

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Crime Impact Statement

Abbey House, 11 Cooper Street

Retail (30sqm) & Leisure (180sqm)

For GLM

Version A: 16th December 2013

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Not Protectively Marked

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Crime Impact Statement

Abbey House, 11 Cooper Street

Retail (30sqm) & Leisure (180sqm)

2013/0936/CIS/01

For GLM

Version A: 16th December 2013

Executive Summary

☐ **Significant material changes are advised**

☐ **Proposal is satisfactory in principle but minor changes are advised**

☒ **Proposal is generally acceptable subject to the advice in this report**

The proposed development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed development is generally acceptable from a crime prevention perspective, however consideration needs to be given to the following points (see section 5.2 for more details):

- Management
- Physical security

If these recommendations are taken into account we would be supportive of the development at planning application stage.



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1 Visual Audit

1.1.1 The diagram below shows the location of the development site (edged in red). The site is located in central Manchester, approximately 100m from St Peters Square, and close to the Town Hall, Central Library and Albert Square. Piccadilly Gardens is approximately 500 metres to the North of the development site. The commercial unit was previously occupied by Oddbins.

1.1.2 The tram stop at St Peters Square, Town Hall and Central Library tram stop brings people to the area at all hours. Outside business hours, the tram stop is often busy with people attending events at the library theatre, Bridgewater Hall and nearby conference venues.

1.1.3 The Crown public house is opposite the site on Nicholas Street and there are a number of other licensed premises in the local area including those on Kennedy Street (The Waterhouse, The City Arms and The Vine Inn).



1



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

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

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

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

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st December 2012 and 2013.

2.1 Crime Count

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
<20	175	152	394	832	28	20	158	<20	239

2.1.1 The volume of crime in this area is high, due to its location within the city centre. The volumes of violent crimes, theft, robbery and vehicle crime are exceptionally high and the rate of burglary at commercial premises is much greater than is experienced across Manchester as a whole.

2.2 Misc Theft (Retail Use Only): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts within/against retail units, recorded in the Manchester council area.

Figure 2: Misc Theft – Day Range



Figure 3: Misc Theft – Time Range



2.2.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of misc. theft at Manchester retail units is greatest on Saturday. It is likely that the risk of theft increases on Saturday when shops are busiest, providing offenders with more opportunities.

2.2.2 Time Range: The risk of misc. theft increases in the afternoon, peaking between 4pm and 5pm. The number of shoppers is greatest in the afternoon and therefore the opportunity to commit theft is greater. It is likely that thieves will target the busiest shops, as crowds can provide anonymity and can reduce the risk of being detected.

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2.3 Theft (Drinking Establishments): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts within/against licensed premises/restaurants, recorded in the Manchester council area.

Figure 9: Misc Theft – Day Range



Figure 10: Misc Theft – Time Range



2.3.1 Day Range: The risk of theft peaks on the days of the weekend, between Friday and Saturday. On these days, restaurants, nightclubs, bars and public houses in the city centre area experience higher levels of attendance than during the week. Licensed premises are usually open for longer at the weekend and the opportunity for offenders to commit theft is much greater.

2.3.2 Time Range: The risk increases late in the night into the early morning. This is when bars and nightclubs area busiest and the opportunities for theft arise at a greater frequency. The most frequently stolen items are customer belongings, such as handbags, purses, wallets and mobile phones.

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2.4 Burglary Other (Retail Use Only): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against retail units, recorded in the Manchester council area.

Figure 4: Burglary Other – Day Range



Figure 5: Burglary Other – Time Range



Figure 6: Burglary Other – Point of Entry



2.4.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of retail burglary in Manchester is greatest on Monday and Friday, with the risk lowest on Saturday and Sunday.

2.4.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk of burglary increases in the afternoon and in the early evening. A high number of burglaries have taken place when shops are open and offenders have entered posing as legitimate customers, before targeting areas restricted to staff.

2.4.3 Point of Entry: The majority of burglaries at retail premises have been committed through front and rear doors and a high number committed through 'unknown' points of entry, which have typically been when offenders (posing as customers) have targeted staff only areas. When doors have been targeted, they have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure and, in a number of cases, glazing within doors have been smashed by offenders to gain entry.

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2.5 Burglary Other (Drinking Establishments): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against licensed premises/restaurants, recorded in the Manchester council area.

Figure 6: Burglary Other – Day Range



Figure 7: Burglary Other – Time Range



Figure 8: Burglary Other – Point of Entry



2.5.1 Day Range: In Manchester, the risk of burglary at licensed premises is greatest on between Saturday and Tuesday; the risk is significantly lower on other days.

2.5.2 Time Range: The risk is highest early in the afternoon and in the early hours of the morning. Licensed premises are likely to be targeted at these times, as they are unlikely to be open or are open with reduced numbers of staff.

2.5.3 Point of Entry: The majority of burglaries have been committed through doors. Most commonly, rear doors have often been forced open with bodily pressure and hand tools; in a number of cases glazing in rear doors and rear windows has been smashed by offenders.

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2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 7: Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Figure 8: Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.6.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of vehicle crime is highest on Wednesday.

2.6.2 Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime in the local area is greatest in the evening, peaking between 7pm and 9pm. It is likely that offenders target vehicles at this time when it is dark and vehicles parked on remote/isolated side streets and car parks are vulnerable to attack undetected.

2.7 Wounding: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to instances of wounding committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 9: Wounding – Day Range



Figure 10: Wounding – Time Range



2.7.1 Day Range: Violent crime peaks at the weekend. Between Friday and Sunday, a greater number of people attend city centre licensed premises, often drinking for longer periods and consuming more alcohol – leading to conflicts.

2.7.2 Time Range: The risk of violent crime increases in the late evening and into the early hours of the morning, peaking between 1am and 2am. At these times, those attending licenses premises are more likely to be intoxicated and violent disorder is more likely to breakout in licensed premises, on streets, at taxi ranks/bus stops/train stations and at takeaways.

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2.8 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown

The data below relates to criminal damage and robbery offences committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 11: Criminal Damage Targets



Figure 12: Robbery Targets



2.8.1 Criminal Damage Targets: The makeup of the criminal damage in this area shows that properties are almost twice as likely to be targeted as vehicles. Common incidents of criminal damage include graffiti, windows being smashed (both of properties and vehicles) and damage to vehicle bodywork.

2.8.2 Robbery Targets: Robbery against the person is much more prevalent than against businesses in this area. The risk of personal robbery increases when lone victims take quieter, more secluded routes through the area in the evening/at night.

2.9 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.9.1 Drinking establishment: Theft of customer property from/under tables and chairs.

A particular issue in drinking establishments within the Manchester city centre area is the theft of personal effects; handbag and mobile phone theft is a particular issue. Consideration should be given to fixing 'Chelsea Clips' (see image), Grippa™ clips, or simple hooks to the underside of tables to allow customers to secure bags or jackets to the table while keeping it in view; a more secure option than, for example, table tops or back of chairs, where belongings can be liable to theft.



The internal layout of the premises can also help deter theft by promoting surveillance and creating an uncluttered, environment, avoiding pinch points or areas of concealment. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.

2.9.2 Drinking establishment: Violent disorder/conflict between intoxicated customers

Whilst it is appreciated that the operator of the premises cannot be held responsible for the behaviour of patrons once they leave the establishment, they can adopt good management practices to discourage violence and disorder. The effective management of entry (including any queuing) and egress of patrons by staff, particularly at busy periods, is essential to control numbers and avoid conflict.

2.9.3 Retail: Front and rear doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure

Security-certified doorsets have resisted a series of professional attacks (using a variety of tools) including to the door itself, the frame, the locks and the fittings (see Section 7.1). They are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.

2.9.4 Retail & Drinking establishment: Glazing in doors has been smashed to gain entry

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All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 7.3). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.

2.9.5 Retail & Drinking establishment: Customers posing as legitimate customers, gaining access to staff only areas

There should be a secure area for staff to leave their belongings while at work and access to all staff areas should be restricted with auditable access controls.

3 Risk Factors

3.1 Drinking Establishments

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Misc theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises

3.2 Retail

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery
- Shoplifting
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Employee theft
- Loitering groups
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

4 Design Considerations

The design and layout of your development will be appraised both in this document and through face-to-face meetings if and when required. Design for Security does recommend however that designers and developers refer to:

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4.1 Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London

Seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention are detailed within Chapter 2 of this ODPM publication. Annex 3 also contains many useful references. You can download 'Safer Places' at www.designforsecurity.org

4.2 Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

5 Design & Layout Appraisal

5.1 Recommendations

5.1.1 Licensed premises are often the scene of violent incidents and therefore it is highly recommended that a CCTV system is installed, covering internal and external areas, so that any incidents are captured. More information on CCTV systems can be found in section 6.6 of this report.

5.1.2 The proposed opening hours should be in keeping with surrounding licensed premises and not be excessive, Service of drinks should end approximately thirty minutes before the premises closes to aid effective dispersal of customers.

5.1.3 The bar should be located so that customers entering/leaving the premises through the main entrance should be easily observed by staff.

5.1.4 Staff should also have clear views of the toilets to monitor usage.

5.1.5 In order to minimise criminal opportunities the following elements are recommended:

- Only one entrance should be used by customers.
- Tables should be spaced so that it is easy for staff and customers to negotiate their way through the premises.
- Consideration should be given to high/wide bar areas, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of the service counter should be prevented (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled).
- The internal layout the premises should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding pinch points. A clear pathway to and from the toilets to the seating areas is desirable.
- There should be few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation.
- The proposed external seating area should be:
    i. Supervised and covered by CCTV;
    ii. The seating area should be enclosed with barriers with a single entry exit point;
    iii. Barriers should be sufficiently high to deter sneak thefts from passers-by; and,
    iv. Tables, chairs and barriers should be removed into premises after 23:00, to reduce the risk anti-social behaviour or becoming the scene of criminal behaviour.
- Entry to staff-only areas should be access controlled or be lockable by key to prevent unauthorised entry. Signage should indicate which areas are only for members of staff.
- Toilets should be clearly signed so that there are no excuses for customers finding their way to the back of house.

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5.1.6 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any till/bar area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods. Cash should be stored securely in a safe within a secure back office.

5.1.7 An 'operating policy' should be drawn up, which includes:

- Details of tables, chairs and barrier system to be used around any external seating, and a procedure for managing and maintaining external seating including a procedure for removing.
- Location, facilities and management of any smoking areas.
- Details of waste management provision (bins should be securely stored within the premises).
- A procedure for making the premises secure after customers have left so that counting and securing the takings can be carried out in a secure environment, and a procedure for staff leaving and securing the premises so that staff safety is not compromised.
- Details of staff security training.
- Details of a CCTV system - including camera positions and monitoring/recording facilities.
- Cash storage/management, which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe.

5.1.8 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

6 Physical Security

The following standards and features will be required for this development to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.

6.1 Doors

6.1.1 External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2.

6.1.2 External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

6.1.3 Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

6.2 Windows and Shutters

6.2.1 Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.

6.2.2 Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

6.2.3 It is highly unlikely that the folding doors on the shop front will be certified to an acceptable security standard; therefore, it is recommended that the shop front is secured with internal perforated shutter or security grilles certified to LPS 1175 SR 1.

6.3 Glazing

Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

6.4 Alarms

6.4.1 An alarm should be installed and be linked to contacts on all external doors, including fire doors.

6.4.2 PIR detectors should cover all rooms with windows.

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6.4.3 It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security patrol team).

6.5 Access Control

6.5.1 Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:

- Main entrance
- Doors into staff only areas

7 External Features

7.1 Lighting

7.1.1 The external façade and particularly the main entrance of the premises, and all fire doors, should be adequately and uniformly lit, with dusk to dawn sensors, avoiding any pooling or shadowing. Lighting levels should be sufficient to support any CCTV system.

7.2 CCTV

7.2.1 Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

7.2.2 CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

7.2.3 Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

7.2.4 With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

7.2.5 Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

7.2.6 **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

7.2.7 **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

7.2.8 The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: the main entrance (external and internal view), the bars and till points, general views of the seating areas (internal and external), and any fire escape doors.

8 Management & Maintenance

8.1.1 Active continuous management and maintenance of the premises can reduce the likelihood of crime and disorder occurring. A maintenance plan should be created to promote good management of the premises, this plan should focus on issues such as:

- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV;
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti;

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- Opening and closing of premises including staff arrival and departure;
- Cash management within the premises;
- Cash in transit collections/delivers and banking practices; and,
- Management of deliveries.

9 Construction

Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
21/11/2013	David Johnson	CIS instruction received

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

DWG No.	DWG Title	Date	Rev
G (2-) 001	Ground floor plan as proposed	11/13	A
G (2-) 002	Mezzanine floor plan	09/13	-
G (2-) 003	Elevations as proposed	09/13	-
G (2-) 004	Elevations as proposed – vinyl's not shown	09/13	-
S (2-) 005	Sections as proposed	09/13	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status			Revisions Made
A	☐	☐	☒	

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 3621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Key Egress.

The minimum standard for locks on external or entrance doors to be acceptable to the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the police service. The effectiveness of the lock also depends on the quality of the door, frame and other hardware which is not tested by this standard and which may fail before the lock.

BS 8621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Keyless Egress.

Same as above, but egress is possible without a key (by use of thumb turn or latch lever.

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2007

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at *www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted*)

CRA

Crime Reduction Advisor. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

NPT

Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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