

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Crime Impact Statement

Santaidd Manor, Burnage Lane, Burnage

Conversion of Building to form 13 no. Apartments

For Westwood Group Ltd.

Version A: 12/03/14

www.designforsecurity.org
info@designforsecurity.org
0161 856 5912

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

Not Protectively Marked

Crime Impact Statement

Santaidd Manor, Burnage Lane, Burnage

Conversion of Building to form 13 no. Apartments

2014/0151/CIS/01

For Westwood Group Ltd.
Version A: 12/03/14

Executive Summary

☐ **Significant material changes are advised**

☒ **Proposal is satisfactory in principle but minor changes are advised**

☐ **Proposal is generally acceptable subject to the advice in this report**

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. Particular consideration should be given to the following matters, which are discussed in more detail within Section 5.3 of this report:

- Secure line to the side of building (incorporating access controlled pedestrian and vehicular gates), preventing unauthorised access to the side/rear of the building.
- Relocation of visitor parking spaces to the front of the site (outside of the private car park/landscaping space).
- Existing dense vegetation to the frontage of the site removed, thinned or lowered to allow views of/from the building.

If these issues/concerns can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

I would encourage further dialogue with the applicant throughout the design and construction process to ensure the resulting development is secure. Please get in touch with Design for Security if you have any queries regarding the contents of this document, or the security standards referred to therein.



Bradley Hart *MTCP*

Design for Security Consultant

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

Contents

1 Visual Audit 4
2 Crime Statistics & Analysis 6
2.1 Crime Count and Rate Comparison
2.2 Burglary: Risk Analysis
2.3 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis
2.4 Wounding: Risk Analysis
2.5 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown
2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)
3 Risk Factors 10
4 Design Considerations 10
4.1 Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London
4.2 Secured by Design (SBD)
5 Design & Layout Appraisal 11
5.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal
5.3 Points for Further Consideration
6 Physical Security 13
6.1 Doors & Access Controls
6.2 Windows
6.3 Glazing
6.4 Alarms
6.5 Boundaries
7 External Features 14
7.1 Landscaping
7.2 Lighting
7.3 Communal Areas
7.4 Other
8 Management & Maintenance 15
9 Construction 15

Appendix

A Contact register 16
B Associated Documents 16
C CIS Version History 16
D Glossary 17

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

1 Visual Audit

The diagram below highlights relevant local features that could have an impact upon the security of the scheme and/or indicate the presence of crime and antisocial behaviour in the surrounding area.



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

Photos 1 to 3

The site lies on the west side of Burnage Lane and is currently occupied by a large, 2/3 storey former residential property that was last in use as an education centre for oversees students. The building is now derelict and many of the ground and lower ground floor windows have been boarded-up or are shuttered. The frontage of the site has been secured with temporary herras fencing, behind the existing low walls/gates. The hard standing and landscaping areas surrounding the building within the site are unkempt/overgrown. Such unattractive/derelict sites can often attract abuse. Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if an offenders presence does not attract attention and a place feels like it is not under supervision.

Photos 4 to 6

The northern boundary of the site abuts the rear boundary of a two-storey cottage fronting away from the site (and accessed off Burnage Lane) and a narrow watercourse/open land to the rear of the terraced properties fronting onto Burnage Lane. The southern boundary of the site runs adjacent to a narrow private access road (which directly abuts the side gable of the building), leading to a residential property known as The Coach House to the rear (west) of the site. The access road is fitted with high gates to secure it to the south-west of the site.

Photo 7

The frontage of the site is formed by a low wall and gates to the pedestrian/vehicular entrance off Burnage Lane. There are mature trees and vegetation at the front of the building which have dense foliage, particularly during spring/summer months. This impedes views of and from the building from the street and may provide hiding places that could be exploited by criminals.

Photos 8 & 9

The surrounding area is primarily residential in nature. There are two-storey residential properties on the opposite side of Burnage Lane overlooking the site (albeit with a restricted view – see above). That being said, to the south of the site is St. Bernard's RC Church and Presbytery, beyond which is Green End Primary School and Burnage Media Arts College. Burnage Library lies to the north-east of the site (at the junction of Burnage Lane and Shawbrook Road), adjacent to which is Burnage Community Centre and Healthcare Practice. This building has been heavily fortified with retro-fitted shutters, grilles and anti-climb measures along its eaves – indicting that it has experienced problems with crime and disorder.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st February 2013 and 2014.

2.1 Crime Count and Rate Comparison

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
52	<20	48	71	<20	<20	<20	42	<20	<20

2.1.1 The volume of crime within the local area is relatively high, particularly when it is considered that the study area includes some large areas of open space to the north-east (off Avon Road) and to the south-east (around Mauldath Hall and Heaton Moor Golf Course) which are not densely populated. The most prevalent types of crime in the local area are less serious wounding, burglary dwelling, criminal damage and vehicle crime. The rate (per 1,000 dwellings) of domestic burglary in the local area is higher than the average for Manchester and Greater Manchester as a whole.

Figure 2: Comparison of Burglary Dwelling Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 3: Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 4: Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 5: Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



2.1.2 The number of domestic burglaries per dwelling is **higher** than Manchester as a whole, and **higher** than Greater Manchester.

2.1.3 The number of woundings per dwelling is **lower** than Manchester as a whole, and **higher** than Greater Manchester.

2.1.4 Incidents of criminal damage per dwelling are **lower** than Manchester as a whole, and **lower** than Greater Manchester.

2.1.5 Incidents of vehicle crime per dwelling are **lower** than Manchester as a whole, and **higher** than Greater Manchester.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2.2 Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 6: Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Figure 7: Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Figure 8: Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.2.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of burglary dwelling within the local area peaks on Monday and Friday.

2.2.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk of burglary dwelling within the local area rises throughout the afternoon and peaks during the evening (between 8 and 9pm). Offenders often target dwellings during the day when they are more likely to be unoccupied (e.g. while residents are out at work). During the evening, offenders can more easily observe which dwellings are unoccupied and attempt to gain unauthorised access to them without fear of being observed/disturbed.

2.2.3 Point of Entry: The majority of burglaries have been committed through rear doors and windows. Rear points of entry are often targeted, as offenders can conceal themselves from view. Rear doors have been forced open with tools and rear windows have been prised open by offenders. In a number of incidents, the glazing in rear doors and windows has been smashed by offenders to gain entry. Front doors have also been targeted by offenders, who have forced them with bodily pressure or tools.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2.3 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 9: Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Figure 10: Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.3.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of vehicle crime is concentrated between Friday and Monday – peaking on Monday.

2.3.2 Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime is greatest in the evening and early hours of the morning. Offenders frequently target vehicles at these times when it is dark, streets/car parks are quiet and they perceive a lower risk of being detected or indentified.

2.4 Wounding: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to woundings committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 11: Wounding – Day Range



Figure 12: Wounding – Time Range



2.4.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of violence is greatest on Sunday and Monday.

2.4.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk of violence is greatest in the afternoon and in the evening. The risk of violence often increases at these times when alcohol has been consumed in homes, on streets and in licensed premises - leading to conflicts.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2.5 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown

The data below relates to criminal damage and robbery committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 13: Criminal Damage Targets



Figure 14: Robbery Targets



2.5.1 Criminal Damage Targets: The majority of criminal damage in the local area has targeted properties rather than vehicles. In a high number of cases of criminal damage, windows of both buildings and vehicles have been smashed.

2.5.2 Robbery Targets: All robberies in this area have been against individuals rather than businesses. Individuals walking alone through the area at night have been targeted most frequently.

2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Front and rear doors forced open with bodily pressure or tools

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 6.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All private spaces to the sides/rears of the dwellings should be robustly enclosed (particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space) to deter unauthorised access (see Section 6.5). Lighting to the front and rear of the buildings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime (see Section 7.2).

2.6.2 Rear windows prised open to gain entry

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible windows should also be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 6.2), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. Again, unauthorised access to the rear of the dwellings should be deterred by robust boundaries and the avoidance of open pedestrian routes to the rear of the properties.

2.6.3 Glazed panels in and around doors being smashed to gain entry

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 6.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

4 Design Considerations

The design and layout of your development will be appraised both in this document and through face-to-face meetings if and when required. Design for Security does recommend however that designers and developers refer to:

4.1 Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London

Seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention are detailed within Chapter 2 of this ODPM publication. Annex 3 also contains many useful references. You can download 'Safer Places' at www.designforsecurity.org

4.2 Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

5 Design & Layout Appraisal

5.1.1 The proposal is to convert the existing building to form 13 no. 1 and 2 bedroom apartments, with associated parking and landscaping. The lower ground floor of the building will house 4 no. apartments. Apartment 4 will be accessed via an external entrance at the front of the building and Apartments 1, 2 and 3 will be accessed via entrances to the rear of the building. The remainder of the apartment will be served by the existing communal entrance to the building (including Apartments 5 to 8 at ground floor/mezzanine level, Apartments 10 to 13 at first floor level and Apartment 9 within the roof space. The existing pedestrian/vehicular entrance to the site is to be retained, as are the existing wall and vegetation to the front of the site. 4 no. vehicle parking spaces will be provided at the front of the site (to the north-east of the building) and a further 9 no. spaces will be provided to the rear of the building. Two visitor spaces are proposed to the (north) side of the building and there is to be a cycle store to the rear of the building and an enclosed bin store to the front of the site.

5.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

5.2.1 The majority of the proposed apartments will be served by a single, clearly defined communal entrance in a prominent position, capable of being robustly controlled to prevent unauthorised access.

5.2.2 There will be habitable room windows to the front, rear and north side elevations of the building, maximising surveillance opportunities over all parking, landscaping areas, cycle and bin stores.

5.2.3 The development will occupy a currently derelict building/site, which has an unkempt appearance, and will bring back some activity, overlooking and surveillance to the area.

5.2.4 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

5.3 Points for Further Consideration

5.3.1 Some of the external entrances to the lower ground floor apartments will be located at the rear of the building, where they cannot be seen from the street. This allows would-be criminals to legitimately enter the site and have access to all elevations of the building, leaving the building and parked vehicles vulnerable to attack. Ideally, the lower ground floor apartments should be accessed via the main communal entrance visible from Burnage Lane, meaning that any visitors can be well-overlooked from the street and do not have to access what should be defined/enclosed as private space to the side/rear of the building. If this is absolutely unachievable, there should be a secure line at the side of the building formed by high railings, with access controlled pedestrian and vehicular gates, to control access to where the building and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen (see Sections 6.1 and 6.5). This will also protect some of the low windows to the side of the building, which may be vulnerable to damage if left publicly accessible. Care must be taken to ensure that the steps up to the communal entrance of the building do not form a climbing aid over the secure boundary.



5.3.2 In light of the above, the proposed visitor parking spaces should be relocated to the front of the building. The parking areas to the side and rear of the building should be for residents only and should only be accessible to residents and visitors to Apartments 1, 2 and 3 (via the access controlled gates described above).

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

5.3.3 The boundary treatments to the site are vitally important to secure it, any parked vehicles and prevent unauthorised access to private spaces – particularly where rear boundaries abut publicly accessible space or poorly overlooked areas that may provide easy access/escape routes for criminals to utilise (see Section 6.5). The front elevation of the block should be protected by some defensible space, defined by the existing low-level wall, creating an area in front of building entirely separate from the street, in ownership/control of the residents themselves. At present, the dense vegetation to the frontage limits views into the site from the street. It is highly recommended that the existing vegetation is removed, thinned or lowered (see Section 7.1) to allow surveillance of and from the building and avoid hiding places that offenders could exploit. The cycle store and bin store must be robustly enclosed to prevent unauthorised access, damage and theft.

5.3.4 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

6 Physical Security

The following standards and features will be required for this development to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.

6.1 Doors & Access Controls

6.1.1 All external doorsets should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product.

6.1.2 The main communal entrance to the building (serving Apartments 5 to 13) should be single-leaf and secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system (and fob-controlled by residents). It should be self-closing and controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access.

6.1.3 The communal entrance to the rear of the building (serving Apartments 2 and 3) should also be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an audio access control system linked to each apartment.

6.1.4 The external entrance doors to Apartments 1 and 4 should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key. They should also have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.

6.1.5 The pedestrian gate to the side of the building (see Section 6.5) should be 2100mm high, self-closing and fob-controlled by residents. The gate should be fitted with the same video access control system as the main communal entrance to the building itself. Any internal release mechanism/push-button to the gate must not be capable of being reached/operated from the exterior of the site.

6.1.6 All individual internal apartment entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead. Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended, but not generally essential.

6.1.7 Postal delivery arrangements should allow for external deposits and internal withdrawals by residents.

6.2 Windows

6.2.1 Windows and must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.

6.2.2 Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

6.3 Glazing

6.3.1 Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 0.8mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 6.8mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P2A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

6.4 Alarms

6.4.1 Each apartment should have an intruder alarm to comply with either:

- BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems; or
- BS 6799 for wireless systems.

6.4.2 Alarms should be linked to contacts on all entrance doors and PIR detectors should cover any upper/lower ground floor rooms with windows.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

6.5 Boundaries

6.5.1 The north side and rear of the building should be enclosed and defined as private space by 2100mm high walls/railings and gates. Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls/railings should have railings panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.

6.5.2 There should be a secure line to the north side of the building (see Section 5.3), formed by 2100mm high railings incorporating an access controlled pedestrian gate and vehicular gates (preferably sliding). The vehicular gate/s should be operated using a key fob/proximity reader system with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out') so that criminals cannot gain access to the area, attack the vehicles and escape. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, lighting columns, trees etc. If double gates are used, they should overlap when closed and should not be capable of being forced open. Exposed hinges and large apertures/locking points to any gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.

6.5.3 The front of the site should be demarcated by the existing wall along Burnage Lane and low-level walls railings (i.e. 1200-1500mm high) along the access road to the south of the site. The existing vegetation to the frontage of the site must be managed/maintained in order to aid surveillance and overlooking over the building/parking areas from the street (see Section 7.1).

6.5.4 Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

7 External Features

7.1 Landscaping

7.1.1 The existing vegetation to the frontage of the site (any any proposed vegetation to the rest of the site) should not exceed approx.1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than approx. 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow surveillance of and from the building, allow people to see their surroundings better and make rational choices and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions are adhered to.

7.1.2 Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

7.1.3 Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

7.1.4 There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

7.2 Lighting

8.1.1 External lighting must be provided to all parking areas and pedestrian routes, in accordance with BS 5489.

7.2.1 External lighting must also be provided to all external entrances, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended.

7.2.2 Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

7.2.3 Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

7.3 Communal Areas

7.3.1 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

7.4 Other

7.4.1 Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

7.4.2 The cycle store should be a secure, lockable enclosure. For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: http://www.designforsecurity.org/uploads/files/DFS_Cycles.pdf

7.4.3 The bin stores should also be a secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosure. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

8 Management & Maintenance

8.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter/graffiti removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls etc.)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

9 Construction

9.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

9.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
24th February 2014	Mimar Architecture	Receipt of CIS instruction & plans
26th February 2014	Mimar Architecture	Confirmation of instruction & fee
12th March 2014	Mimar Architecture	Email correspondence with Agent re: progress & payment
26th March 2014	Mimar Architecture	Confirmation of payment & issue of CIS report to Agent

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

DWG No.	DWG Title	Date	Rev
MA306 PL-01	Existing Site Location Plan	Feb 2014	-
MA306 PL-02	Existing Topographical Site Plan	Feb 2014	-
MA306 PL-03	Existing Plans	Feb 2014	-
MA306 PL-04	Existing Elevation	Feb 2014	-
MA306 PL-05	Proposed Site Plan	Feb 2014	-
MA306 PL-06	Proposed Floor Plans	Feb 2014	-
MA306 PL-07	Proposed Elevations	Feb 2014	-
MA306 PL-08	External Works and Landscape Proposal	Feb 2014	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status			Revisions Made
A	☐	☒	☐	

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 3621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Key Egress.

The minimum standard for locks on external or entrance doors to be acceptable to the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the police service. The effectiveness of the lock also depends on the quality of the door, frame and other hardware which is not tested by this standard and which may fail before the lock.

BS 8621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Keyless Egress.

Same as above, but egress is possible without a key (by use of thumb turn or latch lever.

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2007

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at ***www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted***)

CRA

Crime Reduction Advisor. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

NPT

Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable