



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

NORTH MANCHESTER GENERAL HOSPITAL (ESTATES DEPARTMENT CAR PARK OFF ELLIS DRIVE), DELAUNEYS ROAD, CRUMPSALL, MANCHESTER

TEMPORARY OFFICES (3,074sqm.)

FOR: Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust (MFT) Property & Estates Development

Greater Manchester Police

VERSION B: 23/09/20

designforsecurity

REFERENCE: 2007/1353/CIS/04

North Manchester General Hospital (Estates Department Car Park off Ellis Drive), Delaunays Road, Crumpsall

URN: 2007/1353/CIS/04

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/improvements required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- The physical security spec of the proposed modular building must be robust enough to withstand damage/unauthorised access, particularly given the front/side elevations will be publicly accessible and will benefit from limited levels of activity/surveillance at night.
- Both of the external escape stairs to each side of the building should be enclosed at ground level, so that they are not vulnerable to fostering loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour and the upper floor escape doors are not accessible/vulnerable out-of-hours.
- Secure system to control of access into/around the building.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit


The site is located on the southern edge of the North Manchester General Hospital (NMGH) campus.

It is currently formed by an existing hard standing service/parking area serving the adjacent Estates Department. The site also extends to the east, north and west to provide associated infrastructure/services to the new building and create a safe pedestrian route into the main hospital site and car parks.

The existing site is bounded by Elis Drive to the north, Eyam Road to the east and Magna Drive to the south. It is enclosed with Palisade fencing and vehicular gates to the north (although the vehicular gates are open during the day), Palisade fencing and dense vegetation to the east and timber fencing with trellis above to the south.

To the south of the site are residential semi-detached houses fronting onto Magna Drive/Eyam Road, beyond which is a narrow rear pedestrian route linking to Crumpsall Park to the west. The existing dwellings do not overlook the site itself, due to the high timber fencing along its southern boundary.

To the east of the site (on the opposite side of Eyam Road) is landscaping, an area of hard standing and a sub-station building, beyond which is a surface car park. To the north (on the opposite side of Elis Drive) are hospital buildings and dense vegetation. The surrounding streets provide little in the way of direct overlooking or passive surveillance over the site - particularly at night. The adjacent Estates Department building to the west does overlook the site during the day.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary



Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
34	12	91	269	60	16	22	35	10	5

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is high – particularly less serious wounding and, to a lesser extent, criminal damage, theft and vehicle crime. The NMGH campus accounts for a significant proportion of these incidents (particularly woundings and thefts – the types of crime typically experienced at hospital sites), as well as the streets to the west (around/off Lansdowne Road/Ash Tree Road).
- 2.1.2 Violent offences in the local area have mostly involved assaults and public order offences occurring on the residential estates surrounding the hospital and within the hospital grounds itself. Offences have mostly involved domestic disputes and incidents between known associates, as well as between patients and hospital employees.
- 2.1.3 Incidents of criminal damage have occurred throughout the hospital grounds and on the surrounding residential streets. The glazing of buildings has been smashed with stones/bricks and internal fixtures/equipment within hospital wards has been damaged by patients/visitors.
- 2.1.4 Thefts have mostly take place in the grounds of the hospital, with offenders removing insecure items left on the wards (mostly patient's bags/purses and mobile phones) and items belonging to the hospital itself (particularly I.T. equipment).
- 2.1.5 As this CIS report relates to a proposed office development, the more detailed analysis below will focus on use-specific burglary and theft.


2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester is greatest on Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary at Manchester office premises rises into the evening/late at night. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.

Manchester Office Burglary – Point of Entry




- 2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** The majority of burglaries at offices in Manchester have been committed through doors. Many of the burglaries against office buildings do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing tools with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks. Offenders have also smashed glazed panels in doors and windows to gain entry. A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' and 'legitimate' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.


2.3 Theft (Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within / against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.

Manchester Office Theft – Day Range



Manchester Office Theft – Time Range



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest on Monday and Tuesday and is generally lower over the weekend (when many are shut).
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.

2.4 General Risk Factors

2.4.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.5 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.5.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting Manchester office premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure to gain entry

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries (see Section 4.5), lighting (see Section 4.6) and CCTV (see Section 4.7) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- Offenders posing as legitimate customers/visitors to gain access and steal items of personal property

Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that callers to office buildings are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access into them (see Section 4.1). All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.

- Glazing in doors and windows has been smashed to gain access

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a temporary modular office building and associated pedestrian route improvements, to facilitate the future redevelopment to the wider hospital site.
- 3.1.2 Initially, the modular building will be 4 storeys in height to accommodate the decant of staff from the north of the NMGH site. The building is expected to be in use for approximately 5 years.
- 3.1.3 The building will front towards Eyam Road (accessed via a pedestrian route taken off Ellis Drive), with enclosed external plant and bin store areas and a cycle store to the south side of the building and external fire escape stairs to the north and south sides of the building. The existing facilities management/bin collection vehicular route to the rear of the building will be retained and gated at the north-wester corner of the proposed building. The building itself will have a reception area adjacent to the main entrance (it is yet to be determined whether access to the building will be controlled by reception staff or an access control system only) and each floor will feature a central access core, W/Cs and staff facilities/stores and open plan office floorplates, with some individual meeting rooms. The rear entrances providing access to the bin store, external plant and internal plant area will only be accessible to building management staff.
- 3.1.4 To the north of the building, a dedicated pedestrian route from the site into the wider NMGH site will be created (as well as associated utilities and drainage works).

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The site lies within the existing NMGH complex, which benefits from existing security protocols.
- 3.2.2 The proposed development will bring additional activity, overlooking and surveillance to a part of the hospital site that currently benefits from limited levels.
- 3.2.3 The footprint and external facades of the building are simple, with no deep recesses or hidden doors/windows (where they would be vulnerable to attack unseen).
- 3.2.4 The building will have a staffed reception desk within the entrance lobby to manage/control access and to provide formal surveillance over all access to/egress from the building, as well as some of the surrounding public realm.
- 3.2.5 The proposed external entrance to the building will be in a prominent position, where it can be clearly seen from surroundings streets.
- 3.2.6 The rear of the building and the existing service road will be enclosed by existing and new fencelines/gates to deter unauthorised access - particularly at night when activity and surveillance levels in the area are likely to be lower.
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures and design features carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 As proposed, the front, north side and part of the south side elevations of the modular building will be publicly accessible, leaving the fabric of the building itself and the accessible doors, windows and glazing vulnerable to damage and attack - particularly at night, when activity/surveillance levels are likely to be lower. The security specification of the walls, doors, windows and glazing of the modular structure must be robust enough to withstand damage/unauthorised access (see Sections 4.1, 4.2 &

4.3) and consideration should be given to securing all accessible glazed doors/windows with shutters out-of-hours (also see Section 4.2).

- 3.3.2 The proposed external escape stairs at either end of the building are potentially vulnerable to fostering loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour if left open/accessible to all (particularly at night), as well as leaving upper floor escape doors accessible and vulnerable to attack. It is highly recommended that they are both enclosed at ground level, with a gate for emergency egress purposes only (see Section 4.5). New fencelines/gates should also be incorporated to enclose the bin store, external plant area and the service road/rear of the building (also see Section 4.5).
- 3.3.3 The control of access into and around the building is paramount to the security of the scheme. Ideally, the reception desk within the entrance lobby should be staffed at all times when the offices are operational, allowing staff to have full surveillance of everyone entering/leaving the building. All visitors should report to reception for vetting by staff before gaining access to the rest of the offices. The internal entrance doors off the lobby area should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff, to prevent unauthorised access if/when required. If the reception area is not to be permanently staffed, the main external entrance must be secured and operated by staff key-card and remotely via an access control system for visitor access (see Section 4.1 for more information). All individual office areas/rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied.
- 3.3.4 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in staff and any visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to be Secured by Design (SBD) compliant.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All external doors (including those at ground level and those at upper floor level onto external escape stairs) should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. Any escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery, with signage to deter casual use.
- ☐ If the reception area is to be staffed during operational hours, the internal doors into and out of the reception lobby should be self-closing/locking and access controlled, in order to prevent access to all but staff and authorised visitors. The doors should be operated by staff key-card or remotely via reception staff, ensuring that any visitors are greeted and vetted before being allowed access to the rest of the building.
- ☐ If the reception is not to be staffed during operational hours, the external entrance doors should be secured with an electronic multi-point locking mechanism (permitted under the security certification of the product) controlled by staff key-card. For visitor access, there should be a video access control system linked to an admin office, each individual office suite or to a security office - allowing staff to vet visitors before allowing them access (either remotely or by coming to the entrance themselves to meet and escort them).
- ☐ Internal doors onto office areas/floors and to any individual offices/meetings rooms, stores or plant areas should be solid-core with 3 hinges and a deadlock or similar, so that they can be secured when unoccupied.
- ☐ Staff key-fobs/cards should be capable of being quickly activated or disabled when required, to ensure they are not mis-used. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times. Key-coded locks are not recommended, as the codes can be easily observed or shared and are rarely changed.

4.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ All windows should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All ground floor and other easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should be lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to shutters to secure all accessible glazing out-of-hours. Any shutters should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required), which should be installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Ideally, external shutters should have shutter boxes and guides built into the fabric of the modular building, where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage or being forced open.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric


- ☐ All ground floor/accessible glazing must incorporate an internal pane of laminated glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining external pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ The construction of the walls and any accessible areas of roof to the modular building should also be carefully considered, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to criminal intrusion. Expanded metal or welded-mesh should ideally be incorporated between the skins of double-skinned walls/roof coverings or within the roof space.

4.4 Alarm

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover the proposed building, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors to accessible rooms with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The FM access road to the rear of the building (and the external plant area) should be enclosed with 2100-2400mm high railings or rigid-panel, welded-wire mesh fencing and gates. Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts (preventing tampering/removal) and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as adjacent low walls, lighting columns, trees etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through. Railings or welded-wire mesh fencing are preferable to Palisade fencing, which can be vulnerable to damage/penetration. If new Palisade fencing must be used, it should be of rivertless construction, ideally with the bottom of the pales buried in concrete.



- ☐ The external refuse store should be enclosed with 1800-2100mm high walls, railings/weld-mesh or fire-resistant close-boarded timber fencing and a self-closing and self-locking gates, which cannot be left unlocked when shut. A strategy should be defined to ensure that waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- ☐ Each of the external escape stairs to the north and south sides of the building should be enclosed/secured at ground level by high pressure laminate panels (as is currently proposed to the south of the building only), railings or welded-wire mesh fencing to a height of 2100-2400mm, with a gate for emergency egress purposes only (fitted with a panic mechanism that cannot be reached/operated from the external face), in order to prevent unauthorised access.
- ☐ It is highly recommended that the publicly accessible front and north side elevations of the building are defined/protected by low-level railings, steel knee-rails or bollards, in order to prevent unauthorised vehicles from getting close to the building out-of-hours.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all new pedestrian routes, in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ External lighting must also be provided to all external doors, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments or up to upper floor windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an [acceptable standard](#) that will allow for [identification](#) of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

[Acceptable Standard](#) - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

[Identification](#) – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are [overview](#) and [recognition](#), which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [all external doors/building facades](#), [the main entrance lobby](#) & [the cycle store](#).

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ Any existing or new vegetation in front of the proposed building should not exceed 1000mm in height and any tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow unimpeded views of and from the building and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people, premises and parked vehicles (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

4.9 Other

- ☐ The proposed cycle store should ideally be well-overlooked from within the building (or covered by CCTV monitored at reception) and should include 'Sheffield' style racks, or similar, that allow staff to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the site must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the building. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.2 An operating/maintenance plan should also be prepared, focussing on issues such as:
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. any boundary treatments, lighting, access controls, CCTV cameras, alarm system etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees.
- 5.1.3 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers/TVs, music equipment, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 5.1.4 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods. Servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
9 th August 2020	Sheppard Robson	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
12 th August 2020	Sheppard Robson	Confirmation of instruction/fee & receipt of additional information
19 th August 2020	Sheppard Robson	Receipt of D&A Statement
2 nd September 2020	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment
16 th September 2020	Sheppard Robson	Version A of CISA report issued to Architect
23 rd September 2020	Sheppard Robson	Receipt of updated D&A Statement & request to make amendments to report

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
6512-SK-108	Initial Site Sketch including site constraints	24/07/20	-
6512-SRA-E1-XX-DR-A-	Site Location Plan	04/08/20	P02
6512-SRA-E1-XX-DR-A-	Site Plan Existing	05/08/20	P01
6512-SRA-E1-XX-DR-A-	Site Plan Proposed	06/08/20	P01
6512-SRA-E1-00-DR-A-20200	Ground Floor Plan	03/08/20	P01
6512-SRA-E1-ZZ-DR-A-	Typical Upper Floor Plan	03/08/20	P01
6512-SRA-E1-XX-DR-A-	East Elevation (Phase 1 Decant)	05/08/20	P01
6512-SRA-E1-XX-DR-A-	East Elevation (Phase 2 Decant)	05/08/20	P01
6512-SRA-E1-XX-DR-A-90201	Proposed Pedestrian Route Improvement Works	05/08/20	P02
-	Existing & Proposed Hard Landscaping/Boundary Treatment mark up	-	-
6512-SRA-E1-XX-RP-A-0002	Design and Access Statement (SUPERSEDED)	Aug 2020	P01-S2
6512-SRA-E1-XX-RP-A-0002	Design and Access Statement	Aug 2020	P02-S2

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Phased installation removed & access control strategy amended	23/09/20

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstdesign.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk