

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

101 Queens Road, Cheetham Hill

13 No. Apartments

FOR: Create It Studio Architects

VERSION B: 4th September 2025

REFERENCE: 2023/0278/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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CPT
CRIME PREVENTION TEAM

Queens Road

2023/0278/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The development is broadly acceptable, in terms of designing out crime; however, the recommendations made in section 3.3 should be addressed, including but not limited to:

- The building should be built to Secured by Design standards.

If the recommendations contained within section 3.3 are implemented, we would be supportive of the planning application.



Patrick Babb

Consultant

e: [redacted]

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
1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be found on adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the area of Cheetham Hill, within the City of Manchester.

The site is located on the junction of Queens Road and Appleford Drive, which form the East and South boundary of the site, with the North of the site bound by WholesaLED to the North, and to the West the site is bound by Manchester Transport Museum and Queens Road Bus Depot.

The site is currently vacant land which is currently overgrown with vegetation/trees. The site boundary is formed by a blockwork wall to Queens Road and Appleford Drive. The local area is typically residential with a large number of terrace houses and Radburn style housing developments.













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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st June 2022 to 31st May 2023.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
11	10	58	328	54	6	6	29	18	11

2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is average for Manchester with less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime are the highest recorded crime types taking place within the local area.

2.1.2 Less serious wounding has taken place throughout the local area, with a hotspot of offences occurring to the north and west of the proposed site, around Smedley Lane and Heywood Street. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings in the area, with the majority of assaults occurring within dwelling and residential streets with domestic disputes most commonly reported. Public order offences have mostly taken place between unknown associates at places of work or public transport stops.

2.1.3 Theft offences have mostly occurred along Cheetham Hill Road and to the south around Eden Leadership Academy school. Offences have mostly involved the theft of unattended bags and mobile phones within the school.

2.1.4 Vehicle crime offences have occurred throughout the local area with theft from a vehicle and criminal damage to a vehicle most commonly reported. Offenders have smashed glazing, causing damage and removing items from within. Offences have also included theft of vehicle registration plates and damage to body work of vehicles.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Offenders gaining access to apartment circulation areas through insecure communal entrance doors or by tailgating.

Possible Solution – Communal entrances into the building should operate on a robust access control system to prevent unauthorised access.

2.2.2 Forcing open secure windows and doors (mostly to the rear of the property) using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain entry to the property.

Possible Solution - All external door sets should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (see section 4.1). Rear doors should be positioned within the secure rear boundary to restrict access to residents. Ground floor and easily accessible windows should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. BS PAS 24).

2.2.3 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.

Possible Solution - Front doors should have split spindles or a fixed external handle so then cannot be opened from outside without a key. Rear doors should be positioned in secure rear gardens with appropriate boundary treatments. Ground floor windows should have restrictors installed so that they cannot be opened from the outside if left insecure.

2.2.4 Breaking glazing in windows and doors using implements.

Possible Solution - All ground floor and easily accessible glazing should be laminated to prevent it from being easily damaged by offenders to gain entry (see section 4.3. for more details).

2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary

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
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

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
2.4 Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.


Comparison of Domestic Burglary Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester




Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **58% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **46% lower** than Greater Manchester and **45% lower** than England & Wales.

2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **16% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **58% higher** than Greater Manchester and **201% higher** than England & Wales.

2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **13% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **48% higher** than Greater Manchester and **80% higher** than England & Wales.


2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **10% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **81% higher** than Greater Manchester and **120% higher** than England & Wales.

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2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.5.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Monday and Tuesday during the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target properties during the early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:


- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
- Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Entering the rear garden of the property and using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the garden shed.

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
2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.6.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Monday and Thursday during the late evening. Offenders often target vehicles during the evening as vehicles are often left unattended for long periods of time, and out of sight of the owner, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development is of 13 no. apartments with parking to the rear.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The apartment building is set back from the public highway/footway which will reduce the potential for antisocial behaviour and noise nuisance. The 3 no. ground floor apartments have front gardens and external entrance doors.

3.2.2 There will be 3 no. car parking places positioned to the front of apartment no. 1 which can easily be viewed by residents of this apartment. The rear apartment car parking area will be well overlooked by residents of the building.

3.2.3 The rear parking area is secured with an access controlled gate.

3.2.4 The proposed residential use is appropriate for this area which is typically residential in nature. The layout of the building does not feature any recessed areas, or similar, which could conceal an offender from view.

3.2.5 There will be an access controlled gate, with an intercom, restricting access to the rear of the development and allow residents to allow visitors access.

3.2.6 The development site is current vacant, and this can generate antisocial behaviour to the detriment of local residents. The redevelopment of the site will deter offenders and those antisocially minded from operating in the vicinity of the site.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 The rear and side boundaries should be inspected for any damaged and repaired where necessary.

3.3.2 External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The

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communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock operating with an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.

3.3.3 Access into the building should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.

3.3.4 The car parking area should be illuminated to a high standard and in accordance with BS 5489. The communal entrance doors and any external apartment doors should be illuminated with dusk-til-dawn lighting.

3.3.5 Ground floor apartment windows, particularly on the front elevations of the blocks, should be restricted in opening to 100mm to reduce the potential of residents leaving them insecure.

3.3.6 External ground floor apartment entrance doors should have a split-spindle or fixed handle to prevent them from being left insecure by residents.

3.3.7 It is highly recommended that ground floor apartments are fitted with an intruder alarm system or the infrastructure for one to be easily installed (i.e. fuse spur).

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access into the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.

☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.

☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. Apartment entrance doors must have a door viewer.

☐ Construction of internal walls surrounding internal apartment entrance doors (600mm either side of the door set) should incorporate a resilient layer to reduce the risk of anyone breaking through the wall to access the locking mechanism. The resilient layer should be timber (minimum thickness of 9mm) or expanded metal.

☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

☐ Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222.

☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

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- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind or within any new cladding/insulated panels to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
  - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
  - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
  - Communal entrances
  - Pedestrian gate
  - Vehicular gate
  - Circulation cores
  - Cycle store

4.6 Bicycle Parking

- ☐ Doors into cycle store must be certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, with access restricted to registered residents (i.e. genuine bicycle owners).
- ☐ Cycle stands should either be U-profile or Sheffield style stands. If rack storage is used it should be possible for both wheels and the frame to be secured.

4.7 Car Parking

- ☐ Access into the car parking area should be restricted with a high speed, security rated, shutter, or bifolding gates.
- ☐ The car parking areas should be illuminated to a high standard in accordance with BS 5489.

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.
- ☐ It is essential that good sightlines are maintained throughout the development to allow residents and visitors to actively survey the area for potential threats and planting should be carefully considered particularly near the building entrance.

4.9 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the development in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting should be taken from a variety of sources and levels (i.e. columns, up lighting) to provide a greater level of coverage and avoid shadows/pooling.

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- ☐ Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk ‘til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Doors within the parking area should be illuminated with a dedicated lighting source.

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
22/05/2023	Saghir Hussain	CIS application received
02/09/2025	Saghir Hussain	Revised drawings

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
A1480_(02)AP001	Location Plan & Existing Site Plan	06/04/23	P1
A1480_(02)AP002	Proposed Site Plan and 3D Views	21/04/23	P1
A1480_(02)AP003	Proposed Floor Plans	21/04/23	P7
A1480_(02)AP004	Proposed Elevations	21/04/23	P6
A1480_(02)AP005	Proposed Street View	21/04/23	P4

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
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