

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Crime Impact Statement

Manchester Fort Shopping Park, Cheetham Hill Road

Restaurant development (912sqm)

For GVA

Version C: 12.12.13

www.designforsecurity.org
info@designforsecurity.org
0161 856 5912

Not Protectively Marked

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

Crime Impact Statement

Manchester Fort Shopping Park, Cheetham Hill Road

Restaurant development (912sqm)

2007/0178/CIS/02

For GVA

Version C: 12.12.13

Executive Summary

☐ **Significant material changes are advised**

☐ **Proposal is satisfactory in principle but minor changes are advised**


☒ **Proposal is generally acceptable subject to the advice in this report**

Both of the proposed premises are located in an area where business burglary and car crime are significant issues. In addition, the nature of the businesses and prominence of location make them a possible target for robbery, particularly the McDonald's unit.

The layout of both buildings is acceptable, subject to adherence to the measures outlined in section 5.3 of this report. It is likely that the local authority will impose a condition relating to the Secured by Design, and if this occurs it is essential that the physical security measures in section 6 are incorporated into the development.

I am happy to support the development but Design for Security's support is subject to the following:

- the developer duly considers all measures highlighted in this report and makes reasonable efforts to incorporate these measures into the proposed works necessary to complete the development;
- limits on opening hours to reduce the potential for very early morning or late night robbery (drive through hours may be different) based on a risk assessment carried out in conjunction with the Neighbourhood Police Team;
- creation of secure 'back of house' to limit offender access;
- panic alarm systems backed by remote monitoring are provided; and,
- secure rooms and time delay safes are provided to safely store cash on each of the premises.



Adrian Murphy *MRTPI*
Consultant
e: adrian.murphy@designforsecurity.org

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

Contents

1 Visual Audit 4

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis 5

2.1 Crime Count

2.2 Miscellaneous Theft (restaurants): Risk Analysis

2.3 Burglary Other (restaurants): Risk Analysis

2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

2.5 Wounding: Risk Analysis

2.6 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown

2.7 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

3 Risk Factors 9

4 Design Considerations 9

5 Design & Layout Appraisal 9

5.1 The Proposal

5.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

5.3 Changes and Amendments Needed

6 Physical Security 11

6.1 Doors

6.2 Windows and Shutters

6.3 Glazing

6.4 Alarms

6.5 Access Control

6.6 Boundaries

6.7 Landscaping

6.8 Lighting

6.9 CCTV

6.10 Car Park/circulation routes

6.11 Other

7 Management & Maintenance 13

8 Construction 13

Appendix

A Contact register 14

B Associated Documents 14


C CIS Version History 14

D Glossary 15

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

1 Visual Audit

1.1.1 The plan and images below show the proposed development sites (in red), the surrounding buildings, including the Manchester Fort Retail Park and housing to the north and west (beige), primary school to the north west corner of the plan; areas of surface car parking (olive), pockets of green space (green), and the local highway layout.



1



2



3



4



5



6



7



8



9



Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

1.1.2 The proposed McDonald's site is prominently located on the corner of Cheetham Hill Road and Queens Road, Cheetham and is currently occupied by a large brown brick building, formerly the Irish World Heritage Centre, which has recently relocated to a site further to the east along Queens Road. A sizeable car park wraps around the sides and rear of the building with access to it gained from Queens Road, at the north eastern corner of the site. A low brick wall defines the front boundary of the site, whilst high fencing and hedges form the side and rear boundaries. The building is now vacant and the site inaccessible to vehicles but, given the absence of security fencing, access on foot is easily made. There is a large advertising hoarding on the most prominent corner of the site, a major light controlled junction where Cheetham Hill Road and Queens Road meet.

1.1.3 The rear boundaries to premises that form part of the Manchester Fort Retail Park, which lies immediately to the south of the site, forms the southern boundary. There are two small residential developments close to the site, one of relatively modern terraces of houses, immediately east of the site, the closest being those on Signet Walk which face the site; the other comprises a block of maisonettes facing Queens Road, with two storey terraces of flats behind, all located on the north side of Queens Road opposite. An electricity sub-station building lies directly opposite the vehicular entrance to the site, whilst the Queens Road bus depot lies obliquely opposite.

1.1.4 The proposed A3 unit would be located centrally within the Manchester Fort Retail, Park in an area currently used for car parking. If developed, the unit will form a cluster of similar food related units, which includes Nando's and KFC.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st November 2012 and 31st October 2013.

2.1 Crime Count

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
<20	70	39	57	35	<20	<20	89	<20	<20

2.1.1 In the study area, the volume of crime is not particularly high, with the exception of vehicle crime and commercial burglary, which occur very frequently. The study area includes the Strangeways industrial area which has a high concentration of businesses and associated car parking which has influenced the high levels of vehicle crime and commercial burglary.

2.2 Miscellaneous Theft (restaurants): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts within/against restaurant premises, recorded in the North Manchester area.

Figure 2: Misc Theft – Day Range





Figure 3: Misc Theft – Time Range



Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2.2.1 Day Range: The risk of theft at restaurants/takeaways in Manchester is concentrated between Thursday and Sunday, peaking on Saturday. The risk of theft often increases at the weekend, when these types of premises are typically at their busiest, creating more opportunities for theft.

2.2.2 Time Range: The risk increases later in the evening, again, when premises tend to be busier and the opportunities for theft arise at a greater frequency (particularly when victims have been drinking alcohol). Handbags, phones and cameras belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Items are usually stolen from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables.

2.3 Burglary Other (restaurants): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against restaurant premises, recorded in the North Manchester area.

Figure 4: Burglary Other – Day Range




Figure 5: Burglary Other – Time Range





Figure 6: Burglary Other – Point of Entry



2.3.1 Day Range: The risk of burglary is highest between Monday and Friday, when such premises are typically open for shorter periods of time. At the weekend, they are often open for longer and the opportunity to commit burglary is reduced.

2.3.2 Time Range: The risk is highest early in the afternoon and in the early hours of the morning. They are likely to be targeted at these times, as they are unlikely to be open or have a reduced staff presence.

2.3.3 Point of Entry: In many cases of burglary, the point of entry is undetermined and this could be due to the open access of most restaurants, where people can walk in freely without raising any suspicion. In many cases, offenders have accessed staff only areas or areas that are not open

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

to the public (by tailgating or through insecure doors) and have stolen property. When offenders have broken in, they have typically targeted doors, including fire doors. Doors have routinely been forced open using bodily pressure or tools.

2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 7: Vehicle Crime – Day Range





Figure 8: Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.4.1 Day Range: The risk of vehicle crime does not vary greatly, but is slightly higher at the weekend and slightly lower on Monday and Thursday.

2.4.2 Time Range: The risk is greatest in the evening, peaking at 9pm. It is likely that offenders target vehicles at this time when people park on streets and in informal car parks in the area for long periods of time, while attending events at the nearby Manchester Arena.

2.5 Wounding: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to instances of wounding committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 9: Wounding – Day Range





Figure 10: Wounding – Time Range



2.5.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of wounding varies greatly. The risk is greatest on Tuesday and lowest on Monday and Saturday.

2.5.2 Time Range: The risk of violent crime increases at midday and in the late evening peaking at midnight. At these times, those attending licenses premises are more likely to be intoxicated and violent disorder is more likely to breakout in licensed premises, on streets, at taxi ranks and in/around takeaways.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2.6 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown

The data below relates to criminal damage and robbery offences committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 11: Criminal Damage Targets





Figure 12: Robbery Targets



2.6.1 Criminal Damage Targets: The makeup of the criminal damage incidents in this area shows that properties are almost twice as likely to be targeted as vehicles. Common incidents of criminal damage include graffiti, windows being smashed and damage to vehicle bodywork.

2.6.2 Robbery Targets: Robberies in the area have been against individuals more frequently than businesses in the past 12 months. Individuals have frequently been targeted when walking alone in the area, particularly at night.

2.7 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.7.1 Burglary where doors have been forced open to gain entry.

In order to counteract such methods, external doors should be certified to a recognised security standard e.g. PAS 24 or LPS 1175. All doors should be illuminated with low intensity dawn til dusk lighting, which can help put off an offender, who is likely to feel more conspicuous if the area is lit and therefore less inclined to offend if there is an increased chance of being witnessed/caught in the act.

2.7.2 Theft of customer property from/under tables and chairs.

A particular issue in restaurants in Manchester is the theft of personal effects; mobile phone theft is a particular issue. Consideration should be given to fixing 'Chelsea Clips' (see image), Grippa™ clips or simple hooks to the underside of tables to allow customers to secure bags or jackets to the table while keeping it in view; a more secure option than, for example, table tops or back of chairs, where belongings can be liable to theft.



The internal layout of premises can also help deter theft by promoting surveillance and creating an uncluttered, environment, avoiding pinch points or areas of concealment.

2.7.3 Burglary where rear windows have been smashed to gain entry.

Like doors, windows should be secure. In particularly secluded locations windows should be protected with discreet security shutters, which meet the LPS 1175 standard, in more visible locations laminate glazing and windows which meet an approved security standard are most appropriate.

2.7.4 Misuse of parking areas by youths causing intimidating behaviour

Clear rule setting, through signage and the expression of ownership, is important. CCTV with audio facility would allow staff to warn offenders without compromising their own safety.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

2.7.5 Robbery at premises for cash (tills, safe, cash in transit), this may include violence towards staff and forcing open entry doors with bodily pressure and/or tools.

Provide panic alarms at till points and in the manager's offices, and a 'time delay' safe certified to LPS 1183 placed in a secure room, which may be the manager's office. Consider rapid deployment shutters at the service counters linked to the panic alarms. Cash in transit vehicles should be able to park as close as possible to the entrance to the buildings to minimise the period of time the personnel spend 'exposed'.

3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict (particularly in the evening)
- Misc. theft of customer belongings
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises

4 Design Considerations

4.1.1 Design for Security recommends that designers and developers refer to:

- Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London

Seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention are detailed within Chapter 2 of this ODPM publication. Annex 3 also contains many useful references. You can download 'Safer Places' at www.designforsecurity.org

- Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

5 Design & Layout Appraisal

5.1 The Proposal

5.1.1 The proposed development comprises two distinct buildings:

1. A two storey drive-through restaurant with associated parking facilities. The preparation area, service counters, storage, a small dining area and disabled toilets are located on the ground floor with the main seating area, toilets and staff rooms on the first floor. Externally, there is a patio seating area adjacent to the customer entrance, a detached bin store, customer parking and a circulation road serving the drive through element to the restaurant. The building itself will occupy a location in the western half of the site close to the major road junction. Vehicle access will continue to be gained from Queens Road albeit slightly to the west of the current site access road. This road will also provide alternative access to the Halfords store (only) on the Fort Retail

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

Park. A landscape buffer will screen the restaurant and car park from the adjacent housing on Signet Walk.

2. A single storey restaurant/café, A3 use, unit within the Manchester Fort Retail Park with, as yet, no specified end user, nor any internal layout details.

5.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

McDonald's

5.2.1 The proposal will result in the redevelopment of a redundant building prior to it becoming an eyesore and a focus for anti-social behaviour.

5.2.2 The front entrance faces the main vehicle entrance so will be well monitored by passing motorists.

5.2.3 The pedestrian route is clearly defined and served by pedestrian crossings.

5.2.4 Customers using the external seating area provide additional surveillance over the car park. This seating must not be used at such times that might reduce the amenity of nearby residents, and must only be used by restaurant customers.

5.2.5 The internal layout of the restaurant displays clear queuing, customer movement and customer seating zones, and doors which can control the movement of customers into 'back of house' areas. Coloured or differing floor treatments can assist in communicating the roles of respective zones, and gives a degree of control over how people use the space.

5.2.6 A dedicated manager's office with a safe has been indicated on the plans. A time-delay safe certified to LPS 1183 is advised and the door to the office should be security certified and automatically lock on closure.

A3 Unit

5.2.7 The proposed building will be located within the demise of the Retail Park, benefitting from the Park's management and CCTV/security presence on the site.

5.2.8 The simple building footprint, with large glazed elements, facilitates surveillance of the interior of the building, and of the surrounding car parking from the building.

5.3 Changes and Amendments Needed

McDonald's & A3 unit

5.3.1 Tills should be kept out of view and reach of customers, perhaps below a raised counter or shielded by robust screens, and securely fixed to the fabric of the counter so they cannot be removed.

5.3.2 Cash chutes behind counters or regular cash drops into the safe should also be employed to ensure large amounts of cash are not kept in the tills.

5.3.3 Theft of personal belongings is quite common in establishments such as this, with a contributory factor being the anonymity afforded to criminals at busy times. By using a dividing barrier between seating area and the ground floor entrance/customer queuing area people standing and queuing are separated from those sitting down, (who may have left their phones, bags, or other belongings accessible), thus reducing the opportunity for a would-be offender to pass directly by possible targets. The upper section of this barrier could be open, or translucent to maintain openness to the seating area and permit surveillance.

5.3.4 There should be a provision for cash collection vehicles to park adjacent to their primary entrance point, to minimise the amount of time their personnel need to spend on exposed to attack outside of the premises. The circulation road immediately adjacent to the entrance door would be ideal. Alternatively, a through the wall cash transfer would system would greatly reduce the risk of cash in transit robbery.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

McDonald's

5.3.5 Boundary treatments should be included to restrict access into the site for pedestrians from Queens Road. This could be achieved through the use of hedges to form a low, but deep boundary, facilitating surveillance but preventing desire lines forming, which could lead to health and safety issues with on-site traffic and control rapid dispersal/escape of any offenders.

5.3.6 All external doors should meet the LPS 1175 standard. If it does not then an internal shutter should be provided which meets LPS 1175.

5.3.7 Drive-through windows should be fitted with restrictors to prevent people climbing or reaching in.

5.3.8 In less busy periods, when supervision of the first floor dining area may be reduced, a mechanism, such as an appropriately powder coated perforated roller shutter, as has been installed at the Bury New Road restaurant, should be used to prevent access to the upper floor.

A3 Unit

5.3.9 The layout of the A3 unit should be cognisant of the need to provide a secure 'back of house', a particularly secure cash storage facility, and the dining area.

6 Physical Security

The following standards and features will be required for both buildings in order to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.

6.1 Doors

6.1.1 External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2.

6.1.2 Sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

6.1.3 External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

6.1.4 Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

6.1.5 All external doors should be fitted with alarm contacts.

6.2 Windows and Shutters

6.2.1 Windows, where feasible and (excluding curtain walling) must be compliant with and certified to BS 7950.

6.2.2 Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

6.2.3 If external shutters are used, they should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required), and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

6.2.4 Rapid deployment shutters linked to panic buttons should be considered for installation at the McDonald's service counters (internal service counter and drive through payment window), to reduce the risk of robbery.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

6.3 Glazing

6.3.1 Glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

6.4 Alarms

6.4.1 Panic alarms buttons should be located at till points, manager's office and other inconspicuous locations, in the food preparation area for example.

6.4.2 An intruder alarm should be installed and it should be linked to contacts on all external doors. PIR detectors should cover all rooms with windows.

6.4.3 It is strongly recommended that any panic and intruder alarm systems are monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security patrol team). Panic alarm monitoring should include the ability to remotely monitor CCTV images and initiate an appropriate response.

6.5 Access Control

6.5.1 Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:

- All internal doors from public space (e.g. dining areas and toilet lobbies) into staff-only space (doors D7, D10 and D18 in the McDonald's restaurant)..
- The manager's office, D2, and staff changing rooms, D13 and D15 in the McDonald's restaurant..

6.6 Boundaries

6.6.1 A boundary fence or hedging should be included to prevent pedestrian access into the McDonald's site other than from designated footpaths. The fence should be sufficiently high or deep to dissuade casual access.

6.7 Landscaping

6.7.1 Loose surface materials in should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used against vehicles and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

6.7.2 To preserve residential amenity and discourage late night loitering, any external seating at the proposed McDonald's site must be closed to the public not later than 23.00.

6.8 Lighting

6.8.1 External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within each site in accordance with BS 5489.

6.8.2 Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

6.8.3 Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

6.8.4 Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids to access the roof of the building. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

6.9 CCTV

6.9.1 A CCTV system should be installed with cameras monitoring activity inside and around the premises. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

6.9.2 Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

- **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

6.9.3 Cameras should be located in such locations as to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: public entrances, external seating areas, staff/rear doors, any cycle parking, car parking spaces related to the McDonald's restaurant, sales counters, all dining areas, and accessible and upper floor toilet lobbies.

6.10 Car Park/circulation routes

6.10.1 Lighting to car parking spaces should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.

6.11 Other

6.11.1 There must be no features of either building envelope which create sheltered/hiding places or ledges, which could endanger passers-by or encourage loitering.

6.11.2 Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to the roof.

6.11.3 Secure cycle parking stands should be provided in front of the main entrance to the McDonald's restaurant.

6.11.4 Bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures.

7 Management & Maintenance

7.1.1 The upkeep of a site and buildings over its lifetime is crucial to maintaining a secure and safe development. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to lighting, CCTV, signage, access controls

8 Construction

8.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
28.10.13	Hayley Knight	Request for Crime Impact Statement
13.11.13		Site visit
15.11.13	Hayley Knight	Report issued
26.11.13	Hayley Knight	Amended report issued
12.12.13	Hayley Knight	Amended report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

DWG No.	DWG Title	Date	Rev
10545-6000	Existing site plan	09/13	-
10545-102	Proposed site plan option 3 Rendered	09/13	-
10545-201	New A1A3 units rendered	10/13	-
10545-400	McDonalds Ground floor plan	09/13	-
10545-401	McDonalds First floor plan	09/13	-
10545-402	McDonalds Elevations 1 Rendered	09/13	-
10545-403	McDonalds Elevations 2 Rendered	09/13	-
10545-404	McDonalds Site plan	12/13	A

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status			Revisions Made
A	☐	☐	☒	
B	☐	☐	☒	Report amended to include A3 unit
C	☐	☐	☒	Report amended to include external seating to McDonalds restaurant

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 3621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Key Egress.

The minimum standard for locks on external or entrance doors to be acceptable to the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the police service. The effectiveness of the lock also depends on the quality of the door, frame and other hardware which is not tested by this standard and which may fail before the lock.

BS 8621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Keyless Egress.

Same as above, but egress is possible without a key (by use of thumb turn or latch lever.

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2007

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at *www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted*)

CRA

Crime Reduction Advisor. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

NPT

Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable