

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Crime Impact Statement

56 Dale Street, Manchester

28 Apartments

For Stephenson:ISA STUDIO Ltd

Version B: 28.11.13

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Not Protectively Marked

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Crime Impact Statement

56 Dale Street, Manchester

28 Apartments

2013/0264/CIS/01

For Stephenson:ISA STUDIO Ltd
Version B: **28.11.13**

Executive Summary

☐ **Significant material changes are advised**

☐ **Proposal is satisfactory in principle but minor changes are advised**

☒ **Proposal is generally acceptable subject to the advice in this report**

The proposed development will increase activity, surveillance and animation to this part of the Northern Quarter. The proposed use seems appropriate, and it will help to contribute to the development of a vibrant, mixed use area as well as bringing a redundant building back into use, which can help to reduce anti-social and criminal behaviour in its immediate environs.

There are security issues/omissions in the design of the scheme that need to be addressed, in order to reduce the risk of criminal activity affecting this development. The main issues are: the creation of a single, secure, communal entrance; the use of access controls to manage movement into the building, ensuring that the quality of individual apartment doors is appropriate, and providing additional lighting to the Mangle Street elevation.

If these concerns can be addressed, as well as the other physical security measures set out in sections 4.3 and 5 of this report, I would be happy to support the development.



Adrian Murphy *MRTPI*

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Contents

1 Visual Audit 4
2 Crime Statistics & Analysis 6
2.1 Crime Count and Rate Comparison
2.2 Burglary Dwelling: Risk Analysis
2.3 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis
2.4 Wounding: Risk Analysis
2.5 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown
2.6 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)
2.7 Risk Factors
3 Design Considerations 10
○ Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London
○ Secured by Design (SBD)
4 Design & Layout Appraisal 10
4.1 The Proposal
4.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal
4.3 Changes and Amendments Needed
5 Physical Security 11
5.1 Doors
5.2 Windows
5.3 Glazing
5.4 Intruder Alarm
5.5 Access Control
5.6 Lighting
5.7 Communal Areas
5.8 Other
6 Construction 12

Appendix

A Contact register 13
B Associated Documents 13
C CIS Version History 13
D Glossary 14

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1 Visual Audit

1.1.1 The plan and photographs below show the site (edged in red), the surrounding commercial and residential buildings, areas of surface car parking to the west, development sites (yellow), and local highway network.



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1.1.2 This rectangular shaped site is occupied by 56 Dale Street, a four storey red brick building with a stone façade, dating from the early 20th century. Eleska House (Grade II listed) and 3 China Lane are attached to No. 56, all sharing a central courtyard. The site lies within the boundary of the Stevenson Square Conservation area.

1.1.3 The building faces Dale Street, whilst the only other exposed elevation faces Mangle Street. Back Piccadilly lies to the west beyond a secure parking compound. The main entrance to the building is located on Dale Street. A shuttered entrance to the basement is located at the corner of Dale Street and Mangle Street. The lower ground floor windows on the Dale Street and Mangle Street elevations are protected with ironwork. On the Mangle Street elevation, bars have been interfered with in order to gain unlawful entry. The higher ground floor windows are elevated above street level and remain unprotected. Again, some of the ground floor windows on Mangle Street have been broken; a reflection of the seclusion and lack of surveillance of that elevation.

1.1.4 There is a pair of very large loading dock doors on the Mangle Street elevation as well as a shutter entrance door. A wrought iron external fire escape hangs above street level, heavily protected with razor wire.

1.1.5 Dale Street is a busy thoroughfare connecting Piccadilly through the Northern Quarter to the Arndale Shopping Centre. Mangle Street and Back Piccadilly are essentially back streets/service roads, with little traffic - pedestrian or vehicular. Typically, the elevations of buildings that face these back streets have been secured with grilles, shutters and bars, a reflection of the lack of activity and surveillance, and their vulnerability to breaking and entering, or criminal damage.

1.1.6 There are several hotels in the vicinity of this development along with retail, offices and wholesale businesses. Residential uses in this locality tend to be concentrated further to the east around the canal basin, although there are two apartment conversions in nearby buildings at Piccadilly Lofts, on Dale Street, and at The Vaults, on Tariff Street.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st April 2012 and 31st March 2013.

2.1 Crime Count and Rate Comparison

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
<20	198	301	968	1247	189	40	271	37	421

Figure 2: Comparison of Burglary Dwelling Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 3: Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 4: Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 5: Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



2.1.1 The volume of crime in this area is high, due to its location within the City Centre. The volume of violent crimes, theft, robbery and vehicle crime are exceptionally high, and the rate of burglary at commercial premises is much greater than is experienced across Manchester as a whole. Given the number of businesses in the area and their central location, this is not unexpected, nevertheless a large of properties lack decent security.

2.1.2 The number of domestic burglaries per dwelling is **lower** than in both the City of Manchester and Greater Manchester.

2.1.3 The number of woundings, vehicle crimes and incidents of criminal damage per dwelling and are **higher** than in both the City of Manchester and Greater Manchester.

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2.2 Burglary Dwelling: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 6: Burglary – Day Range



Figure 7: Burglary – Time Range



Figure 8: Burglary – Point of Entry



2.2.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of burglary does not vary greatly with the exception of Saturday when the risk is significantly higher than other days during the week.

2.2.2 Time Range: The risk of burglary in the area examined is concentrated in the evening. Offenders frequently target residential properties in the evening when it is dark and offenders perceive the risk of being caught as low. The risk of burglary is highest on Saturday evening and it is likely that properties are targeted when residents go out or are away.

2.2.3 Point of Entry: The majority of residential burglaries in the local area have been committed through front doors and rear windows. The majority of burglaries have been committed at flats and offenders have often gained access to communal areas by deception through insecure communal entrances – allowing front doors of flats to be forced open with tools or bodily pressure. Ground floor rear windows of flats have repeatedly been prised open and this has been particularly common when rear windows are easily accessible or in the public domain.

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2.3 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 7: Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Figure 8: Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.3.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of vehicle crime is highest on Wednesday.

2.3.2 Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime in the local area is greatest in the evening, peaking between 7pm and 9pm. It is likely that offenders target vehicles at this time when it is dark and vehicles parked on remote/isolated side streets and car parks are vulnerable to attack undetected.

2.4 Wounding: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to instances of wounding committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 9: Wounding – Day Range



Figure 10: Wounding – Time Range



2.4.1 Day Range: Violent crime peaks at the weekend. Between Friday and Sunday, a greater number of people attend city centre licensed premises, often drinking for longer periods and consuming more alcohol – leading to conflicts.

2.4.2 Time Range: The risk of violent crime increases in the late evening and into the early hours of the morning, peaking between 1am and 2am. At these times, those attending licenses premises are more likely to be intoxicated and violent disorder is more likely to breakout in licensed premises, on streets, at taxi ranks/bus stops/train stations and at takeaways.

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2.5 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown

The data below relates to criminal damage and robbery offences committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 11: Criminal Damage Targets



Figure 12: Robbery Targets



2.5.1 Criminal Damage Targets: The makeup of the criminal damage in this area shows that properties are almost twice as likely to be targeted as vehicles. Common incidents of criminal damage include graffiti, windows being smashed (both of properties and vehicles) and damage to vehicle bodywork.

2.5.2 Robbery Targets: Robbery against the person is much more prevalent than against businesses in this area. The risk of personal robbery increases when lone victims take quieter, more secluded routes through the area in the evening/at night.

2.6 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Front doors of flats have been forced open after offenders have gained access to insecure communal areas

Solution — *A robust access control system should be in place to allow vetting of visitors before allowing them access to the building. The main entrance should be located in a highly visible position and be well lit to deter offenders from trying to break-in.*

Entrance doors to individual flats should be certified to BS PAS 24. In the case that offenders gain access to the building this will reduce the vulnerability of the flat entrance to attack.

2.6.2 Rear windows of ground floor flats have been prised open

Solution — *Use BS7950 windows, which include laminate glazing. Include opening restrictors limiting opening to 100mm.Prevent unauthorised access to rear of the building by use of appropriate fencing and lockable gates.*

2.7 Risk Factors

2.7.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Antisocial behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space

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- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

3 Design Considerations

3.1.1 Design for Security recommends that designers and developers refer to:

○ Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London

Seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention are detailed within Chapter 2 of this ODPM publication. Annex 3 also contains many useful references. You can download 'Safer Places' at www.designforsecurity.org

○ Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

4 Design & Layout Appraisal

4.1 The Proposal

4.1.1 The development comprises: 7no. one bedroom apartments, 16no. two bedroom apartments and 5no. three bedroom apartments, totalling 28 apartments with apartments located on all floors from the lower ground to the top floor.

4.1.2 Car parking spaces shall be made available to residents for annual rental in a neighbouring car park

4.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

4.2.1 The use of the building will result in an increase in footfall to the area and help to animate Dale Street and Mangle Street, providing additional natural surveillance, which can help promote a greater sense of safety on the street.

4.2.2 The footprint of the building is regular and free of recesses that could provide shelter, impede surveillance or attract antisocial behaviour.

4.2.3 The principal entrance to the building is located in a prominent position and is readily apparent from the street. Approaches to the front of the building for pedestrians are along routes that have good sightlines.

4.2.4 Vulnerable lower ground windows are already protected with ornate metalwork, although some repair is needed.

4.2.5 An illuminated entrance, with appropriate signage, will clearly indicate the communal entrance to the development,

4.2.6 All but the lower ground floor apartments are all located above the street level (the ground floor being elevated above street level), meaning that residents' possessions cannot easily be seen from outside, reducing the risk of the building being targeted by opportunists who may otherwise see valuables on show. Of course, this does not apply to the lower ground floor apartments. Lower ground floor windows are protected by ironwork but, in similar developments elsewhere in the city centre, residents tend to draw curtains across window openings to retain privacy at the expense of natural light permeating the space. This is not ideal from a living perspective but does enhance security for the reason stated previously. I would recommend a 'frosted' film or internally fitted louvered window shutters be used on lower ground floor windows to retain privacy without a total absence of natural light penetration.

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4.2.7 Most apartments will overlook the public realm around the block which will help to improve natural surveillance around the building.

4.2.8 A secure cycle and bin stores are provided in the loading dock on the Mangle Street elevation.

4.3 Changes and Amendments Needed

4.3.1 The communal entrance to the building, as well the doors leading to the bin/bike storage area on Mangle Street, must be security-certified to an appropriate standard. The communal entrance should, ideally, be single-leaf, secured with an electrically operated multi-point lock and operated via an audio-video access control system. Doors into the bin/bike store area from within the building should be fitted with an electronic lock activated by a fob (in and out).

4.3.2 The development should take into account the security of residents approaching and leaving the building, particularly at quiet times and late at night. Improved street lighting to Mangle Street and Back Piccadilly would be helpful.

4.3.3 Arrangements for the delivery of post should be agreed prior to the occupation of the building. For security reasons, a 'through the wall' system on the Dale Street entrance is preferred.

4.3.4 See 4.2.6 above regarding the use of film or shuttering on lower ground floor windows.

5 Physical Security

The following standards and features will be required for this development to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.

5.1 Doors

5.1.1 If replaced, the external, communal access door must be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. If retained the existing door must have an electrically operated, multi-point lock, operated via an audio-video access control system. Doors connecting the main building to the bin/cycle store must be to the same PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2 standard, fitted with an electronic lock activated by a fob. There must be no push button opening control. All communal entrance points should have door closers fitted. Such additions must form part of the 'tested' (BS PAS 24, etc) door.

5.1.2 Individual apartment entrance doors must be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, but are provided with door viewers instead. Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended but not generally essential.

5.1.3 Upper floor doors (and windows) accessible from the external fire escape (Mangle Street elevation) should be fitted with at least two locking points and the glazing replaced with at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356

5.1.4 The pedestrian gate from Mangle Street into the bin/cycle store should be fitted with an electronic lock activated by a fob and be self closing/self locking.

5.1.5 Letterboxes, if provided within any door(s), must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

5.2 Windows

5.2.1 If altered, the ground floor opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm. The frames should, if possible meet the BS7950 or PAS 24:2012 standard. If existing windows are retained, window locks and opening restrictors should be added, and laminate glazing fitted (see 5.3.1 below).

5.3 Glazing

5.3.1 Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

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5.4 Intruder Alarm

5.4.1 Ideally, an alarm should be installed to each apartment, which should comply with BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems, or BS 6799 for wireless systems. It should be linked to contacts on all external doors of each apartment and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

5.4.2 If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

5.5 Access Control

5.5.1 A remote access control system should be installed to the communal entrance door of the building, with an audio-visual link to each apartment, so that residents can vet visitors prior to allowing entry.

5.6 Lighting

5.6.1 External lighting must be provided to all external doors/loading dock doors of the building, additional street lighting is also recommended, particularly on Mangle Street. Lighting should be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.

5.6.2 Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

5.6.3 Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Wall mounted lighting is preferred.

5.7 Communal Areas

5.7.1 Communal areas not under the direct ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

5.8 Other

5.8.1 Postal arrangements should be clarified. External boxes are preferred.

5.8.2 Meter cupboards should be located in an easily accessible area, ideally within an external, secure housing.

5.8.3 A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
02.04.13	Aftab Faheem	Request for crime impact statement
12.04.13		Site visit
14.04.13	Aftab Faheem, Amar Okhai	Report issued
28.10.13	Roger Stephenson	Request for redrafting the report
22.11.13	Eleanor Swire	Revised plans received
29.11.13	Eleanor Swire	Revised report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

DWG No.	DWG Title	Date	Rev
4302-01	SITE LOCATION PLAN		
4302-02	EXISTING GROUND FLOOR PLAN	JAN '13	
4302-03	EXISTING FIRST FLOOR PLAN	JAN '13	
4302-04	EXISTING SECON FLOOR PLAN	JAN '13	
4302-05	EXISTING THIRD FLOOR PLAN	JAN '13	
4302-06	EXISTING SECTIONS	JAN '13	
4302-07	PROPOSED GROUND FLOOR PLAN		
4302-08	PROPOSED FIRST FLOOR PLAN		
4302-09	PROPOSED SECOND FLOOR PLAN	JAN '13	
4302-09	PROPOSED SECOND FLOOR PLAN	JAN '13	A
4302-10	PROPOSED THIRD FLOOR PLAN	JAN '13	
4302-10	PROPOSED third FLOOR PLAN	JAN '13	A
	Basement layout		
7310-AL(05)0010	Basement		
7310-AL(05)0011	Lower ground floor		
7310-AL(05)0012	Ground floor		
7310-AL(05)0013	First floor		
7310-AL(05)0014	Second floor		
7310-AL(05)0015	Third floor		
7310-AL(05)0016	Third floor mezzanine		
7310-AL(05)0050	Dale Street elevations		
7310-AL(05)0051	Mangle Street elevations		
	Design & Access Statement		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status			Revisions Made
A	☐	☐	☒	
B	☐	☐	☒	Revisions to reflect change in numbers of apartments and use of lower ground floor

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 3621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Key Egress.

The minimum standard for locks on external or entrance doors to be acceptable to the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the police service. The effectiveness of the lock also depends on the quality of the door, frame and other hardware which is not tested by this standard and which may fail before the lock.

BS 8621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Keyless Egress.

Same as above, but egress is possible without a key (by use of thumb turn or latch lever.

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2007

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at *www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted*)

CRA

Crime Reduction Advisor. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

NPT

Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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