

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Crime Impact Statement

Coronation Street Set, ITV Quay Street Site

Change of use from former studio to temporary visitor attraction

For Deloitte

Version A: 25th November 2013

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Not Protectively Marked

Crime Impact Statement

Coronation Street Set, ITV Quay Street Site

Change of use from former studio to temporary visitor attraction

2013/0897/CIS/01

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Executive Summary

☐ **Significant material changes are advised**

☐ **Proposal is satisfactory in principle but minor changes are advised**

☒ **Proposal is generally acceptable subject to the advice in this report**

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. Particular consideration should be given to the following matters, which are discussed in more detail within this report (see Section 5.2):

- The existing security features, including alarm, CCTV and gates should be maintained
- Develop good practice and staff training for cash collection and delivery.
- The building should be capable of being 'zoned', to prevent access

If these concerns / issues can be addresses as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

We would encourage further dialogue with the applicant throughout the design and construction process to ensure the resulting development is secure. Please get in touch with Design for Security if you have any queries regarding the contents of this document, or the security standards referred to therein.

Julia Hall RIBA

Design for Security Consultant

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
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1 Visual Audit

The diagram below highlights relevant local features that could have an impact upon the security of the scheme and/or indicate the presence of crime and antisocial behaviour in the surrounding area.



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- The proposed development site is located from Atherton Street off Quay Street in Manchester city centre in Greater Manchester.
- The street, designated the A34, continues Peter Street westwards towards the River Irwell and Salford.
- Quay Street Was created in the 18th century for access to a quay on the river and is lined by several listed buildings.
- Edward Byrom built a quay on the River Irwell in the 1730's and the street was built to link it to Deansgate which was then known as Aldport Lane.
- The Opera House, formerly known as The New Theatre, was built in 1912 by Richardson and Gill with Farquarson in the Classical style.
- Architect Joseph Sunlight, built the Grade II* listed Sunlight House.
- The street is known for Granada Studios, the UK's first purpose built television studios and home to Granada Television.
- The building was designed by architect, Ralph Tubbs and was an early example of a building constructed using the curtain wall method.

1 View from Artherton Street looking north along Artherton Street towards Quay Street.

2 View from Artherton Street looking west at the Granada Studios building. The entrance to the proposed development site is located centrally within the photo.

3 View from Artherton Street looking northwest towards to entrance of the proposed development site.

4 View from the entrance of the proposed development site looking north along Artherton Street towards Quay Street. Note there are two lines of gates to enter the proposed development site. Located to the left of the photo is the proposed entrance point for visitors.

5 View from Artherton Street at the typical boundary treatment to the proposed development site.

6 View from within the proposed development site looking southeast towards an existing gated entry point to Lower Byrom Street

7 View from within the proposed development site of the existing television set for Coronation Street.

8 View the rear of the proposed development site showing typical boundary fencing and security measures. Note the boundary sensors linked to an existing monitored alarm and CCTV system.

9 View from within the proposed development site looking southwest towards the boundary of Manchester Museum of Science and Industry. The boundary fencing is a minimum of 2100mm in height.

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Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st November 2012 and 2013.

1.1 Crime Count

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
<20	108	127	303	379	27	<20	154	<20	100

1.1.1 The volume of crime in this area is high, due to its location within the city centre. The volumes of violent crimes, theft, robbery and vehicle crime are exceptionally high and the rate of burglary at commercial premises is much greater than is experienced across Manchester as a whole.

1.2 Misc Theft (Proposed Use Only): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 2: Misc Theft – Day Range





Figure 3: Misc Theft – Time Range



1.2.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of theft of personal property is highest on Saturday and Sunday, peaking on Sunday. A high proportion of the thefts in the local area have taken place in restaurants and bars, which are typically busiest at the weekend.

1.2.2 Time Range: The risk of theft is highest in the evening and early hours and in the morning. The majority of thefts have take place in restaurants and bars which are busiest in the evening, and at night, and opportunities to commit theft are greatest.

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1.3 Burglary Other (Proposed Use Only): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary other offences committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 4: Burglary Other – Day Range




Figure 5: Burglary Other – Time Range





Figure 6: Burglary Other – Point of Entry



1.3.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of burglary at commercial premises is highest on Saturday, with the lowest risk experienced on Wednesday.

1.3.2 Time Range: The risk of burglary in the local area is concentrated in the evening and in the early hours of the morning. Offenders frequently target commercial premises, within the city centre, at night and in the early hours of the morning when the area is less busy – particularly between Sunday and Thursday, it is dark and they perceive the risk of being caught or identified as low.

1.3.3 Point of Entry: The majority of burglaries have been committed through doors, both front and rear doors, windows have also been targeted and areas restricted to staff within public buildings have been targeted. Doors have typically been forced open with bodily pressure and tools. Glazing in both doors and windows has been smashed by offenders to gain entry.

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1.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 7: Vehicle Crime – Day Range





Figure 8: Vehicle Crime – Time Range



1.4.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of vehicle crime peaks on Monday and Thursday.

1.4.2 Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime in the local area is greatest in the evening, peaking between 7pm and 9pm. It is likely that offenders target vehicles at this time when it is dark and vehicles parked on remote/isolated side streets and car parks are vulnerable to attack undetected.

1.5 Wounding: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to instances of wounding committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 7: Vehicle Crime – Day Range





Figure 8: Vehicle Crime – Time Range



1.5.1 Day Range: Violent crime peaks at the weekend. Between Friday and Sunday, a greater number of people attend city centre licensed premises, often drinking for longer periods and consuming more alcohol – leading to conflicts.

1.5.2 Time Range: The risk of violent crime increases in the late evening and into the early hours of the morning, peaking between 1am and 4am. At these times, those attending licenses premises are more likely to be intoxicated and violent disorder is more likely to breakout in licensed premises, on streets, at taxi ranks/bus stops/train stations and at takeaways.

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1.6 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown

The data below relates to criminal damage and robbery offences committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 11: Criminal Damage Targets





Figure 12: Robbery Targets



1.6.1 Criminal damage: The makeup of the criminal damage in this area shows that properties are almost twice as likely to be targeted as vehicles. Common incidents of criminal damage include graffiti, windows being smashed (both of properties and vehicles) and damage to vehicle bodywork.

1.6.2 Robbery: The majority of robberies in this area have been against individuals rather than businesses. Individuals walking alone through the area at night have been targeted most frequently.

1.7 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

1.7.1 Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools

Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 6.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doorsets have resisted a series of professional attacks (using a variety of tools) including to the door itself, the frame, the locks and the fittings. They are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by staff, security personnel or passersby. Consideration should also be given to security-certified shutters (see Section 6.2) to protect particularly vulnerable doors.

1.7.2 Glazing in rear doors and windows has been smashed

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 6). The windows themselves should also be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 6), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. It may be necessary for more vulnerable windows to be fitted with security-certified shutters, blinds or grilles, in order to provide some additional protection.

1.7.3 Offenders have forced access into staff restricted areas of public buildings

Possible Solution - All secured areas and access to obvious risk areas/staff areas should be restricted by lockable doors/access controls.

2 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Safety of medical records and drugs
- Theft of personal belongings (patients and staff)

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- Criminal damage to property
- Unauthorised access to private space/restricted areas
- Robbery and attacks on staff, patients and members of the public
- Arson
- Bicycle theft
- Loitering groups
- Theft of/from parked cars
- Acts of criminal damage during the construction period.

3 Design Considerations

The design and layout of your development will be appraised both in this document and through face-to-face meetings if and when required. Design for Security does recommend however that designers and developers refer to:

3.1 Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London

Seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention are detailed within Chapter 2 of this ODPM publication. Annex 3 also contains many useful references. You can download 'Safer Places' at www.designforsecurity.org

3.2 Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

4 Design & Layout Appraisal

4.1 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

4.1.1 The proposed development site is surrounded by existing secure boundary treatments.

4.1.2 The proposed development site has an existing monitored alarm and CCTV system.

4.1.3 The proposed development site currently employs 24 hour security presence on site.

4.1.4 The proposed development site has a secure single entrance sequence for visitors from Artherton Street. A personal attack alarm should be provided within the entrance booth, which activates a loud alarm at the scene. The activation of the alarm may well shock and disorientate visitors and clearly signals that assistance has been requested.

4.1.5 The proposed development site has a double gate (air lock) arrangement for both vehicles and pedestrian visitors located at the site entrance.

4.2 Changes and Amendments Needed

4.2.1 This proposal has been identified by Greater Manchester Police as potentially vulnerable to weaknesses in radio communications. Please contact **Gwyneth Howes**, at GMP Radio Network Services, on **0161 856 0855** to confirm the levels of radio coverage provided by the proposal.

4.2.2 The existing security features, including alarm, CCTV and gates should be maintained within the proposal for the new visitors attraction.

4.2.3 Develop good practice and staff training for cash collection and delivery.

4.2.4 Ensure a time delay safe and secure safe room available. All internal doors to staff areas (including offices, stores etc.) should have proximity-reader or swipe card auditable access controls to prevent unauthorised access. Any cash management offices should have solid masonry walls (with no adjacent

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false/suspended ceilings) and a certified doorset (see above) with safes providing adequate capacity and overnight cover, with a deposit facility, certified to LPS 1183. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs. There should be direct access to any cash office for cash in transit (CIT) personnel, away from the general public. A dedicated parking area should be provided for the cash-in-transit vehicle within the immediately vicinity of the access point.

4.2.5 The building should be capable of being 'zoned', to prevent access to all other portions of the building when it is being used out-of-hours (e.g. limit access to other areas when only the theatre is in use). Each 'zone' should be capable of being independently secured.

4.2.6 Toilets can give rise to crime and anti-social behaviour issues and the following issues should be considered:

- Avoid areas where items such as drug paraphernalia can be hidden (e.g. suspended ceilings). Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work, etc. should be used. Services where possible should be accessed from outside the facility.
- Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
- Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening. This will aid gaining access to collapsed persons. Opaque panels can be used to great effect to ensure no persons are collapsed inside, whilst preserving privacy. This measure discourages drug taking and facilitates staff checks. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 20 centimetres from the floor and to reduce the top height.
- Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
- Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats (to a minimum of 400mm from the top of the door).
- Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

4.2.7 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to certain areas.

4.2.8 Lighting should be provided to the access road/all parking areas and the exterior of the building, to an adequate and uniform level (as defined within BS 5489), so as not to allow any areas of pooling/shadowing.

4.2.9 It is preferable to have cycle lockers for customers to use. If not, there should be 'sheffield' style racks provided in a highly visible location.

4.2.10 Any refuse storage areas should be fully enclosed and secured so that the bins are not vulnerable to attack.

4.2.11 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

4.2.12 Careful consideration should be given to securing the site during construction, to prevent unauthorized access and theft of equipment. The new rear boundary to proposed construction site should be adequately secured to prevent visitors to the proposed new attraction accessing the construction site and conversely secure enough to prevent access from the construction site to the visitor's attraction.

5 Physical Security

The following standards and features will be required for this development to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.

5.1 Doors

5.1.1 External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2.

5.1.2 Sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

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5.1.3 Revolving doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

5.1.4 External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

5.1.5 Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

5.1.6 All external doors should be fitted with alarm contacts (only if an alarm is to be provided; see section 11.4)

5.1.7 Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

5.2 Windows and Shutters

5.2.1 Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.

5.2.2 Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

5.2.3 Shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required), and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

5.3 Glazing

Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

5.4 Alarms

5.4.1 If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors.

5.4.2 If an alarm is installed, PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

5.4.3 If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be an infrastructure in place to allow for the easy installation of an alarm system (conduits and power points).

5.4.4 It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security patrol team).

5.5 Access Control

5.5.1 Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:

- All restricted areas
- All staff areas

5.6 Boundaries

5.6.1 Secure boundary treatments should generally be 2100mm high and of welded wire mesh construction. It is recommended that a 358-type fence panel is used in higher risk situations.

5.6.2 There should be minimal ground clearance beneath the fence, to reduce the potential for crawling in to secure areas.

5.6.3 The site boundary treatment should be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary.

5.6.4 Sub-divisional boundaries within the site may be as low as 1800mm.

5.6.5 The openly accessible areas of the site should be demarcated by a low boundary and/or indicated by a change in surface treatment to communicate a sense of ownership of the space.

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5.6.6 Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

5.6.7 Gates should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:

- A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
- A key operable deadlock

Double gates should have lockable (or externally inaccessible) drop bolts to each leaf.

5.7 Fit-Out

Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their buildings once complete, and therefore the end-users requirements. Typical components which are subject to fit-out are:

- Internal access control
- Internal doors in to premises
- Alarm systems

These features can be critical to a secure environment, and we would urge the client to provide would-be tenants with the contact details for Design for Security, who will provide free advice on internal security matters so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

6 External Features

6.1 Landscaping

6.1.1 In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

6.1.2 Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

6.1.3 Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

6.1.4 There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

6.2 Lighting

6.2.1 External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.

6.2.2 Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

6.2.3 Dusk ‘til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

6.2.4 Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

6.3 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

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6.3.1 CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

6.3.2 Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

6.3.3 With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

6.3.4 Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Main entrances, lifts, stairwells, sales counters and lobbies.

6.4 Car Parks

6.4.1 Lighting to car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 10 (rural areas) or 20 (urban areas) with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.

6.4.2 Lighting to basement and/or under croft parking areas should display an average lux level of 75-100, with a uniformity level of no less than 50%.

6.4.3 Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.

6.4.4 Where feasible, a one-way system should be implemented to reduce the likelihood of collisions and conflict.

6.4.5 Electronic car park exit gates should not be on an induction loop (open automatically). All gates to car parks should be fob-in and fob-out.

6.4.6 Pedestrian gates in to car parks should also be fob in and fob out only.

6.5 Communal Areas

6.5.1 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6.6 Other

6.6.1 There must be no features of the building envelope which create sheltered/hiding places or ledges, which could endanger passers-by or encourage loitering.

6.6.2 Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

6.6.3 Any cycle stores should be secure, lockable enclosures. For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: http://www.designforsecurity.org/uploads/files/DFS_Cycles.pdf

6.6.4 Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

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7 Management & Maintenance

The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

8 Construction

Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
11.11.13	L. Feekins	CIS application received
20.11.13	J. Hall	Site visit
25.11.13	J. Hall	CIS report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

DWG No.	DWG Title	Date	Rev
P237.CS.002	Coronation Street Tour Site Boundaries	10/13	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status			Revisions Made
A	☐	☐	☒	

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 3621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Key Egress.

The minimum standard for locks on external or entrance doors to be acceptable to the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the police service. The effectiveness of the lock also depends on the quality of the door, frame and other hardware which is not tested by this standard and which may fail before the lock.

BS 8621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Keyless Egress.

Same as above, but egress is possible without a key (by use of thumb turn or latch lever.

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2007

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at ***www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted***)

CRA

Crime Reduction Advisor. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

NPT

Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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