

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Crime Impact Statement

Bideford Drive, Wythenshawe

Residential (10 Houses)

For BYA Ltd

Version A: 28.01.14

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Not Protectively Marked

Crime Impact Statement

Bideford Drive, Wythenshawe

Residential (10 Houses)

2006/0525/CIS/01

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Version A: 28.01.14

Executive Summary

☐ **Significant material changes are advised**

☐ **Proposal is satisfactory in principle but minor changes are advised**

☒ **Proposal is generally acceptable subject to the advice in this report**

The proposed layout is well planned being outward facing with front doors facing the street, with secure rear gardens, and in-curtilage parking is provided. The development will help to secure houses currently exposed to the public realm. It will also positively impact on recurring issues such as off-road motorcyclists accessing the park, diverting them to other areas, and eliminate fly-tipping on, or adjacent to the site.

The area does not suffer from especially high levels of crime, but there are streets in the immediate vicinity of the site that tend to be the focus of criminal activity. Constructing the houses to Secured by Design standards is important to reduce the dwellings vulnerability to burglary, car crime and criminal damage.

Residential development seems entirely appropriate for this site, and I am happy to support the proposals subject to the adoption of the recommendations contained within section 6 of this report.



Adrian Murphy *MRTPI*

Consultant
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1 Visual Audit

1.1.1 The plan and photographs below highlight: the site, edged in red; surrounding housing – low rise and tower blocks; parklands to the south; and, the local highway network, including pedestrian routes through the estate.



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1.1.2 Bideford Drive forms the spine road through a small residential estate on the edge of Wythenshawe. The estate is bound by Altrincham Road to the south, Moor Road to the west and Wythenshawe Park to the north and east.

1.1.3 Social housing dominates the housing stock within the estate, with a mixture of houses and maisonettes as well as low and high rise apartments. Vehicle access into the estate is limited to two points, Bideford Drive and Parklands Road, both of which connect the estate to Moor Road. The estate is inward facing, turning its back on Moor Road, whilst a green edge separates the estate from Altrincham Road. Typical of 'Radburn' layouts, the estate has a large number of pedestrian connections, including interconnected streets, links from the estate into the adjacent park, and through to Altrincham Road; car parking is generally provided in small clusters close to the houses they serve; and, there are numerous small pockets of open space.

1.1.4 The proposed development site is located between Bideford Drive and Wythenshawe Park. Moorcot Court, a nine storey residential tower block lies immediately to the east, whilst to the west there is a short terrace of two storey houses. Opposite the site, on the south side of Bideford Drive, there is a terrace of three storey flats and maisonettes and a sixteen storey tower block. The site is currently laid out as a car park but is now little used. Such superfluous spaces can become a focus for anti-social behaviour, so redevelopment of the site is a sensible solution. The edge of the site adjacent to Bideford Drive includes a grassed edge intersperse with mature street trees.

1.1.5 A steel palisade fence of around 1800mm forms the boundary between the park and the site, and includes a lockable gate, which was open and footprints and desire lines suggest it is well used. Fly-tipping along the fence line within the park appears to be an issue. In addition, a sign at the gate suggests that illegal use of motorcycles across the fields and estate is also a problem in this location. The fencing between the site and the tower block is a combination of retaining wall, railings and high wire mesh fencing. At the western end is more domestic in nature being concrete posts with timber panels.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st January 2013 and 31st December 2013.

2.1 Crime Count and Rate Comparison

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
28	20	69	79	20	<20	<20	<20	<20	<20

Figure 2: Comparison of Burglary Dwelling Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 3: Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 4: Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 5: Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



2.1.1 The volume of crime in the study area is about average for suburban Manchester.

2.1.2 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings and incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings are lower than the City of Manchester rate, and in the case of vehicle crime lower than the Greater Manchester average rate. Burglary rates in the study area are around 30% lower than the City of Manchester rate but around 20% higher than the average rate for Greater Manchester,

2.1.3 Incidents of both wounding and criminal damage per 1000 dwellings are higher than the average for the City of Manchester as a whole, and higher than Greater Manchester average rate.

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2.2 Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 6: Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Figure 7: Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Figure 8: Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.2.1 Day Range: The risk of burglary is highest on a Monday and on a Friday.

2.2.2 Time Range: The risk is concentrated in the middle of the day, peaking at midday. Offenders often target residential properties during the day when residents are likely to be out of the house.

2.2.3 Point of Entry: The majority of burglaries have been committed through rear doors and windows. Rear points of entry are often targeted, as offenders can conceal themselves from view. Rear doors have been forced open with tools and rear windows have been prised open by offenders. Front doors have also been targeted but less frequently than rear doors. It is not unknown for residents to leave front doors closed but unlocked making it easy for offenders to enter.

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2.3 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 9: Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Figure 10: Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.3.1 Day Range: The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Wednesday and Saturday.

2.3.2 Time Range: The risk is greatest in the evening and early hours of the morning. Offenders frequently target vehicles in the evening and early hours of the morning when it is dark and they perceive the risk of being caught or identified as low.

2.4 Wounding: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to woundings committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 11: Wounding – Day Range



Figure 12: Wounding – Time Range



2.4.1 Day Range: The risk of violence is evenly spread through the week, peaking on Wednesday and Saturday. The risk of violence often increases at the weekend when more people attend license premises, often for longer and consuming more alcohol leading to conflict.

2.4.2 Time Range: The risk is greatest late in the late afternoon and in the evening. The risk of violence often increases at these times when alcohol has been consumed in homes and licensed premises leading to violence.

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2.5 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown

The data below relates to criminal damage and robbery committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 13: Criminal Damage Targets



Figure 14: Robbery Targets



2.5.1 Criminal Damage Targets: Both property and vehicles are targeted in incidents of criminal damage.

2.5.2 Robbery Targets: Robbery levels in the study area are every low, when robberies have occurred individuals are targeted rather than businesses.

2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Rear doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure

Solution *Prevent unauthorised access to rear of the houses by use of high fencing and lockable gates. Include attack resistant rear doors, which can withstand a 3 minute manual attack (same standard as front doors). Install security light to rear door. If garden sheds are provided, ensure that they have adequate locking mechanisms to deter intruders from using garden tools to prise open doors and windows.*

2.6.2 Rear windows have been prised open by offenders

Solution *Use PAS 24 or BS7950 windows, which include key operated window locks. Include laminate glazing to reduce the risk of an offender breaking the glass and unlocking windows.*

2.6.3 Insecure front doors have been targeted in burglaries

Solution *Use of fixed outer handles, or split spindles, within front door handles will mean that the only way into the houses is with a key and can help to eliminate 'walk-in' burglaries.*

3 Risk Factors

3.1.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Antisocial behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

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4 Design Considerations

4.1.1 Design for Security recommends that designers and developers refer to:

Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London

- Seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention are detailed within Chapter 2 of this ODPM publication. Annex 3 also contains many useful references. You can download 'Safer Places' at www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design (SBD)

- Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

5 Design & Layout Appraisal

5.1 The Proposal

5.1.1 A development of 10no. two and three bedroom semi-detached family houses is proposed. The houses are arranged in a line facing Bideford Drive with in-curtilage driveway parking spaces in front of each house. Front gardens are enclosed with low level fencing and gates with rear gardens enclosed with high fencing with a gate to the side of the houses to provide access to and from the secure rear gardens.

5.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

5.2.1 Front doors face the street to maximise surveillance and activity onto the street.

5.2.2 The proposed parking arrangements facilitate the security of vehicles.

5.2.3 Defensible space has been created at the front of each dwelling, defined by an 1100mm high wall and railing, with vehicular gates.

5.2.4 Rear gardens are secured by appropriately high fencing and lockable gates.

5.2.5 The security of the adjacent housing on the western side of the site will be enhanced. The exposed fencing of the property immediately adjacent to the site has been damaged leaving the property vulnerable. The development of houses on the adjacent land, together with provision of replacement/additional fencing, will result in the exposed housing being part of a continuous, and more secure, block and provide security to the garden.

5.2.6 The fly-tipping along the park fence is likely to cease when the development commences.

5.3 Changes and Amendments Needed

5.3.1 Lockable gates (mortise lock) should be introduced to provide secure access to the rear gardens. Locks should be able to be opened from both the inner and outer side of the gate so that, for example, cyclists can access the rear directly without having to go through the house.

5.3.2 The palisade fence at the rear of the site should be retained and a 2100mm high, close boarded, timber fence, with a trellis topping, should be provided on the private side of the palisade.

5.3.3 Fencing to the western boundary of the site, the boundary with the existing houses, should be renewed; an 1800mm high close boarded fence would be appropriate.

5.3.4 The theft of copper (wiring and piping) and lead from development sites is a recurring crime issue. The use of lead substitute should be considered by the developer, and it is essential that adequate provision for site security be employed during the construction period to minimise the risk of theft from the site.

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6 Physical Security

The following standards and features will be required for this development to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.

6.1 Doors

6.1.1 Front and side doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2.

6.1.2 Front doors should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.

6.1.3 Front doors should have either fixed sidelights or door viewers. Chain limiters are recommended but not essential. Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

6.2 Windows

6.2.1 Ground floor windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950 and, escape requirements permitting, must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

6.3 Glazing

6.3.1 Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

6.4 Intruder Alarms

6.4.1 Ideally, an intruder alarm should be installed to each property. It should be linked to contacts on all external doors; PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows. If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

6.5 Boundaries

6.5.1 The rear boundaries of the houses with the Park should be 2100mm high, and of close boarded timber construction. It is recommended that the top 600mm consist of trellis structure to make it additionally difficult to climb.

6.5.2 Sub-divisional boundaries in the rear gardens between houses may be as low as 1500mm but the 1800mm panels detailed on drawing 1766-201C are acceptable.

6.5.3 The fronts of properties should be demarcated by low boundaries such as railings to an approximate height of around 1000mm. The 1100mm wall and railing and the also shown on drawing 1766-201C is acceptable.

6.5.4 High gates should be included to secure rear gardens. Gates should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments (1800mm) and incorporate a key operable deadlock which can be accessed from either side of the gate, as cyclists are likely to use the rear gates to come and go..

6.6 Landscaping

6.6.1 To promote natural surveillance, low planting in front gardens should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over the rear garden boundary fences at the edges of the development. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

6.7 Lighting

6.7.1 External lighting must be provided to the front and rear doors of the houses, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended.

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6.7.2 Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

6.8 Other

6.8.1 Meter cupboards should be located to the fronts of properties only, not in the private areas.

6.8.2 Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

7 Construction

7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7.1.3 For further information regarding site security, please contact your local Crime Reduction Advisor, **Gillian Price**, on **0161 856 6174**.

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
14.01.14	Keith Dunn, BYA Ltd	Request for Crime Impact Statement
21.01.14	Unaccompanied	Site visit
28.01.14	Keith Dunn, BYA Ltd	Report Issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

DWG No.	DWG Title	Date	Rev
1766-201C	Proposed site layout, plans & elevations	01/14	C

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status			Revisions Made
A	☐	☐	☒	

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 3621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Key Egress.

The minimum standard for locks on external or entrance doors to be acceptable to the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the police service. The effectiveness of the lock also depends on the quality of the door, frame and other hardware which is not tested by this standard and which may fail before the lock.

BS 8621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Keyless Egress.

Same as above, but egress is possible without a key (by use of thumb turn or latch lever.

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2007

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at *www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted*)

CRA

Crime Reduction Advisor. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

NPT

Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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