CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

64 BRIDGE STREET, MANCHESTER

CHANGE OF USE OF GROUND FLOOR UNIT TO FORM 373sqm. RESTAURANT

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: BUTAROSE

VERSION A: 21/04/16

REFERENCE: 2016/0261/CIS/01

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64 Bridge Street Manchester


URN: 2016/0261/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Design changes not required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The proposal will not achieve 'Secured by Design' (SBD) accreditation without the replacement of all existing external building elements (such as glazing, windows and doors) to SBD standards. Nevertheless, we are happy to endorse this development, subject to all other measures being incorporated into the proposed scope of works. The overall security of the development will be heavily reliant on the continuous effective management of the premises, rather than just the physical measures recommended in the report.



Bradley Hart *MTCP*

Design for Security Consultant

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
1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the south side of Bridge Street in Manchester city centre. It is currently formed by a ground floor retail showroom unit fronting onto Bridge Street, with a rear elevation onto Wood Street. The upper floors of the building are in use as offices and the basement is in use as a wellness centre.

There is a narrow alleyway to the east of the building, linking Bridge Street and Wood Street, and there is a small enclosed/gated service area off the alleyway on the west side of the building. The alleyway itself is very narrow, includes sharp changes in direction (impeding views along it) and has recessed doorways along it – creating hidden areas and leaving adjacent premises and legitimate users potentially vulnerable to attack unseen. Many of the adjacent premises have been heavily fortified with shutters and rota-spikes to single-storey eaves.

Bridge Street is a wide thoroughfare, busy with vehicular traffic and pedestrian movement, containing a number of commercial premises. As a result, it benefits from good levels of natural surveillance and overlooking.

In contrast, Wood Street is a much narrower street which has more limited levels of activity, pedestrian footfall and vehicular movement - leaving buildings potentially vulnerable to unauthorised access or damage unseen. Many of the properties along this stretch of Wood Street back onto the route itself, leaving numerous blank facades or window and door openings that have either been secured (with grilles or shutters) or have been bricked up.













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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

The following information has been produced to give an insight into the types and volume of crime experienced across Manchester city centre, the North Manchester division and Greater Manchester as a whole. Particular attention is paid to the area surrounding Bridge Street and to crimes which research shows can be affected by the built environment. All data is based on crimes recorded between 1st April 2015 and 31st March 2016.

2.1 Crime Overview

2.1.1 Over the previous 12 months there have been 225,061 crimes reported across the Greater Manchester Police force area. Of these, 33,775 incidents (15%) have occurred on the North Manchester division with 30,412 (90%) of these victim based crimes (i.e. crimes with a specific identifiable victim).

2.1.2 When looking at the figures in more detail, the number of crimes recorded within a Km² centred on the development site over the previous 12 months is as follows:

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
<20	156	201	649	673	59	35	164	<20	153

2.1.3 In the last 12 months, the most frequently occurring offences in the local area have been miscellaneous theft, less serious wounding and criminal damage. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues. The majority of the violence in the local area has taken place in the evening and during early hours of the morning, with a higher volume of incidents typically experienced between Friday and Sunday – when more people visit the city and attend licensed premises (often for longer periods and consuming more alcohol, leading to conflicts).


2.1.4 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a restaurant, the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and miscellaneous theft.

2.2 Burglary Other (Restaurants): Risk Analysis


2.2.1 Non-domestic burglary accounts for 4% (1,293 offences) of victim based crimes recorded within North Manchester; a figure which has decreased compared to previous years (April 2014 – March 2015).

2.2.2 When looking in detail at restaurants and cafes in Manchester city centre, the graphs below show the level of risk to these premises in terms of day of the week and hour of the day.

Burglary Other – Day Range



Burglary Other – Time Range




2.2.3 Day Range: In Manchester city centre, the risk of burglary at restaurants/cafes is greatest on Sunday – when many of them are likely to be closed or operate reduced opening hours.

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2.2.4 Time Range: The risk of burglary is highest in the early hours of the morning, peaking between 2am and 4am. Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the areas/streets where they are typical found are quiet – meaning offenders perceive the risk of being detected or identified as low.

2.2.5 Point of Entry: Where offenders have targeted restaurant/cafe premises in the Manchester city centre area, they have used the following points of entry:

Burglary Other – Point of Entry




2.2.6 In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered restaurants/cafes through external doors. Most commonly, doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and hand tools. In a number of cases, glazing in doors has been smashed by offenders to gain unauthorised access. Where the point of entry is unknown, this is likely to have been when offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas.


2.3 Miscellaneous Theft (Restaurants): Risk Analysis

2.3.1 The graphs below show the risk of miscellaneous theft occurring at restaurants and cafes within the Manchester city centre. Miscellaneous theft covers offences such as theft of customer and/or staff property.

Misc Theft – Day Range



Misc Theft – Time Range



2.3.2 Day Range: During the week, the risk of miscellaneous theft at city centre restaurants/cafes peaks on Saturday. Many premises within the city centre area experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater.

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2.3.3 Time Range: The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants/cafes are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, phones and cameras belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Theft of property belonging to staff is also common, with offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain access to unauthorised areas.

2.4 General Risk Factors

2.4.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Employee theft
- Loitering groups
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.5 Crime Summary

2.5.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting restaurant premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure

  Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doorsets are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.

- Glazing in doors and windows has been smashed to gain access

  Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.

- Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables

  Possible Solution - Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' (see below) to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The internal layout of the premises can also increase surveillance opportunities and help deter offenders. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.



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- Offenders posing as legitimate customers, gaining access to staff only areas

  Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 4.1).

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3 Physical Security Measures

3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 The proposal is to change the use of the existing ground floor unit to form a 373sqm. Restaurant – comprising of approx. 120 dining covers, an 'open' kitchen, a drinks bar, accessible sanitary facilities, storage space, staff area and an office. There will be a new shopfront fitted fronting onto Bridge Street and a new rear door onto Wood Street.

3.2 Any External Alterations

3.2.1 If any external works are to be carried out on the existing unit, either now or in the future, it is strongly recommended that the following physical security measures are incorporated:

3.2.2 Doors

- ❑ Any new external doors should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. Any escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.

- ❑ Any letterboxes within new doors should be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

3.2.3 Windows & Shutters

- ❑ Any new windows should be compliant with and certified BS PAS 24, where possible. Any full height windows should take account of the requirements of the standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.

- ❑ Any new shutters should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Shutters should either be provided internally or, if they are to be externally mounted, shutter boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building (where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage).

3.2.4 Glazing

- ❑ Any new glazing should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

3.3 Other Security Measures

3.3.1 Internal Doors

- ❑ It should not be possible for patrons of the premises to gain unauthorised access to the basement/upper floors of the building or vice versa. Any doors providing access between the premises and other parts of the building should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2, with any escape ironmongery permitted under the security certification of the product. Emergency egress doors should be alarmed and signed as such to prevent mis-use.

- ❑ All back-of-house/staff areas should also not be publicly accessible. Internal doors to storage rooms, staff rooms and offices should be solid-core and self-closing - fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with keys (carried by staff only if required for duties and accounted for at all times). Any cash office should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false/suspended ceilings and a security-certified doorset. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

3.3.2 Building Fabric

- ❑ Internal walls between the premises and any other portions of the building should either be of robust masonry construction or should incorporate timber sheathing (minimum 9mm thick) or expanded metal, in order to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack/penetration.

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3.3.3 Alarm

- ☐ A comprehensive intruder alarm system should be installed to cover the premises, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (i.e. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre, who will alert the key holder or a security patrol team).

3.3.4 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be all external doors, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

3.3.5 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *acceptable standard* that will allow for *identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

  Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

  Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are '*Overview*' and '*Recognition*', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: the main entrance to the unit and all sales counters/till positions.

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4 Internal Layout Guidance

The internal layout of the restaurant should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

4.1.1 Restaurants can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- Opportunities - Large numbers of people congregating in restaurants generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- Lack of attention - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- Cohesion – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent restaurants means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- Customer turnover – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- Valuable goods – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys, MP3 players etc.
- Stealth - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

4.1.2 In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

- The main entrance to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.
- Customers entering/leaving the premises through the main entrance should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.
- The internal layout the premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.
- Consideration should be given to high/wide bars/service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable hatches that cannot be easily scaled).
- Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- Public toilets can give rise to problems and the following issues should be considered:
  - Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
  - Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
  - Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
  - Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.

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- Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
- Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the restaurant must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the scheme. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:

- Opening and closing of the restaurant premises, including staff arrival and departure;
- Cash storage/management within the premises;
- Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices;
- Management of stock deliveries and waste collection;
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access controls, lighting, alarm system, CCTV cameras etc; and
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc.

5.1.2 The opening hours of the restaurant should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses. Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.

5.1.3 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers, TVs, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

5.1.4 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods. Servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.

5.1.5 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only areas.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
23rd March 2016	Butarose	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
29th March 2016	Butarose	Confirmation of instruction & fee
4th April 2016	GMP Finance Dept.	Confirmation of payment
16th April 2016	Butarose	Telephone correspondence re: progress

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
L (EX) 002	Block Plan Existing	15/12/2015	
L (EX) 007	Front Elevation Existing	14/12/2015	
L (EX) 009	Lightwell Elevations & Plan Existing	04/12/2015	
L (--) 003	Plan Level 0 Proposed	20/01/2016	C
L (--) 007	Front Elevation Proposed	14/12/2015	A
L (--) 008	Rear Elevation Existing	14/12/2015	A
L (--) 012	Front Elevation Advert Proposed	14/01/2016	B
-	Design & Access Statement	23/12/2015	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999
General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular doorset is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012
General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)
Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)
Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012
Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011
Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT
Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS
Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT
Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)
A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)
A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)
The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org
CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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