

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Change of use of 1069m^2 storage/industrial space to office use

at Chatham Mill, 8 Chester Street, Manchester

FOR: **Atelier MB**

VERSION A: **29.09.16**

Ref: **2016/0693/CIS/01**

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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CPT
CRIME PREVENTION TEAM

Chatham Mill, 8 Chester Street, Manchester

2016/0693/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The refurbishment of this part of the Mill is welcomed. The proposals are likely to result in a more intensive use of the building, which is likely to lead to an increase footfall to the area. Passive surveillance of the surrounding public realm will be enhanced.

There are no significant issues to address from a crime prevention perspective but, to improve the overall security of the building, a number of recommendations are included, the main ones are summarised as follows:

- A receptionist/concierge is present whenever the building is open.
- Security rated external doors and office suite entrance doors are installed.
- Access controls are installed in order to regulate movement into the building into individual office suites.
- CCTV and intruder alarm systems are installed.
- Removing the window grilles, roller shutter and graffiti from the parts of the building for which planning consent is sought.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will recommend that, should the Manchester's Planning Authority be minded to approve the application, a condition be included to require the approved works to be constructed in accordance with the specification set out in section 4 of this report.



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1 Visual Audit

The photographs and plan below show the development site and its surroundings. The site, forms a part of Chatham Mill, a grade II listed building, edged in red on the plan, is located on the north side of Chester Street between Lower Chatham Street and Lower Ormond Street. The L-shaped Mill is of brick construction and has a 6 storey element facing Chester Street and a 4 storey wing to Lower Ormond Street. The main entrance is centrally located on the Chester Street elevation. There are secondary entrances some of which are secured with roller shutters on both the Chester Street and Lower Chatham Street elevations. To the rear, there is a two storey extension, set within a courtyard, the open areas to which are used for car parking. The courtyard is accessed via a tall, gated, archway at the point on Lower Ormond Street where the four storey wing joins the main six storey building. The building is currently appears to be used for a used for a variety of uses, including office, workshop and studio spaces. The immediate area is dominated by Manchester Metropolitan University teaching buildings as well as student residential accommodation. There are also several retail and food and drink premises on Chester Street as well as a public car park.
This application relates to use of the ground floor of the six storey building and the ground floor of the two storey, courtyard building.



Looking west along Chester Street - the development site is on the centre-left and MMU to the right



The Chester Street facing façade of Chatham Mill




The western fringe of the Mill at the corner of Chester Street and Lower Ormond Street with the courtyard entrance archway






Looking north along Lower Chatham Street with the eastern elevation of the Mill on the right and the Manchester Student Village on the left



The two storey building and car parking set within the courtyard to the rear of the main mill building



The proposed entrance to the offices on the Chester Street elevation, where graffiti and window grilles are very apparent

There have been over 1650 reported crimes committed in the neighbourhood around the site in the past 12 months. By Greater Manchester standards, this is a very high number of offences but this is not unusual for a city centre location. The most common recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the site include: use of violence, or the threat of violence, – 35%; theft – 25%; and, vehicle crime - 14%. The most common crimes to be committed at office premises within the Police division in which Chatham Mill falls within are burglary (59%), theft (17%), and criminal damage to property (11%). Business premises, particularly isolated premises, are easily targeted through the evening and at night-time when workers have left for the day and there is very little passive surveillance of premises, and where buildings have not been designed with adequate security features. Given the presence of window grilles, roller shutters, anti-climb spikes and graffiti on the building it appears that the Mill has clearly been targeted by criminals in the past. However, what was once a relatively isolated area is now densely populated with students living and studying locally who, together with customers of the commercial premises on Chester Street, keep the surrounding streets very active throughout the day and long into the evening. Such activity and associated passive surveillance will help to dissuade criminals targeting property, if the prospect of being witnessed is now highly probable.

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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st September 2015 and 31st August 2016.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site									
Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
76	47	152	322	416	120	26	155	10	128

2.1.1 The volume of crime in the area analysed is high, particularly the levels of violence and theft. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of town or city centres, where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises. Incidents of violence have most commonly occurred at the weekend, primarily around Oxford Road, Princess Street and Whitworth Street.

2.2 Modus Operandi used by offenders in committing burglary and theft at offices in Manchester & measures to reduce vulnerabilities

2.2.1 Doors have been targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of walk burglaries:

- external doors and doors connecting lobbies to private office space and other restricted areas should be fitted with electronic locks activated by a card or fob;
- ell external entry doors should be fitted with self-closing devices and have the capability to lock automatically upon closure

2.2.2 Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 sr2 standard – security rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- only those external doors where they can be easily observed by staff or monitored by CCTV should be used, all doors should be fitted with alarm contacts; and,
- appropriate boundary treatments to control access to a site, and lighting can also deter offenders.

2.2.3 Offenders, posing as legitimate customers/visitors, gaining access to restricted areas to steal property

To minimise the risk of offenders posing as customers in an attempt to gain access to private areas within premises:

- external entrance doors to the building should include access controls to prevent entry by unauthorised visitors
- access control systems should also be employed to prevent unauthorised personnel from entering sensitive spaces within the premises - especially offices and staff rooms, where sensitive information, expensive equipment, or staff belongings may be stored;
- include space for employees to store personal/valuable items securely e.g. lockers or lockable drawers;
- locate a reception desk in a place that maximises surveillance of the entrance door; and,
- install CCTV cameras to monitor movements in, around, and out of the building and the exterior spaces.

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2.3 Risk Factors


2.3.1 The typical security risks for an inner city office development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Theft of employees personal belongings from offices or staff rest rooms
- Theft of stock and equipment by employees
- Theft of bicycles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Criminal damage to vehicles
- Criminal damage, including graffiti, to the building
- Theft of plant and machinery and criminal damage during the construction period


2.4 Burglary at Office Premises: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary at offices, recorded in the North Manchester area.

Burglary– Day Range



Burglary– Time Range




2.4.1 Day Range: The risk of burglary in office premises remains high throughout the week, with the greatest risk on a Wednesday, Friday and Sunday.

2.4.2 Time Range: The risk of burglary is concentrated in the early hours of the morning and late in the evening. Such premises are often targeted at these times by offenders when they are closed for business, it is dark and the areas/streets in which they are located may be deserted when there is little prospect of being witnessed.

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Burglary – Point of Entry




Point of Entry: The most common points of entry by offenders committing burglary are doors. Offenders have typically forced doors open with either bodily pressure or tools, with a number of front doors and fire doors targeted when left insecure. Where entry points were unknown, offenders may have entered as legitimate customers to gain access to premises, before targeting restricted areas. The most commonly targeted items were building tools and computer devices.


2.5 Theft at Office Premises: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to theft within offices, recorded in the North Manchester area.

Theft – Day Range



Theft – Time Range



2.5.1 Day Range: The risk of theft in office premises across North Manchester is greatest during the working week.

2.5.2 Time Range: The risk peaks in the middle of the day between 12-4pm. Lunchtime is a period when staff leave belongings unattended as they take their lunch, and there is a flow of people in and out of office as staff leave for lunch, which allows offenders to blend in with staff and by-pass the attention of reception staff and gain entry. Handbags, computers and audio/media devices were the most commonly stolen items.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development involves the change of use of 1036m^2 of the ground floor of the Mill and first floor of the two storey extension to three separate B1 office spaces. The main entrance will be on the Chester Street elevation where a reception desk will be located and from which reception staff can monitor movements in and out of the building.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposals will result in the reuse of an important listed building which, in the past, has been prone to acts of crime and anti-social behaviour.

3.2.2 The development presents the opportunity to significantly improve the Chester Street façade of the building, with the removal or unsightly grilles, roller shutters and graffiti.

3.2.3 The proposed development will continue the regeneration of this part of the city centre creating additional activity and surveillance to the area during the day.

3.2.4 Natural surveillance over the street and the courtyard will be enhanced with the presence of greater numbers of workers within the building.

3.2.5 Access controls can easily be employed to control movement into and within the building, and to securely isolate the three individual office suites should they be let by three different tenants.

3.2.6 The reception area adjacent to the main entrance allows controls to be set in place to contain visitors in the reception area prior to being escorted into the respective offices.

3.2.7 The courtyard at the rear includes a secure perimeter and locking substantial gates.

3.2.8 There is some car parking on the site, located in an area that is well overlooked from office windows.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 To minimise the risk of burglary or theft from the offices, all external doors to the building (the main entry doors and escape doors) and doors to individual office suites should be security rated.

3.3.2 To prevent casual entry into the building or sensitive areas of the building, the main entrance and individual office suite entry doors should include door closers, which fully engage the locking mechanisms upon closure.

3.3.3 Laminate glass should be fitted within any glazed doors and all windows regardless of whether glazing is replaced. P4A rated laminate glass is difficult to break and enter.

3.3.4 The reception desk should be staffed at all times that the offices remain open for business.

3.3.5 All visitors to the office suites should report to reception for vetting by staff before gaining access to the building.

3.3.6 Audio visual links should be included at the ground floor entrance doors providing visitors and staff a means of communicating with the reception or staff in the relevant office, particularly outside of standard office hours, when the main entrance door should only be operable by holders of appropriate door release cards/fobs. Similarly, doors to individual office suites should include electronic locks with audio-visual controls so that reception staff within each office can further verify visitors prior to allowing entry. A door viewer, or small glazed panel, is also recommended on these office suite doors.

3.3.7 Lockers should be provided to enable staff to safely store valuables.

3.3.8 The streetscape immediately in front of the development must be of a high environmental quality. It must be very well illuminated during the hours of darkness, include signage to indicate the name of the development. All graffiti should be removed from the building.

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3.3.9 Intruder alarms should be fitted to the main entrance and lobby and to each office suite.

3.3.10 A CCTV system should be installed to monitor the development.

3.3.11 Secure, sheltered, cycle parking should be provided within the development. Cycle stands should allow cyclists to secure the frame as well as the wheels to the stand.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

☐ The main entrance door, doors into individual office suites, escape doors, and service doors should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.

☐ The locking system to the main, external, entrance door and the individual office suites must be capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. As necessary, an audio visual unit should relay images (one way) and audio (two ways) to a handset at each office suite to allow vetting of visitors prior to allowing entry, should the reception desk be unmanned. Staff should be able to operate the locking mechanism of the entrance doors remotely, from within their offices.

☐ The entrance doors to the building and to each individual office suite should be self-closing and capable of locking automatically upon closure.

4.2 Glazing

☐ All new door and window glazing within the development must incorporate laminate glazing rated as P4A under EN 356.

4.3 Intruder Alarm

☐ A monitored intruder alarm system should be installed to the building entrance and to each office suite. Alarms should be linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at the security control room/patrol team. Intruder alarms should have two secure signalling paths (one being GSM radio back-up), so that if either signalling path is tampered with by an intruder, or is faulty, the other continues to monitor for any further alarms and transmits them as ‘confirmed activations’ – extra confirmation that an intruder is on the premises and that the alarm isn’t false.

4.4 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, rather than numeric key pads. The following should operate on access control:

- The main entrance doors and individual office suites
- Doors into stair wells or corridors that connect with the parts of the building that are not the subject of this application
- Cycle store – if provided

4.5 Shutters

☐ If shutters or window grilles are installed on any of the ground level doors or windows, they should fitted internally, and be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2.

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4.6 Lighting

- ❑ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors and to any external cycle parking.
- ❑ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.7 CCTV

- ❑ A CCTV system should be used to monitor the interior and exterior of the building, although I do appreciate that some of these areas may fall within the landlord's domain rather than that of this particular development and developer. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
  - With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
  - Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
    - **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
    - **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ❑ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ❑ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ❑ The location of cameras should help to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations for cameras would be: all external doorways, the reception area, doors into each office suite, any cycle store, the car park and the courtyard entry gates.
- ❑ Recording equipment should be securely stored on site, or images could be recorded and stored off site by a suitable monitoring/management company.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ❑ The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as litter removal and repair to lighting, CCTV, signage, and access controls.

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6 Construction

- The developer should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site. Given the proximity of residents, and for other good reasons, the contractor on this scheme should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

- If used, site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

7 Secured by Design (SBD)

- Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
26.08.16	Andrew Burns, Atelier MB	Request for Crime Impact Statement
16.09.16		Site visited
29.09.16	Andrew Burns, Atelier MB	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
E (100)	Ground Floor Plan	AUG 15	
E (200)	Loading Bay Elevation	APR 16	
E (300)	Sections – Existing	JUN 16	
E (103)	Ground Floor Plan	JAN 16	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention through Environmental Design
(Learn more at ***www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted***)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org
Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com
RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com
LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com
Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk
DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org
Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org
CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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