

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

77 Piccadilly Manchester, M1 2BZ

Gym

FOR: Atelier MB

VERSION A: 14th April 2016

REFERENCE: 2016/0239/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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CPT
CRIME PREVENTION TEAM

77 Piccadilly Manchester M1 2BZ

URN: 2016/0239/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Changes Not Required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed scheme has been found acceptable and if submitted to the local planning department in its current form we will support the application.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Appendix 2 of this report.



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1 Visual Audit


The extent of the proposed development at ground floor level can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The proposed gym will occupy an area of the basement if the building, totalling 529m² including the ground floor area.

The development site is located in the city centre area of Manchester at no. 77 Piccadilly, between Piccadilly Gardens and Piccadilly Railway Station.

The entrance to the proposed gym is located close to the midway point of the building, which also features Fatso's Café and Piccadilly Tavern Public House at ground floor level.

Opposite the development on Piccadilly are Tesco Express and NCP The Grand Car Park multi-story car park.













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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

The following information has been produced to give an insight into the types and volume of, crime experienced across Greater Manchester and North Manchester. Particular attention is paid to the area surrounding Piccadilly and to crimes which research shows can be affected by the built environment. All data is based on crimes recorded between 1st March 2015 and 29th February 2016.

2.1 Crime Overview

2.1.1 Over the previous 12 months there have been 224,543 crimes reported across the Greater Manchester Police force area. Of these. 33,497 (15%) have occurred on the North Manchester division with 30,182 (90%) of these victim based crimes (crimes with a specific identifiable victim).

2.1.2 When looking at the figures in more detail, the number of crimes recorded within a Km² centred on the development site over the previous 12 months is as follows:

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
36	198	350	1429	1125	181	52	312	27	163

2.1.3 The most frequently occurring offences over the previous 12 months in the research area have been less serious wounding, miscellaneous theft and criminal damage. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues. The majority of the violence in the local area has taken place in the evening and during early hours of the morning, with a higher volume of incidents typically experienced on Saturday and Sunday – when more people visit the city and attend licensed premises (often for longer periods and consuming more alcohol, leading to conflicts).

2.1.4 As this Crime Impact statement has been prepared for a non-residential development the more detailed analysis below will look at non-domestic burglary and miscellaneous theft

2.2 Non-domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

2.2.1 Non-domestic burglary accounts for 4% (1,289 offences) of victim based crimes recorded within North Manchester; a figure which has decreased compared to previous years (October 2013 – September 2014).


2.2.2 When looking in detail at gyms across Greater Manchester, there have been relatively few incidents of burglary. Of those incidents that have occurred, offenders have gained entry through a number of different entry points. Where the point of entry is unknown, this is likely to have been when offenders have posed as legitimate service users to gain access, before targeting insecure doors or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas. Where the point of entry is known, offenders have commonly targeted roofs, typically by climbing on to these and then either damaging or prising open skylights to gain access. Where doors have been targeted, these have typically been forced open using bodily pressure and/or tools or the glazing in them has been smashed. Offenders have most commonly targeted gyms in the evening and early hours of the morning - when they are shut, it is dark, streets are quieter and they perceive a lower risk of being detected.

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
2.3 Miscellaneous Theft: Risk Analysis

2.3.1 The graphs below show the risk of miscellaneous theft occurring at gyms across Greater Manchester. Miscellaneous theft covers offences such as theft of customer and/or staff property.

Misc Theft – Day Range



Misc Theft – Time Range



2.3.2 Day Range: During the week, the risk of miscellaneous theft at Greater Manchester gym premises is greatest on Tuesday.

2.3.3 Time Range: During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the late afternoon and evening. This is when gyms are typically at their busiest and the opportunities to offend are greater. The majority of thefts are either of staff property or unattended/insecure items of personal property belonging to service users.

2.4 Risk Factors

2.4.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Theft of user/staff belongings
- Other theft from premises
- Theft of/from parked cars
- Controlled Access (staff/user only)
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Arson
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Cycle security
- Safety of children
- Cash Robbery

2.5 Crime Summary

2.5.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, commonly used M.O's (modus operandi) and possible solutions/recommendations to help reduce the likelihood of them being used on/in future developments are as follows:

- Offenders have typically climbed on to roofs before targeting skylights to gain entry

Possible Solution – There should be no single storey elements or features that might make the roof accessible to offenders.

- Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools

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Possible Solution - Possible Solution - All external doors and internal apartment entrance doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified door sets have resisted a series of professional attacks (using a variety of tools) including to the door itself, the frame, the locks and the fittings. They are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.

- Offenders posing as legitimate service users to gain access to unauthorised areas, in order to steal property

Possible Solution – A robust access control system should be in place to ensure that the proposed gym unit is only accessible to legitimate users. There should be secure lockers for the use of members and any staff only areas should be fitted with self-closing, solid-core doors fitted with auditable access controls, in order to prevent unauthorised access.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development is the conversion of the existing basement space to a gym, with access from the public footway via the existing entrance.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposed gym only has one entrance from street level, reducing the potential for burglary.

3.2.2 The office is located adjacent the turnstiles, allowing staff to vet members/visitors before allowing them access to the gym.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 The majority of thefts at gyms have occurred where offenders have gained access to the gym floor or changing rooms before targeting property belonging to members. Access in to the gym should be restricted to members with the use of turnstiles or an airlock system (or similar) to prevent non-members gaining access in to the building. Access control systems should be auditable so that in the event of an incident a record of those in the building at the time is available.

3.3.2 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work.

3.3.3 Inadequate provision of lockers or those that provide little security leave members personal property vulnerable. Secure lockers must be provided for gym users and they should be encouraged to utilise them rather than leave any unattended items insecure/accessible. Changing facilities should be frequently patrolled by staff.

3.3.4 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the premises must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the gym. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff/members should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating plan should focus on issues such as:

- Opening and closing of the premises, including staff arrival and departure.
- Member access/egress.
- Lone-worker risk assessments.
- Protocols for on-site or remote responses to incidents.

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- Any cash storage/management within the unit.
- Management of any stock deliveries and waste collection.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.

4.2 Glazing

☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356 (laminated). The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.3 Alarms

☐ An alarm should be installed to cover the entire building, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility - be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security patrol team.

4.4 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:

- Main entrance
- Gym area
- Staff only areas

☐ Measures must be included to prevent visitors/intruders from progressing beyond the entrance without authorisation.

4.5 CCTV

☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

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- **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

- **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: **Main entrances, stairwells, and gym floor.**

4.6 Other

- Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
17/03/2016	Mark Mayhew	CIS application received

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
E (900)	Site Edge Red Plan	Mar 16	
T13119 – 77 - 1104	Proposed Ground And Basement	JAN 16	0

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at ***www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted***)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org
Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com
RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com
LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com
Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk
DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org
Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org
CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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