

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Crime Impact Statement

26a Lever Street, Stevenson Square

Licensed Bar (260sqm)

For St Joseph Ltd

Version A: 25.09.13

www.designforsecurity.org
info@designforsecurity.org
0161 856 5912

Not Protectively Marked

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

Crime Impact Statement

26a Lever Street, Stevenson Square

Licensed Bar (260sqm)

2013/0758/CIS/01

For St Joseph Ltd

Version A: 25.09.13

Executive Summary

☐ **Significant material changes are advised**

☐ **Proposal is satisfactory in principle but minor changes are advised**

☒ **Proposal is generally acceptable subject to the advice in this report**

The premises in an area where crime and disorder are very significant issues, and whilst, to a degree, that is to be expected in a very busy city centre the presence of large numbers of licensed premises is a major factor affecting the crime levels. Increasing the density of licensed premises is likely to increase the potential for crime and disorder, and put further strain on the City Centre Police Team.

However, given the modest size of the premises, the proximity to taxi ranks and other forms of public transport, I am happy to support the proposal.

Design for Security's support is subject to the following:

- the developer duly considers all measures highlighted in this report and makes reasonable efforts to incorporate these measures into the proposed works necessary to complete the development;
- produces an operations plan, which is submitted to the Police and the Local Authority and its contents agreed and the plan adhered to for the life of the development;
- limits any licence application opening hours to be consistent with the availability of public transport;
- secure rooms are created to safely house cash, stock and staff belongings; and
- secure waste storage is provided on site, not in the street or in such a place that impedes escape routes.



Adrian Murphy *MRTPI*Consultant
e: adrian.murphy@designforsecurity.org

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

Contents

1 Visual Audit 4
2 Crime Statistics & Analysis 6
2.1 Crime Count
2.2 Theft (Licensed Premises): Risk Analysis
2.3 Burglary Other (Licensed Premises): Risk Analysis
2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis
2.5 Wounding: Risk Analysis
2.6 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown
2.7 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)
3 Risk Factors 10
4 Design Considerations 10
5 Design & Layout Appraisal 10
5.1 The Proposal
5.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal
5.3 Recommended Design Features to Improve Security
6 Physical Security 12
6.1 Doors
6.2 Windows and Shutters
6.3 Glazing
6.4 Intruder Alarm
6.5 CCTV
6.6 Lighting
6.7 Staffing
6.8 Cash storage
6.9 Other

Appendix

A Contact register 14
B Associated Documents 14
C CIS Version History 14
D Glossary 15

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

1 Visual Audit

1.1.1 The plan below shows the premises (in red), the surrounding buildings (peach), areas of surface car parking (olive), development sites (yellow), pockets of open space (green), the canal network to the east, Piccadilly Gardens to the south, and the local highway layout.



1



2



3



4



5



6



7



8



9



Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

1.1.2 26 Lever Street/8 Stevenson Square is a multiple use, basement and four storey redbrick building, located in the heart of the Northern Quarter close within the boundary of the Stevenson Square Conservation Area.

1.1.3 Number 26a Lever Street is situated at the corner of Lever Street and Stevenson Square, on the north side of the Square. The premises, the subject of this planning application, are located in the basement of the building, with its only external entrance at the corner of Lever Street and Stevenson Square. The basement is currently occupied by a fashion wholesale business but ground and upper floors of the building is vacant.

1.1.4 The premises are entered via a double door, protected by a roller shutter when the premises are closed, down a flight of stone steps to a set of doors at basement level. The basement windows on both street facing elevations are protected with bars, grilles, or in one instance solid panels carrying adverts. Such crude security measures suggest that premises with the building have been targeted in the past by criminals.

1.1.5 The central part of the Northern Quarter accommodates a wide variety of land uses including an increasing number of bars and restaurants, there are two other bars close by, Noho to the west and Hula on the northern side of the Square.

1.1.6 There are a number of apartment buildings in the locality, but none obviously very close to these premises.

1.1.7 Footfall in the area is steady both during the day and at night-time, relative to particularly high footfall streets of Piccadilly. However, the area is emerging in importance as a business and entertainment district and knowledge of the area suggests that footfall would appear to be on the increase. Footfall is important in providing surveillance of the street as a means to prevent crimes such as car crime, cycle theft and personal robbery.

1.1.8 There are large surface and multi storey car parks in the area as well as metered on-street parking. In terms of public transport, there is a bus stop on Stevenson Square immediately outside of the premises, but the principal place to catch buses, and trams, is at Piccadilly Gardens and Shudehill, whilst there are also trains and trams at Piccadilly Station. There are taxi ranks at Piccadilly Gardens, Shudehill and Piccadilly Station.

1.1.9 A single, public CCTV camera, located on a building on the north side of the Stevenson Square, appears capable of monitoring activities both on the Square and on Lever Street.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st September 2012 and 31st August 2013.

2.1 Crime Count

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
21	197	198	499	1017	174	29	191	22	349

2.1.1 The volume of crime in this area is high due to its location within the city centre. The volumes of violent crimes, theft, robbery, vehicle crime and bicycle theft are exceptionally high, and the rate of burglary at commercial premises is much greater than experienced in suburban Manchester.

2.2 Theft (Licensed Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts within/against licensed premises/restaurants, recorded in the Manchester council area.

Figure 9: Misc Theft – Day Range



Figure 10: Misc Theft – Time Range



2.2.1 Day Range: The risk of theft peaks on the days of the weekend, between Friday and Saturday. On these days, restaurants, nightclubs, bars and public houses in the city centre area experience higher levels of attendance than during the week. Licensed premises are usually open for longer at the weekend and the opportunity for offenders to commit theft is much greater.

2.2.2 Time Range: The risk increases late in the night into the early morning. This is when bars and nightclubs area busiest and the opportunities for theft arise at a greater frequency. The most frequently stolen items are customer belongings, such as handbags, purses, wallets and mobile phones.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2.3 Burglary Other (Licensed Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against licensed premises/restaurants, recorded in the Manchester council area.

Figure 6: Burglary Other – Day Range



Figure 7: Burglary Other – Time Range



Figure 8: Burglary Other – Point of Entry



2.3.1 Day Range: In Manchester, the risk of burglary at licensed premises is greatest on between Saturday and Tuesday; the risk is significantly lower on other days.

2.3.2 Time Range: The risk is highest early in the afternoon and in the early hours of the morning. Licensed premises are likely to be targeted at these times, as they are unlikely to be open or are open with reduced numbers of staff.

2.3.3 Point of Entry: The majority of burglaries have been committed through doors. Most commonly, rear doors have often been forced open with bodily pressure and hand tools; in a number of cases glazing in rear doors and rear windows has been smashed by offenders.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 7: Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Figure 8: Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.4.1 Day Range: The risk of vehicle crime is highest between Wednesday and Friday – peaking on Wednesday.

2.4.2 Time Range: The risk is greatest in the evening – peaking at 8pm.

2.5 Wounding: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to instances of wounding committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 9: Wounding – Day Range



Figure 10: Wounding – Time Range



2.5.1 Day Range: Violent crime peaks at the weekend. Between Friday and Sunday, a greater number of people attend City Centre licensed premises, often staying for longer, consuming more alcohol.

2.5.2 Time Range: The risk of violent crime increases in the late evening and into the early hours of the morning, peaking between 1am and 4am. At these times, those attending licenses premises are more likely to be intoxicated with violent disorder is most likely to breakout within and outside licensed premises, and at taxi ranks and takeaways.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2.6 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown

The data below relates to criminal damage and robbery offences committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 11: Criminal Damage Targets



Figure 12: Robbery Targets



2.6.1 Criminal Damage Targets: Property is almost twice as likely to be targeted as vehicles in reported crimes of criminal damage within the City Centre. Common incidents of criminal damage include graffiti, windows being smashed (both on vehicles and buildings), and damage to vehicle bodywork.

2.6.2 Robbery Targets: Robbery against the person is much more prevalent than against businesses in the city Centre. Victims are most often targeted at night on the quieter streets of the City or on canal towpaths.

2.7 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.7.1 Burglary where rear doors have been forced open to gain entry.

In order to prevent such a method of entry, external doors should be certified to a recognised security standard e.g. PAS 24 or LPS 1175. Access should be restricted to any hidden elevations of the building, where any doors could be attacked unseen from the street. Illuminating rear elevations/rear doors with low intensity dawn til dusk lighting can also help put off an offender who is likely to feel more conspicuous if the area is lit and therefore less inclined to offend if there is an increased chance of being witnessed/caught in the act.

In this development there are no rear external rear doors, however, doors connecting the premises to the internal escape route should be certified as though it were an external door.

2.7.2 Theft of customer property from/under tables and chairs.

A particular issue in bars in the Northern Quarter is the theft of personal effects; handbag and mobile phone theft is a particular issue. Consideration should be given to fixing 'Chelsea Clips' (see image), Grippa$_{TM}$ clips, or simple hooks to the underside of tables to allow customers to secure bags or jackets to the table while keeping it in view; a more secure option than, for example, table tops or back of chairs, where belongings can be liable to theft.



The internal layout of the premises can also help deter theft by promoting surveillance and creating an uncluttered, environment, avoiding pinch points or areas of concealment. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.

2.7.3 Burglary where rear windows have been smashed to gain entry.

Windows should be particularly secure. In particularly secluded locations, windows should be protected with discreet security shutters, which meet the LPS 1175 standard, in more visible locations laminate glazing and windows that meet an approved security standard are most appropriate. The existing bars

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

and grilles on the basement lights, whilst not ideal visually, do provide a good level of security to the premises.

2.7.4 Violent disorder/conflict between intoxicated customers

Whilst I appreciate that the operator of the premises cannot be held responsible for the behaviour of patrons once they leave the establishment, they can adopt good management practices to discourage violence and disorder. The effective management of entry (including any queuing) and egress of patrons by staff, particularly at busy periods, is essential to control numbers and avoid conflict.

3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Misc theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises

4 Design Considerations

4.1.1 Design for Security recommends that designers and developers refer to:

- Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London

Seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention are detailed within Chapter 2 of this ODPM publication. Annex 3 also contains many useful references. You can download 'Safer Places' at www.designforsecurity.org

- Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

5 Design & Layout Appraisal

5.1 The Proposal

5.1.1 A licensed bar is proposed in the basement floor of the premises with entrance via the existing entrance on the corner of Lever Street and Stevenson Square. The bar, and toilets are located on the opposite wall of the premises to the entrance door, with seating arranged in booths along one wall and individual tables and chairs elsewhere,.

5.1.2 There is no provision for outdoor seating, the bus stop constricts the pavement outside the premises. A smoking area has not been shown designated on the plans but I assume that patrons will gather outside the entrance.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

5.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

5.2.1 The modest size of the premises, with plans indicating that the majority of the customers would be seated, suggests that it would not attract very large numbers. Venues with large capacities and with low ratio of seating to customers tend to be more difficult to manage and more susceptible to violence.

5.2.2 There is an indication that food will be offered, although that seems limited. Licensed premises that offer food tend to have less disorder problems.

5.2.3 The building itself is reasonably secure with secure windows and a shutter protecting the front door. Given the nature of the premises, there is no easy access to the rear, other than through the adjacent premises.

5.2.4 In terms of the exterior environment, I have no concerns regarding the movement of customers into, and out of, the front of premises. There is an issue with the means of escape route from the rear of the premises, which will need secured without compromising the security of the wider building.

5.2.5 The proposed development should help generate additional footfall to the area during the day and night-time.

5.3 Recommended Design Features to Improve Security

5.3.1 Bars, in particular, and restaurants can, if poorly managed, generate crime for because:

1. Large numbers of people congregating in one place generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons of bars/restaurants are stationary for long periods of time making them easier to target.
2. The movement of people, noise, social interaction, and levels of intoxication mean patrons are less vigilant in the care of their personal belongings.
3. Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent premises means that such a venue would lack ‘community territoriality’, i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them. This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur in venue where there is a ‘regular’ clientele.
4. High customer turnover bars/restaurants, with high levels of customer movement within the establishment are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
5. Valuable goods (mobile phones, wallets, purses, etc.) are very often available and on show, a particular problem on external seating areas, although that is not an issue with this proposal.
6. Poorly arranged waste disposal can lead to arson. Unsecured bins placed on the highway or in accessible rear areas have been targeted in the city centre in the past, if the bins are very close to a building this can have very serious consequences.

5.3.2 In order to minimise the above issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

- The entrance to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.
- Customers entering/leaving the premises through the entrance should be easily observed by staff. Staff should always have a clear view of the entrance door and stairs via a CCTV system.
- The back-of-house area should not be accessible to the public.
- There should be secure lockers for staff to store their belongings whilst at work located in a private room within the premises.
- There should be a secure room, with a time delay safe, so that staff can count the takings out of public gaze and store cash overnight.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

- Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind the bar area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- Consideration should be given to an elevated high or wide bar, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons, and aids surveillance of all parts of the floor.
- Tills fronting customers are preferable as they enable staff to maintain vision of the serving area and beyond. (Ideally, fit tills below the bar or protect with screening to prevent snatches).
- Casual access to the rear of service counters should be prevented (e.g. with a lockable hatch).
- The internal layout the premises should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding pinch points. A clear pathway to and from the entrance/exit and the toilets to the seating areas is desirable.
- Service areas should be secured at all times.

5.3.3 With the above in mind, an 'operating policy' should be drawn up which includes:

- security (door policy; door staff; staff training; CCTV cameras - monitoring and recording facilities, and their locations; and cash storage/management);
- fire safety, including clearing the designated escape route of all obstacles;
- dispersal procedure; and,
- servicing and waste management (in a secure location), avoiding the disposal of glass late at night which might disturb any nearby residents.

6 Physical Security

Whilst the plans do not show any alterations to the exterior of the premises, the following standards and features will be required for this development to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.

6.1 Doors

6.1.1 If the street level front doors are to be replaced, they should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2. It seems more likely the doors will be retained, and so they should have at least 2 locking points to each leaf – top and bottom on the slave leaf and BS8621 mortice locks at 1/3 points on the active leaf. A door viewer and an externally mounted CCTV camera will allow staff to vet visitors outside of opening times. The internal entrance doors (basement lobby) should be protected by a LPS 1175 sr 2 rated shutter, or replaced with doors which meet one of the above security standards.

6.1.2 The office door, the escape door into 24 Lever Street, and other internal escape door (adjacent to glass wash) should meet one of the above security standards. The office door should have a door viewer, or a small laminate glass vision panel, to allow staff to vet anyone attempting entry.

6.1.3 The beer store door should be 44mm solid core with two BS 8621 locks located at 1/3 points on the door.

6.1.4 The security to the door of the adjacent unit in the basement lobby should be upgraded to one of the above standards.

6.2 Windows and Shutters

6.2.1 If there any new windows proposed, they must be compliant with and certified to BS 7950.

6.2.2 Any replacement shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2.

6.3 Glazing

6.3.1 Any new external glazing to any doors or windows must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

6.4 Intruder Alarm

6.4.1 An intruder alarm should be installed, linked to contacts on all external doors to the premises and shutters. The alarm signal should terminate at a recognised Alarm Receiving Centre. The system should comply with the current version of the EN 50131-1 standard and be eligible for a Police response as defined by the ACPO Policy on Police Response to Security Systems, Level 1 status.

6.4.2 The internal entrance doors (basement lobby), the escape route doors into 24 Lever Street and into the adjacent basement space, and the entrance door roller shutter should be fitted with alarm contacts. The escape route doors would only be used in an emergency so need only require a panic bar on the inner, 'private', side; the 'public' side of the door should have no ironmongery and signed as 'no entry, escape door keep clear'.

6.4.3 Internal escape doors (adjacent to the gents toilet and adjacent to the glass wash should be clearly signed as private and that an alarm (not connected to the intruder alarm) will sound so that customers are aware that they are prohibited from entering these spaces.

6.4.4 The alarm system should incorporate personal attack buttons for the use of staff in identified locations, such as behind the bar and in the cash office. The office should contain a telephone and a mobile phone with a clear signal.

6.5 CCTV

6.5.1 A CCTV system should be used within this proposal. The system will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
    - **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
    - **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

6.5.2 Suitable camera locations are: street level entrance door, basement lobby, escape doors (both sides of the doors), till points, the bar, and locations around the premises so that all internal areas are monitored.

6.6 Lighting

6.6.1 All lighting sources should be compatible with requirements of any CCTV system installed.

6.6.2 Internal lighting should be used to create the right atmosphere. Striking a balance, which avoids being so dim as to prevent staff from seeing all that is going on, but not so bright that the light is glaring, 'cold', and unwelcoming.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

6.6.3 An override is required, within easy reach of bar staff, so that if an incident occurs the lighting level can be raised. High-level house lighting is an important element of control. This will also help at the end of trading so that staff can see to clear up, and patrons have no doubt that its closing time.

6.6.4 Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors, particularly those at the rear.

6.6.5 External fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

6.7 Staffing

6.7.1 There should be a lone worker policy drawn-up, ensuring that there is more than one staff member on the premises at any one time, and that locking down the premises at the end of business is not carried out by a single member of staff.

6.8 Cash storage

6.8.1 Cash kept on the premises should be stored securely. A safe certified to LPS 1183 will provide a good level of security. A time-delay lock is advised.

6.8.2 Consider a chute deposit safe (to LPS 1183) behind the bar to reduce cash amounts held in tills during busy periods. A protocol should be set up to ensure that large amounts of cash are not kept in the tills at any one time.

6.9 Other

6.9.1 A secure bin storage area should be provided within the premises.

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
20.09.13	Mark Whyte	Request for Crime Impact Statement
11.09.13		Site visited
25.09.13	Mark Whyte	Report Issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

DWG No.	DWG Title	Date	Rev
3404-03	Lower ground floor front demise	09/13	A
3404-02	Lower ground floor existing layout	09/13	A
3404-05	Lower ground floor means of escape	09/13	A
3404-04	Lower ground floor proposed	09/13	A
3404-06	Lower ground floor ventilation	09/13	A
3404-001	Location plan	09/13	A

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status			Revisions Made
A	☐	☐	☒	

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 3621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Key Egress.

The minimum standard for locks on external or entrance doors to be acceptable to the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the police service. The effectiveness of the lock also depends on the quality of the door, frame and other hardware which is not tested by this standard and which may fail before the lock.

BS 8621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Keyless Egress.

Same as above, but egress is possible without a key (by use of thumb turn or latch lever.

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2007

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at *www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted*)

CRA

Crime Reduction Advisor. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

NPT

Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable