum height of 2400mm, with any framing/horizontal elements on the internal side of the fenceline, so as not to provide any climbing aids. Secondary fencelines within the site (2100-2400mm high) should separate the service areas to the north, west and south of the building from the parking/landscaped areas along the building frontage (to the east).

- ☐ Access to and egress from the service areas could be via automatic vehicle arm barriers during normal working hours when the adjacent gatehouse is staffed (e.g. 7am to 6pm) and via 2400mm high automatic vehicular gates out-of-hours or if the gatehouse is not staffed (operated via audio-visual access-controls linked to a transport/security office). Any pedestrian gate should also be 2400mm high, self-closing/locking and operated by staff key-card on access and egress.
- ☐ Access to and egress from the car park should be via a 2400mm high automatic vehicular gate/s outside of normal working hours, controlled by staff key-card/ANPR or an audio-visual access-control system linked to the reception desk/security office for visitors. The pedestrian gate could also be open during normal working hours, but should be operated by staff key-card out-of-hours.
- ☐ Sliding vehicular gates are preferred, but if double gates are used they should overlap when closed and should not be capable of being forced open. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points to any gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. If panic mechanisms are required on the inner face of pedestrian gates, they should not be capable of being reached/operated from the external face of the fenceline/gate.
- ☐ Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of retaining walls and fencing have panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid. Care should also be taken to ensure there are no trees or any other hard/soft landscaping features immediately adjacent and on the publicly accessible side of any secure boundaries that could be used as a climbing aid to scale the fencing. Any such features should be pruned or removed where possible. The site boundary treatment should also be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary.
- ☐ It is highly recommended that condition of the fencing along the perimeter of the site is regularly inspected for signs of damage/attack and is repaired immediately if any incidents are experienced. Where exposed, the perimeter fencing to the service yards should be protected on the inner side from potential damage from large vehicles, using crash barriers or rails, to deflect any encroachment and maintain a secure boundary.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.



4.7 Parking Areas

- ☐ Lighting to all parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, with an average lux level 20 and a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ The surface of the parking areas should be even tarmac or concrete. The integrity of the surface treatment should be maintained to ensure that there is no loose material that can be used to commit crime.
- ☐ Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated to avoid confusion or conflict, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.
- ☐ Where feasible, traffic calming measures should be incorporated to limit the speed of vehicles within the site.

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all parking/servicing areas and service routes within the site, in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors and loading bay doors.

- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.9 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *Acceptable Standard* that will allow for *Identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *Overview* and *Recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: *the entrance to the site, the external facades and main entrance of the building, the main entrance lobby/reception area, access to any internal areas/rooms housing sensitive/dangerous equipment and all service/parking areas.*

4.10 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around site/building frontages and entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow unimpeded surveillance and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

4.11 Other

- ☐ The position of ancillary structures, parked trailers and any external storage areas should be carefully considered in relation to the following:
 - Their potential to block sight lines and create hiding places.
 - Their potential to obscure CCTV and lighting.
 - Their potential to create climbing aids that would assist unauthorised exit/entry over boundary fencing.
 - Their potential to obscure damage to fencelines.

Any proposed lighting columns, street furniture, tree/shrub planting etc. within or external to the site perimeter should also be reviewed in relation to the above issues.

- ☐ Any cycle parking areas should be located where they can be well-overlooked from routinely occupied rooms within the building and should include 'Sheffield' type stands, which both wheels and the crossbar can be locked to rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/>.
- ☐ Any external bin/recycling stores should be secure, lockable and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- ☐ Any lockers within staff changing facilities must be robust/secure and all users should be encouraged to use them and not leave belongs unattended in changing areas. Staff should undertake regular inspections of any changing facilities or locker areas.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 There should be a comprehensive security regime in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV etc.)
 - Frequent physical check of all perimeter fencing to check for evidence of breaches
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.3 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, tools, plant/equipment etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 5.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the site and the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to restricted/authorised staff only areas.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
14 th May 2025	Plan:8 Town Planning	Request for quotation
14 th May 2025	Plan:8 Town Planning	Quote issued & request for additional info
27 th May 2025	Plan:8 Town Planning	Receipt of plans/info & confirmation of instruction/fee
3 rd June 2025	Plan:8 Town Planning	Email sent re: timescales. Telephone call re: letter of comfort for Estates Dept – issued same day
9 th June 2025	Plan:8 Town Planning	Email sent re: report completion & payment
10 th to 11 th June 2025	Plan:8 Town Planning & GH Sheldon	Email correspondence re: invoice & payment
11 th June 2025	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
21003 0001	Site Plan as Existing (SUPERSEDED)	Jan '21	-
OKR-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-9100	Location Plan	24.01.24	P1
OKR-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7001	Existing Site Plan	11.03.25	P1
OKR-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7002	Proposed Site Plan	11.03.25	P1
OKR-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7003	Proposed Building Plan (Ground Floor)	11.03.25	P1
OKR-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7004	Proposed Ground Floor Office (Building Plan Excerpt)	11.03.25	P1
OKR-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7005	Proposed First Floor Office (Building Plan Excerpt)	11.03.25	P1
OKR-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7006	Proposed Second Floor Office (Building Plan Excerpt)	11.03.25	P1
OKR-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7007	Proposed Ancillary Ground Floor (Building Plan Excerpt)	11.03.25	P1
OKR-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7008	Proposed Ancillary First Floor (Building Plan Excerpt)	11.03.25	P1
OKR-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7009	Proposed Ancillary Second Floor (Building Plan Excerpt)	11.03.25	P1
OKR-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7010	Proposed Elevations	11.03.25	P1
OKR-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7011	Proposed Elevations	11.03.25	P1
OKR-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7012	Existing and Proposed Site Sections	11.03.25	P1
OKR-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7013	Proposed Tree Felling Plan (Existing Site Plan)	11.03.25	P1
OKR-KMA-XX-XX-DR-A-7014	Proposed Structured Landscape and Boundary Plan (Block Plan)	11.03.25	P1
T1179 7100	Preliminary 3D View 1 (Pedestrian Access)	11.03.25	P1
T1179 7101	Preliminary 3D View 2 (Car Park)	11.03.25	P1
T1179 7102	Preliminary 3D View 3 (Service Yard Entrance)	11.03.25	P1
T1179 7103	Preliminary 3D View 4 (Service Yard)	11.03.25	P1
T1179 7104	Preliminary 3D View 5 (Kelbrook Road)	11.03.25	P1
T1179 7105	Preliminary 3D View 6 (Vehicular Access)	11.03.25	P1
T1179 7106	Preliminary 3D View 7 (HGV Access)	11.03.25	P1
T1179 7107	Preliminary 3D View 8 (Herne Street)	11.03.25	P1
T1179 7108	Preliminary 3D View 9 (Clayton Lane)	11.03.25	P1

T1179 7109	Preliminary 3D View 10 (Aerial View – Southeast)	11.03.25	P1
T1179 7110	Preliminary 3D View 11 (Aerial View – Southwest)	11.03.25	P1
T1179 7111	Preliminary 3D View (Aerial View – Northwest)	11.03.25	P1
-	Inward/Outward Vehicle Movements	-	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk