

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Crime Impact Statement

Land off Bamford Street, Clayton

14 Houses

For Mosaic Town Planning

Revision A: 19th January 2011

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Not Protectively Marked

Crime Impact Statement

Land off Bamford Street, Clayton

14 Houses

2011/0011/CIS/01

For Mosaic Town Planning
Revision A: 19th January 2011

Executive Summary

☐ **Significant material changes are advised**

☐ **Proposal is satisfactory in principle but minor changes are advised**

☒ **Proposal is generally acceptable subject to the advice in this report**

The general layout of the proposal is acceptable and workable from our perspective. Some slight alterations to boundary positioning (mainly plots 6 and 9) and driveway security are advised, which are detailed in section 5.2 (page 11). Furthermore, the boundary specification (including heights) should be brought in line with those contained in section 5.2 and section 6.5.

Once these amendments have been made, I would be happy to support the scheme providing that the physical security specification (section 6) can is also incorporated.



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1 Visual Audit

The diagram below highlights relevant local features that could have an impact upon the security of the scheme and/or indicate the presence of crime and antisocial behaviour in the surrounding area.



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9



1 The north of the site fronts on to the blank gables of adjacent terraced streets. Whilst these gables will offer few surveillance opportunities over the new development, the new development will be able to offer new sources of surveillance over the existing properties. Future regeneration of the existing properties may also allow for mutual surveillance, therefore any development should overlook this route for an increased sense of safety.

2 This corner plot does feature openings overlooking the site. It is advised against to have such openings directly on the footpath, which leads to curtains being drawn (for privacy), and an increased opportunity for criminal damage. The new development should make good use of defensible space, and avoid replicating this feature.

3 The north of the site comprises an imposing brick wall, which creates a sense of enclosure, as well as a lack of surveillance. Redevelopment could help to open up this space, and add more activity to the space, which is an ingredient of a safe environment.

4 The west of the site is overlooked by industrial/warehouse units, which again offer little in the way of surveillance over the site. This stretch of Bank Street feels quite isolated given the lack of activity, or apparent human presence. Residential use will add this activity, but the limited counter-surveillance of the opposing units will require a sensitive design and security specification.

5 Existing street furniture, such as these service boxes needs to be considered in the design of the proposed scheme. Such features, if retained, must not obscure important views to and from properties, provide hiding places along pedestrian routes, or be in close proximity to secure boundary treatments (as they could act as convenient climbing aids in to rear gardens for example).

6 Although there is no residential use directly to the west or south of the site, some activity is generated by the industrial units. These units do however display quite overt security measures (shutters, razor wire etc) which may not only reflect high crime levels, but also serves to increase the fear of crime.

7 A garage is directly to the south of the site, but as with the industrial units, any activity generated by this establishment will cease out of operating hours, placing emphasis on the security of the proposed development.

8 The parking signage would imply that there are, or have been, issues surrounding parking associated with the City of Manchester Stadium. Residents should be able to park within clear view of their properties and within the curtilage of the plot.

9 Properties to the east of the site show good defensible space, with gated driveways. The new development should continue this.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st January 2010 and 2011.

2.1 Crime Count and Rate Comparison

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
47	<20	62	80	58	28	<20	22	<20	<20

Figure 2: Comparison of Burglary Dwelling Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 3: Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 4: Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



Figure 5: Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



2.1.1 The volume of crime in this area is high, especially considering that there is a large amount of open space in the area studied. The rate of all crimes examined above, with the exception of vehicle crime, is higher than what is experienced on average in both Manchester and Greater Manchester.

2.1.2 The number of domestic burglaries per dwelling is **higher** than Manchester as a whole, and **higher** than Greater Manchester as a whole.

2.1.3 The number of woundings per dwelling is **higher** than Manchester as a whole, and **higher** than Greater Manchester as a whole.

2.1.4 Incidents of criminal damage per dwelling are **lower** than Manchester as a whole, and **higher** than Greater Manchester as a whole.

2.1.5 Incidents of vehicle crime per dwelling are **lower** than Manchester as a whole, and **higher** than Greater Manchester as a whole.

2.2 Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 6: Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Figure 7: Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Figure 8: Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.2.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of burglary is greatest during the week between Monday and Friday, with the risk of burglary lower at the weekend. The peak days for burglary during the week are Monday and Tuesday.

2.2.2 Time Range: During the day the risk of burglary predominately occurs in the evening and the early hours of the morning, peaking between 7pm and 8pm. The risk of burglary is likely to be higher in the evening and night, when it is dark and offenders can tell with greater ease which dwellings are occupied.

2.2.3 Point of Entry: In the local area the majority of burglaries are committed through rear points of entry, mainly through rear windows but also through rear doors. The rears of property have routinely been accessed through alleyways that run behind most of the terraced properties in the area. Rear windows are frequently prised open to gain entry and in some instances smashed. Rear doors have been forced open with tools or bodily pressure and in a number of instances offenders have entered through insecure front and rear doors.

2.3 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 9: Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Figure 10: Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.3.1 Day Range: The risk of vehicle crime varies during the week, but is generally greater between Monday and Friday than at the weekend. The peak day for vehicle crime during the week is Friday.

2.3.2 Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime is concentrated in the evening and early hours of the morning, peaking between 1am and 2am. It is likely that offenders target vehicles at this time as it is likely to be dark with fewer pedestrians around, and they perceive the risk of being caught as low.

2.4 Wounding: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to woundings committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 11: Wounding – Day Range



Figure 12: Wounding – Time Range



2.4.1 Day Range: A greater volume of violent crime occurs at the weekend, from Friday to Sunday, than during the week. More incidents occurred in licensed premises and on the street on these days and it is likely that the increase in violent crimes is linked to the increased number of people frequenting licensed premises often for longer times.

2.4.2 Time Range: Violent crime rises in the evening and peaks between 7pm and 8pm and again between 1am and 2am. The level of violent disorder is likely to increase in the evening when greater numbers of people are attending licensed premises.

2.5 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown

The data below relates to criminal damage and robbery committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 13: Criminal Damage Targets



Figure 14: Robbery Targets



2.5.1 Criminal Damage Targets: In the area examined, criminal damage to property is just under two thirds of criminal damage with the remaining incidents targeting vehicles. This is typical of the average for Greater Manchester. Routinely incidents of criminal damage include arson, windows being smashed and damage to vehicle bodywork.

2.5.2 Robbery Targets: In the local area there have been a number of robberies and individuals have been targeted more frequently than businesses. Individuals are generally targeted in the evening at night when walking through the area alone.

2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Offenders gaining access to the rear of properties via insecure alleyways

Avoiding the use of rear alleys will help to remove the opportunities for rear access to dwellings. Gates that lead in to the rears of properties, given the high levels of crime committed in this fashion, should be secured with a mechanism that ensures gates cannot be left unlocked.

2.6.2 Rear windows being prised open to gain entry

Windows certified to BS 7950 aim to address this weakness, and incorporate the necessary design and reinforcement features to make this very difficult for criminals to achieve. Furthermore, key-lockable handles, laminated glass, and opening restrictors further enhance windows resilience to attack, and properties resilience to burglary.

2.6.3 Rear doors being forced open with bodily pressure or tools to gain entry

As with windows, a door certified to BS PAS 24 will incorporated the necessary design and specification measures to address this. Avoiding thumb turns, and including laminated glass will further strengthen a door.

2.6.4 Offenders gaining access to dwellings through insecure (open, or unlocked) front and rear doors

Doors which are susceptible to opportunist attempts like this can include features such as split spindles, or fixed outer handles, meaning access is only possible with a key.

3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Antisocial behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

4 Design Considerations

The design and layout of your development will be appraised both in this document and through face-to-face meetings if and when required. Design for Security does recommend however that designers and developers refer to:

4.1 Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London

Seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention are detailed within Chapter 2 of this ODPM publication. Annex 3 also contains many useful references. You can download 'Safer Places' at www.designforsecurity.org

4.2 Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

5 Design & Layout Appraisal

5.1 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

5.1.1 All dwellings face on to the street, with few areas not overlooked by the proposed development.

5.1.2 Each dwelling is to have parking for two cars, located within the property's curtilage.

5.1.3 Driveways and front boundaries will be demarcated by low boundary treatments and gates, which we would deem necessary.

5.1.4 Shared alleys and communal parking areas have been avoided, which is positive. These features place a long term burden on management and maintenance, and often act as enablers for crime and ASB.

5.1.5 Ground floor windows to gables have been included, but importantly these are to active rooms (living/dining spaces) and are narrow, maximising their effectiveness and minimising their vulnerability respectively.

5.1.6 Meter cupboards are shown in accessible areas, the ideal position.

5.2 Changes and Amendments Needed

5.2.1 Our main observation is the parking arrangements for plots 6 and 9. Although adjacent to neighbouring parking, they are quite remote from their respective properties, and therefore out of view of their prospective owners. These spaces should be included within the curtilage of the rear boundary, providing greater security and located in clear view of their respective plots. The sketch below illustrates how this can be achieved, by increasing the depth of the driveway allowed for plot 6:



5.2.2 As shown above, boundaries which directly abut the footpath should be of a more robust construction, and I would prefer to see a brick wall to a height of 2100mm or similar which has greater resilience to damage (be it accidental or intentional). I would also suggest an angled coping to the top of this wall, to increase the difficulty of climbing. If possible, deterrent planting should line the outer face of the wall to set it back from the footpath edge.

5.2.3 Low boundaries which adjoin higher boundaries should have a transitional segment, meaning the lower boundary cannot easily be used as a step up to climb the higher wall. This is relevant where shown above (as well as the mirrored plots to the north) and to the back of all driveways to HT1 plots.

6 Physical Security

The following standards and features will be required for this development to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.

6.1 Doors

6.1.1 Front doors to dwellings must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2.

6.1.2 Any external French/double doors or sliding doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.

6.1.3 Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.

6.1.4 Front doors should have door viewers.

6.1.5 Chain limiters are a recommended addition.

6.1.6 Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

6.1.7 All external doors should be fitted with alarm contacts.

6.2 Windows

6.2.1 Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS 7950.

6.2.2 Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

6.3 Glazing

Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 0.8mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 6.8mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P2A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

6.4 Alarms

6.4.1 Alarms should be installed which comply with either:

- BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
- BS 6799 for wireless systems

6.4.2 The alarm should be linked to contacts on all external doors.

6.4.3 PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

6.5 Boundaries

6.5.1 Rear boundaries between plots (publicly inaccessible) should generally be 1800mm high and of close boarded timber construction. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure to allow for better surveillance between plots (see sketch on page 11).

6.5.2 Rear boundaries that are adjacent to public space should be of masonry construction to a total height of 2100mm. It is recommended that these are topped with an angled coping. These are specified on page 11.

6.5.3 Rear boundaries along driveways should also be 2100mm high including a 300mm trellis topping, to deter climbing in to the rear gardens from the driveways.

6.5.4 Sub-divisional rear/side boundaries may be as low as 1500mm.

6.5.5 The fronts of properties should be demarcated by low boundaries such as planting and/or railings to an approximate height of 1000mm. Openings leading to front doors should be gated.

6.5.6 Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher. These are specified on page 11.

6.5.7 Pedestrian gates in to the rear curtilage of dwellings should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:

- A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
- A key operable deadlock

If residents are likely to use these gates when leaving their property, then the gates must be lockable from both sides.

6.5.8 Vehicular gates in to the rear curtilage of dwellings (requested to plots 6 and 9) must be lockable from both sides by key or padlock. The slave leaf should have a drop bolt internally to secure it in place when locked.

6.5.9 The lower boundaries in the publicly accessible areas should not have flat tops, or a topping which could provide seating. This may encourage loitering. A hoop-top or similar should be used to low railings, or angled bricks to low walls.

7 External Features

7.1 Landscaping

7.1.1 Low planting to the fronts of dwellings should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places.

7.1.2 Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

7.1.3 Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

7.1.4 There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots. These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

7.2 Lighting

7.2.1 External lighting must be provided to the front and rear of dwellings, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended for these locations and should not be employed unless advised.

7.2.2 Gable-end driveways which are protected by low gates must be lit, but this could be through dusk til dawn lighting as above, or PIR security lighting.

7.2.3 Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

7.2.4 Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

7.3 Communal Areas

7.3.1 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

7.4 Other

7.4.1 Meter cupboards should be located to the fronts of properties only, not in the private areas.

7.4.2 Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

7.4.3 Any bin stores should be lockable and located within the secure rear curtilage of dwellings..

8 Management & Maintenance

The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. If applicable, a maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

9 Construction

Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

For further information regarding site security, please contact your local Crime Reduction Advisor, **Denis Brogan**, on **0161 856 3560**.

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
5/1/11	Applicant/Agent	Instruction to prepare CIS
19/1/11	Agent	CIS confirmed as complete to Agent

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

DWG No.	DWG Title	Date	Rev
BAMFORD/HT1/01	HT1 – 2 Bed 4 Person	Jun 10	C
BAMFORD/2BFP/01	LHC – 2 Bed 4 Person	Jun 10	A
BAMFORD/SK/04	Planning Layout	Jun 09	-
BAMFORD/P/01	Scheme Presentation Drawing	Aug 10	-
BAMFORD/LOC/01	Site Location Plan	May 10	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Revision History

Revision	Status			Revisions Made
A	☐	☐	☒	

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 3621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Key Egress.

The minimum standard for locks on external or entrance doors to be acceptable to the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the police service. The effectiveness of the lock also depends on the quality of the door, frame and other hardware which is not tested by this standard and which may fail before the lock.

BS 8621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Keyless Egress.

Same as above, but egress is possible without a key (by use of thumb turn or latch lever.

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2007

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at *www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted*)

CRA

Crime Reduction Advisor. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

NPT

Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk