

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

36 CHARLOTTE STREET, MANCHESTER

OFFICES OF 788 SQ.M & A RESTAURANT OF 207 SQ.M

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR CHAN HONG PROPERTIES

VERSION A: 11TH SEPTEMBER 2015

REFERENCE: 2015/0472/CIS/02

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CPT
CRIME PREVENTION TEAM

36 CHARLOTTE STREET, MANCHESTER

2013/0472/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Design changes not required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed scheme has been found acceptable and if submitted to the local planning department in its current form we will support the application.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Patrick Babb

Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map edged in red. The site is located in the city centre area of Manchester on the junction of Portland Street and Charlotte Street, bound by Reyner Street to the rear.

Charlotte Street is one of the main routes in to the China Town area of the city centre and Portland Road is one of the busiest roads in the area placing the site in a prominent location.

The city centre area in general suffers from a very high level of crime and the development is located in close proximity to several high crime hotspots including Piccadilly Gardens and the Village area, it is also close to the Oxford Road corridor, China Town and the Northern Quarter.













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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between1st August 2014 and 31st July 2015.

2.1 Crime Summary


Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site									
Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
41	291	321	1333	1274	198	33	205	<20	258

2.1.1 In the last 12 months, the volume of crime in the local area has been high and this reflects the site's location within the city centre. In particular, there have been a high number of incidents of theft and violence. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues. The majority of the violence in the local area has taken place in the evening and during early hours of the morning, with a higher volume of incidents typically experienced between Friday and Sunday – when more people visit the city and attend licensed premises (often for longer periods and consuming more alcohol, leading to conflicts).

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 **Restaurant:** Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables

Possible Solution - A particular issue in restaurants within the Manchester city centre area is the theft of personal effects; handbag and mobile phone theft is a particular issue. Consideration should be given to fixing 'Chelsea Clips' (see image), Grippa clips, or simple hooks to the underside of tables to allow customers to secure bags or jackets to the table while keeping it in view; a more secure option than, for example, table tops or back of chairs, where belongings can be liable to theft.



The internal layout of the premises can also help deter theft by promoting surveillance and creating an uncluttered, environment, avoiding pinch points or areas of concealment. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.

2.2.2 **Restaurant/office:** Offenders posing as legitimate customers, gaining access to staff only areas

Possible Solution - There should be a secure area for staff to leave their belongings while at work and access to all staff areas should be restricted with auditable access controls.

2.2.3 **Restaurant/office:** Glazing in windows and doors has been smashed

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.

2.2.4 **Restaurant/office:** Doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure

Possible solution – All external doors should be certified to the relevant security standards (see section 4). External doors should be covered by lighting and CCTV where available.

2.2.5 **Office:** Theft of personal property left on desks

Possible Solution - There should be a robust access control system in place (see Section 6.1) to ensure that callers to the building are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access into the


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building. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work.


2.3 Burglary Other (Restaurant/café Use Only): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against restaurants/cafes, recorded in the Manchester city centre area.


Burglary Other – Day Range



Burglary Other – Time Range



Burglary Other – Point of Entry



2.3.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of burglary is greatest on Monday.

2.3.2 Time Range: The risk of burglary is highest in the early hours of the morning, peaking between 2am and 4am. Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place in the evening and during the night, when they are closed and the areas/streets where they are typical found are quiet – meaning offenders perceive the risk of being detected or identified as low.


2.3.3 Point of Entry: Burglaries have taken place through a number of different points of entry, including doors (particularly front doors) and through windows. Doors have frequently been forced open with tools and bodily pressure and in a number of cases glazing in doors has been smashed by offenders to gain unauthorised access.

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
2.4 Misc Theft (Restaurant/café Use Only): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts within/against restaurants/cafes, recorded in the Manchester city centre area.

Misc Theft – Day Range



Misc Theft – Time Range



2.4.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of miscellaneous theft increases towards the weekend. On these days, many restaurants/cafes in the city centre area experience higher levels of attendance than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and the opportunity for offenders to commit theft is much greater.


2.4.2 Time Range: The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and evening. This reflects the times when restaurants/cafes are at their busiest and therefore the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, phones and cameras belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Theft of property belonging to staff is also common with offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain access to unauthorised areas.

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
2.5 Burglary Other (Office Use Only): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester city centre area.


Burglary Other – Day Range



Burglary Other – Time Range



Burglary Other – Point of Entry



2.5.1 Day Range: During the week the risk of burglary to office premises in Manchester city centre is greatest on Monday and Sunday.

2.5.2 Time Range: The risk of burglary against office premises in Manchester city centre is greatest in the evening and early hours of the morning. Offenders often target office buildings when they are closed for the day as it is dark, streets are quieter and they perceive a lower risk of being detected.


2.5.3 Point of Entry: The majority of burglaries at offices in the local area have been committed through doors. Burglaries against office buildings in this area do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing tools with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks. There has also been incidence of offenders smashing glazed panels in doors and windows to gain entry. A number of burglaries have occurred during the day, when offices are open, with offenders posing as legitimate visitors and trespassing to steal property. Fire doors have also been forced open by offenders to gain entry.

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
2.6 Misc Theft (Office Use Only): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester city centre area.

Misc Theft – Day Range



Misc Theft – Time Range



2.6.1 Day Range: The risk of miscellaneous theft in office premises is greatest between Monday and Friday, with fewer incidents occurring at the weekend. Office buildings are likely to be busiest during the week, when most people work, and the opportunity to commit theft is greatest.

2.6.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk of miscellaneous theft is concentrated between mid-morning and 6pm in the evening. During this time many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts peak at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing and the premises is likely to be less secure, possibly while cleaning operations are carried out.

2.7 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Misc theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 Fraser House is located in the city centre area of Manchester on the junction of Portland Street and Charlotte Street, bound by Reyner Street to the rear. The proposed development is a change of use to restaurant at basement, ground floor, first floor and part of the second floor, with the remainder of the second floor and above being office accommodation.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The restaurant and office space will have separate, clearly defined, entrances (with the exception of the office entrance being used as disabled entrance to the restaurant) reducing the potential for conflict between users.

3.2.2 The entrance for the office space will be located on Portland Street elevation and the entrance for the restaurant will be taken off Charlotte Street. Portland Street is one of the main pedestrian and vehicular routes through the city centre and Charlotte Street is one of the main routes in to the China Town area, which should provide the entrances with a high level of passive surveillance.

3.2.3 The restaurant and the offices will be managed by the same company reducing the potential for conflict between uses.

3.3 Changes and Amendments Needed

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 The restaurant and office uses should be self-contained as far as possible. Restaurant patrons should not be able to access office areas and, conversely, office staff should not be permitted access to any restaurant areas. Clear signage should be provided to prevent confusion being used as an excuse for accessing restricted areas.

3.3.2 Door sets in to office space, which can be access by restaurant staff/patrons should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.

3.3.3 Office staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building. The main entrance doors should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff by means of a video access control system linked to each individual office suite (allowing staff to vet callers before allowing them entry).to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobbies.

3.3.4 It should not be possible for the staff/visitors of one office floor/suite to access another. All individual office levels or suites should be fitted with self-closing access-controlled doors, operated by staff swipe cards/fobs or by intercoms linked to individual receptions and all rooms within office suites should be capable of being deadlocked when unoccupied.

3.3.5 Staff only areas of the restaurant should be restricted to staff with a comprehensive access control system (i.e. fob or card readers). It is highly recommended that any access control systems are auditable in the event of any incidents.

3.3.6 The door to the room containing the safe should be secure. The door should be a minimum of 44mm solid core door with at least one key operated lock certified to BS 3621 or 8621, with atleast two locking points (alternatively, a door set certified to BS PAS 24 can be used). The walls to the office should be solid. The door should be self-closing and lock when shut. Doors in to secure rooms should be covered by CCTV.

3.3.7 Restaurant staff should be provided with a secure area to store personal belongings (i.e. secure lockers).

3.3.8 Restaurant toilets can give rise to anti-social behaviour problems. The following issues should be considered:

- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.

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- Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
- Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
- Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
- Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
- Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

3.3.9 An intruder alarm should be installed to both the office and the restaurant. The alarm system should be linked to contacts on all external doors. PIR detectors should cover all rooms with windows. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with the alarm signal terminating at a recognised Alarm Receiving Centre.

3.3.10 The door to the room containing the safe (restaurant) should be secure. The door should be a minimum of 44mm solid core door with at least one key operated lock certified to BS 3621 or 8621, with atleast two locking points (alternatively, a door set certified to BS PAS 24 can be used). The walls to the office should be solid. The door should be self-closing and lock when shut. Doors in to secure rooms should be covered by CCTV.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve the Secured by Design award.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Office entrance doors, within areas shared between the restaurant and the office, should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

4.2 Windows and Shutters

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required), and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

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4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ An intruder alarm should be installed to both the office and the restaurant. The alarm system should be linked to contacts on all external doors. PIR detectors should cover all rooms with windows. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with the alarm signal terminating at a recognised Alarm Receiving Centre.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
  - Office entrance (from Portal Street)
  - Staff only areas (restaurant)
  - Office entrances

4.6 Fit-Out

- ☐ Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their buildings once complete, and therefore the end-users requirements. Typical components which are subject to fit-out are:
  - Internal access control
  - Internal doors in to premises
  - Alarm systems
- ☐ These features can be critical to a secure environment, and we would urge the client to provide would-be tenants with the contact details for Design for Security, who will provide free advice on internal security matters so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk ‘til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

4.8 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

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- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

- **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

- **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Main entrances, lifts, stairwells, restaurant floor space, corridors and office entrances.

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.

5.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the building remains in good repair.
- Regular inspection, service and repair to communal security features (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV, alarms, fencing & gates)
- Ensure that the site management is for which the building / site was designed able to cope with the remains in place, such as 24 hour concierge / security patrols.
- Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.

5.1.3 There should be a lone worker policy drawn-up, ensuring that there is more than one staff member on the premises at any one time, and that locking down the premises at the end of business is not carried out by a single member of staff.

5.1.4 Cash kept on each of the premises should be stored securely. A safe certified to LPS 1183 will provide a good level of security. A time-delay lock is advised. Consider a chute deposit safe (to LPS 1183) at each till to reduce cash amounts held in tills during busy periods. A protocol should be set up to ensure that large amounts of cash are not kept in the tills at any one time.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site

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during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
05/08/2015	Jonathon Davidson	CIS application received
28/08/2015	Jonathon Davidson	Progress update

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
206 SK 1101	Sketch Proposals Proposed Lower Ground Floor	Jun 12	E
206 SK 1102	Sketch Proposals Proposed Upper Ground Floor	Jun 12	H
206 SK 1103	Sketch Proposals Proposed 1st Floor	Jun 12	F
206 SK 1104	Sketch Proposals Proposed 2nd Floor	Jun 12	E
206 SK 1105	Sketch Proposals Proposed 3rd Floor	Jun 12	F
206 SK 1106	Sketch Proposals Proposed 4th Floor	Jun 12	E

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status			Revisions Made
A				

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at ***www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted***)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org
Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com
RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com
LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com
Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk
DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org
Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org
CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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