

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

2 LITTLE LEVER STREET, MANCHESTER

EXTENSION TO HOTEL AT 55 PICCADILLY (2,570sqm.) & GROUND FLOOR RETAIL SPACE (40sqm.)

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: Cairn Group

VERSION A: 25/08/16

REFERENCE: 2016/0595/CIS/01

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2 Little Lever Street, Manchester

URN: 2016/0595/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions required


This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- The external entrance to the extension (onto Back Piccadilly) should be defined as a means of escape and for servicing only. All guests should access the main hotel building and the proposed extension building via the main entrance fronting onto Piccadilly Gardens and then use the proposed bridge link at third floor level.
- Control of access into and around the hotel – including to the external entrances, onto bedroom levels and into/from the ground floor car park.
- The proposed retail units are likely to benefit from limited levels of surveillance/overlooking at night, and should therefore be secured with shutters out-of-hours.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development. The overall security of the development will be heavily reliant on the continuous effective management of the premises, rather than just the physical measures recommended in the report.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Sections 4 & 5 of this report.



Bradley Hart *MTCP*

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site is bounded by Cavell Street to the north, Little Lever Street to the west and Back Piccadilly to the south, on the edge of the Northern Quarter area of Manchester city centre. The site is currently vacant and is enclosed with timber hoardings that have been heavily graffitied.

Cavell Street, Little Lever Street and Back Piccadilly are all relatively narrow routes that benefit from limited levels of activity, surveillance and overlooking, backed onto by buildings fronting onto Dale Street/Newton Street/Piccadilly Gardens/Lever Street.

There is also a large amount of litter and graffiti to the buildings/boundaries along these routes. Such evidence of disorder can attract further abuse if not cleared/rectified immediately, as it can give the impression that buildings are not cared for and that crime and disorder are tolerated. There are numerous blank facades along these routes and the buildings have been heavily fortified shutters, bars/grilles and barbed wire. There are many similar streets within the Northern Quarter area and the wider city centre which have limited levels of pedestrian footfall and vehicular movement, particularly at night, and this can leave buildings potentially vulnerable to unauthorised access or damage unseen, as well as to nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues.

To the south-west of the site is the Garden Hotel, which fronts onto and is accessed from Piccadilly, between the existing retail/commercial units. The hotel has a rear entrance off Back Piccadilly (as well as service doors/fire doors). In addition to the general lack of surveillance/overlooking along the route, the rear entrance itself is deeply recessed – leaving it even more hidden and vulnerable to attack unseen.

There is a small public house to the west of the site, at the junction of Little Lever Street and Back Piccadilly.

In terms of the wider area, Piccadilly Gardens is a very busy area of public realm containing a public transport interchange and surrounded by retail units, bars, cafés/restaurants, office premises and hotels. The Northern Quarter lies to the north-east.





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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st August 2015 and 31st July 2016.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
<20	257	425	1699	1411	190	71	231	22	289


2.1.1 The most frequently occurring offences in the local area over the last 12 months have been less serious wounding, miscellaneous theft and criminal damage. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues. The majority of the violence in the local area has taken place in the evening and during early hours of the morning, with a higher volume of incidents typically experienced between Friday and Sunday – when more people visit the city and attend licensed premises (often for longer periods and consuming more alcohol, leading to conflicts).

2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed hotel extension, the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and theft.


2.2 Burglary Other (Hotels): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester city centre area.

Burglary Other – Day Range



Burglary Other – Time Range




2.2.1 Day Range: The risk of burglary at hotel premises in the North Manchester peaks on Monday and is lowest on Tuesday.

2.2.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk of burglary at North Manchester hotels is greatest in the evening and the early hours of the morning. It is likely that offenders target hotels at these times when guests are likely to be out or when staffing levels are likely to be lower than during the day – allowing offenders time to attempt to gain unauthorised access without being detected.

2.2.3 Point of Entry: Where offenders have targeted city centre Hotels, they have used the following points of entry:

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Burglary Other – Point of Entry




2.2.4 In the majority of burglaries at city centre hotels, the point of entry has not been determined. It is likely that these burglaries have occurred when offenders have entered hotels posing as legitimate guests and gained access to hotel rooms without using force – possibly when they have been left insecure by cleaners or by using stolen or forged keys/cards. Where doors have been targeted, offenders have applied bodily pressure or have used tools to force entry.


2.3 Miscellaneous Theft (Hotels): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester city centre area. Miscellaneous theft covers offences such as theft of customer and/or staff property.

Misc Theft – Day Range



Misc Theft – Time Range



2.3.1 Day Range: The risk of theft at North Manchester hotels increases greatly during the weekend, with a higher risk experienced between Friday and Sunday than during the rest of the week. It is possible that the risk increases at the weekend when hotels typically have more guests and the opportunity to carry out such offences is greater. However, offenders do also target hotels between Monday to Thursday when they are typically less busy and the risk of being caught/challenged is lower.


2.3.2 Time Range: The risk of theft is greatest in the evening. This is often when hotel restaurants, bars and gyms are likely to be at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater.

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
2.4 Burglary Other (Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against retail premises, recorded in the Manchester city centre area.

Burglary Other – Day Range



Burglary Other – Time Range




2.4.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at city centre retail premises fluctuates throughout, but is greatest on Wednesday.

2.4.2 Time Range: The risk of burglary at retail premises in the city centre is greatest in the early hours of the morning. Offenders frequently target premises at these times, when they are more likely to be closed, it is dark and there is often much less activity/surveillance in the areas in which they are typically located – all of which contribute to a lower perceived risk to offenders of being detected.

2.4.3 Point of Entry: Where offenders have retail premises in the city centre, they have used the following points of entry:

Burglary Other – Point of Entry




2.4.4 A number of burglaries at retail premises in Manchester city centre have been committed through doors, particularly to the front of the premises. When doors have been targeted, they have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure and, in a number of cases, the glazing within doors has been smashed by offenders to gain entry. However, the majority of burglaries at retail premises have been committed through 'unknown' points of entry, which are likely to have been when offenders posing as legitimate customers have gained unauthorised access to staff-only areas unnoticed (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.).

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
2.5 Miscellaneous Theft (Retail): Risk Analysis

The graphs below show the risk of miscellaneous theft occurring at retail premises within Manchester city centre. Miscellaneous theft covers offences such as theft of customer and/or staff property.

Misc. Theft – Day Range



Misc. Theft – Time Range



2.5.1 Day Range: During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester city centre retail premises remains relatively consistent, but peaks slightly on Saturday.

2.5.2 Time Range: During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated between 12pm and 7pm. The majority of thefts are either of staff property or of/from the handbags of shoppers. The risk of theft of customer belongings is likely to be greater during this period, as retail premises are often at their busiest - creating more opportunities for offenders. Thefts of staff property are more likely to be noticed at either midday, when lunch breaks are taken, or when staff are leaving for the day.

2.6 General Risk Factors

2.6.1 Hotel: The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary of hotel rooms
- Robbery to business
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Violence towards staff
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

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2.6.2 Retail: The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery
- Shoplifting
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Employee theft
- Loitering groups
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.7 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.7.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting hotel premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Hotels: Offenders forcing open doors to hotel rooms to commit theft

  Possible Solution - All individual bedroom doors should ideally be security-certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Where this is not possible, access controls should be incorporated to limit and regulate access to bedroom floors.

- Hotels: Offenders, posing as guests or legitimate customers, accessing staff-only/restricted areas to steal property

  Possible Solution - The main reception should be located to have full view of everyone entering and leaving the premises and all routes to bedrooms and staff areas. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour. Access controls should be used to restrict access to vulnerable areas.

- Hotels: Offenders entering rooms using forged or stolen electronic keycards or fobs

  Possible Solution - Auditable electric locking systems (such as Vingcard or similar) should be used, which can be easily activated/disabled electronically by reception staff.

- Retail: Doors have been forced open and glazed panels within them have been smashed to gain entry.

  Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 5.3). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.

- Retail: Offenders posing as legitimate customers/service users to gain access to unauthorised and staff-only areas and theft of service user/staff property

  Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place (see Sections 5.1 & 6) to ensure that public access is not possible to staff-only areas. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a 7 storey building that will form an extension to the existing Garden Hotel, which is also to be refurbished and extended (subject to a separate Crime Impact Statement).

3.1.2 The ground floor of the building will house 2 no. small retail units (at the junction of Cavell Street/Little Lever Street and Little Lever Street/Back Piccadilly), a parking area comprising of 7 no. vehicle spaces (accessed off Little Lever Street), a lobby and back-of-house areas (including laundry, refuse store and plant areas). The upper floors of the building will house 60 no. guest bedrooms and there will be a bridge link at third floor level, crossing Back Piccadilly, to join with the existing Garden Hotel fronting onto Piccadilly.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposed development will bring a derelict site back into use, resulting in additional activity and surveillance to the area at all times of the day and night.

3.2.2 The building is a regular shape, with no deep recesses that would hide windows or doors - leaving them potentially vulnerable to attack.

3.2.3 The glazed façades of the retail units offer both surveillance opportunities and a greater level of artificial light onto the street/public realm.

3.2.4 The hotel reception area is located directly adjacent to the main entrance of the hotel (off Piccadilly), providing staff with good views of all people entering/leaving the building and external circulation areas.

3.2.5 The layout of the hotel corridors provides clear views and contains few recessed areas, which may conceal criminal activity.

3.2.6 The majority of the hotel bedrooms will be provided well above street level, reducing the potential impacts of noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).

3.2.7 The ground floor car park will be enclosed and secured with a shutter, protecting the parked vehicles from attack unseen and preventing unauthorised access up to bedrooms on the upper floors of the building.

3.2.8 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.3.1 The control of access into and around the hotel is paramount to the security of the development. The ground floor lobby within the proposed extension will not be staffed and could be exploited by criminals to bypass the staffed reception, gain unauthorised access to bedroom floors and escape unseen if left open. It is essential that all guests access the hotel and the proposed extension via the main entrance fronting onto Piccadilly, where surveillance opportunities are maximised and where reception staff have a full, unimpeded view of everyone entering/leaving the building. The external entrance to the extension building (onto Back Piccadilly) should be defined as a means of escape and for servicing purposes only and should not be used by the public. It should be operated by staff fob on access and egress and should be clearly signed to indicate it is alarmed and is not to be mis-used by guests. The door itself should include no/limit amounts of glazing, which could be vulnerable to damage or attack.

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3.3.2 The reception desk within the main entrance lobby of the hotel (off Piccadilly) must be staffed at all times to meet and direct guests. The lift serving all levels of the proposed extension building (as well as the doors to the bridge link between them) should only be accessible/operable by guest key-card, ensuring that non-guests cannot access bedroom floors and guests can only gain to their particular building/floor and no other (see Sections 4.1/4.5). The access stairs should be for staff use and emergency escape purposes only.

3.3.3 The ground floor car park should be secured with a security-certified, high-speed automatic shutter, to reduce the potential for tailgating (see Section 4.6). The location of the shutter should not create a sheltered recess within the building line that may foster loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour. If the car park is intended for the use of guests, the shutter itself should be operated by guest key-card (either by swipe or, preferably, proximity reader), both on access and egress (i.e. no automatic egress). Only guests who have already checked-in and been issued with a key-card to operate the vehicle shutter, the door off the car park and the lift should be able to access to car park (see Sections 4.5/4.6). The doors off the parking area should be operated by guest key-card or staff fob only – preventing anyone who may have gained unauthorised access to the car park from gaining further access into the building and up to bedroom floors.

3.3.4 The proposed retail units will be somewhat remote/isolated at night, when footfall, activity and surveillance levels are likely to be lower than during the day. In addition to the appropriate specification of doors, windows and glazing (see Sections 5.1, 5.2 & 5.3), it is highly recommended they are also secured with shutters out-of-hours (see Section 5.2).

3.3.5 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

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4 Physical Security (Hotel)

4.1 Doors

- ❑ All external doors should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery. Security-certified louvred doorsets are available if required to bin stores (e.g. http://www.securedbydesign.com/members/premier-ss-ltd/).

- ❑ The lift to the proposed extension building should only be accessible/operable by guest key-card, ensuring that non-guests cannot access bedroom floors and guests can only gain to their particular building/floor and no other. The doors into the stair core at each level should be certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2 and fitted with electromagnetic locks (permitted as part of the certification) connected to the fire alarm, so that guests at one level cannot access other levels. These doors should be alarmed and clearly signed to deter casual use. Once an emergency escape core is accessed by a member of the public, the only means of egress should be at ground floor level onto the street. Staff access/egress into or from the access stair core should be controlled via fob/swipe card. The doors off the ground floor car park and to the bridge link at third floor level should also be security-certified (to one of the above standards) and access controlled (see Section 4.5).

- ❑ All individual hotel bedroom doorsets/frames should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick), self-closing and secured with 3 hinges and an electronically operated lock, controlled by Vingcard or similar. They should also be fitted with door viewers and chain limiters. All external doors to first floor balconies should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2.

- ❑ Internal doors/frames to the laundry, plant areas and any stores should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock controlled by staff key-card. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

- ❑

4.2 Windows

- ❑ All ground and first floor windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

- ❑ Any ground and first floor opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ❑ All ground and first floor glazing must incorporate an internal pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining external pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

- ❑ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any cladding to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.

- ❑ Any louvres to the ground floor car park or servicing areas should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid to reach upper floor windows or balconies.

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4.4 Alarm

- ☐ All external escape doors should be fitted with alarm contacts, linked to a 24/7 intruder alarm system.
- ☐ Alarm activations should be relayed to the hotel reception, so staff can investigate or call the authorities as appropriate.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by staff swipe card/fob or by guest key-card, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
    - The external entrance doors to the proposed extension building (off Back Piccadilly) – operated by staff swipe card/fob only.
    - The car park entrance shutter, the doors off the car park and the doors to the bridge link – operated on access and egress by staff swipe card/fob or by guest key-card.
    - The lift to all bedroom floors – operated by staff swipe card/fob or by guest key-card.
    - All doors to the stair core – operated on access and egress by staff swipe card/fob only.
    - All doors to the laundry, plant areas and any stores – operated by staff swipe card/fob only.
- ☐ The electric locking system to be used throughout the building should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff and guest key-cards should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled by staff to ensure that mis-use is prevented.

4.6 Car Park

- ☐ The vehicular entrance to the ground floor car park should be fitted with a high-speed shutter certified to LPS 1175 SR1 and operated staff/guest key-card, with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out'), so that criminals cannot gain access to the area, attack the vehicles and escape. Any emergency override of the shutter should be alarmed (linked to reception) and signed as such, to deter mis-use.
- ☐ Lighting to the car park should be in accordance with BS 5489 and display an average lux level of 75-100, with a uniformity level of no less than 50%. Light-coloured walls and ceilings can help achieve this and create a safe and non-threatening environment.
- ☐ Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated to avoid confusion/conflict and aid surveillance.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors and the vehicular shutter.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light, and fixtures must not be positioned where they may provide climbing aids up to high level windows/balconies. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

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4.8 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

  Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

  Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

  The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: the external entrance off Back Piccadilly, the ground floor car park and the entrance of it, all lift/stair lobbies on each floor and the bridge link at third floor level.

4.9 Other

- Each guest bedroom should have a small wall or floor safe, operated by a personal identification number (PIN) selected by each new guest.
- The cycle store within the ground floor car park should include stands that allow staff/guests to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: http://designforsecurity.org/downloads
- A strategy should be prepared to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- There should be no hard landscaping or features of the building that could inadvertently create sheltered/hiding places, ledges, seating or loitering spots. These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.
- Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows/balconies.

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5 Physical Security (Retail)

5.1 Doors

- ❑ The external doorsets should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

- ❑ Any back-of-house/staff areas within the retail units should not be publicly accessible. Internal doors to storage rooms/offices should be solid-core and self-closing - fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with keys (carried by staff only if required for duties and accounted for at all times). Any cash office should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false/suspended ceilings and a security-certified doorset (see above). Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

5.2 Windows & Shutters

- ❑ All windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.

- ❑ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

- ❑ The shopfronts should be secured with shutters out-of-hours. The shutters themselves should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Shutters should either be provided internally or, if they are to be externally mounted, shutter boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building (where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage).

5.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ❑ All glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

- ❑ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any cladding to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from external ground level, to ensure that the building fabric itself is not vulnerable to attack.

- ❑ The glazed elevations of the retail units should be protected by anti-ram bollards or re-enforced steel risers, to deter against ram-raid type attacks.

5.4 Alarms

- ❑ A comprehensive intruder alarm system should be installed to cover each of the units, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (i.e. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre, who will alert the key holder or a security patrol team).

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5.5 Lighting

- ❑ External lighting must be provided to the entrances of the units, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.

- ❑ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light, and fixtures must not be positioned where they may provide climbing aids up to high level windows/balconies. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

5.6 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ❑ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

- ❑ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

- ❑ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

- ❑ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

  Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

  Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ❑ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: the main entrances to each unit and all sales counters/till positions.

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6 Internal Layout Guidance for Retail Units

The internal layout of the retail units should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their units once complete, and therefore, the end-users requirements. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

6.1.1 Clear views should also remain from the premises through to the public realm, i.e. large promotional signs should not obstruct views.

6.1.2 Careful consideration should be given to the location of paypoints to ensure that staff have full surveillance over the entrances to the units.

6.1.3 Any internal product displays should be aligned to assist surveillance from pay points and avoid blind-spots. There should be no items of high-value displayed close to the entrances of the units.

6.1.4 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any tills, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.

6.1.5 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 5.1) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

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7 Management & Maintenance

7.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the hotel must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the development. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made east for people to raise concerns or report observations.

7.1.2 The opening hours of the retail units should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses. An operating/maintenance plan for the retail units should also be prepared, which focuses on issues such as:

- Opening and closing of the retail units, including staff arrival and departure;
- Cash storage/management within the premises;
- Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices;
- Management of stock deliveries and waste collection;
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access controls, lighting, alarm system, CCTV cameras etc; and
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc.

7.1.3 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, projectors, flat screen monitors/televisions, tools, portable gym equipment etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

7.1.4 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.

7.1.5 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to certain areas.

8 Construction

8.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

8.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

9 Useful References

9.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

9.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
22nd July 2016	Street Design Partnership	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
23rd to 25th July 2016	Street Design Partnership	Email correspondence re: fee
26th July 2016	Street Design Partnership	Confirmation of instruction & fee
3rd August 2016	Street Design Partnership	Email correspondence re: progress & timescales
22nd August 2016	Street Design Partnership	Email correspondence re: progress & payment
24th August 2016	GMP Finance Dept.	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
PS100	LOCATION PLAN	29.06.16	-
PS102	PROPOSED GROUND,FIRST & SECOND FLOOR PLANS	29.06.16	-
PS103	PROPOSED THIRD,FOURTH & FIFTH FLOOR PLANS	29.06.16	-
PS104	PROPOSED SIXTH & ROOF FLOOR PLANS	29.06.16	-
PS105	PROPOSED LITTLE LEVER STREET & BACK PICCADILLY ELEVATIONS	29.06.16	-
PS106	PROPOSED CAVELL STREET ELEVATION	29.06.16	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999
General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for doorsets and windows, which certifies that a particular doorset is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012
General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)
Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)
Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012
Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011
Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT
Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS
Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT
Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)
A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)
A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)
The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org
CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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