Crime Impact Statement

- 86 North Street, Cheetham, Manchester
- Education



Greater Manchester Police

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Contents

Summarative Evaluation 3

Contact Register 3

Document Register 3

Introduction 4

PART A – Analysis of the Site

1.0 The Proposal 5

2.0 Site Analysis 5

3.0 Crime Issues at this Location 6

4.0 Security Considerations 9

5.0 General Design Considerations 9

6.0 Site/Development Specific Design Considerations 14

PART B – Assessment of the Development

1.0 Description of the Development 16

2.0 Assessment Criteria 16

2.1 Design & Layout 16

2.2 Physical Security 17

2.3 Management & Maintenance 20

2.4 Construction 21

3.0 Secured By Design (SBD) 21

4.0 Conclusions 22

APPENDICES

A1 Glossary of Crime Types 23

A2 Considerate Constructors Scheme 24

Summarative Evaluation

This scheme is consistent with the current principles and standards of CPTED, subject to the points within this report being included in the scheme.

Contact Register

Date of Contact	Summary of Contact
22nd December 2009	Initial enquiry from agent re: CIS
23rd December 2009	Receipt of CIS instruction form
29th December 2009	Receipt of plans
10th – 11th January 2010	E-mail correspondence with agent re: details of the scheme

Document Register

The analysis of the proposals is based on the following documents submitted by the developer:

Document/Drawing Reference Number	Document/Drawing Title
2619-03 Rev. B	Proposed Ground Floor Plan
2619-04 Rev. B	Proposed First Floor Plan
2619	Layout of Car Park

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

Introduction

This Crime Impact Statement:

- Has been produced by the Greater Manchester Police Design for Security consultancy, a professional organisation independent of the design process.
- Highlights crime and disorder issues in the vicinity of the development.
- Assesses the development in terms of its likely effect on crime and disorder in the area.
- Identifies design solutions based on analysis of the crime issues in the area that will reduce the proposals vulnerability to crime.
- Helps an applicant to adapt a development to avoid/reduce the adverse affects of crime and disorder.
- Allows Local Planning Authorities (LPAs) to use the information to make better decisions and enable the planning process to run more smoothly.
- Helps to allay public fears about a development that are often brought about by a lack of information and create goodwill on behalf of the developer.

Part A – Analysis of the Site

1.0 The Proposal

The proposal is to change the use of the existing building from offices to an educational facility, with an ancillary car park in front of the building.

2.0 Site Analysis



- The site is located on the east side of North Street, to the north of the junction with Peel Lane. The site itself is occupied by a large office/business unit called 'The Tube', which is currently unoccupied. There is also an enclosed car park at the front of the building.
- There is a sub-station at the north-western corner of the site and to the north is a wholesale distributors, beyond which is the Manchester Fort Retail Park. To the east are a number of industrial/warehouse/commercial units, along with a Christian Centre at the junction of North Street and Broughton Street.
- Again, there are a number of commercial units to the south of the site and Fairholme caravan site lies to the east (accessed off Collingham Street), beyond which is a dismantled railway and open land leading to the River Irk.
- In terms of the wider area, there is a Metrolink Depot approx. 600m to the north-east of the site and Strangeways Prison lies approx. 600m to the west of the site. Manchester City Centre lies approx. 1½km to the south.

3.0 Crime Issues at this Location

The graph below illustrates the number of crimes recorded in the period 1st December 2008 and 1st December 2009 in a grid area centred on the site, measuring approximately 1km^2 (please see Appendix 1 for a description of each of the crime types).



As can be seen from the graph above, the most prevalent types of crime in the area are vehicle crime (79 theft from and 50 theft of) and burglary other (61). The majority of crimes in the area occur along the main arterial route of Cheetham Hill Road, around the retail park to the north and on the streets to the west (around/off Broughton Street), south-west (around/off Stanley Street/Stocks Street) and south (around/off Collingham Street/Back Bank Street/Honey Street and Roger Street/Fernie Street) of the site.





As can be seen from the graphs above, an analysis of the existing crime levels in the area over the last 12 months shows an increased risk of burglary other on Wednesdays and at the weekend (Friday to Sunday). There also appears to be a trend of increased risk in the early hours of the morning.



The graph above shows that the majority of burglary other incidents in the area have been carried out through doors and shutters. The charts shown below show a relatively even spread of vehicle crime incidents throughout the week, with an increased risk in the afternoon.





In terms of the more immediate area around the site itself, there have been a number of recorded crimes within the last 12 months including, most notably:

- Burglary other (including forcing/removing shutters/doors, using plant to damage building fabric, removing barbed wire from top of boundary fencing, removing window frames/bars, access gained via flat roof, smashing panel in door, cutting wiring to electric shutter/alarm, forcing lock on container, access gained via insecure loading bay door);
- Theft of/from motor vehicle (parked on street and on car parks); and

- Miscellaneous thefts (including theft from secured compound, theft of trailers, theft of cash/mobile phone).

These mirror the trends shown within the wider area.

4.0 Security Considerations

The typical security issues for a development of this nature are:

- Acts of theft and criminal damage during the construction period.
- Burglary.
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles.
- Theft of/from parked vehicles.
- Violence towards staff.
- Unauthorised access to grounds/building/staff areas.
- Theft of personal belongings (students and staff).
- Loitering/nuisance/anti-social behaviour.
- Arson.
- Cycle thefts.

5.0 General Design Considerations

The seven attributes of safer places are contained within *'Safer Places – The Planning System and Crime Prevention'*, a planning guidance document issued by the Home Office and the ODPM (now the DCLG) for England and referenced by Planning Policy Statement 1. All seven general attributes, listed below, align with the general principles of CPTED and SBD. They should be considered and applied to the detailed design of the development:

Access & Movement

Places with well defined and well used routes with spaces and entrances that provide for convenient movement without compromising security. Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if:

- Pedestrian routes are poorly lit, indirect and away from traffic;
- Streets, footpaths and alleyways provide access to the rear of buildings;
- There are several ways into and out of an area – providing potential escape routes for criminal activity;
- It is easy for people to become lost or disorientated; streets and spaces are unwelcoming or underused by capable guardians.

A good movement framework has direct routes that lead people safely to the places they want to go by whatever means – on foot, by bike or on public transport. Layouts based on main routes and shared spaces reduce the need for underused alleyways, shortcuts and minor access points that can become vulnerable to or facilitate crime. The consequences of the number and type of connections in this setting need to be carefully considered.

Structure

Places that are structured so that different uses do not cause conflict. Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if:

- Buildings and private/communal spaces have a large number of sides exposed to the public realm;
- The way that buildings streets and spaces are laid out allow criminals to move around and operate undetected;
- A places tends to bring together people who are likely to offend and suitable targets;
- Capable guardians are not present;

- Places become derelict or underused;
- Under and unused buildings and spaces that have become vulnerable to crime are not remodelled or removed.

A safe and legible urban structure has a well-defined and clearly understood movement framework and good quality, well-used public spaces that support surveillance. Pedestrians need well-lit and clearly defined routes linking areas of activity and key destinations. A legible layout lessens the need to depend on signs to find one's way around. It enables people to read their surroundings and the way ahead in order to detect dangers and warning signs.

Surveillance

Places where all publicly accessible spaces are overlooked. Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if:

- Criminals can operate, including travelling to and from the location, without fear of being seen;
- Criminals or their activities do not attract attention – or they are confident that no one will take any action;
- All sides of buildings and all parts of spaces are not overlooked by surrounding users or passers-by;
- Buildings and spaces are not designated to allow surveillance 'outside' from 'inside' and vice versa.

Clear sightlines and good visibility allow people to see where they are going and make a reasonable choice of routes. This has a significant impact on feeling and being safe. In areas designed for use after dark, visibility depends on effective lighting. Well-designed lighting increases the opportunity for surveillance at night, sends positive messages about the management of an area, and enhances the aesthetics of the night-time environment.

Ownership

Places that promote a sense of ownership, respect, territorial responsibility and community. Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if:

- It is unclear whether space is public or private, and what behaviour is expected in each;
- Private space is easily accessible to people who have no right to be there;
- An offender's presence in the area does not attract attention;
- A place feels like it is not under supervision of local residents, businesses, organisations or other users.

Encouraging residents and tenants to feel a sense of ownership and responsibility for their surroundings can make an important contribution to crime prevention. Uncertainty of ownership can reduce responsibility and increase the likelihood of crime and antisocial behaviour going unchallenged. Alternatively, when responsibility and ownership are high, there is a feeling that crime is more likely to be detected and responded to.

Physical Protection

Places that include necessary, well-designed security features. Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if:

- The target hardening measures (for example the doors, windows and gates recommended for 'Secured By Design' (SBD) accreditation) are not selected to be appropriate to the building and to the crime risk faced, or are not integrated, installed or used properly;
- It is easy to enter and exit properties illegally;
- It is easy to remove property.

Physical protection involves measures that make it more difficult to commit offences and instil a feeling of safety in users. It includes active security measures (such as locks, doors, windows, and glazing) that aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture. It is important that this is done in a balanced way by employing methods that reasonably secure a place without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

Activity

Places where the level of human activity is appropriate to the location and creates a reduced risk of crime and a sense of safety at all times. Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if:

- An area is either very quiet or very busy, depending on the local context and the type of crime;
- Different groups of people feel that there is nothing to do;
- Criminals can go about their business unnoticed;
- Places become devoid of activity at certain times of the day or night, whilst remaining accessible to offenders;
- Potential offenders and/or victims are concentrated in the same place at the same time, such as bus stops, taxi ranks, or fast food outlets after pubs close or areas of the town centre throughout the evening.

Crime can be deterred through the 'eyes on the street' of people going about their everyday business. However, too much activity risks anonymity and can also lead to increases in the opportunity to commit particular types of crime, such as pick-pocketing, and anti-social behaviour. Decisions about which levels and types of activity are appropriate need to be made for the local context.

Management and Maintenance

Places that are designed with management and maintenance in mind, to discourage crime in the present and the future. Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if:

- Places are untidy or unattractive, giving the impression of not being cared for or that crime and disorder is tolerated;
- Signs of disorder and neglect, such as broken windows, abandoned vehicles or graffiti are not removed at the earliest opportunity;
- An organised human presence (such as police, security guards, street wardens or concierges) is absent.

The overall quality of the environment and its upkeep can influence both the perception and reality of safety and security. A good quality, attractive public space that is perceived as well maintained and cared for by its owners and its users improves its overall image, encourages greater use, promotes greater respect for the environment and reduces the likelihood of crime or vandalism.

6.0 Site/Development Specific Design Considerations

The above general measures/principles should be considered in the detailed design of the development. In terms of the layout of the development, the following site/development specific issues are highlighted at this stage and need to be addressed in the final design:

- The location of the existing building, although not far from the busier Cheetham Hill Road, is within an area predominantly commercial in nature, where activity and surveillance opportunities are limited in the evenings and at weekends. This may leave the building itself and the students attending the centre (particularly early in the morning and late at night) vulnerable.

- The number of entrances into the site should be reduced to the minimum practicable in order to more effectively control and overlook who is entering and leaving the site. If the boundary/gates enclosing the front of the site are to be replaced, there should be robust enough to withstand scaling, penetrating or damaging them.
- Procedures for dealing with visitors are vitally important, not only to the security but to the culture and image of the centre. Being able to identify and challenge an intruder is key to any security. The main entrance to the centre should be adequately controlled to prevent unauthorized access.
- Appropriate physical security measures should be incorporated to protect the building and its contents at night or when it is not in use.
- The internal layout of the building should be simple, avoiding any hidden areas and pinch points in circulation, especially where high footfall is expected at certain times of the day.
- Any landscaping features (hard or soft) should not impede natural surveillance of/from the building and car park or reduce the effectiveness of any CCTV system. Future soft landscaping growth and maintenance must be taken into account at the design stage.
- A successful lighting scheme deters and reveals potential intruders and reduces the fear of crime. Lighting levels should be good, but not oppressive, evenly distributed, allow clear colour rendition (supporting any CCTV system) and avoid light spillage.
- All entrances and circulation areas (both inside and out), as well as the car park, should be covered a CCTV system monitored either on-site or remotely, allowing an immediate response to any incidents recorded.

Given the existing crime levels in the area, it is highly recommended that the development is designed and constructed to 'Secured by Design' (SBD) standards (please see www.securedbydesign.com for more information and general design guides).

Part B – Assessment of the Development

1.0 Description of the Development

The proposal is to change the use of the existing building from multi-occupancy office space to a learning centre for IT Management and Accountancy, for UK and overseas students. The centre will be open from 7am to 10pm Monday to Friday. There will be 10 full-time and 2 part-time members of staff and the centre will accommodate a maximum of 200 students at any one time. The rear warehouse area will be used as storage and there are no external works proposed to the existing building.

2.0 Assessment Criteria

2.1 Design & Layout

- If the boundary fencing/gates enclosing the car park and the front elevation of the building are to be replaced, I would highly recommend the use of high security welded-wire mesh fencing i.e. '358' type fencing (please see www.securedbydesign.com for SBD licensed companies/products), to a minimum height of 2400mm. Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels. The hinges/locking mechanism of the gates should not provide footholds and the gap at the bottom of the gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through. The fencing/gates should also be located away from any other climbing aids, such as low walls or street lights etc.

- There should be a reception desk adjacent to the main entrance, which should be staffed at all times when the building is in use. A high, wide reception desk increases the distance between staff and any potential aggressive visitors and aids surveillance of all parts of the entrance lobby. A personal attack alarm should be provided at the reception desk, which activates a loud alarm at the scene. The activation of the alarm may well shock and disorientate visitors and clearly signals that assistance has

been requested. There should also be a secure room behind reception for staff to retreat into, in the event of an incident.

- I would also highly recommend the use of an access control system within the main lobby of the building (e.g. a barrier/turn-style system with swipe/fob access for staff and students – as seen at other university/college buildings, libraries etc. within Manchester) to prevent unauthorised access into the learning centre. All visitors should report to reception for vetting before gaining access into the building.
- It is preferable to have cycle lockers for staff and students to use. If not, there should be 'sheffield' style racks provided in a highly visible location (i.e. overlooked from the building itself). Recent research by the 'Design Against Crime' Centre suggests that cyclists should be encouraged to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand rather than just the crossbar and, therefore, a design of cycle stand that enables this method of locking is recommended (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable).
- The bin store should be fully enclosed and lockable so that the bins are not vulnerable to attack, ideally away from the building to deter arson.

2.2 Physical Security

- Although it is appreciated that the proposed scope of works is unlikely to include external alterations, I would make the following recommendations if some elements are to be replaced, either as part of the proposed redevelopment or in the future:
  - Any new glazing at ground floor level/easily accessible from ground floor level should be laminated to a minimum thickness of 7.5mm (with a minimum 'pvb interlayer' thickness of 1.5mm – the material that bonds the glazing together), on at least one pane in a double-glazed unit.
  - Any new windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS 7950 (securely fixed in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications). All ground floor/accessible windows should be fitted with opening restrictors (to a maximium opening width of 100mm) and lockable handles (unless windows are used for

escape). All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of BS 7950, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.

- Any new external doorsets should be certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 (SR) 2 and have at least two-point locking to each leaf (with BSI Kitemark tested and approved cylinders and securely fixed in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications). All fire doors/frames should have no external ironmongery and should be alarmed (audible upon opening).
- If the load bay door is to be replaced, it should also be certified to LPS 1175.

- The ground floor windows/doors should be protected by grilles, shutters or security blinds, certified to LPS 1175, when the building is not in use. I would also like to see the front elevation of the building protected by anti-ram bollards (certified to LPS 1246 or BS PAS 68) or similar to deter against ram raid type attacks. The loading bay door should be protected by retractable bollards.

- It is unclear whether the warehouse portion of the building will be used as storage by the learning centre or by a separate tenant. The internal walls between the two portions of the building must be robust (ideally solid masonry) to ensure that unauthorized access cannot be easily gained from one into the other.

- A suitable monitored alarm system should be installed covering the entire building, including any fire exits, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room. The system should comply with the current version of the BS EN 50131-1 standard (minimum Grade 3). The alarm itself should have two secure signaling paths (one being GSM radio back-up). If either signaling path is tampered with by an intruder, or is faulty, the ARC will be alerted and the relevant emergency services, or authorized keyholder, will be called. If either is interfered with by an intruder, the other continues to monitor for any further alarms and transmits them as 'confirmed activations' – extra confirmation that an intruder is on the premises and that the alarm isn't false.

- The car park, the main entrance to the building and all circulation spaces, both inside and out, should be covered by a CCTV system, monitored either on-site (by reception/security staff) or off-site (in a security control room), to allow an immediate response to any incidents recorded. Any CCTV system should be maintained and operated in accordance with the relevant British Standard (BS 7958) and recording equipment should be stored in a secure area, with access restricted to authorised staff only.

- Lighting should be provided to the exterior of the building, particularly to all parking areas and building entrances, to an adequate and uniform level (as defined within BS 5489), so as not to allow any areas of pooling/shadowing and support any CCTV system.

- All internal doors/frames to classrooms, offices and stores should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a 5 lever mortice deadlock (to BS 3621/EN 12209), so that the rooms can be secured when unoccupied. Stud partition walls can be significantly strengthened with the use of high impact gypsum boards. It is also recommended that the building is capable of being 'zoned', to prevent access to other floors/rooms when a portion of it is being used outside of normal hours.

- Toilets can give rise to crime and anti-social behaviour issues and the following issues should be considered:
    - Avoid areas where items such as drug paraphernalia can be hidden (e.g. suspended ceilings). Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work, etc. should be used. Services where possible should be accessed from outside the facility.
    - Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
    - Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening. This will aid gaining access to collapsed persons. Opaque panels can be used to great effect to ensure no persons are collapsed inside, whilst preserving privacy. This measure discourages drug taking and facilitates staff checks. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and the top of the door.

- Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
- Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karabiner style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
- Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built-in visited/checked chart should be provided.

- The use of signage is important in preventing unauthorised access into and around the development. Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to certain areas.

2.3 Management & Maintenance

- All high value equipment (e.g. computers, projectors, flat screen monitors/televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

- Any proposed vegetation around the front of the building should be kept to a maximum height of 1000mm and any foliage to trees should be at a height exceeding 2000mm, so as not to create potential hiding places for would-be criminals to exploit or impede natural surveillance of/from the building or any parked vehicles.

- The physical security measures/CCTV systems recommended above should be regularly maintained and repaired/replaced immediately if faulty, in order to ensure the safety and security of the development and it's users.

- Cleaning, removal of graffiti and repair of damage arising from vandalism should be carried out quickly in order to maintain a culture of care and respect. A lack of maintenance often attracts further abuse.

2.4 Construction

Careful consideration should be given to securing the site during construction, to prevent unauthorized access and theft of equipment. For more information, please contact the local Crime Reduction Adviser (details below).

Name of local CRA(s):	Denis Brogan
Contact Telephone No(s):	0161 856 3560

Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. We recommend the preferred contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme' (see Appendix 2), who maintain responsibility for a tidy area around their site.

3.0 Secured By Design (SBD)

SBD is a police initiative to encourage the building industry to adopt sensible security measures in the design and construction of developments to assist in reducing the opportunity for crime and the fear of crime, creating a safer and more secure environment. Developers who gain SBD accreditation also benefit from a significant marketing opportunity and are entitled to use the official SBD logo in their literature and advertising – the police award for incorporating design, layout and security measures that are conducive to community safety. More information about the application process and SBD licensed companies/products, as well as the application forms themselves, can be found at www.securedbydesign.com or www.designforsecurity.org.

4.0 Conclusions

This development has been assessed against and is consistent with the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), thus reducing the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The scheme will not achieve full SBD accreditation without a more comprehensive redevelopment of the site and the existing building. Nevertheless, we are happy to endorse this development, subject to the above measures being incorporated into the proposed scope of works.

designforsecurity
Consultant

Bradley Hart MTCP

Appendices

A1 Glossary of Crime Types

SOURCE: Home Office

Arson

Deliberately destroying or damaging property by fire.

Burglary in a dwelling

Burglary in a dwelling

Where an offender enters a dwelling as a trespasser to steal, rape or commit grievous bodily harm.

Aggravated burglary in a dwelling

Where an offender, armed with a firearm, weapon or explosive, enters a dwelling as a trespasser to steal, rape or commit grievous bodily harm.

Burglary in a building other than a dwelling

Burglary in a building other than in a dwelling

Where an offender enters a building other than a dwelling as a trespasser to steal, rape or commit grievous bodily harm.

Aggravated burglary in a building other than a dwelling

Where an offender, armed with a firearm, weapon or explosive, enters a building other than a dwelling to steal, rape or commit grievous bodily harm.

Criminal damage

Criminal damage to a dwelling

Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging somebody else's home.

Racially or religiously aggravated criminal damage to a dwelling

Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging somebody else's home, where there is a racial or religious motive to the offence.

Criminal damage to a building other than a dwelling

Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging a building that belongs to someone else.

Racially or religiously aggravated criminal damage to a building other than a dwelling

Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging a building that belongs to someone else, where there is a racial or religious motive to the offence.

Criminal damage to a vehicle

Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging a vehicle that belongs to someone else.

Racially or religiously aggravated criminal damage to a vehicle

Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging a vehicle that belongs to someone else, where there is a racial or religious motive to the offence.

Other criminal damage

Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging items, excluding dwellings, buildings or vehicles that belong to someone else (not counted elsewhere).

Racially or religiously aggravated other criminal damage

Deliberately, or recklessly, destroying or damaging items, excluding dwellings, buildings or vehicles that belong to someone else (not counted elsewhere), where there is a racial or religious motive to the offence.

Threat or possession with intent to commit criminal damage

Threatening or causing someone to fear that his or her property might be damaged; or possessing anything, without lawful excuse, intended to cause damage.

Less serious wounding

Less serious wounding (including any minor injury)

Maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm, with or without a weapon; also assaulting someone and causing him or her actual bodily harm.

Racially or religiously aggravated other wounding

Maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm, with or without a weapon; also assaulting someone and causing him or her actual bodily harm, where there is a racial or religious motive to the offence.

Common assault (includes some minor injury)

Common assault (no injury)

Assaulting another person where the victim receives a minor injury or, as of 2002/03, no injury.

Racially or religiously aggravated common assault

Assaulting another person where the victim receives no injury and there is a racial or religious motive to the offence.

Miscellaneous theft

Theft from the person

Stealing property from another person, with intent to permanently deprive him or her of it.

Theft from shops

Stealing, with intent to permanently deprive, from retail premises (i.e. shoplifting).

Theft by an employee

Stealing from one's employer, with intent to permanently deprive the employer.

Theft or unlawful taking of mail

Unlawfully taking away or opening a mailbag.

Proceeds of crime

Concealing, disguising, converting, transferring or removing property obtained through criminal activity (i.e. money laundering).

Abstracting electricity

Dishonestly using, wasting or diverting electricity, without authority.

Other theft or unauthorised taking

Stealing not classified elsewhere.

Handling stolen goods

Dishonestly receiving or handling goods, knowing or believing them to be stolen.

Robbery

Robbery of personal property

The actual or threatened use of force during or immediately before the theft of personal property.

Robbery of business property

The actual or threatened use of force during or immediately before the theft of property belonging to a business.

Serious wounding

More serious wounding or other act endangering life

Viciously intending to cause grievous bodily harm to another person.

Theft from a motor vehicle

Theft from a vehicle

Where there is intent to steal from a vehicle rather than drive it away.

Vehicle interference and tampering

Interfering with a vehicle, its contents or anything carried in it.

Theft in dwelling

Theft from an automatic machine or meter

Stealing money from a meter in a dwelling.

Theft in a dwelling other than from an automatic machine or meter

Stealing property from a dwelling where the thief has not trespassed to gain entry

Theft of a motor vehicle

Theft or unauthorised taking of a motor vehicle

Stealing a motor vehicle, with intent to permanently deprive the owner of it.

Aggravated vehicle taking

Stealing a motor vehicle, with intent to permanently deprive the owner of it, and driving that vehicle dangerously, or consequently causing injury or damage to property, including to the vehicle.

Theft of a Pedal Cycle

Theft or unauthorised taking of a pedal cycle

Stealing a bicycle, with intent to permanently deprive the owner of it.

A2 Considerate Constructors Scheme

SOURCE:

www.consideratecontructorsscheme.org.uk

Code of Practice for the Scheme

1. ***Considerate***

All work is to be carried out with positive consideration to the needs of traders and businesses, site personnel and visitors, and the general public. Special attention is to be given to the needs of those with sight, hearing and mobility difficulties.

2. ***Environment***

Be aware of the environmental impact of your site and minimise as far as possible the effects of noise light and air pollution. Efforts should be made to select and use local resources wherever possible. Attention should be paid to waste management. Reuse and recycle materials where possible.

3. ***Cleanliness***

The working site is to be kept clean and in good order at all times. Site facilities, offices, toilets and drying rooms should always be maintained to a good standard. Surplus materials and rubbish should not be allowed to accumulate on the site or spill over into the surroundings. Dirt and dust from construction operations should be kept to a minimum.

4. ***Good Neighbour***

General information regarding the Scheme should be provided for all neighbours affected by the work. Full and regular communication with neighbours, including adjacent residents, traders and businesses, regarding programming and site activities should be maintained from pre-start to completion.

5. ***Respectful***

Respectable and safe standards of dress should be maintained at all times. Lewd or derogatory behaviour and language should not be tolerated under threat of severe disciplinary action. Pride in the management and appearance of the site and the surrounding environment is to be shown at all times. Operatives should be instructed in dealing with the general public.

6. ***Safe***

Construction operations and site vehicle movements are to be carried out with care and consideration for the safety of site personnel, visitors and the general public. No building activity should be a security risk to others.

7. ***Responsible***

Ensure that everyone associated with the site understands implements and complies with this code.

8. ***Accountable***

The Considerate Constructors Scheme poster is to be displayed where clearly visible to the general public. A site's contact details should be obvious to anyone affected by its activities.