

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

THE MEWS, GREAT NORTHERN WAREHOUSE, DEANSGATE, BAR & RESTAURANTS

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR PAUL BUTLER ASSOCIATES
VERSION A: 21ST JANUARY 2016
REFERENCE: 2015/1104/CIS/01

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CPT
CRIME PREVENTION TEAM

THE MEWS, GREAT NORTHERN WAREHOUSE, DEANSGATE, MANCHESTER

2015/1104/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor design changes required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed scheme has been found generally acceptable and if submitted to the local planning department with the recommendations made in section 3 taken in to consideration we will support the application.



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
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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The properties that are to be refurbished (The Mews) are accessed from a second floor level walkway that runs through the Great Northern (adjacent to the multi-storey car park) from Great Bridgewater Street to the AMC cinema. The walkway can also be access from Deansgate adjacent Peter Regan Hairdressing.

The majority of the units on the walkway do not appear to have ever been in use; whereas some have been in previous use and have subsequently closed. The Eastern side of the walkway has some shelter in the form of a canopy and there are benches within the walkway area; in spite of this there were no signs of antisocial or criminal behaviour.













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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

The following information has been produced to give an insight into the types and volume of, crime experienced across Greater Manchester, North Manchester and the city centre. Particular attention is paid to the area surrounding Deansgate and to crimes which research shows can be affected by the built environment. All data is based on crimes recorded between 1st December 2014 and 30th November 2015.

2.1 Crime Overview

2.1.1 Over the previous 12 months there have been 219,343 crimes reported across the Greater Manchester Police force area. Of these, 32,440 incidents (15%) have occurred on the North Manchester division with 29,180 (90%) of these victim based crimes (crimes with a specific identifiable victim).

2.1.2 When looking at the figures in more detail, the number of crimes recorded within a Km² centred on the development site over the previous 12 months is as follows:

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
<20	101	171	566	539	66	39	183	<20	98

2.1.3 The most frequently occurring offences over the previous 12 months in the research area have been less serious wounding, miscellaneous theft, theft from a motor vehicle and criminal damage. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues. The majority of the violence in the local area has taken place in the evening and during early hours of the morning, with a higher volume of incidents typically experienced between Friday and Sunday – when more people visit the city and attend licensed premises (often for longer periods and consuming more alcohol, leading to conflicts).


2.1.4 As this Crime Impact statement has been prepared for a non-residential development the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and miscellaneous theft

2.2 Non-domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis


2.2.1 Non-domestic burglary accounts for 5% (1,389 offences) of victim based crimes recorded within North Manchester; a figure which has decreased compared to previous years (December 2013 – November 2014).

2.2.2 When looking in detail at restaurants and licensed premises in Manchester city centre, the graphs below show the level of risk to these premises in terms of day of the week and hour of the day.

Burglary Other – Day Range



Burglary Other – Time Range




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2.2.3 Day Range: In Manchester, the risk of burglary at licensed premises and restaurants is greatest on Monday and Tuesday.

2.2.4 Time Range: The risk of burglary is highest in the early hours of the morning. Premises are likely to be targeted at this time, as they are unlikely to be open or are open with reduced numbers of staff – allowing offenders to operate without being noticed.

2.2.5 Further to the above it is also important to consider offenders entry points

Burglary Other – Point of Entry




2.2.6 Point of Entry: In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered licensed premises through external doors. Most commonly, doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and hand tools. In a number of cases, glazing in doors has been smashed by offenders to gain unauthorised access. Where the point of entry is unknown, this is likely to have been when offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas.


2.3 Miscellaneous Theft: Risk Analysis

2.3.1 The graphs below show the risk of miscellaneous theft occurring at restaurants and licensed premises in Manchester city centre. Miscellaneous theft covers offences such as theft of customer and/or staff property.

Misc Theft – Day Range



Misc Theft – Time Range



2.3.2 Day Range: During the week, the risk of miscellaneous theft at city centre licensed premises and restaurants peaks on the days of the weekend. On these days, many premises within the city centre area experience higher levels of attendance than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunity for offenders to commit theft is greater.

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2.3.3 Time Range: The risk of theft increases late at night and into the early morning. This is when restaurants and licensed premises are often at their busiest and the opportunities for theft arise at a greater frequency (particularly when victims have been drinking alcohol). Handbags, phones and cameras belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Items are usually stolen from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables.

2.4 Risk Factors

2.4.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Misc theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises

2.5 Crime Summary


2.5.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, commonly used M.O's (modus operandi) and possible solutions/recommendations to help reduce the likelihood of them being used on/in future developments are as follows:

- Doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure

Possible Solution – Security-certified door sets have resisted a series of professional attacks (using a variety of tools) including to the door itself, the frame, the locks and the fittings (see appendix 2). They are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Access should be restricted to any hidden elevations of the building, where any doors could be attacked unseen from the street.

- Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables

Possible Solution - Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' (see below) to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The internal layout of the premises can also increase surveillance opportunities and help deter offenders. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.





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- Offenders posing as legitimate customers, gaining access to staff only areas

Possible Solution – Staff-only areas should be effectively separated, both visually and physically, so that customers cannot readily gain entry. This can be achieved by the use of access-controlled doors or barriers, but they should create a clear distinction so that any intruder can be more easily identified. There should be provision within the staff only areas for the secure storage of personal belongings while at work.

- Glazing in windows and doors has been smashed

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.



Rosanna Johnstone *MSc*

- Design for Security Analyst

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development is the refurbishment of The Mews units on the second floor walkway of the Great Northern (that runs adjacent to Deansgate – connecting Great Bridgewater Street and the AMC cinema/Great Northern complex.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposed restaurants and bars have the potential to increase pedestrian flow and vitality in the area in the evening and at night.

3.2.2 Bar staff will generally be able to view those entering and leaving the premises.

3.2.3 Shop fronts will be heavily glazed allowing for views in to and out of the premises to provide surveillance opportunities.

3.3 Required Changes and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 The proposed external outdoor seating area (Units D & E) should be capable of being secured out of hours to minimise the risk of criminal and antisocial behaviour such as congregation or general misuse (including that of the mezzanine level).

3.3.2 The bar and food serving facilities in the external seating area should be secured when closed, with full height shutters, to prevent theft; alternatively, all stock and cash (including any tills) should be stored securely inside the premises.

3.3.3 Access to the first floor walkway serving these units should be restricted to staff.

3.3.4 Consideration should be given to installing skateboard (and similar) deterrents to the proposed walkway seating areas to reduce the potential for misuse.

3.3.5 Tables, chairs and barriers should not remain on the public footway after 11:00pm. The external seating area should be illuminated and covered by CCTV.

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3.3.6 Access to staff/storage areas should be restricted to staff. It is recommended that doors from the public areas of the restaurant to staff only area operate on access control (i.e. fob or swipe card) and a door closer should be installed to ensure the door locks as staff enter/leave this area. Signage should indicate which areas are only for members of staff to avoid confusion.

3.3.7 Theft of personal property is a common occurrence in restaurants in the city centre. It is recommended that 'Chelsea Clips' (see image), Grippa clips, or simple hooks are fitted to the underside of tables to allow customers to secure bags or jackets to the table while keeping it in view; a more secure option than, for example, table tops or back of chairs, where belongings can be liable to theft. This is particularly pertinent in outdoor seating areas.

3.3.8 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any till/bar area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods. Cash should be stored securely in a safe within a secure back office.

3.3.9 In order to minimise criminal opportunities the following elements are recommended:

- Only one entrance should be used by customers (per unit).
- Tables should be spaced so that it is easy for staff and customers to negotiate their way through the premises.
- Consideration should be given to high/wide bar areas, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of the service counter should be prevented (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled).
- The internal layout of the individual units should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding pinch points. A clear pathway to and from the toilets to the seating areas is desirable.
- Toilets should be clearly signed so that there are no excuses for customers finding their way to the back of house.

3.3.10 Publically accessible toilets can give rise to anti-social behaviour problems. The following issues should be considered if the retail premises are to provide toilets for customers:

- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
- Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
- Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
- Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
- Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
- Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

3.3.11 An 'operating policy' should be drawn up, which includes:

- Location and management of any smoking areas.
- Details of waste management provision (bins should be securely stored within the premises).
- A procedure for making the premises secure after customers have left so that counting and securing the takings can be carried out in a secure environment, and a procedure for staff leaving and securing the premises so that staff safety is not compromised.
- Details of staff security training.

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- Details of a CCTV system - including camera positions and monitoring/recording facilities.
- Cash storage/management, which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to comply with Secured by Design standards. It is noted that the development is a change of use and that not all external fittings will be replaced; however, where external fittings are replaced they should be to the following standards.

4.1 Doors

☐ The main entrance door or the secondary entrance door should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.

☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.

☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

4.4.1 An alarm should be installed to cover the ground floor restaurant, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security patrol team).

4.5 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:

- Areas restricted to staff

4.6 Lighting

☐ Dusk ‘til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

4.7 CCTV

☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

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- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

- **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

- **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: External doors, bar area and external seating areas.

5 Internal Layout & Guidance

5.1.1 The premises should be designed with efficient ventilation / extraction systems capable of reducing temperatures and providing sufficient ventilation without the need for staff or customers to open service doors (to the side or rear of the premises) or windows that could undermine the integrity of other security arrangements.

5.1.2 Customer Toilets. Any passages providing access to customer toilets should be well-lit and contain reflective surfaces (e.g. mirrors) in order to improve visibility, particularly at right angled corners – this will allow customers and staff to have a better view of their surroundings.

5.1.3 Customers entering/leaving the premises should be easily observed by staff. Staff must be able to easily monitor people arriving or leaving the premises from any potential access point.

5.1.4 The internal layout of the premises should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding pinch points.

5.1.5 Large amounts of cash should not be stored in the premises overnight and signage should be installed to indicate this. Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.

5.1.6 Toilets should be clearly signed so that there is no excuse for customers finding their way to the back of house.

5.1.7 A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development, and should not require bins to be left on the street for extended periods. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.

5.1.8 Permitted opening hours should be the same as similar nearby premises.

5.1.9 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers, music equipment, utensils etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

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6 Management & Maintenance

6.1.1 Active continuous management and maintenance of the premises can reduce the likelihood of crime and disorder occurring. A maintenance plan should be created to promote good management of the premises, this plan should focus on issues such as:

- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV, lighting, locks etc.;
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti;
- Procedures for opening and closing of premises including staff arrival and departure, with particular attention to lone members of staff;
- Cash management within the premises;
- Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices; and,
- Management of stock deliveries.

7 Construction

7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
PH116/002.3	Proposed Plan Level Three (First Floor)	Oct 15	A
PH116/002.4	Proposed Plan Level Four (Second Floor)	Oct 15	A
PH116/002.6	Proposed Mews Elevation (East)	Oct 15	-
PH116/002.8	Proposed Unit Section D & E	Nov 15	-
PH116/002.10	Proposed Unit Section H-K	Nov 15	-
PH116/002.12	Proposed Unit Section N & O	Nov 15	-
PH116/001.4	Existing Plan Level Four (Second Floor)	Oct 15	-
PH116/001.6	Existing Elevations Deansgate And Mews	Nov 15	-
PH116/001.8	Existing Unit Section D & E	Nov 15	-
PH116/001.10	Existing Unit Section H-K	Nov 15	-
PH116/001.15	Existing Unit Section N & O	Nov 15	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status			Revisions Made
A				

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at ***www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted***)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org
Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com
RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com
LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com
Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk
DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org
Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org
CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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