

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Crime Impact Statement: Lite

55/57 Bridge Street, Manchester

Change of Use to Bar

For Paul Butler Associates

Version A: 15th May 2013

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Not Protectively Marked

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2013/0296/CIS/01

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The 'Crime Impact Statement: Lite' Explained

The 'Crime Impact Statement: Lite' has been created to accompany planning applications for small developments, changes of use, and other minor applications at the discretion of the local planning authority in accordance with the local validation checklist. These developments, although small, can have a tendency to invite a disproportionately high volume of crime and incidents, making designing-out criminal opportunities at the outset an invaluable opportunity. The CIS: Lite will advise on a range of measures possible given the scope of works, which aim to minimise these opportunities for crime.

Executive Summary

☐ **Significant material changes are advised**

☐ **Proposal is satisfactory in principle but minor changes are advised**

☒ **Proposal is generally acceptable subject to the advice in this report**

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. In general the proposed scheme is generally acceptable from a crime prevention perspective. Recommendations have been made within this report that would reduce the vulnerability of the development to crime, and these can be found in section 4.2 of this report. These recommendations include the local licensing officer's requirement that the street furniture forming the external seating area is removed from the piazza by 23:00.

If the recommendations outlined in this report are taken into account we would be supportive of the development at planning application stage.



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1 Visual Audit

The diagram below shows the red edge plan of the development site. The site is located in the Manchester City Centre, close to the Spinningfields area, Deansgate and the Salford city council boundary. Properties in the local area are generally commercial, with a high number of public houses, bars, takeaways and restaurants/cafes in the local area, there are also a small number of retail units, close by in Spinningfields are a large number of office buildings and court buildings – including the Civil Justice Centre.

There is a large piazza area to the font of the building, defined by benches, boulders and trees. The proposals include a small seating area on the piazza in front of the building. The piazza and the front elevation of the building can be seen in the photographs below.




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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st April 2012 and 2013.

2.1 Crime Count

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
20	122	173	433	614	196	23	218	28	217

2.1.1 The volume of crime in this area is high due to its location within the city centre. The volumes of violent crimes, theft, robbery and vehicle crime are exceptionally high and the rate of burglary at commercial premises is much greater than normally experienced in the Manchester area.

2.2 Misc Theft (Proposed Use Only): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to misc theft offences within/against bar premises, recorded in the Manchester city centre area.

2.2.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of misc theft peaks on the days of the weekend, between Friday and Saturday. On these days, nightclubs, bars and public houses in the city centre area experience higher levels of attendance than during the week. Licensed premises are usually open for longer at the weekend and the opportunity for offenders to commit theft is much greater.

2.2.2 Time Range: The risk of theft increases late in the night into the early morning. This is when bars and nightclubs area busiest and the opportunities for theft arise at a greater frequency. The most frequently stolen items are customer belongings, such as handbags, purses, wallets and mobile phones.

2.3 Burglary Other (Proposed Use Only): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against bar premises, recorded in the Manchester city centre area.

2.3.1 Day Range: In the Manchester area the risk of burglary at licensed premises is greatest on Sunday and Tuesday. The risk of burglary is not significantly higher than the risk of burglary on other days. The risk of burglary is likely to be highest on Sunday when opening hours are often curtailed.

2.3.2 Time Range: The risk of burglary is highest early in the afternoon and in the early hours of the morning. Licensed premises are likely to be targeted at these times, as they are unlikely to be open or are open with reduced numbers of staff.

2.3.3 Point of Entry: In many cases of burglary the point of entry is undetermined and this could be due to the open access of most bars and nightclubs where people can walk in freely, without raising any suspicion. In many cases of burglary offenders have accessed staff only areas, or areas that are not open to the public and stealing property. When offenders have broken in they have typically targeted doors, including fire doors. Doors have routinely been forced open using bodily pressure or tools.

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2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The information below relates to vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.

2.4.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of burglary in the local area is greatest between Wednesday and Friday. On average the risk of burglary is greatest between Monday and Friday than at the weekend.

2.4.2 Time Range: During the day the risk of vehicle crime is concentrated in the afternoon and evening, peaking at midday and between 7pm and 8pm.

2.5 Wounding: Risk Analysis

The information below relates to woundings committed within a Km² centred on the site.

2.5.1 Day Range: Violent crime peaks at the weekend. Between Friday and Sunday, a greater number of people descend on the city centre area to attend licensed premises, often drinking for longer periods, consuming more alcohol.

2.5.2 Time Range: The risk of violent crime increases in the late evening and into the early hours of the morning, peaking between 1am and 4am. At these times, those attending licenses premises are more likely to be intoxicated and violent disorder is more likely to breakout in licensed premises, taxi ranks and takeaways.

2.6 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown

The information below relates to criminal damage and robbery committed within a Km² centred on the site.

2.6.1 Criminal Damage Targets: The makeup of the criminal damage split in this area shows that property is almost twice as likely to be targeted as vehicles. Common incidents of criminal damage include graffiti, windows being smashed (both on properties and buildings) and damage to vehicle bodywork.

2.6.2 Robbery Targets: Robbery against the person is much more prevalent than against businesses in this area. The risk of robbery increases when victims take quieter, more secluded routes through the area in the evening/at night.

2.7 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.7.1 Theft of and from handbags in crowded bars

Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' (see opposite) to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The internal layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.

2.7.2 Theft of property from unrestricted staff areas

There should be a secure area for staff to leave their belongings while at work. Access to all staff areas should be restricted with auditable access controls and an internal CCTV system would provide the means to identify any offenders.

2.7.3 Burglary where rear doors have been forced open to gain entry

All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (PAS 24 or LPS 1175). Access should be restricted to any hidden elevations of the building, where any doors could be attacked unseen from the street.

2.7.4 Burglary where rear windows have been smashed to gain entry.

Secure rear windows when the premises are closed with discreet security shutters which meet the LPS 1175 standard

2.7.5 Outbreaks of violent disorder late at night due to intoxication

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Although it is appreciated that the licensee cannot be held responsible for the behaviour of patrons once they leave the establishment, they can adopt good practice management measures to discourage violence and disorder. The effective management of entry (including any queuing) and egress of patrons by staff, particularly at busy periods, is essential to control numbers and avoid conflicts.

3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Misc theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises

4 Design Considerations

4.1 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

4.1.1 The existing basement bar 'The Liars Club' has suffered from a relatively low number of incidents in the previous 24 months, which suggests that the correct policies and procedures are in place.

4.1.2 The location of the bar, the toilets, and access into the premises are all positioned at different points within the premises. This separation will allow easier customer flow and reduce the possibility of conflict at pinch points.

4.1.3 The location of the ground floor bar, and regular shape of the ground floor of the premises, provides a clear view of patrons arriving and leaving the premises, and of customers within the establishment.

4.2 Recommendations

4.2.1 Licensed premises are often the scene of violent incidents and therefore it is essential that a CCTV system is installed, covering internal and external areas, so that any incidents are captured.

4.2.2 In order to minimise criminal opportunities the following elements are recommended:

- Only one entrance should be used by customers.
- Tables should be spaced so that it is easy for staff and customers to negotiate their way through the premises.
- The bar area should be designed to afford a clear view of the entrances and the access to the toilets.
- The proposals include an external seating area located on the piazza to the front of the building. The external seating area should be:
    i. Supervised and covered by CCTV.
    ii. The seating area should be enclosed with barriers with a single entry exit point.
    iii. Barriers should be sufficiently high to deter sneak thefts from passers-by.
    iv. The local licensing officer has strongly recommended that tables, chairs and barriers should be removed into premises after 23:00, to reduce the risk of this area generating anti-social behaviour or becoming the scene of criminal behaviour and violence.

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- Entry to staff-only areas should be access controlled or be lockable by key to prevent unauthorised entry. Signage should indicate which areas are only for members of staff.
- Toilets should be clearly signed so that there are no excuses for customers finding their way to the back of house.

4.2.3 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any till/bar area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods. Cash should be stored securely in a safe within a secure back office.

4.2.4 An 'operating policy' should be drawn up, which includes:

- Details of tables, chairs and barrier system to be used around any external seating, and a procedure for managing and maintaining external seating including a procedure for removing ;
- Location, facilities and management of any smoking areas;
- Details of waste management provision (bins should be securely stored within the premises).
- A procedure for making the premises secure after customers have left so that counting and securing the takings can be carried out in a secure environment, and a procedure for staff leaving and securing the premises so that staff safety is not compromised.
- Details of staff security training;
- Details of a CCTV system - including camera positions and monitoring and recording facilities; and

4.2.5 Cash storage/management, to take place in a secure room with a certified safe.

5 Physical Security

Whilst the plans received do not indicate that any external alterations are to be made to the shop front, any changes to external hardware should comply with the standards stated below.

5.1 Doors

5.1.1 Any new external doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2.

5.1.2 Any new external escape-only doors should be steel doors in steel frames, with multi-point panic hardware to all leaves (certified to EN 1125). These doors must also have hinge bolts, and no external ironmongery.

5.2 Glazing

5.2.1 Any new glazing should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

5.3 Shutters

5.3.1 The shop front should be secured with shutters when the unit is not in use. I would prefer to see the use of internal shutters/grilles (please see www.securedbydesign.com for SBD licensed companies/products), but if external shutters are used, the shutter box and guides should be built into the fabric of the building.

5.4 Lighting

5.4.1 The external façade and particularly the main entrance of the premises, and all fire doors, should be adequately and uniformly lit, with dusk to dawn sensors, avoiding any pooling or shadowing. Lighting levels should be sufficient to support any CCTV system.

5.4.2 Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

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5.5 Alarms

5.5.1 An alarm should be installed and be linked to contacts on all external doors, including fire doors.

5.5.2 PIR detectors should cover all rooms with windows.

5.5.3 It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security patrol team).

5.6 CCTV

5.6.1 A monitored CCTV system should be installed. It will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
    - **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
    - **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

5.6.2 The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: the main entrance (external and internal view), secondary/basement entrance, the bars and till points, general views of the seating areas, the staff area, and any fire escape stairwells.

6 Management & Maintenance

6.1.1 Active continuous management and maintenance of the premises can reduce the likelihood of crime and disorder occurring. A maintenance plan should be created to promote good management of the premises, this plan should focus on issues such as:

- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV;
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti;
- Opening and closing of premises including staff arrival and departure;
- Cash management within the premises;
- Cash in transit collections/delivers and banking practices; and,
- Management of deliveries.

6.1.2 The proposed opening hours should be in line with local shops rather than licensed premises. Late opening hours may attract anti-social behaviour and intoxicated individuals causing annoyance.

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Additional advice and information regarding local crime prevention initiatives can be obtained from the Crime Reduction Advisor for central Manchester (**John Sargeson** – **0161 856 3046**).

7 Useful References

The design and layout of your development will be appraised both in this document and through face-to-face meetings if and when required. Design for Security does recommend however that designers and developers refer to:

7.1 Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London

Seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention are detailed within Chapter 2 of this ODPM publication. Annex 3 also contains many useful references. You can download 'Safer Places' at www.designforsecurity.org

7.2 Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
17/04/2013	Tom Flanagan	CIS instruction received
13/05/2013	Tom Flanagan	Progress update
13/05/2013	Martin Aylett	Licensing comments
14/05/2013	John Sargeson	Crime Reduction Special comments
15/05/2013	Tom Flanagan	Report Issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

DWG No.	DWG Title	Date	Rev
	SITE LOCATION PLAN		
	GENERAL PLAN GROUND FLOOR PROPOSED REVISED 2		
	GENERAL PLAN GROUND FLOOR EXISTING		
	FRONT ELEVATION EXISTING REVISION 1		
	SIDE ELEVATIONS EXISTING REVISION 1		
	FRONT ELEVATION PROPOSED		
	SIDE ELEVATIONS PROPOSED		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status			Revisions Made
A	☐	☐	☒	

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