

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Crime Impact Statement

435 Barlow Moor Road, Manchester

Residential (12 apartments) & Retail (800sqm)

For Merepark Project Management LLP

Version A: 27th May 2014

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Not Protectively Marked

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435 Barlow Moor Road, Manchester

Residential (12 apartments) & Retail (800sqm)

2013/0435/CIS/01

For Merepark Project Management LLP
Version A: Date

Executive Summary

☐ **Significant material changes are advised**

☒ **Proposal is satisfactory in principle but minor changes are advised**

☐ **Proposal is generally acceptable subject to the advice in this report**

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. Particular consideration should be given to the following matters, which are discussed in more detail within this report (see Section 5.2):

- It is essential that the front entrance door to the apartments (south elevation) is recessed no more than 600mm.
- External lighting must be provided to the alleyway located at the north elevation of the development. This lighting should comply with Section 8.2.
- External lighting should be installed above all external doors. Additionally, it is recommend that all publically accessible elevations of the building elevations should be illuminated (at ground floor level) to deter loitering/congregation.
- The proposed ATM should be protected by bollards to prevent against, and deter, a ram-raid style attack.

If these concerns / issues can be addresses as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

We would encourage further dialogue with the applicant throughout the design and construction process to ensure the resulting development is secure. Please get in touch with Design for Security if you have any queries regarding the contents of this document, or the security standards referred to therein.



Julia Hall RIBA

Design for Security Consultant

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Contents

1 Visual Audit 4

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis 6

2.1 Crime Count

2.2 Crime Rate Comparison (Residential)

2.3 Burglary Dwelling: Risk Analysis

2.4 Burglary Other (Proposed Use Only): Risk Analysis

2.5 Misc Theft (Proposed Use Only): Risk Analysis

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

2.7 Wounding: Risk Analysis

2.8 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown

2.9 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

3 Risk Factors 11

3.1 Residential

3.2 Retail

4 Design Considerations 12

4.1 Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London

4.2 Secured by Design (SBD)

5 Design & Layout Appraisal 13

5.1 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

5.2 Changes and Amendments Needed

6 Physical Security (Residential) 14

6.1 Doors (Apartments)

6.2 Windows

6.3 Glazing

6.4 Alarms

6.5 Access Control

6.6 Boundaries

7 Physical Security (Non-Residential) 15

7.1 Doors

7.2 Windows and Shutters

7.3 Glazing

7.4 Alarms

7.5 Access Control

7.6 Boundaries

7.7 Fit-Out

8 External Features 17

8.1 Landscaping

8.2 Lighting

8.3 CCTV

8.4 Car Parks

8.5 Communal Areas

8.6 Other


9 Management & Maintenance 18

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10 Construction 19

1 Visual Audit

The diagram below highlights relevant local features that could have an impact upon the security of the scheme and/or indicate the presence of crime and antisocial behaviour in the surrounding area.



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1. View from the entrance the proposed development site looking south along Barlow Moor Road.
2. View from the entrance the proposed development site looking north along Barlow Moor Road towards Chorlton town centre.
3. View from the entrance the proposed development site looking north along Barlow Moor Road showing the front elevation of the existing disused property.
4. View from the west end of the existing car park showing the existing south façade of the disused property.
5. View from the North West corner of the existing car park showing the rear of the existing disused building.
6. View showing the rear of the existing building. Note the existing security measures in place.
7. View of the existing residential apartments located to the south west corner of the existing site.
8. View looking west along the existing alley located between the current proposed development site and the neighbouring properties. The alley currently connects with the alleyway to the rear of the residential properties located on Claude Road.
9. View looking west along the existing alley located between the current proposed development site and the neighbouring properties.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st May 2013 and 2014.

2.1 Crime Count

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
92	94	62	52	24	<20	<20	43	<20	<20

2.1.1 In the local area the volume of crime is high. The most frequently occurring crimes in the local area are burglary, criminal damage, violence and vehicle crime. The rate of domestic burglary in the local area is higher than the Manchester and Greater Manchester average rates.

2.2 Crime Rate Comparison (Residential)

Figure 2: Comparison of Burglary Dwelling Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester




Figure 3: Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester




Figure 4: Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester





Figure 5: Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km²), LPA Area, and Greater Manchester



2.2.1 The number of domestic burglaries per dwelling is **higher** than Manchester as a whole, and **higher** than Greater Manchester.

2.2.2 The number of woundings per dwelling is **lower** than Manchester as a whole, and **lower** than Greater Manchester.

2.2.3 Incidents of criminal damage per dwelling are **lower** than Manchester as a whole, and **lower** than Greater Manchester.

2.2.4 Incidents of vehicle crime per dwelling are **lower** than Manchester as a whole, and **lower** than Greater Manchester.

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2.3 Burglary Dwelling: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 6: Burglary – Day Range




Figure 7: Burglary – Time Range





Figure 8: Burglary – Point of Entry



2.3.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of burglary is highest on Tuesday, Wednesday and Saturday.

2.3.2 Time Range: In the local area the risk of burglary is concentrated in the evening, peaking between 8pm and 10pm. Offenders often target residential properties at night when it is dark and they perceive the risk of being caught or identified as low.

2.3.3 Point of Entry: The majority of burglaries have been committed through rear doors and windows. Rear points of entry are often targeted, as offenders can conceal themselves from view. Rear doors have been forced open with tools and rear windows have been prised open by offenders. In a number of incidents, the glazing in rear doors and windows has been smashed by offenders.

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2.4 Burglary Other (Proposed Use Only): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against retail premises, recorded in the Manchester City Council area.

Figure 4: Burglary Other – Day Range




Figure 5: Burglary Other – Time Range





Figure 6: Burglary Other – Point of Entry



2.4.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of burglary peaks on Tuesday.

2.4.2 Time Range: During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises peaks during the day between 9pm and 10pm. Break-in burglaries are more common when shops are closed and these typically occur late in the evening and during the early hours of the morning.

2.4.3 Point of Entry: The most frequent point of entries for burglaries at retail premises in the local area have been through doors to the front and rear of premises. Doors to retail premises have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure to gain entry and in some instances glazed panels have been smashed to gain entry. In a number of burglaries, shutters have also been forced upwards to gain access to entry points.

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2.5 Misc Theft (Proposed Use Only): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts within/against retail premises, recorded in the Manchester City Council area.

Figure 2: Misc Theft – Day Range





Figure 3: Misc Theft – Time Range



2.5.1 Day Range: The risk of misc. theft in retail premises is greatest between Monday and Friday with fewer incidents occurring at the weekend as activity levels in the vicinity drop and premises are closed.

2.5.2 Time Range: The risk of misc. theft increases in the afternoon, peaking between 4pm and 5pm. The number of shoppers is greatest in the afternoon and therefore the opportunity to commit theft is greater. It is likely that thieves will target the busiest shops, as crowds can provide anonymity and can reduce the risk of being detected.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 9: Vehicle Crime – Day Range





Figure 10: Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.6.1 Day Range: The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Tuesday, Friday and Saturday,

2.6.2 Time Range: During the day the risk of vehicle crime peaks at midday. Offenders often target vehicles at or around midday when residents are likely to be out at work and footfall in residential areas is often low and offenders perceive the risk of being caught or identified as low.

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2.7 Wounding: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to instances of wounding committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 11: Wounding – Day Range





Figure 12: Wounding – Time Range



2.7.1 Day Range: The risk of violence is concentrated between Friday and Sunday. The risk often increases at the weekend when more people attend license premises, often for longer and consuming more alcohol leading to conflict.

2.7.2 Time Range: The risk of violence is greatest late in the afternoon and in the evening. The risk often increases at these times when alcohol has been consumed in homes and licensed premises leading to violence.

2.8 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown

The data below relates to criminal damage and robbery offences committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 13: Criminal Damage Targets





Figure 14: Robbery Targets



2.8.1 Criminal Damage Targets: The majority of criminal damage in the local area has targeted property rather than vehicles. In a high number of cases of criminal damage windows on both buildings and vehicles have been smashed.

2.8.2 Robbery Targets: The majority of robberies in this area have been against individuals rather than businesses. Individuals walking alone through the area at night have been targeted most frequently.

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2.9 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.9.1 Retail: Doors to the front and rear of premises have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure

Possible Solution: Access to the site should be strictly controlled. All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 6), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Lighting to the front and rears of the premises can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime. Avoid locating doors in deep recesses.

2.9.2 Retail: Glazing has been smashed by offenders to gain entry

Possible solution – All ground floor / accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 6.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within / directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

2.9.3 Retail: Roller shutters have been forced upwards to gain entry

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc) have been scrutinised by professionals. Consideration should also be given to certified shutters built into the fabric of the building or discreet security grilles that would secure the building out-of-hours without raising the fear of crime.

2.9.4 Residential: Offenders have forced open apartment doors with bodily pressure and tools, after gaining access to communal areas

Possible solution - The proposal should be designed to discourage would-be intruders. This could be achieved by instilling high levels of activity around entrance points, directing good levels of surveillance over the space, and increasing the distance (effort) an intruder would have to travel (exert) to enter the building. Access control measures will be key in preventing this, and should be implemented at tactical points around and within the buildings. Consider progressive access control, vertically within the building.

2.9.5 Residential: Offenders have climbed balconies to gain access to apartments

Possible solution -

3 Risk Factors

3.1 Residential

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Antisocial behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

3.2 Retail

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

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- Burglary
- Robbery
- Shoplifting
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Employee theft
- Loitering groups
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

4 Design Considerations

The design and layout of your development will be appraised both in this document and through face-to-face meetings if and when required. Design for Security does recommend however that designers and developers refer to:

4.1 Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London

Seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention are detailed within Chapter 2 of this ODPM publication. Annex 3 also contains many useful references. You can download 'Safer Places' at www.designforsecurity.org

4.2 Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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5 Design & Layout Appraisal

5.1 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

5.1.1 The development will occupy a currently derelict building/site, which has an unkempt appearance, and will bring back some activity, overlooking and surveillance to the area.

5.1.2 The houses opposite the site will afford the development with natural surveillance; the proposed flats will contribute to the levels of natural surveillance in the local area.

5.1.3 The principal residential entrances are located in prominent positions and are readily apparent from the street. Approaches to the front of the building for pedestrians are along routes that have good sightlines.

5.1.4 The footprint of the building is uncomplicated and free of recesses that could provide shelter, impede surveillance or attract antisocial behaviour.

5.1.5 There will be habitable room windows to the front, rear and north side elevations of the building, maximising surveillance opportunities over all parking, landscaping areas, cycle and bin stores.

5.1.6 All external staircases (necessary for fire egress) must be enclosed with wire mesh fencing and gated with emergency egress access only. It is essential that escape stairs are not used as an alternative access to apartments.

5.1.7 Secure boundary treatments are shown enclosing the north and west boundaries of the development. These are to be a minimum of 2100mm high and of welded wire mesh construction. It is recommended that a 358-type fence panel is used in this situation.

5.1.8 Gates are to be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:

- A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
- A key operable deadlock

Double gates should have lockable (or externally inaccessible) drop bolts to each leaf.

5.1.9 The entrance to the apartments includes an airlock arrangement with postal deliveries made within this area.

5.1.10 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

5.2 Changes and Amendments Needed

5.2.1 It is essential that the front entrance door to the apartments (south elevation) is recessed no more than 600mm.

5.2.2 The proposed ATM should be protected by bollards to prevent against, and deter, a ram-raid style attack.

5.2.3 The ATM room, and any safe rooms in the retail units, should have solid masonry walls, no false/suspended ceilings, a certified doorset (to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2) with a thumb-turn lock and a security-certified safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover. The correct size and category of safes should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs. The safe should have a time delay operation, if operationally viable, of no less than 5 minutes.

5.2.4 External lighting should be installed above all external doors. Additionally, it is recommend that all publically accessible elevations of the building elevations should be illuminated (at ground floor level) to deter loitering/congregation.

5.2.5 External lighting must be provided to the alleyway located at the north elevation of the development. This lighting should comply with Section 8.2.

5.2.6 The proposed retail units should be covered by monitored alarms.

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5.2.7 The design of shop fronts should incorporate features that would reduce opportunities for ram raiding – this could include a masonry up-stand / wall, internal rails or street furniture. Any bollards specifically intended for this purpose should be certified to BS PAS 68.

5.2.8 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

6 Physical Security (Residential)

The following standards and features will be required for this development to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.

6.1 Doors (Apartments)

6.1.1 External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.

6.1.2 Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.

6.1.3 Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.

6.1.4 Any ground floor external French/double doors or sliding doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.

6.1.5 Communal doors in to circulation cores from a secure basement car park should have multi-point electronic locking, operable via an access control system.

6.1.6 Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended but not generally essential.

6.1.7 Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

6.1.8 All flat entrance doors should be fitted with alarm contacts (only if an alarm is to be provided; see section 11.4)

6.1.9 External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

6.2 Windows

6.2.1 Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.

6.2.2 Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

6.3 Glazing

Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

6.4 Alarms

6.4.1 If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:

- BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
- BS 6799 for wireless systems

6.4.2 If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, (including internal doors in to garages).

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6.4.3 If an alarm is installed, PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

6.4.4 If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

6.5 Access Control

6.5.1 Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:

- Entrance door to apartments
- Escape doors
- Escape stairs
- Residential refuse store
- Cycle store

6.6 Boundaries

6.6.1 Rear boundaries should generally be 1800mm high and of close boarded timber construction. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.

6.6.2 Rear boundaries that are adjacent to public space should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base, with timber fence above to a total height of 2100mm. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.

6.6.3 Sub-divisional rear boundaries may be as low as 1500mm.

6.6.4 The fronts of properties should be demarcated by low boundaries such as planting and/or railings to an approximate height of 1000mm.

6.6.5 Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

6.6.6 Gates in to the rear curtilage of dwellings should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:

- A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
- A key operable deadlock

If residents are likely to use these gates when leaving their property, then the gates must be lockable from both sides.

6.6.7 Vehicular gates in to the rear curtilage of dwellings must be lockable from both sides.

7 Physical Security (Non-Residential)

The following standards and features will be required for this development to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.

7.1 Doors

7.1.1 External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2.

7.1.2 Sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

7.1.3 Revolving doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

7.1.4 External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

7.1.5 Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

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7.1.6 All external doors should be fitted with alarm contacts (only if an alarm is to be provided; see section 11.4)

7.1.7 Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

7.2 Windows and Shutters

7.2.1 Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS 7950.

7.2.2 Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

7.2.3 Shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2, and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

7.3 Glazing

Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

7.4 Alarms

7.4.1 If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors.

7.4.2 If an alarm is installed, PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

7.4.3 If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be an infrastructure in place to allow for the easy installation of an alarm system (conduits and power points).

7.4.4 It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security patrol team).

7.5 Access Control

7.5.1 Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:

- Entrance doors to retail units
- Service doors
- Commercial refuse store
- Private access to retail units B & C

7.6 Boundaries

7.6.1 Secure boundary treatments should generally be 2100mm high and of welded wire mesh construction. It is recommended that a 358-type fence panel is used in higher risk situations.

7.6.2 There should be minimal ground clearance beneath the fence, to reduce the potential for crawling in to secure areas.

7.6.3 The site boundary treatment should be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary.

7.6.4 Sub-divisional boundaries within the site may be as low as 1800mm.

7.6.5 The openly accessible areas of the site should be demarcated by a low boundary and/or indicated by a change in surface treatment to communicate a sense of ownership of the space.

7.6.6 Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

7.6.7 Gates should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:

- A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or

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- A key operable deadlock

Double gates should have lockable (or externally inaccessible) drop bolts to each leaf.

7.7 Fit-Out

Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their buildings once complete, and therefore the end-users requirements. Typical components which are subject to fit-out are:

- Internal access control
- Internal doors in to premises
- Alarm systems

These features can be critical to a secure environment, and we would urge the client to provide would-be tenants with the contact details for Design for Security, who will provide free advice on internal security matters so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

8 External Features

8.1 Landscaping

8.1.1 In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

8.1.2 Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

8.1.3 Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

8.1.4 There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

8.2 Lighting

8.2.1 External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.

8.2.2 Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

8.2.3 Dusk ‘til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

8.2.4 Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

8.3 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

8.3.1 CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

8.3.2 Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

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8.3.3 With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

8.3.4 Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Main entrances, lifts, stairwells, sales counters and lobbies.

8.4 Car Parks

8.4.1 Lighting to car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 10 (rural areas) or 20 (urban areas) with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.

8.4.2 Lighting to basement and/or under croft parking areas should display an average lux level of 75-100, with a uniformity level of no less than 50%.

8.4.3 Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.

8.4.4 Where feasible, a one-way system should be implemented to reduce the likelihood of collisions and conflict.

8.4.5 Electronic car park exit gates should not be on an induction loop (open automatically). All gates to car parks should be fob-in and fob-out.

8.4.6 Pedestrian gates in to car parks should also be fob in and fob out only.

8.5 Communal Areas

8.5.1 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents/tenants should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

8.6 Other

8.6.1 Meter cupboards to houses should be located to the fronts of properties only, not in the private areas.

8.6.2 There must be no features of the building envelope which create sheltered/hiding places or ledges, which could endanger passers-by or encourage loitering.

8.6.3 Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

8.6.4 Any cycle stores should be secure, lockable enclosures. For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: http://www.designforsecurity.org/uploads/files/DFS_Cycles.pdf

8.6.5 Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

9 Management & Maintenance

The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a

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process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

10 Construction

Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
28/04/2014	P. Woodcock	CIS application received
27/05/2014	J. Hall	Site visit
10/06/2014	J. Hall	CIS report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

DWG No.	DWG Title	Date	Rev
MP84 (PL) 113	Existing site plan	03/14	-
MP84 (PL) 110	Proposed site plan	03/14	-
MP84 (PL) 111	Proposed site plan	03/14	-
MP84 (PL) 112	Proposed plans	03/14	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status			Revisions Made
A	☐	☐	☐	

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 3621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Key Egress.

The minimum standard for locks on external or entrance doors to be acceptable to the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the police service. The effectiveness of the lock also depends on the quality of the door, frame and other hardware which is not tested by this standard and which may fail before the lock.

BS 8621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Keyless Egress.

Same as above, but egress is possible without a key (by use of thumb turn or latch lever.

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2007

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at ***www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted***)

CRA

Crime Reduction Advisor. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

NPT

Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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