

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

# Crime Impact Statement

## 46-50 Oldham Street, Manchester

## Change of use to a Licensed Restaurant (450sqm.)

**For Turtle Bay Restaurants**

**Version A: 01/04/14**

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**Not Protectively Marked**

# Crime Impact Statement

## 46-50 Oldham Street, Manchester

## Change of use to a Licensed Restaurant (450sqm.)

## 2014/0235/CIS/01

**For Turtle Bay Restaurants**
**Version A: 01/04/14**

# Executive Summary

☐ **Significant material changes are advised**

☐ **Proposal is satisfactory in principle but minor changes are advised**

☒ **Proposal is generally acceptable subject to the advice in this report**

This development has been assessed against and is consistent with the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED). The development will not achieve 'Secured by Design' (SBD) accreditation without the replacement of all existing external building elements (such as glazing, windows and doors) to SBD standards. Nevertheless, we are happy to endorse this development, subject to all other measures being incorporated into the proposed scope of works. The overall security of the development will be heavily reliant on the continuous effective management of the premises, rather than just the physical measures recommended in the report.

I would encourage further dialogue with the applicant throughout the design and construction process to ensure the resulting development is secure. Please get in touch with Design for Security if you have any queries regarding the contents of this document, or the security standards referred to therein.



**Bradley Hart** *MTCP*

*Design for Security Consultant*



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# Contents

1 Visual Audit ..... 4
2 Crime Statistics & Analysis ..... 5
2.1 Crime Count
2.2 Theft (Proposed Use Only): Risk Analysis
2.3 Burglary Other (Proposed Use Only): Risk Analysis
2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis
2.5 Wounding: Risk Analysis
2.6 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown
2.7 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)
3 Risk Factors ..... 9
4 Design Considerations ..... 9
4.1 Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London
4.2 Secured by Design (SBD)
5 Design & Layout Appraisal ..... 10
5.2 External Alterations
5.3 Internal Layout & Security
5.4 Alarm
5.5 CCTV
5.6 Other

# Appendix

A Contact register ..... 14
B Associated Documents ..... 14
C CIS Version History ..... 14
D Glossary ..... 15


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# 1 Visual Audit



1



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Photo 1 & 2 – The site lies on the south-eastern side of Oldham Street and backs onto Spear Street, in the Northern Quarter of Manchester city centre. The ground floor unit is currently occupied by a retail unit.

Photos 3 & 4 – Oldham Street is a busy vehicular and pedestrian route. Spear Street is much narrower, with blank elevations, shutters and fire doors addressing the street and much less activity/surveillance.

Photos 5 – The site is flanked by a unit occupied by YPSF City Centre Project (The Young People Support Foundation – providing a wide range of services to support young people towards an independent life as an adult) to the north and a Green Fish Resource Centre (a centre for several voluntary and community sector support agencies in one location) to the south.

Photo 6 – Oldham Street and the wider Northern Quarter houses a concentration of independent retail units, bars, cafés/restaurants and office premises, as well as some residential units and budget hotels.


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# 2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st March 2013 and 2014.

## 2.1 Crime Count

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

| Burglary Dwelling | Burglary Other | Criminal Damage | Less Serious Wounding | Misc. Thefts | Robbery | Serious Wounding | Theft from Motor Vehicle | Theft of Motor Vehicle | Theft of Pedal Cycle |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| <20 | 177 | 252 | 494 | 932 | 128 | 25 | 358 | <20 | 239 |

2.1.1 The volume of crime in this area is very high, which is typical for such a city centre location. The volume of violent crimes, theft, robbery and vehicle crime are exceptionally high, and the rate (per 1,000 properties) of burglary at commercial premises is much greater than is experienced across Manchester as a whole.

## 2.2 Theft (Proposed Use Only): Risk Analysis

*The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts within/against restaurants/licensed premises, recorded in the Manchester council area.*

Figure 9: Misc Theft – Day Range






Figure 10: Misc Theft – Time Range




2.2.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of misc. theft peaks on the days of the weekend. On these days, many restaurants/licensed premises in the city centre area experience higher levels of attendance than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and the opportunity for offenders to commit theft is much greater.

2.2.2 Time Range: The risk of theft increases late at night and into the early morning. This is when restaurants/licensed premises are busiest and the opportunities for theft arise at a greater frequency (particularly when victims have been drinking alcohol). Handbags, phones and cameras belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Items are usually stolen from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables.


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## 2.3 Burglary Other (Proposed Use Only): Risk Analysis

*The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against restaurants/licensed premises, recorded in the Manchester council area.*

Figure 6: Burglary Other – Day Range





Figure 7: Burglary Other – Time Range






Figure 8: Burglary Other – Point of Entry




2.3.1 Day Range: In Manchester, the risk of burglary at restaurants/licensed premises is greatest between Saturday and Tuesday. The risk is significantly lower on other days of the week.

2.3.2 Time Range: The risk of burglary is highest early in the afternoon and in the early hours of the morning. Restaurants/licensed premises are likely to be targeted at these times, as they are unlikely to be open or are open with reduced numbers of staff.

2.3.3 Point of Entry: The majority of burglaries have been committed through doors. Most commonly, rear doors have often been forced open with bodily pressure and hand tools. In a number of cases, glazing in rear doors and rear windows has been smashed by offenders.


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## 2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

*The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.*

Figure 7: Vehicle Crime – Day Range






Figure 8: Vehicle Crime – Time Range




2.4.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of vehicle crime is highest on Wednesday.

2.4.2 Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime in the local area is greatest in the evening, peaking between 7pm and 9pm. It is likely that offenders target vehicles at this time when it is darker, streets/car parks are quieter and they perceive the risk of being observed and identified as low.

## 2.5 Wounding: Risk Analysis

*The data below relates to instances of wounding committed within a Km² centred on the site.*

Figure 9: Wounding – Day Range






Figure 10: Wounding – Time Range




2.5.1 Day Range: Violent crime peaks at the weekend. Between Friday and Sunday, a greater number of people attend city centre licensed premises, often drinking for longer periods and consuming more alcohol – leading to conflicts.

2.5.2 Time Range: The risk of violent crime increases in the late evening and into the early hours of the morning, peaking between 1am and 2am. At these times, those attending licenses premises are more likely to be intoxicated and violent disorder is more likely to breakout in licensed premises, on streets, at taxi ranks/bus stops/train stations and at takeaways.


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## 2.6 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown

*The data below relates to criminal damage and robbery offences committed within a Km² centred on the site.*

Figure 11: Criminal Damage Targets






Figure 12: Robbery Targets





2.6.1 Criminal Damage Targets: The makeup of the criminal damage in this area shows that properties are almost twice as likely to be targeted as vehicles. Common incidents of criminal damage include graffiti, windows being smashed (both of properties and vehicles) and damage to vehicle bodywork.

2.6.2 Robbery Targets: Robbery against the person is much more prevalent than against businesses in this area. The risk of personal robbery increases when lone victims take quieter, more secluded routes through the area in the evening/at night.

## 2.7 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.7.1 Theft of customer property



*Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' (see opposite) to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The internal layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment.*

2.7.2 Rear doors and windows have been forced open with tools

*Possible Solution - Although the location of doors and windows should be considered (ideally placed where they can be readily observed, so that potential criminals would be more easily detected), it is inevitable that some will be located where they will benefit from lower levels of natural surveillance. All external doors and windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors/windows are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can deter criminals from attempting this, by deterring access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passersby.*

2.7.3 Shutters have been forced upwards

*Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc) have been scrutinised by professionals. Consideration should also be given to certified shutters built into the fabric of the building or discreet security grilles that would secure the building out-of-hours without raising the fear of crime.*


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2.7.4 Burglary where rear windows have been smashed to gain entry.

*Possible Solution - An appropriate glazing specification should be used (incorporating at least one pane of laminated glazing) to adequately secure the building (see Section 5.2). In vulnerable locations, shutters or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection.*

# 3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict (particularly in the evening)
- Misc. theft of customer belongings
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises

# 4 Design Considerations

The design and layout of your development will be appraised both in this document and through face-to-face meetings if and when required. Design for Security does recommend however that designers and developers refer to:

## 4.1 Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London

Seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention are detailed within Chapter 2 of this ODPM publication. Annex 3 also contains many useful references. You can download 'Safer Places' at www.designforsecurity.org

## 4.2 Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/


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# 5 Design & Layout Appraisal

5.1.1 The proposal is to change the use of the existing ground floor unit from A1 retail use, to an A3 restaurant, with ancillary A4 bar area, managed and operated by Turtle Bay Restaurants. The existing shopfront onto Oldham Street will be retained and repaired, with the addition of new signage and mesh panels adjacent to the exterior tables. The rear of premises will also remain largely unaltered, except for the addition of condensers and an extract duct. Internally, the premises will house an island bar servery, 18no. easy bar seats, 41 no. high stools and 112 no. dining covers , unisex toilets, a large kitchen and back-of-house areas including a staff room and an office. There will also be an external seating area, providing an additional 16 no. covers.

5.1.2 The proposed opening hours of the restaurant will be:

- 8am to 12.30am Sunday to Thursday; and
- 8am to 1.30am Friday and Saturday.

## 5.2 External Alterations

5.2.1 Although it is noted that they are not currently part of the proposed scope of works, if any external works are to be carried out either now or in the future, it is strongly recommended that the following physical security measures are incorporated:

- Any new external doors should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. Any escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- Any new windows should be compliant with and certified to BS 7950 or BS PAS 24, where possible. Any full height windows should take account of the requirements of the standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.
- Any new glazing should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- Any new shutters should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2, and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Where possible, shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building.

5.2.2 The proposed external seating area should be enclosed and defined as separate from the pedestrian footway by barriers/planters, to ensure that pedestrians cannot pass too close-by to the tables/chairs. The layout of the tables/chairs should be configured so that, as much as possible, they are not located directly adjacent to barriers where it would be easy reach over and steal any items of value. Any removable barriers, as well as the table and chairs themselves. should be locked away/secured out-of-hours to prevent damage and mis-use.


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## 5.3 Internal Layout & Security

5.3.1 Restaurant/bar premises can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- Opportunities - Large numbers of people congregating in restaurants generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- Lack of attention - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- Cohesion – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent restaurants means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- Customer turnover – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- Valuable goods – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys, MP3 players etc.
- Stealth - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

5.3.2 In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

- Customers entering/leaving the premises through the main entrance should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.
- The internal layout the premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility. Clear views should also remain from the premises through to the public highway, i.e. large promotional signs and menus should not obstruct views.
- All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible. Internal doors to storage/cellar rooms, staff rooms and offices should also be solid-core and self-closing - fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with keys (carried by staff only if required for duties and accounted for at all times). There should also be a secure cash office – which should have solid masonry walls (with no adjacent false/suspended ceilings), a doorset certified to BS PAS 24 and a safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs.
- Consideration should be given to high/wide bars/service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled).
- Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.

## 5.4 Alarm

5.4.1 An alarm should be installed to cover the entire unit, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (e.g. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre, who will alert the key holder).


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## 5.5 CCTV

5.5.1 Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

5.5.2 CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

5.5.3 Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

5.5.4 With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

5.5.5 Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

**Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

**Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

5.5.6 The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: the main entrance to the premises, customer circulation/seating areas and till positions.

## 5.6 Other

5.6.1 Active continuous management and maintenance of the premises can reduce the likelihood of crime and disorder occurring. An operating/maintenance plan should be created to promote good management of the premises, this plan should focus on issues such as:

- Opening and closing of premises including staff arrival and departure;
- Cash management within the premises;
- Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices;
- Management of stock deliveries;
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc; and
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc.

There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.

5.6.2 The opening hours of the premises should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses.

5.6.3 Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.


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5.6.4 Toilets can give rise to problems and the following issues should be considered:

- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
- Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
- Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
- Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
- Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
- Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

5.6.5 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, flat screen monitors/televisions etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

5.6.6 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.

5.6.7 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to certain areas.


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# A Contact register

| Date | Contact With | Summary of Contact |
|---|---|---|
| 19th March 2014 | Pegasus Group | Receipt of CIS instruction & plans |
| 24th March 2014 | Pegasus Group | Confirmation of instruction & fee |
| 27th March 2014 | Pegasus Group | Email correspondence with Agent clarifying nature of proposals & proposed opening hours |
| 1st April 2014 | Pegasus Group | Email correspondence with Agent re: progress & payment |
| 9th April 2014 | Pegasus Group | Payment cleared & issue of report |

# B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

| DWG No. | DWG Title | Date | Rev |
|---|---|---|---|
| 110/33_101 | Site Location Plan | Feb 2013 | - |
| 110.33/100 | Existing Plan | Feb 2014 | - |
| 110.33/200 | Proposed Layout | Feb 2014 | - |
| 110.33/210 | HVAC Proposed Initial Layout | Feb 2014 | - |
| 110.33/300_A | Licensing Plan | Feb 2014 | A |
| 110.33/400 | Existing Shopfront | Mar 2014 | - |
| 110.33/401 | Existing Rear Elevation | Mar 2014 | - |
| 110.33/402 | Proposed Shopfront | Mar 2014 | - |
| 110.33/403 | Proposed Rear Elevation | Mar 2014 | - |

**PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.**

# C CIS Version History

| Version | Status | | | Revisions Made |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | ☐ | ☐ | ☒ | |
| | | | | |


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# D Glossary

## Burglary Resistance Standards

### BS 3621, 2007

***Thief resistant locks. Key Egress.***

The minimum standard for locks on external or entrance doors to be acceptable to the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the police service. The effectiveness of the lock also depends on the quality of the door, frame and other hardware which is not tested by this standard and which may fail before the lock.

### BS 8621, 2007

***Thief resistant locks. Keyless Egress.***

Same as above, but egress is possible without a key (by use of thumb turn or latch lever.

### BS 7950, 1997

***Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.***

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

### BS PAS 23-1, 1999

***General performance requirements for door assemblies.***

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

### BS PAS 24-1, 2007

***General security performance requirements for door assemblies.***

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

### ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

***Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification***

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

### LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

***Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components***

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

### EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

***Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.***

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

## Commonly Used Acronyms

### CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

### CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at ***www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted***)

### CRA

Crime Reduction Advisor. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

### NPT

Neighbourhood Policing Team.

### PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

### LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

### UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

## Useful Websites

***Secured by Design***
***www.securedbydesign.com***

***RIBA Product Selector***
***www.ribaproductselector.com***

***LPCB – Red Book Live***
***www.redbooklive.com***

***Crime Reduction (Home Office)***
***www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk***

***DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre***
***www.designagainstcrime.org***

***Building for Life***
***www.buildingforlife.org***

***CLG (Communities and Local Government)***
***www.communities.gov.uk***


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