



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

PARTIAL CHANGE OF USE OF GROUND FLOOR TO FOOD HALL
DUCIE STREET WAREHOUSE, DUCIE STREET, MANCHESTER

For: Manchester Street Food Ltd.

Version A: 29/08/25

Reference: 2007/0183/CIS/02

designforsecurity

Ducie Street Warehouse, Ducie Street, Manchester

URN: 2007/0183/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

Subject to the following highlighted issues being addressed and the inclusion of appropriate security measures incorporated into the proposed scope of works (see Sections 3.3 & 4 for more details), we would be happy to support an application to the Local Planning Authority for the scheme:

- Control of access through the main entrance/s during busy periods and consideration given to how access through the other external entrances of the building is managed to ensure security personnel cannot be circumnavigated.
- Secure access-controls to prevent unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas and to the existing ground floor/upper floor apart-hotel units and gym.

The overall security of the development will be heavily reliant on the continuous effective management of the building and all of its functions, rather than just the physical measures outlined in the report.

Bradley Hart

GMP Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the south side of Ducie Street in Manchester city centre. It is occupied by a 7 storey Grade II former warehouse building, known as Ducie Street Warehouse. The space to the east of the warehouse building is in use as a public car park (pay by mobile/cashless kiosk), enclosed with high railings/gates and accessed off Ducie Street.


The majority of the ground floor of the warehouse is occupied by a restaurant, as well as a small cinema room and a public gym with its own reception – although it is understood that this use may be coming to an end and a new tenant sought. Part of the ground floor and upper floors of the building are in use as an apart-hotel.

To the rear of the building is a steel storage container and an external seating area across the rear facade, enclosed with timber planters and roofing panels/umbrellas.

There is a small pay & display surface car park to the west of the site, beyond which is Piccadilly Station's Station Approach and a car park serving the building and the station itself. To the south of the site is another large surface car park (accessed off Store Street), which sits at a much lower ground level than that of the site. The site is separated from these car parks by retaining walls and high Palisade fencing.

The site is surrounded by residential apartments and commercial uses, including another apart-hotel on the opposite side of Ducie Street and a hotel just to the north-west, fronting onto Dale Street.

The Rochdale Canal lies just to the north of the site and the Ashton Canal lies just to the east. Canal and riverside routes can often be focal points for crime and disorder issues, as they usually benefit from limited levels of overlooking/surveillance (leaving legitimate users isolated and potentially vulnerable) and can provide the means to gain unauthorised access or cause damage to immediately adjacent buildings/sites unseen.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime Summary



The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st August 2024 to 31st July 2025.

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
20	71	211	1,484	579	173	45	241	27	57

- 2.1.1 In the last 12 months, the volume of crime in the local area has been extremely high – with the most prevalent types of crime being violence, theft, vehicle crime, criminal damage and robbery. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues. The majority of recorded incidents of less serious wounding, theft, robbery and criminal damage are concentrated around Piccadilly Gardens, the Northern Quarter, Canal Street and Piccadilly Station and incidents of vehicle crime are concentrated where there are public car parks around the city centre.
- 2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed food hall development, the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and theft and local vehicle crime.


2.1 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area 2018 - 2019.



- 2.1.1 **Day Range:** In Manchester, the risk of burglary at licensed premises peaks between Monday and Wednesday and is lowest on Friday.
- 2.1.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary is highest in the early hours of the morning. Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the areas/streets where they are typically found are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive the risk of being detected or identified as low.

M/cr Licensed Premises Burglary – Point of Entry




- 2.1.3 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered licensed premises through external doors. Most commonly, doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and hand tools/implements. In a number of cases, glazing in doors and windows has been smashed by offenders to gain unauthorised access. Where the point of entry was legitimate/unknown, this is likely to have been when offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas.


2.2 Theft (Manchester Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.

M/cr Licensed Premises Theft – Day Range




M/cr Licensed Premises Theft – Time Range



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester licensed premises peaks over the weekend. On these days, many premises within the city centre area experience higher levels of attendance than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunity for offenders to commit theft is greater.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft peaks late at night and into the early morning. This reflects the times when licensed premises are at their busiest and therefore the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets, cash and phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items - usually stolen from table tops, from bags hung on chairs/stored under tables or via pickpocketing and distraction methods. Theft of property belonging to staff is also common, with offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain access to unauthorised areas.

2.3 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at restaurants/cafés in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday, Thursday and Sunday.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed.
- 2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered Manchester restaurants/cafés through external doors. Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools/implements and glazing within doors/windows has been smashed to gain entry. Offenders have also posed as legitimate customers before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas when premises are open to the public.

2.4 Theft (Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester restaurants/cafes peaks over the weekend. Many premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants/cafes are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Offenders have also targeted I.T equipment within premises, particularly tablets and laptops, as well as alcohol from storage rooms.


2.5 Non-Domestic Burglary (GM Event Spaces): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against event spaces, recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018 - 2019.



- 2.5.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at event spaces in Greater Manchester peaks on Monday and Sunday, when they are less likely to be in use.
- 2.5.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks in the evening/late at night, when they are likely to be closed or have fewer employees on-site, meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being detected.

GM Event Spaces Burglary – Point of Entry




2.5.3 **Point of Entry:** At Greater Manchester event spaces, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:

- Doors have been targeted most frequently, with offenders forcing them with implements/bodily pressure or targeting them.
- Shutters have also been forced open to gain access to premises or the doors/windows behind them.


2.6 Theft (GM Event Spaces): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against event space, recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018 – 2019.

GM Event Space Theft – Day Range



GM Event Space Theft – Time Range



2.6.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at event spaces in Greater Manchester peaks on Saturday, when venues are often at their busiest.

2.6.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks late at night – with offenders targeting the belongings of customers/patrons and staff (particularly mobile phones and purses/wallets), often by using pick pocketing and distraction techniques.

2.7 General Risk Factors

2.7.1 **Licensed Premises/Restaurants & Cafes:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.7.2 **Event Spaces:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery
- Theft of personal property
- Unauthorised access to premises and back-of-house/staff areas
- Theft of/from parked cars and cycle security
- Criminal damage to premises and vehicles
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Controlled access (to staff/authorised patrons only)
- Theft of personal belongings from changing/dressing rooms
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.8 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.8.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting Manchester licensed premises and restaurant/café premises and Greater Manchester event spaces are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **Greater Manchester Event Spaces, Manchester Licensed Premises & Restaurant/Cafes:** Doors have been forced open with tools/implements and bodily pressure

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting (see Section 4.3) and CCTV (see Section 4.4) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- **Manchester Licensed Premises & Restaurant/Cafes:** Glazing in doors and windows has been smashed to gain unauthorised access

Possible Solution – All new ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.1), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength

of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

- **Manchester Licensed Premises & Restaurant/Cafes:** Offenders posing as legitimate customers, gaining access to staff only areas to steal items

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Sections 4.2).

- **Manchester Licensed Premises & Restaurant/Cafes:** Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with ‘Chelsea Clips’ to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats (see Section 5). The layout of any bars/restaurants/lounges can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. External seating areas should be enclosed to clearly define them as separate from adjacent pedestrian routes.

- **Greater Manchester Event Spaces:** A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (e.g. to LPS 1175 SR 1/2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.

3 Scheme Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is a partial change of use of the ground floor level to form a foodhall, with associated vendor kiosks, bars, customer seating areas and back of house facilities. The existing cinema room and external seating terrace will be retained, as will the ground floor/upper floor apart-hotel and ground floor fitness suite space.
- 3.1.2 The proposed foodhall will be open to the general public and will operate 07:00 to 01:00 Sunday to Thursdays and 07:00 to 02:00 Friday to Saturday. The external seating area will be operational Monday to Sunday 12:00 to 22:00. The venue will serve hot and cold 'Street Food' and drinks, with table service operated by Manchester Street Food Ltd (MSF) staff. There will also be live entertainment, DJ sets and the broadcasting of live sporting events.
- 3.1.3 The proposal will be accessed via the existing main entrance off Ducie Street and will feature 10 no. vendor kiosks arranged around a central communal seating area (with small stage), as well as a large central bar and a smaller secondary bar in an area with another small stage capable of being separated from the rest of the premises by a retractable screen. The premises will also feature a games area (with pool tables, a foosball table and arcade machines) also capable of being separated from the rest of the premises by a retractable screen. The existing cinema room will be secured when not in use and will be staffed when utilised. The premises will cater for a total of 400 covers, with an additional 48 high table covers and 76 covers within the external seating area. The proposal will also include male and female W/Cs and back-of-house areas, including storage area (with 2 no. fridges and 2 no. freezers), a dry store, a cleaners store and a delivery area with external collection point for takeaway drivers on the west elevation of the building.
- 3.1.4 The apart-hotel has its own dedicated reception check in station with a guest key-card system to control access the lifts and the doors to guest apartments at ground and upper floor levels. The existing gym is secured out-of-hours and also has its own staff reception desk, although it is understood that the use may be ceasing and another tenant will be sought.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

- 3.2.1 *The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.*
- 3.2.2 The proposed scheme is located within the ground floor of an existing building, with established security protocols in place to prevent unauthorised access to the ground floor fitness suite and ground floor/upper floor apart-hotel units. Back-of-house/staff only areas should also be capable of being secured to prevent unauthorised access.
- 3.2.3 The proposal will bring additional activity, natural surveillance and overlooking to the area when operational and when events are taking place – both during the day and into the evening/night.
- 3.2.4 The proposed premises will be served by a main access/egress point on Ducie Street, allowing security to be focussed on this location and monitor all arrival to and departure from the venue during busy periods. An Operational Management Plan has been prepared that covers security procedures for the venue (including theft of personal property, exclusion of weapons and illicit drugs and drug seizures).
- 3.2.5 The venue will be required to apply for a Premises Licence, which will include a comprehensive set of conditions designed to regulate any negative impact that the proposed uses of the site may otherwise bring. Adherence to the conditions set out in the Premises Licence and a Dispersal Policy will be essential to prevent/deter crime and disorder incidents and limit disturbance to local residents.
- 3.2.6 The premises will be staffed by a security team, which will have a presence during operational hours, allowing for an immediate response to any incidents experienced.
- 3.2.7 Procedures will be in place for the collection of food order from a dedicated entrance for all 10 no. kitchens, with controls in place to ensure drivers do not enter the building.
- 3.2.8 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the scheme and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

- 3.3.1 *The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.*
- 3.3.2 The main external entrance to the proposed licensed foodhall should be staffed with security personnel at busy periods/into the evening to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising. The entrance itself should be clearly defined and well illuminated, with any potential customer queues well defined and controlled. Any door/security staff engaged at the premises should be provided by an SIA ACS approved security company. Consideration should be given to how access through the other external entrances of the building is managed during busy periods – to ensure security personnel cannot be circumnavigated.
- 3.3.3 Although it is noted that there are no external alterations proposed to the existing building at this stage, it is highly recommended that any new or replacement doorsets, windows and glazing in the future are to Secured by Design (SBD) standards - see Section 4.1 for more information. All internal doors to back-of-house/staff areas should be access controlled to prevent unauthorised access (see Section 4.2). Consideration could be given to a secure Manger's/cash office, with a time delay safe securely fixed to the floor with a floor anchor (also see Section 4.2). With that said, non-cash payment methods are preferred and should be encouraged. All bars/food serveries/kiosks within the premises should be capable of being secured out-of-hours/when not in use (with no cash left within them) – also see Section 4.2 for more information.
- 3.3.4 The operational hours of the venue should not conflict with nearby uses, particular where residential properties/hotel premises are in close proximity or along routes likely to be used by crowds leaving the venue late at night, as this can cause nuisance, conflict and generate police activity. The use of external areas in particular should be closely monitored and controlled in the late evening to avoid disturbance.
- 3.3.5 Although it is appreciated that the existing ground floor and upper floor apart-hotel (as well as the ground floor gym) within the building are not part of the proposal, given the proposed publicly accessible foodhall at ground level, it is essential that non-guest access to these areas continues to be restricted. The following measures should be incorporated/maintained:
- The lifts providing access to the upper floors of the building must be access-controlled by staff/guest key card, ensure that non-guests cannot access bedroom floors.
 - Any doors providing access to the ground floor apartment areas or to stair cores should ideally be security-certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2 and fitted with electromagnetic locks permitted as part of the certification, operated by guest key-card (which should fail safe in the event of a fire alarm), ensuring that non-guests cannot access bedroom areas/floors. Once an emergency escape core is accessed by a member of the public, the only means of egress should be at ground floor level onto the street. Any staff access/egress into or from any access cores should be controlled via fob/swipe card.
 - The entrance to the fitness suite should be staffed at all times when it is open, to allow staff to control and overlook access and egress to/from the facilities. If it is not to be staffed at any point during operational hours, it should be controlled by turnstiles (that cannot be easily by-passed), operated by membership/guest card.
- 3.3.6 It is essential that the physical security measures listed below are incorporated where appropriate into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in staff and customers.

4 Physical Security

4.1 Any External Alterations

It is strongly recommended that any external alterations to be carried out as part of the proposed scope of works, or in the future, should incorporate the following physical security measures:

- ☐ Any new external doorsets (including single-leaf, double-leaf, sliding or bi-folding) should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. Escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ Any new windows should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2/3 where possible. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any new curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be fixed with a secure glazing retention system (e.g. with security glazing tape, with a dedicated security sealant/gasket or a secure mechanical fixing system from the glazing retention tests within the BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 standards).
- ☐ Any new external glazing should incorporate an inner pane with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.2 Internal Security

- ☐ All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work. Internal access doors/frames leading to the back-of-house/staff areas should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and fitted with either auditable access controls (i.e. staff proximity readers or swipe cards). Doors to individual offices, staff rooms or storage areas should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and key operated locks to secure them when unoccupied/when access is not required.
- ☐ Each individual kiosk should be capable of being independently secured with solid-core lockable doorsets and/or shutters when not in use. The secondary bar should be similarly capable of being secured when not in use. The existing cinema room should remain locked when not in use and should be staffed at all times when operational.
- ☐ Ideally, cash-free forms of payment should be adopted. Where this is absolutely unachievable, there should ideally be a secure Manager's/cash office, which should have solid masonry walls (with no adjacent false/suspended ceilings), a doorset certified to BS PAS 24 and a time delay safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover. Any cash office should contain a telephone and a mobile phone with a clear signal. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs. Chute deposit safes (certified to LPS 1183) should be located behind bar or kiosk serveries, or an alternative management practice should be utilised which would reduce the amount of cash held in the tills during busy periods.
- ☐ Considerations should be given to the installations of personal attack buttons for the use of staff in identified locations, such as behind bars/serveries, at the main entrance/s to the premises and in any cash office, to indicate to security staff that assistance is required. The installation of a 'drug' safe may also be appropriate (to safely store confiscated controlled substances). This should have two keys - one held by Police and one by the premises supervisor. Both keys should be required to empty the safe and deposits can be made without a key. A formal protocol between operators and Greater Manchester Police will need to be put in place to manage such a facility.
- ☐ Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Any electric locking system to be used throughout the premises should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Any access control cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times. The use of numeric keypad locks is not advised, as codes can be easily observed or shared and are rarely changed.

- ☐ It is noted that the external doorset to the west of the building will be utilised as a sole collection point for all 10 kitchens. The door itself should be supervised by staff if left open during busy periods and remain secure/locked at all other times (with a system in place for drivers to alert staff when they arrive e.g. via a doorbell or an audio access control system). All delivery drivers must wait outside until their order is ready to collect and it should not be possible for them to enter the back-of-house area.

4.3 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors and the pedestrian route to the delivery driver collection point. Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED, metal halide or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Internal lighting should be controlled from behind bars or in a security/management room, away from public access. Zoned dimmers should be used to increase the control of areas from the bar/management office. An override should be provided, within easy reach of security staff, so that if an incident occurs the lighting level can be raised. This will also help at the end of an event so that staff can see to clear up, and patrons have no doubt that it is closing time and they should make their way out of the premises. The lighting override can also be linked to music controls so that, in the event of an incident, music can be turned off immediately as well as lighting increased.

4.4 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to complement the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *Acceptable Standard* that will allow for *Identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individual's head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *Overview* and *Recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: *the main entrance to the premises, all external elevations/other external doorsets, all external/internal circulation spaces and seating areas and all sales counters/till positions.*
- ☐ The proposed CCTV system should be capable of being monitored by the on-site security team, so there can be an immediate response to any incidents being recorded.

4.5 Other

- ☐ Any external bin/recycling stores should be secure, lockable and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

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- ☐ Any external storage shipping containers should be of robust steel construction, ideally with internal hinges to any openings, recessed lock boxes (preventing access to locks) and door bolts top and bottom to opening leafs. They should be secured with container locks or padlocks to CEN Insurance Grade 4 or Sold Secure rating Silver/Gold. They should never be left insecure when unattended.
 - ☐ It is preferable to have cycle lockers for customers or delivery drivers to use. If not, there should be 'Sheffield' style racks (or similar) provided in a highly visible location. Cyclists should be encouraged to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand rather than just the crossbar and, therefore, a design of cycle stand that enables this method of locking is recommended (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.

5 Internal Layout Guidance

The internal layout of the premises should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

5.1.1 Such premises can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- **Opportunities** - Large numbers of people congregating in such premises generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- **Lack of attention** - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- **Cohesion** – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent such premises means that such a venue would lack ‘community territoriality’ (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- **Customer turnover** – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- **Valuable goods** – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys etc.
- **Stealth** - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

5.1.2 The incidence and severity of disorder issues in large licensed venues and their environs are often linked to physical features of these locations, such as:

- High concentration of people;
- Crowd congestion;
- Services that do not cater for demand, i.e. insufficient serving staff;
- Physical hazards arising from type and placement of furniture/ancillary structures; and
- Insufficient and unclean toilets.


In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

5.1.3 The main entrances to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.

5.1.4 Customers entering/leaving the premises should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.

5.1.5 Consideration should be given to a high/wide service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Any tills should be positioned away from customers’ reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of bars and service counters should be prevented (e.g. with a lockable hatch/door that cannot be easily scaled). The areas directly in front of counters should be clearly defined to provide an easy queuing system to help prevent against queue jumping, which can lead to conflict. Consideration should be given to Internal floor demarcations (such as different coloured floor tiles) to direct people and encourage efficient circulation within the premises (i.e. defining separate queuing/waiting and seating areas). Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.

- 5.1.6 Designing the interior of the premises to improve traffic flow and prevent congestion can reduce the opportunities for accidental bumps that may escalate into fights and limit the opportunities for personal theft during busy periods. The internal layout the premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and visibility. Clear views should also remain from the premises through to the public highway, i.e. large promotional signs and menus should not obstruct views.
- 5.1.7 Any self-service fridges or counters should be in full view of staffed positions and covered by CCTV cameras.
- 5.1.8 It is highly recommended that all both internal and external customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



- 5.1.9 Any easily removable tables and chairs, canopies, heaters or screens/barriers to external seating areas should be stored within the building out-of-hours, in order to prevent damage or mis-use and prevent the space from fostering loitering/gathering, nuisance/anti-social behaviour and mis-use when the premises are closed. Any awnings should also be retracted and stored securely out-of-hours where possible. The success of any external seating area is largely dependent on the effective management of the space, particularly at peak times. Staff should closely monitor customer use/behaviour and should regularly clear away any used crockery/cutlery to prevent theft or mis-use.
- 5.1.10 Adequate signage should be deployed to direct people throughout the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.
- 5.1.11 Public toilets can give rise to crime and disorder issues and the following issues should be considered:
- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
 - Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
 - Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
 - Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
 - Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
 - Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 The success of the proposal will be dependent on effective management of the premises and a zero tolerance policy should be adopted with customers who behave inappropriately. Comprehensive risk assessments should be carried out in advance of all events/uses, in order to identify and address potential security issues.
- 6.1.2 During busy periods, the control of people entering the premises will be essential to maintaining order, both inside and outside the building. Strict monitoring of numbers entering the premises may be required at busy periods, as overcrowding will facilitate criminal activity. Management of any people awaiting entry will also be important, in order to prevent frustrations building up that could create disorder. Sufficient security staff will be needed to supervise entry and maintain a security presence at busy times. They should also ensure the swift and safe dispersal of visitors away from the premises at closing time. All door/security staff engaged at the premises should be provided by an SIA ACS approved security company. Security staff should regularly patrol internal areas and the external seating area to ensure a visible presence to visitors and potential offenders.
- 6.1.3 The setting up, dismantling and operational processes involved in specialised events can provide many opportunities for criminal activity, as an offender can act anonymously within the relatively transient community of temporary workers/delivery personnel, and gain access to otherwise secure areas. It is therefore essential that effective identification and verification procedures are put in place for the whole period of events.
- 6.1.4 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the premises must be prepared and remain in place for its day-to-day running. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. It should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of the premises, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Security procedures for entrance checks, queuing controls, exclusion of intoxicated customers, seizure of illicit substances/items, customer dispersal after closing etc;
 - Any cash management within the premises - including a chute deposit safe behind any bar/till areas, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods;
 - Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
 - Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. fencing, access controls, alarm systems, CCTV cameras etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti and litter (regular litter patrols should be carried out inside and outside the premises, to prevent discarded bottles, glasses, cans etc. from being used to cause criminal damage or used as weapons); and
 - Refuse collection arrangements (which should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods).
- 6.1.5 The opening hours of the premises should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses.
- 6.1.6 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers/TVs, music/DJ equipment, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
11 th August 2025	Turley	Receipt of CIS instruction form
12 th August 2025	Turley	Request for floorspace & location plan
13 th August 2025	Turley	Receipt of floorspace/location & issue of quotation/request
13 th August 2025	Turley	Confirmation of instruction/fee. Additional info to follow
14 th August 2025	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment
15 th August 2025	Turley	Receipt of additional info/plans
18 th August 2025	ESF	Receipt of additional info

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
MSF_006	MSF Location Plan	21/07/25	A
MSF_001	MSF Existing GA Layout	21/07/25	C
MSF_100	MSF Proposed GA Layout	21/07/25	K
-	MSF Operational Management Plan	-	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status	Revisions Made
A		

D Glossary

Physical Security Standards

PAS 24

Enhanced security performance requirements for doorsets and windows in the UK. Doorsets and windows intended to offer a level of security suitable for dwellings and other buildings exposed to comparable risk. It is designed to mimic an attack by an opportunist burglar, using tools which are easy to conceal.

STS 201

Enhanced security to satisfy the requirements for certification of doorsets, equivalent to test standard to PAS 24.

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors, roller shutters, fences and barriers. Products are rated via the term Burglary Resistance (BR) and range from BR1 (lower security rating) to BR6 (higher security rating).

LPS 1175

Physical security for products manufactured for perimeter, façade, internal spaces and entrapment protection. The higher the security rating, the more formidable the security product.

Developed following extensive consultation with stakeholders, the most recent issue sees the previous single digit performance classifications (i.e. Security Ratings 1 to 8) extended to one formed of two elements that illustrate performance in terms of:

- Threat level (first element) – Letter (A to H) corresponding with the tool kit used to evaluate the product's intruder resistance and number of attackers involved.
- Delay (second element) – Numeric value (1, 3, 5, 10, 15 or 20) corresponding with the minimum delay (in minutes) provided by the product when placed in a locked condition.

BS EN 1627

European standard for the burglary resistance of pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters. It defines six resistance classes, from RC1 to RC6, with RC1 being the lowest level of resistance and RC6 the highest. These classes indicate the level of resistance to forced entry, with higher classes requiring more time and specialized tools to breach.

BS EN 356

European standard that specifies the resistance of laminated glazing (i.e. two or more layers of glass bonded together with a plastic interlayer) to manual attacks, such as might occur during forced entry or vandalism. It classifies laminated glass into different resistance levels, ranging from P1A to P8B, with P1A being the lowest and P8B the highest.

Useful Websites

[Design For Security – Designing Out Crime](#)

– apply for Crime Impact Statements or the Secured by Design Award from Greater Manchester Police

[Secured by Design - Secured by Design](#)

– SBD Award Scheme, Design Guides and Member Companies

[ParkMark - Home](#) – Park Mark Safer Parking Award Scheme

[NBS Source](#) – find, select and specify building products (including security-certified products)

[RedBook Live - LPCB Red Book](#) – search for LPS 1175 certified products