

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

# Crime Impact Statement

## 8-10 and 12 John Dalton Street, Manchester

## Change of use (A3 Restaurant 250sqm – est.)

**For Deloitte**

**Version A: 6th December 2013**

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**Not Protectively Marked**

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# Crime Impact Statement

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## Change of use (A3 Restaurant 250sqm - est.)

## 2013/0942/CIS/01

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# Executive Summary

☐ **Significant material changes are advised**

☐ **Proposal is satisfactory in principle but minor changes are advised**

☒ **Proposal is generally acceptable subject to the advice in this report**

Levels of crime in the district, particularly violent and alcohol-related disorder, are well above average for Greater Manchester. It is therefore essential that the scheme does not incorporate features that would increase the risk of crime or the fear of crime in and around the premises.

As an adaptation of an existing building, the physical scope to introduce additional security interventions is limited, and thus the success of this proposal will be dependent on effective management of the premises.



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# 1 Visual Audit

The diagram below highlights relevant local features that could have an impact upon the security of the scheme and/or indicate the presence of crime and antisocial behaviour in the surrounding area.




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- The site is a single storey unit located on the ground floor of John Dalton House, an 8 storey commercial building with office space at upper levels.
- The premises is on a corner site and has three public facades. The principal elevation is on John Dalton Street where the main entrance is located, with the other elevations to Ridgefield and also the area of public open space at the rear.
- John Dalton Street is a busy thoroughfare for vehicles and pedestrians. The pavement outside the premises is relatively wide but pedestrian movement is constrained by the clutter of street furniture which includes a bus shelter, litterbins, advertising units, bike racks, telephone boxes, a public convenience and a number of street trees and bollards.
- The building footprint contains some recessed and protruding features that can create the impression of concealment and thus be subject to abuse.
- The amenity space at the rear of the premises on the corner of Ridgefield and Mulberry Street is quite secluded. The raised planting bed provide an informal sitting area and secluded gathering space. The existing lighting does not account for the large plane tree and other vegetation which creates considerable shade and obscures views into the space from adjacent buildings. Mulberry Street is effectively a service road that provides access to the rear of premises on John Dalton Street and Brazennose Street.
- The surrounding area accommodates a mixture of commercial use including retail, offices, restaurants/cafes and drinking establishments which generates activity throughout the day and late into the evening. Albert Square is close to the site and occasionally hosts major events which generate significant activity in the vicinity of the site. Nearby Deansgate contains many licensed premises which create significant disorder issues.

**Pictures**

1 John Dalton Street, with the proposed restaurant premises in the middle of the picture. Many of the former retail premises in the area have been replaced by bars or restaurants.

2 The corner of John Dalton Street and Ridgefield, showing one of the frequent bus services that call at the stop outside the proposed restaurant premises. This is used by services that continue west into Salford and also the free city centre bus, thus the bus stop and area around it is often occupied by people waiting.

3 The Ridgefield elevation includes the recessed doors that provide the emergency egress from upper floors of John Dalton House.

4 Ridgefield looking towards John Dalton Street with the proposed restaurant visible on the left of the picture.

5 A view of the amenity space at the rear of the premises, on the corner of Mulberry Street and Ridgefield, showing the raised planting bed containing the large tree. The flat topped walls provide informal seating in this relatively secluded location, which can prove attractive to antisocial groups.

6 In the same area the retaining walls provide a climbing aid onto the first floor flat roof area which has prompted the retro-fitting of ugly deterrent features on top of the walls, in order to discourage unauthorised access.

7 Temporary street furniture on John Dalton Street has provided a target for criminal damage.

8 The footpath outside the proposed restaurant is relatively wide but contains many potential obstacles to pedestrians.

9 Litter accumulated at back of the premises. Lack of maintenance or care for external spaces can generate disorder which affects the adjacent properties.


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# 2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st December 2012 and 2013.

## 2.1 Crime Count

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

| Burglary Dwelling | Burglary Other | Criminal Damage | Less Serious Wounding | Misc. Thefts | Robbery | Serious Wounding | Theft from Motor Vehicle | Theft of Motor Vehicle | Theft of Pedal Cycle |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| <20 | 175 | 152 | 394 | 832 | 28 | 20 | 158 | <20 | 239 |

2.1.1 The volume of crime in this area is high, due to its location within the city centre. The volumes of violent crimes, theft, robbery and vehicle crime are exceptionally high and the rate of burglary at commercial premises is much greater than is experienced across Manchester as a whole.

## 2.2 Misc Theft (Proposed Use Only): Risk Analysis

*The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts within/against restaurant premises, recorded in the Manchester city centre area.*

Figure 2: Misc Theft – Day Range






Figure 3: Misc Theft – Time Range




2.2.1 Day Range: The risk of theft peaks on the days of the weekend, between Friday and Saturday. On these days, restaurants in the city centre area experience higher levels of attendance than during the week. Restaurants are usually open for longer at the weekend and the opportunity for offenders to commit theft is much greater.

2.2.2 Time Range: The risk of theft is greatest around midday and in the evening. This is when restaurants are busiest and opportunities for theft arise at a greater frequency. The most frequently stolen items are customer belongings, such as handbags, purses, wallets and mobile phones.


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## 2.3 Burglary Other (Proposed Use Only): Risk Analysis

*The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against restaurant premises, recorded in the Manchester city centre area.*

Figure 4: Burglary Other – Day Range





Figure 5: Burglary Other – Time Range






Figure 6: Burglary Other – Point of Entry




2.3.1 Day Range: In Manchester, the risk of burglary at licensed premises is greatest on between Saturday, Sunday and Monday; the risk is significantly lower on other days.

2.3.2 Time Range: The risk is highest early in the afternoon and in the evening.

2.3.3 Point of Entry: The majority of burglaries have been committed through doors. Most commonly, rear doors have often been forced open with bodily pressure and hand tools; in a number of cases glazing in rear doors and rear windows has been smashed by offenders.


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## 2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

*The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.*

Figure 7: Vehicle Crime – Day Range






Figure 8: Vehicle Crime – Time Range




2.4.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of vehicle crime is highest on Wednesday.

2.4.2 Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime in the local area is greatest in the evening, peaking between 7pm and 9pm. It is likely that offenders target vehicles at this time when it is dark and vehicles parked on remote/isolated side streets and car parks are vulnerable to attack undetected.

## 2.5 Wounding: Risk Analysis

*The data below relates to instances of wounding committed within a Km² centred on the site.*

Figure 9: Wounding – Day Range






Figure 10: Wounding – Time Range




2.5.1 Day Range: Violent crime peaks at the weekend. Between Friday and Sunday, a greater number of people attend city centre licensed premises, often drinking for longer periods and consuming more alcohol – leading to conflicts.

2.5.2 Time Range: The risk of violent crime increases in the late evening and into the early hours of the morning, peaking between 1am and 2am. At these times, those attending licenses premises are more likely to be intoxicated and violent disorder is more likely to breakout in licensed premises, on streets, at taxi ranks/bus stops/train stations and at takeaways.


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## 2.6 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown

*The data below relates to criminal damage and robbery offences committed within a Km² centred on the site.*

Figure 11: Criminal Damage Targets






Figure 12: Robbery Targets




2.6.1 Criminal Damage Targets: The makeup of the criminal damage in this area shows that properties are almost twice as likely to be targeted as vehicles. Common incidents of criminal damage include graffiti, windows being smashed (both of properties and vehicles) and damage to vehicle bodywork.

2.6.2 Robbery Targets: Robbery against the person is much more prevalent than against businesses in this area. The risk of personal robbery increases when lone victims take quieter, more secluded routes through the area in the evening/at night.

## 2.7 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.7.1 Burglary where rear doors have been forced open to gain entry.

*Possible solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified door-sets have resisted a series of professional attacks (using a variety of tools) including to the door itself, the frame, the locks and the fittings. They are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Consideration should also be given to security-certified shutters to protect particularly vulnerable doors.*

2.7.2 Theft of customer property from/under tables and chairs.



2.7.3 *Possible solution - Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' (see opposite) to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The internal layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.*

2.7.4 Burglary where rear windows have been smashed to gain entry.

*Possible solution – Use certified windows that incorporate laminated glass and consider securing rear windows when the premises are closed with discreet security shutters which meet the LPS 1175 SR2 standard.*

2.7.5 Violent disorder/conflict between intoxicated customers

*Possible solution - The operators should adopt good management practices to discourage violence and disorder. The effective management of entry (including any queuing) and egress of patrons by staff, particularly at busy periods, is essential to control numbers and avoid conflicts. Restrictions on swearing, rowdiness etc. can also reduce aggression. Whilst it is accepted that restaurant premises*


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*create fewer problems than establishments that dispense alcohol, operators of the premises should nevertheless liaise with other local businesses and cooperation with police initiatives in order to reduce potential disorder in the vicinity.*

# 3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Misc theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises

# 4 Design Considerations

The design and layout of your development will be appraised both in this document and through face-to-face meetings if and when required. Design for Security does recommend however that designers and developers refer to:

## 4.1 Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London

Seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention are detailed within Chapter 2 of this ODPM publication. Annex 3 also contains many useful references. You can download 'Safer Places' at www.designforsecurity.org

## 4.2 Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/


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# 5 Development Appraisal

## 5.1 Layout

5.1.1 Outdoor seating areas to front and rear and side of the site. The proposed external seating occupies three separate areas. It is essential that the behaviour of customers using these areas can be easily monitored by staff. More remote areas cannot be readily seen from inside the premises and this deficiency would need to be supplemented by a CCTV system with monitors visible to staff inside the restaurant.

5.1.2 The layout of the external seating should maintain a minimum of 3m clear space along the public footway. This clearway should be free of pinch points or obstacles (such as bins or plant containers). In order to avoid confusion, it would be desirable to incorporate some subtle ground markings to indicate the permitted extent of the seating area in order to prevent encroachment within the clear passage. Some rationalisation of the existing street furniture should be pursued with Manchester City Council.

5.1.3 Catering establishments should be designed with efficient ventilation / extraction systems capable of reducing temperatures and providing sufficient ventilation without the need for staff or customers to open service doors (to the rear of the premises) that could undermine the integrity of other security arrangements.

5.1.4 The ground floor windows will effectively connect the internal activities with the public realm, thus helping to enliven the street scene and improve natural surveillance of the areas around the restaurant.

5.1.5 The internal layout appears relatively uncluttered and free of recesses and pinch points that would create opportunities for criminal or antisocial behaviour.

5.1.6 Most back of house functions seem to be well separated from public areas.

5.1.7 Servicing of the premises is separate from customer functions and is accessed via the enclosed gated yard off Mulberry Street.

## 5.2 Management and Operational Considerations

5.2.1 The application does not involve major physical changes to the building. As such the success of the proposal will be dependent on effective management of the premises and a zero tolerance policy should be adopted with customers who behave inappropriately.

5.2.2 Café / Restaurants can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- **Opportunities** - Patrons of cafes are stationary for extended periods of time making them easier to target.
- **Lack of attention** - The movement of people, noise, social interaction, and other factors mean patrons are easily distracted.
- **Customer turnover** – High customer turnover with high levels of customer movement within the establishment offer greater anonymity and allow more opportunities for offenders to operate unnoticed.
- **Valuable goods** – These are often available and likely to be on show, (a particular problem on external seating areas). Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, portable goods – mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys, etc. and people often make use of these items when sitting in a cafe.
- **Stealth** - Busy venues can provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

5.2.3 In order to minimise these and other security issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

- Customers entering/leaving the premises through the main entrances should be easily observed by staff.
- All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.


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- Large amounts of cash should not be stored in the premises overnight and signage should be installed to indicate this. Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach. Casual access to the rear of the service counter should be prevented (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled). No tills should be kept outside.
- The internal layout of the premises should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding pinch points.
- There should be no places for concealment in public areas to allow staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation. Installation of mirrors in strategic locations can assist staff in monitoring areas outside their direct line of sight.

5.2.4 Active continuous management and maintenance of the premises can reduce the likelihood of crime and disorder occurring. A maintenance plan should be created to promote good management of the premises, this plan should focus on issues such as:

- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras, lighting, doors and locks etc;
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti;
- Opening and closing of premises including staff arrival and departure, with particular attention to lone members of staff.
- Cash management within the premises
- Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices
- Management of stock deliveries.

5.2.5 Toilets should be clearly signed so that there is no excuse for customers finding their way to the back of house

5.2.6 Outdoor Seating

- The outdoor seating areas should be supervised and a duty of care exercised to ensure seating does not stray outside the permitted area and cause obstruction to pedestrians.
- Arrangements should be put in place for clearing and cleaning the pavement area at the end of the day.
- No seating or tables should be left outside the premises overnight. Seating must be stacked and secured off the street outside the permitted hours of use.
- Staff should be required to ensure customers do not move seats and tables outside the designated area, and any infringement should be addressed promptly.

5.2.7 A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development, and should not require bins to be left on the street for extended periods. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.

5.2.8 Permitted opening hours should be the same as similar nearby premises.

5.2.9 High customer turnover in restaurants, with high levels of customer movement within the establishment are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed – staff must be able to easily monitor people arriving or leaving the premises from any potential access point.

5.2.10 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers, music equipment, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.


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# 6 Physical Security

The proposed development comprises conversion of an existing building which involves minor changes to the structure, thus the potential to make alterations and upgrade the physical security of the building is limited. The following recommendations are made on this understanding. If the identified security risks cannot be addressed by design solutions, the protection of the building and its occupants / users will be dependent on effective management and deployment of an on-site security presence and / or monitored alarms / CCTV.

## 6.1 Doors

6.1.1 External doors including French Windows, must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2.

6.1.2 External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

6.1.3 Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

6.1.4 All external doors should be fitted with alarm contacts.

6.1.5 Doors to storage, staff-only or office space should be solid core, with multi point locking.

## 6.2 New Windows and Shutters

6.2.1 Any new windows must be compliant with and certified to BS 7950, must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

6.2.2 Any shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required), and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

## 6.3 Glazing

6.3.1 Any new external glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

## 6.4 Intruder Alarm

6.4.1 An intruder alarm should be installed linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors should cover any rooms with windows.

6.4.2 It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security patrol team).

## 6.5 Access Control

6.5.1 Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:

- Office, storage and staff-only areas

## 6.6 CCTV

6.6.1 Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.


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- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: all external doors, till points, bar area, the entrance area, and external seating areas.

## 6.7 Lighting

6.7.1 Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

6.7.2 Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

# 7 Construction

7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).


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# A Contact register

| Date | Contact With | Summary of Contact |
|---|---|---|
| 25/11/13 | Deloitte | CIS instruction Received |
| 04/12/13 | N/A | Site Visit |
| 06/12/13 | Deloitte | CIS version A issued |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |

# B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

| DWG No. | DWG Title | Date | Rev |
|---|---|---|---|
| 011-025-01 | Ground floor ventilation layout | 09/13 | B |
| 011-025-02 | Rear elevation ventilation layout | 09/13 | A |
| 4411/102 | Existing layout – sections & elevations | 09/13 | - |
| 4411/101 | Existing layout – floor plans | 09/13 | - |
| 4411/201/A | Proposed GA layout – floor plans | 09/13 | A |
| 4411/202/B | Proposed GA layout – elevations | 09/13 | B |
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**PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.**

# C CIS Version History

| Version | Status | | | Revisions Made |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | ☐ | ☐ | ☒ | |
| | | | | |


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# D Glossary

### Burglary Resistance Standards

**BS 3621, 2007**

***Thief resistant locks. Key Egress.***

The minimum standard for locks on external or entrance doors to be acceptable to the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the police service. The effectiveness of the lock also depends on the quality of the door, frame and other hardware which is not tested by this standard and which may fail before the lock.

**BS 8621, 2007**

***Thief resistant locks. Keyless Egress.***

Same as above, but egress is possible without a key (by use of thumb turn or latch lever.

**BS 7950, 1997**

***Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.***

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

**BS PAS 23-1, 1999**

***General performance requirements for door assemblies.***

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

**BS PAS 24-1, 2007**

***General security performance requirements for door assemblies.***

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

**ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)**

***Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification***

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

**LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)**

***Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components***

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

**EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)**

***Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.***

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

### Commonly Used Acronyms

**CIT**

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

**CPTED**

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at ***www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted***)

**CRA**

Crime Reduction Advisor. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

**NPT**

Neighbourhood Policing Team.

**PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)**

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

**LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)**

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

**UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)**

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

### Useful Websites

***Secured by Design***
***www.securedbydesign.com***

***RIBA Product Selector***
***www.ribaproductselector.com***

***LPCB – Red Book Live***
***www.redbooklive.com***

***Crime Reduction (Home Office)***
***www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk***

***DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre***
***www.designagainstcrime.org***

***Building for Life***
***www.buildingforlife.org***

***CLG (Communities and Local Government)***
***www.communities.gov.uk***


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